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In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in Xenophon as a historian, 
literary artist, and political philosopher.  However, scholarly research on the Poroi—the 
only work of political economy to survive from antiquity—has been minimal.  To date, 
no book-length, synoptic analysis of the text exists.  This dissertation contributes 
significantly to filling this lacuna in the scholarship while also serving to enhance our 
understanding of fourth-century Athenian political discourse and ideology, finance, and 
economics.  
I argue that the Poroi is a unique anti-imperialistic discourse that aims to 
demonstrate the ways in which the Athenians can maintain themselves financially 
without exploiting other states.  While Xenophon’s objectives of alleviating the poverty 
of the Athenians and increasing their revenues are conventional, the means by which he 
intends to achieve these goals are innovative.  Unlike his contemporaries, Xenophon 
recommends employing financial resources derived not from empire but rather from 
 vii  
peaceful economic activities.  Specifically, I conte d that the Poroi boldly challenges the 
parasitic, consumer-based orientation of Athens’ imperial economy by proposing 
practical measures meant to transform Athens into a center of silver mining, manufacture, 
and free commercial exchange.  Xenophon’s vision for Athens’ new economy, I submit, 
even displays features of modern rational capitalism.  To advance this argument, I adopt a 
contextualist approach that situates Xenophon’s ideas both in the immediate historical 
milieu of fourth-century Athens and within the history of economic and political thought.  
I am therefore able to highlight the points of contact between the Poroi and subsequent 
developments in the history of ideas and thus to underscore the groundbreaking aspects 
of Xenophon’s political economy.      
My study parts company with previous interpretations i  two fundamental ways.  
First, Xenophon’s attempt to improve the financial ondition of the Athenians stems from 
a desire not to promote or to retard the political activity of the people but to eliminate the 
injustice of Athenian imperialism.  Second, his program to stimulate the Athenian 
economy necessarily entails the development of the productive forces of Attica.  In brief, 
such a radical transformation of Athenian fiscal and economic practices represents 
nothing short of a “reorientation” of Athenian political economy.  
 viii  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Preface: Text and Context 
 
“Sir, At length the War, which has been carry’d on f r so many Years, with such 
Expense of Blood, and Treasure to the Nation, is at an End; and we have the fairest 
Prospect imaginable of a lasting Peace…”1  So begins Walter Moyle’s preface to the first 
English translation of Xenophon’s Poroi (1697), a work dedicated to the gifted economist 
Charles Davenant (1656-1714), who served as England’s Commissioner of Excise (1683-
1689) and Inspector General of Exports and Imports (1705-1714).  The war to which 
Moyle refers is the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97), which had bankrupted the 
exchequer and brought English commerce to a virtual standstill for nearly a decade.  For 
Moyle, the time had come for the country to enjoy a “lasting peace” and to become “Rich 
and Happy, by the improvement of…Navigation, and the increase of Trade: For tis to 
Trade we owe the Rise and Progress of the English Greatness…”  
To this End, I present you [Davenant] with a Transltion of the Discourse 
of Xenophon upon the Subject of Revenue and Trade…one of the greatest 
Men that Antiquity ever produc’d, and the only ancient Author upon this 
Subject, which is now extant.  You will admire the Force and Solidity of 
his Observations, the Exactness of his Calculations, the justness, and 
freedom of his Thoughts, not confin’d to the narrow Notions of Parties 
and Factions, and the vigour of his Judgment and Eloquence at so great an 
Age.  The general Rules for the Increase of Riches and Trade, are either 
directly advanc’d, or may be very naturally deduc’d from this Discourse.  
That admirable Maxim That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, 
consists in Numbers of People, well emply’d, is every where inculcated 
throughout the whole Course of the Treatise.  And I believe Xenophon 
was the first Author that ever argu’d by Political Arithmetick, or the Art of 
Reasoning upon things by Figures, which has been improv’d by some able 
                                                
1 Moyle 1697: 3-4.  The translation was also appended to Devanant’s Discourses on the Publick Revenues 
and on the Trade of England (1698). 
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Heads of our own Nation, and carry’d to the highest Perfection by your 
successful Inquiries.2   
 
As we learn a year later from Davenant’s Discourses on Public Revenues and on the 
Trade of England, Moyle actually translated the Poroi at the economist’s request: 
Davenant desired “to shew the public, how ancient the true notions were, concerning 
public revenues and trade” so that whatever he himself advanced in his treatise could “be 
examined and tried by this standard.”3  Davenant was so thoroughly impressed with 
Moyle’s translation, which includes a short but still-useful commentary, that he offered 
the text as an “example” to the young aspiring state men of his day in the hope that it 
would incite them “to study the business of trade, and the revenues of their country.”   
To the best extent of our knowledge, this was the first and only time since 
Xenophon originally published the work in 355/4 B.C. that the Poroi was invoked 
seriously as a model for improving the financial and economic situation of a state.  
Though separated by two millennia of history replete with radical political and economic 
changes, Davenant and Moyle found common cause with Xenophon.  They considered 
the Poroi a useful text in the promotion of a new economic policy in the golden age of 
mercantilism.  As it had been for Xenophon in the aft rmath of the Social War, financial 
and economic exhaustion, brought on by years of grievous war, suggested the need to 
pursue peace and to develop trade and commerce for the betterment of both private and 
public fortunes.4  For Davenant the Poroi is not so much a practical guide or template for 
                                                
2 Moyle 1697: 7-8. 
3 Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 149. 
4 For example, in a direct allusion to Poroi 5.12, Davenant remarks “how much the national stock 
encreases in time of peace, and impairs and grows less in time of war” (Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 
347); cf. “for as war consumes wealth, so peace restor  it” (353). 
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his own ways and means of augmenting state revenues and timulating trade; nowhere in 
his work does he advocate any of Xenophon’s proposals in the Poroi.5  Rather, Davenant 
found in Xenophon a farsighted thinker with similar ideological proclivities who helped 
him articulate a rejoinder to some of the most pernicious mercantilist trade policies of the 
day.6   
While some scholars deem Davenant a moderate mercantilist, he in fact appears 
to be one of the earliest advocates of free trade. To quote just one salient example of his 
free trade tendencies: “Trade is in its nature free, finds its own channel, and best directeth 
its own course: and all laws to give it rules and directions, and to limit and circumscribe 
it, may serve the particular ends of private men, but are seldom advantageous to the 
public.”7  At one notable point in his Discourses, he cites Poroi 3.2 to demonstrate how 
out of touch his contemporaries’ views were concerning trade:  
It is strange, Xenophon, so long ago, should see that exportation of 
bullion, in the way of Traffic, could not be prejudicial to a country; and 
yet that we, who are a trading nation, should startle a  it, to whom 
experience should have given better lights.  His words are, “And whereas 
in other trading cities merchants are forced to barter one commodity for 
another, in regard their coin is not current abroad; we abound not only in 
manufactures and products of our own growth, sufficient to answer the 
demands of all foreign traders; but in case they refused to export goods in 
return for their own, they may trade with us to advntage, by receiving 
                                                
5 It should be noted that Davenant does generally support the construction of merchant marines, which 
Xenophon recommends at 3.14 (e.g., Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 357).  However, unlike Xenophon, he 
does not advocate the public ownership and leasing of these ships as a way to increase public revenues.   
6 In the mercantilist worldview, the wealth of a nation was determined strictly by the current stock of g ld 
and silver bullion and/or coined money a country had in its possession.  Any reduction in that stock, 
especially through the exportation of money abroad t  pay for imports, was considered deleterious, whereas 
the importation of money through the selling of domestic goods was thought to be beneficial.  Trade was 
perceived as zero-sum—one country’s gain was another’s loss—a view that frequently led to costly wars s 
countries struggled to get the upper hand in the balance of trade (see, e.g., Devanant  [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 
352-3). 
7 Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 1, 98; cf. Vol. 1, 345-393. 
 4 
silver in exchange for them, which transported to any other market, would 
pass for more than they took it for at Athens.”8   
 
Though Athens had a distinct advantage over other countries in its possession of silver 
mines, thus affording some latitude in the exportation of its bullion abroad, Davenant 
nonetheless intimates that what made the city exceptional was its possession of export 
“manufactures,” which balanced losses of specie suffered through the importation of 
goods and necessities.  The lesson of the Poroi therefore is simple: the export of bullion 
to pay for imported goods, which are put into the srvice of production and 
manufacturing, is ultimately advantageous for a country.  
To many contemporary historians and classicists, whose views on the ancient 
economy are informed by the Weber-Hasebroek-Finley model, Davenant’s understanding 
of the Poroi as a kind of free-trade manifesto may seem to embody the worst kind of 
anachronistic tendencies of the old modernist school of thought.9  Yet Davenant wrote 
the Discourses almost two centuries before the Bücher-Meyer controve sy, which 
henceforth focused the study of the ancient economy n institutions rather than on 
ideas.10  Both substantivist and formalist historians continue to frame the debate in terms 
                                                
8 Devanant [1698] 1771: Vol. 2, 107. 
9 I borrow the locution “Weber-Hasebroek-Finley” from Runciman 1991: 351, who uses it to refer to the 
largely homogenous views these scholars held concerning the ancient economy—“that is, that the poleis 
had no economic policies as such and that their economic institutions, such as they were, were inextricably 
bound up with and subordinated to their political institutions (and attitudes).”  See note 11 below. 
10 The debate began when Karl Bücher (1893) claimed that the Greeks never transcended their “closed 
household economy” and progressed either to the “city economy” of the Middle Ages or to the “national 
economy” characteristic of the modern world.  Ed. Meyer countered by arguing that the idea of a “closed 
household economy” was an apropos description only for the early Greeks and that later periods in Greek 
economic history did correspond to those of modern Europe: “the seventh and sixth centuries correspond t  
the fourteenth and fifteenth in the modern world, the fifth corresponds to the sixteenth” (Meyer in Austin 
and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 5).  Hasebroek termed Bücher’s position the “primitivist view” and Meyer’s the 
“modernizing view” (Hasebroek in Pearson et al. 1957: 4).  The relevant texts of Bücher and Meyer ar  
collected in Finley 1979.  For brief discussions of the controversy and the primitivist-modernist debat , see 
Will 1954: 9-11 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 3-5.      
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of institutions, that is, the question of the existence or non-existence of an economy with 
integrated price-regulating markets.11  Indeed, the two camps agree on little else in spite 
of the sharp divide between them over the admissibility of applying economic concepts, 
theories, and models derived from the study of the modern, free-market economy to the 
ancient world.  However, the example of Davenant cautions against an excessive 
emphasis on institutions.  I argue that not all ideas have a “material existence” or are 
embedded in social, political, and economic practices and institutions.12  Long before 
free-market capitalism, price-regulating markets, and the industrial revolution, political 
philosophers and statesmen formulated ideas and concepts that were instrumental in 
occasioning the emergence of those very institutions.  Free trade, laissez-faire, the 
division of labor—to name only a few—all have a long history predating the triumph of 
capitalism in the western world.  Indeed, some of these ideas can be traced back to the 
ancient world, and as Davenant’s Discourses suggest, directly to Xenophon’s Poroi.13  
Davenant’s interest lies not in understanding the nature of the ancient Athenian economy, 
but rather in establishing “how ancient the true notions [of Xenophon] were.”  For him, 
                                                
11 Cartledge 2002a: 15 offers a succinct summary of the debate: “For the formalists, the ancient economy 
was a functionally segregated and independently instituted sphere of activity with its own profit 
maximizing, want-satisfying logic and rationality, less ‘developed’ no doubt than any modern economy but 
nevertheless recognizably similar in kind.  Substantivists, on the other hand, hold that the ancient economy 
was not merely less developed but socially embedded and politically overdetermined and so—by the 
standards of neoclassical economics—conspicuously conventional, irrational and status-ridden.  It is 
crucially important that this much more interesting and important substantivist-formalist debate should not 
be confused, as it often is, with the primitivist-modernizer debate.”  Integrated price-regulating markets—
that is, markets that are not only linked but also integrated  to such a degree that prices are set according to 
the laws of supply and demand—is also crucial to the debate (see Saller 2002: 254).  For introductions t  
the two approaches and recent developments in the modeling of the ancient economy, see also Vidal-
Naquet 1977: 5-18, Hopkins 1983, Burke 1992, Davies 1998, Morris in Finley 1999: ix-xxxvi and 2002, 
and Andreau 2002.   
12 The notion that all ideas and ideology have a “materi l existence” in the social, economic, and political 
practices of a people is the thesis of Althusser 1971: 165-70. 
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Xenophon’s ideas transcend time and place because they speak to his project of 
redirecting England’s commercial policy away from mercantilism to free trade.  
Davenant’s reading therefore encourages us to consider the Poroi from an ideational 
perspective and treat it as a serious work that addresses some of the perennial issues of 
political and economic thought.  
In this dissertation, I often go “beyond the text” and explore the points of contact 
between Xenophon and subsequent developments in thehistory of ideas to underscore the 
innovative aspects of Xenophon’s political economy.  At the same time, however, this 
dissertation is not merely a study of the Poroi’s Nachleben or of political theory, which 
treats texts in isolation of the historical factors that contributed to their production.14  
Rather, it is largely a work of intellectual history, which aims to elucidate Xenophon’s 
motives for composing the Poroi and to determine how this text functions within the 
political and intellectual culture of fourth-century Athens.  To that end, I adopt a 
contextualist approach, drawing on the work of histor ans from the Cambridge School, 
whose major exponent is Quentin Skinner.15  Unlike traditional contextualist approaches, 
which seek to establish the meaning of ideas by identifying the immediate political, 
economic, and social circumstances from which they originate, Skinner claims that 
ascertaining the “linguistic” conventions through which ideas are communicated also 
contributes significantly to determining the meaning of ideas.  Following the speech act 
                                                                                                                                      
13 For the contribution of the Greeks to the history f economic thought, see Spengler 1980, Meikle 1979 
and 1985, Lowry 1987 with full bibliography of previous scholarship. 
14 E.g., the approach of Leo Strauss, whose studies on Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, and Hiero 
make no attempt to understand them in the context of fourth-century Athenian political thought. 
15 Skinner’s seminal writings are collected in Tully ed. 1988; for a concise instruction to his methodolgy, 
see Tully’s essay in Tully ed. 1988.  For an application of Skinner’s approach in classical scholarship, see 
Ober 1998. 
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theory of the linguist John Austin, Skinner argues that all texts of a given period, to a 
greater or lesser extent, share the same linguistic commonplaces, such as vocabulary, 
grammar, syntax, and more importantly, assumptions, conceptions, and ideas about the 
world.  Once the historian has identified these shared ideological commonplaces, he/she 
is then able to argue why something was written and to ascertain the extent to which an 
author “[was] accepting and endorsing, or questioning and repudiating, or perhaps 
polemically ignoring, the prevailing assumptions and conventions of political debate.”16   
As a methodology, the “linguistic contextualism” pioneered by Skinner has much 
to recommend it, but a caveat is in order.  If “ideology is the language of politics,” as 
Skinner maintains, then it follows that all ideologies are reducible to their political 
contexts, a formulation that easily succumbs to the fallacy of reductionism.17  As stated 
above, not all ideas are embedded in contemporary institutions and practices.  Intelligent, 
perspicacious thinkers may subvert, innovate upon, and even transcend the conventional 
constraints of language and ideology.  Interestingly, Xenophon’s ideational “freedom” 
from the determinism of his political environment is what so impressed Moyle, who 
points to “the Force and Solidity of his Observations, the Exactness of his Calculations, 
the justness, and freedom of his Thoughts, not confin’d to the narrow Notions of Parties 
and Factions.”  If we were to overlook the Poroi’s place in the history of economic and 
political thought, we would potentially run the risk of missing some of Xenophon’s most 
ambitious and revolutionary ideas.  My contextualist methodology therefore entails going 
“beyond the text” to include the study of ideas outside the purview of an author’s 
                                                
16 Skinner 1978: xiii. 
17 See the critique of Diggins 1984  
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immediate historical context.  This nuanced approach yields many interesting discoveries 
for readers lacking specialized expertise in the ancient world, who may be struck by 
Xenophon’s prescience and imagination. 
 
1A. Review of Scholarship  
The esteem in which Moyle and Davenant held the Poroi was not contagious, for 
within a generation after their floruit Xenophon’s pamphlet was no longer a practical 
guide for statesmen and economists but a relic of the past—read for antiquarian purposes 
and appreciated only for the light it shed on fourth-century Athenian economic and fiscal 
policies.18  August Boeckh’s short but contentious study in Die Staatshaushaltung der 
Athener (1817) was the first scholarly treatment of the Poroi.  For the renowned historian 
of Athenian public finance, Xenophon’s recommendations are “airy speculations” 
“without foundation in reality.”19  He contends that it would have been “impossible” for 
them to achieve their purpose, which incidentally is a good thing in his opinion, because 
had the Athenians implemented Xenophon’s plan, “theprosperity of Athens would have 
been in imminent danger of being destroyed.”20  The only suggestion that is not “entirely 
objectionable” is Xenophon’s exhortation to peace.  Yet this idea is Isocrates’, which 
                                                
18 The Poroi is cited a few times in Hume’s antiquarian essay On the Populousness of Ancient Nations 
(1742) and once in On Civil Liberty (1752).  Like Davenant’s Discourses on the Publick Revenues, the 
Poroi was appended to the 1751 edition of William Petty’s Political Arithmetik (Lowry 1987: 49).  The 
only references I can find to the work in any major economist or political philosopher of the 19th century is 
in Says’ Treatise on Political Economy (1803) and in Marx’s Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen 
Ökonomie (1857-61) (see, for example, his sections on money).  However, this work was never meant to be 
published, as Marx wrote the manuscript as preparation for A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy (1859) and Capital (1867).  In the published edition of the latter work, all references to the Poroi 
were removed.  This lack of interest in the Poroi contrasts sharply with Xenophon’s other works, especially 
the Oeconomicus and Cyropaedia, which were still being read with great interest throughout the 19th 
century. 
19 Boeckh 1976: 605.     
20 Boeckh 1976: 603.        
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calls into question Xenophon’s originality as a thinker.  In fact, Boeckh maintains that 
Xenophon composed the work not due to his own initiative but under the direction of 
Eubulus, whose welfare policies catered to “the pernicious tendencies of the Athenian 
people.”21  His interpretation has been very influential, informing in one way or another 
all subsequent negative assessments of the Poroi down to this day.  For a number of 
commentators, Xenophon’s proposals are impractical and utopian.22  Some have 
followed Boeckh’s lead in viewing them as ill conceived and even potentially dangerous 
to Athens.23  Still others have traced his ideas to Isocrates, reasserted Eubulus’ influence, 
and deemed Xenophon a conventional, “foolish,” and “naïve” thinker.24 
These opinions, however, are not widely accepted, as a majority of classicists and 
historians hold the Poroi and its author in high regard.  To one group of scholars, 
Xenophon’s prescriptions are practical measures design d to usher in real political, 
economic, and fiscal change.25  Within this camp, many contend that Xenophon inspired 
Eubulus and not the other way around: for example, in the words of Cawkwell, “what 
                                                
21 Boeckh 1976: 608.       
22 Beloch 1967: Vol. III2 1, 452: “contains no single idea which could have be n practically realized;” 
Pöhlmann 1984: 245: “the entire project is utopian” d “an ideological daydream;” Oertel in Pöhlmann 
1984: 532: “castles in the air;” Breitenbach 1967: 1 60: “in many respects illusionary and partly utopian;” 
Bolkestein 1923: 126: “a utopian plan;” Glotz 1920: 48: “a chimerical project.” 
23 Schwahn 1931, Andreades 1933: 388-9, and Gauthier 1976: 164-7.  The comments of Mahaffy 1880: 
283-4 betray the influence of Boeckh: “It is hard to conceive a more dangerous and mischievous theory of 
finance…There is nothing commendable in the policy of the tract…” 
24 For Xenophon’s indebtedness to Eubulus, see Meyer 1884: Vol. 5, 280, Luccioni 1947: 281, and 
Delebecque 1957: 470-66; Schwahn 1931: 258-9 even argues that Eubulus was the author.  That Isocrates’ 
views on peace preceded Xenophon’s is maintained by Mathieu 1925: 181-5, Luccioni 1948: 205-6, 283, 
Delebecque 1957: 474-5, Bringmann 1965: 73, and Breitenbach 1967: 1754.  For expressions of 
Xenophon’s lack of originality and intelligence, see, for example, Müller 1971: 198-9: “feeble pamphlet;” 
Kanitz 1873: 19: “a boastful and foolish fellow;” Hopper 1961: 139: “In matters of economics this writer 
was more than a little naïve;” Gauthier 1976: 22: “[Xenophon] did not pass for having had intelligence or 
an exceptional imagination;” Sealey 1993 114: “Xenoph n did not have an original or distinct mind.” 
25 E.g., Von der Lieck 1933: 4-5, 53, Andreades 1933: 90, Hasebroek 1965: 25, Frolov 1973: 188, 
Runciman 1991: 351, and Doty 2003: 5-9. 
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Xenophon proposed, Eubulus enacted.”26  Some even posit the influence of Xenophon’s 
ideas on Lycurgus’ program for financial and economic recovery after Chaeronea and on 
the economic and fiscal changes of the Hellenistic era.27  Others are loathe to relegate 
Xenophon to an inferior status vis-à-vis Isocrates and stress Xenophon’s originality as a 
thinker.28  Even substantivist historians of the ancient economy see the Poroi as 
exceptional.29  Numerous commentators go still further in their accl im for the work, 
heralding Xenophon as a genuine economist who anticipa ed many modern developments 
in economic theory and practice.  A few quotations will illustrate these accolades. 
Charles Bastable, whose 1892 text on public finance continues to be relevant today, 
claims that of all classical works the Poroi comes the closest to a “scientific” treatment of 
finance.30  Jaeger calls Xenophon a “talented economist” whose recommendations are 
“entirely logical.”31  Though “Xenophon [is] no Adam Smith,” according to Runciman, 
he likewise agrees that his proposals are “eminently sensible in economic terms.”32  
Bresson too is convinced that Xenophon is “by no means ignorant of economic 
                                                
26 Cawkwell 1963: 56.  Cf. Andreades 1933: 390, de Romilly 1954: 340-6, Giglioni 1970: lvii-lviii, Frolov 
1973: 188, Gauthier 1976: 229-31, Burke 1984: 113-8 and 1992: 208, Garland 1987: 43, and Engen 1996: 
376-8. 
27 For the influence of Xenophon on Lycurgus, see Faraguna 1991: 289-380; that some of Xenophon’s 
ideas anticipate Hellenistic developments is noted by Préaux 1966, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, Austin-Vidal-
Naquet 1977: 362-3, Humphreys 1978: 138, and Finely 1999: 164. 
28 Thiel 1922: xxvi, Giglioni 1970: xxiii-xxiv, xxvi, xxviii, Higgins 1977: 138, Schütrumpf 1982: 53-65, 
Tuplin 1993: 33-4, and Cartledge 1997: 167.  
29 Austin-Vidal-Naquet 1977: 362-3: “the work seems to be something exceptional; it is one of the very 
few works of antiquity which gives the impression that the notion of economic development was not 
completely foreign to ancient thought.”  These authors also view Xenophon’s proposals as “subversive.”  
Polanyi 1977: 196 admires the Poroi for its originality in respect to “the thought that wealth, power, and 
security can be the product of peace rather than war.”  Finley 1999: 163 remarks that Xenophon’s measure  
were “bold in some respects.”  
30 Bastable 1927: 17. 
31 Jaeger 1944: 270 and 1938: 55; cf. p. 53: “the voice f a really experienced political economist.” 
32 Runciman 1991: 351. 
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principles.”33  Contrary to Schumpeter and Finley, who assert that Greek economic 
thought never progressed beyond simple observation, Samuel argues that Xenophon’s 
discussion in the Poroi evidences real “economic analysis.”34  Millett declares the Poroi 
to be “perhaps the most inventive piece of economic theorizing to survive from 
antiquity.”35  For Cartledge, “the analysis and recommendations in the Ways and Means 
are offered in a spirit of goal-oriented economic rationality.”36  Lastly, Doty believes that 
Xenophon—not Adam Smith—is most deserving of the titl “father of economics” and 
touts the Poroi as “the first treatment of macroeconomics.”37   
Yet for all this admiration of the work, a surprisingly small amount of scholarship 
has been devoted to the Poroi in the last quarter century.  With the exception of the 
translations of Audring (1992), Waterfield (1997), and Doty (2003), only three original 
articles (two of which focus strictly on the dating of the text) and one short study 
(Schütrumpf 1982) were written during this period.38  This deficit is even more puzzling 
considering the recent resurgence of interest in Xeophon’s works, which has yielded 
scores of monographs, commentaries, and books expressly devoted to the resurrection of 
his status as a political theorist, philosopher, histor an, and literary artist.39  The first-ever 
international conference dedicated entirely to Xenophon in Liverpool in 1999 and the 
                                                
33 Bresson 2005: 55. 
34 Samuel 1983: 21-9; cf. Schumpeter 1959 and Finley 1970. 
35 Millett 2001: 37. 
36 Cartledge 1997: 166. Cf. Lowry 1987: 46-81 who locates the Poroi in the Greek “administrative” 
tradition, which contributed to the development of rationality within public finance. 
37 Doty 2003: 9. 
38 I say “original” because Gauthier 1984 and Schütrumpf 1995 are simply restatements of their positions 
in Gauthier 1976 and Schütrumpf 1982.  The three articles are those of Cataudella 1984, Dillery 1993, and
Bloch 2004. 
39 See the bibliographies in Vela Tejada 1998 and Tuplin ed. 2004: 13, n. 1. 
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recently published accompanying volume, X nophon and his World (2004), has failed to 
produce one paper on or sustained discussion of the Poroi.40  If we consider research on 
the Poroi from the last century, the situation improves somewhat, for here we find the 
important commentaries of Thiel (1922), Giglioni (1970), and Gauthier (1976).  
Invaluable as these works are for understanding the Poroi, they nonetheless are no 
substitute for a book-length, synoptic analysis.  With this dissertation, then, I aim to fill 
this lacuna in the scholarship by reexamining this much-appreciated yet understudied 
text. 
One of the major consequences of this dearth of scholarship is a lack of consensus 
about Xenophon’s motives in composing the Poroi, which has led to many different 
interpretations, especially among the three most prominent contemporary scholars of the 
work: Gabriella Bodei Giglioni, Philippe Gauthier, and Eckart Schütrumpf.  Most 
scholars read the Poroi as a work largely about trophe.  For in the prologue, Xenophon 
asserts simply that he intends to relieve the poverty of the Athenian citizens by providing 
trophe (“food” or “subsistence”) from the domestic resources of Attica, a “most just 
solution” according to Xenophon because the poverty of the masses had compelled the 
Athenians to act rather unjustly toward their allies (1.1).  Later he identifies this trophe 
with a three-obol payment, which the state is pay to every Athenian citizen (3.9-10; 4.17, 
33).  However, within this camp disagreement over th  meaning of trophe has yielded 
diametrically opposed interpretations of the work.   For some trophe is just a synonym for 
misthos (“pay”), suggesting that Xenophon considers the thr e-obol payment from the 
state specifically as remuneration for participation n civic functions, such as jury duty 
                                                
40 See Tuplin ed. 2004. 
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and sitting in the assembly.41  Based on this reading of the Poroi, Xenophon is a 
consummate democrat, as his measures seek to support participation in the political 
process.42  For Gauthier, the most avid supporter of this political interpretation, 
Xenophon’s only concern is to promote the interests of Athenian homines politici, who 
are to live like rentiers at the expense of non-citizen workers (metics, foreign traders, and 
slaves).43  His measures in support of this system therefore are strictly fiscal in nature 
since he intends not to enhance domestic economic activity but to increase revenues from 
these outside sources: “Xenophon only wants the public coffers to be full and is 
uninterested in the development of the Athenian economy.” 44 
Other commentators consider the three-obol payment to be a kind of state-
subsidized alimony designed to eliminate poverty without imposing heavy financial 
burdens on the rich.45  The major advocate of this interpretation, Schütrumpf, contends 
that this trophe payment would have been insufficient to support the carefree, rentier-like 
existence that Gauthier envisions.  Rather, the daily three obols are designed to 
supplement the personal incomes of Athenians having difficulty making ends meet due to 
                                                
41 Herzog 1914: 473-4, Wilhelm 1932: 38-40, and Gauthier 1976: 20-32, 242-53 and 1984: 191, 198. 
42 In addition to the authors cited in the previous note, Schwahn 1931: 253 and Luccioni 1947: 280-303, 
esp. 283, 300-1 stress the democratic aspects of the text, though they do not endorse the rophe-as-misthos 
interpretation.  In his review of Gauthier 1976, Cawkwell 1979: 18-19 points out that Gauthier makes 
Xenophon “a believer in democracy.”  Gauthier 1984 countenances this reading and restates his thesis even 
more forcefully. 
43 Gauthier 1976: 239-41, 251; cf. Pöhlmann 1984: 242, 244, von der Lieck 1933: 23, and Hasebroek 
1965: 35, who also liken Xenophon’s proposals to the rentier ideal, though Gauthier 1976: 248-51 criticizes 
their application of the concept. 
44 Gauthier 1976: 19. 
45 Thiel 1922: 55, Pöhlmann 1984: 240-3, Andreades 1933: 381-391, von der Lieck 1933: 13-19, Frolov 
1973: 187, Schütrumpf 1982: 65-72 and 1995: 293-300, Vannier 1988: 183-96, Schmitt-Pantel 1992: 174, 
and Azoulay 2004: 221-9. 
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the effects of the Social War.46  In fact, according to Schütrumpf, the daily three-obol 
payments are to supplant entirely misthoi for the courts and assembly—traditionally the 
only regular form of state assistance to poor Athenians—whereas remunerations for 
public officials and the council are to be retained.47  Contrary to scholars of the trophe-
as-misthos school who see Xenophon as a democratic sympathizer, Schütrumpf argues 
that the Poroi espouses an oligarchic conservatism akin to that of Isocrates and Aristotle, 
who advocate keeping the people just poor enough to discourage them from leaving their 
jobs to participate in politics but not so poor that they force elites to pay for additional, 
costly subsidies.48  Thus, while Schütrumpf at first seems to advocate a socio-economic 
reading of the Poroi, like Gauthier he ascribes to Xenophon purely political motives.  In 
the final analysis, “Xenophon is not concerned with the establishment of productive 
industry so that the maintenance of the population is guaranteed with necessary goods or 
that Athens has something to give in exchange for its imported wares…His interest is in 
political finance, not political economy, in finance, not economics.”49   
A third group of scholars, however, does not think that Xenophon’s primary 
objective is to provide the Athenian masses with trophe, but rather to stimulate the 
                                                
46 Schütrumpf 1982: 32-3, 38-42 and 1995: 297.  
47 Schütrumpf 1982: 22-3 and 1995: 294, 298-9. 
48 Schütrumpf 1982: 45-65 and 1995: 294, 299.  Recently, Azoulay 2004: 224-5 has pushed Schütrumpf’s 
thesis even further, arguing that Xenophon’s plan “f vored the emergence of a depoliticized civic society,” 
in which the demos was to become a “subject animal.”  Cf  223: “In accord with the conservative political 
orientation of the author, the Poroi…perhaps can be viewed even as encouraging the passivity of the 
demos.”  Citing Oeconomicus 13.9, he also likens the role of the demos vis-à-vis the elite to the 
slave/master relationship (226-7). 
49 Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5; cf. von der Lieck 1933: 20-1, 37 and Samuel 1983: 27.   
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Athenian economy.50  Giglioni, the most ardent proponent of this economic 
interpretation, argues that trophe is only a subsidiary aim, for without an “economic 
rebirth” it would have been impossible to supply the Athenians with a daily triobolon in 
the first place.51  Xenophon’s proposals for increasing the number of metics, improving 
commerce, and exploiting the mines are thus designed to occasion just such an economic 
revival.  Then, once Athens puts the miseries of the Social War behind it and becomes a 
“rich” city again, all Athenians will receive sufficient trophe, which assures not a 
workless existence but a “much easier [life], in which the state through an increase of 
revenues either equal to or greater than the glory da s of imperialism, guarantees a 
widespread well-being, promotes public work, conciliates the interests of the rich and the 
indigent, and transforms Athens into a hardworking center of commerce and 
supporter…of peace.”52  But unlike previous economic readings of the Poroi, especially 
Pöhlmann’s controversial thesis that the Poroi seeks to establish “state socialism” in 
Athens, Giglioni does not think that Xenophon has any interest in developing the 
productive forces of Attica beyond the silver mining i dustry, the improvement of which 
is necessary to create a viable export currency to pay for imports.53  In this one important 
respect, Giglioni, Schütrumpf, and Gauthier agree. 
                                                
50 Cawkwell 1963: 63-5, Doehaerd in Gauthier 1976: 265, n. 31, Giglioni 1970: xi-xv, xxxiii, lxii, lxx, 
lxxxviii, cvii, cxxx-cxxxii, Whitehead 1977: 125, 128, Lowry 1987: 49, Burke 1992: 208, and Sealey 1993: 
113.  
51 Giglioni 1970: lxxxviii. 
52 Giglioni 1970: cxxxiv. 
53 Giglioni 1970: lxix-lxx.  Pöhlmann 1984: 240-1 conte ds that if Athens is to realize a full measure of 
the blessings of peace, it must “develop the productive forces (die Productivkräfte) of Attica, organize 
them, and distribute the proceeds derived from them so that all citizens in the land find sufficient 
livelihood” (emphasis mine).  For criticism of Pöhlmann’s thesis, see von der Lieck 1933: 51-4, Oertel in 
Pöhlmann 1984: 566-7, Giglioni 1970: cxxx, and Schütrumpf 1982: 12, n.50. 
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At present, these three interpretations are the extnt and embodiment of nearly 
two hundred years of research on the Poroi.  As will become apparent to the reader, the 
studies of Giglioni, Gauthier, and Schütrumpf have left an indelible mark on this 
dissertation; without them I would have been unable to nrich my analysis with such a 
myriad of historical data.  Nevertheless, they also have left many questions unanswered 
and drawn uncompromising conclusions from both questionable evaluations of the 
evidence and groundless assumptions about Xenophon.  Giglioni’s economic 
interpretation, to which I am particularly sympathetic, is problematic since it belies any 
real knowledge of Greek economic theory and praxis, especially with respect to metics 
and the mining industry.  While Schütrumpf’s comprehension of the Athenian intellectual 
and political milieu is often profound, his reading of the Poroi as an oligarchic manifesto 
rests on a hackneyed and uncritical view of Xenophon as an anti-democratic thinker.  It is 
also troubling that he denies outright an economic reading of the Poroi when he does not 
even discuss the state of the Athenian economy in the fourth century.  In fact, one would 
be hard pressed to find a single reference to a piece of documentary evidence, without 
which any understanding of the workings of the Athenian mining industry is impossible.  
Gauthier, on the other hand, considers a wide range of evidence, including a rich body of 
epigraphic comparanda from the Hellenistic era, making him a reliable guide on many 
particular details of the Poroi’s relationship to Athenian economic and fiscal practices.  
However, his theoretical conclusions, which are rooted in the controversial Weber-
Hasebroek-Finley model of the ancient economy, are often misleading.   
 
1B. Argument and Outline of the Work 
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My interpretation of the Poroi, while building on the work of the aforementioned 
scholars, seriously calls into question their conclusions.  I argue that the Poroi is largely 
but not exclusively about trophe, as Xenophon also endeavors to augment revenues so 
that the polis can meet all of its expenses and effectively deliver public services.  
However, on the question of trophe, which I interpret strictly as a payment for food, I do 
not ascribe to Xenophon any motive other than the one he himself gives in the prologue: 
to maintain the poor using Attica’s domestic resources and not at the expense of the 
allies.  Thus, Xenophon tries to alleviate the poverty not to promote (Gauthier) or to 
retard (Schütrumpf) the political activity of the dmos but to eliminate the injustice of 
Athenian imperialism.  To achieve these ends, Xenophon directly challenges the 
Athenians’ employment of imperialism and war as the dominant modes of production by 
proposing measures that are to transform Athens into a center of manufacture, silver 
mining, and free commercial exchange and thus revers  the parasitic, consumer-based 
orientation of the Athenian imperial economy.  Contrary to the view of Giglioni, my 
interpretation stresses that Xenophon’s attempt to stimulate the Athenian economy does 
entail the development of the productive forces of Attica.  I contend further that 
Xenophon’s vision for Athens’ economy displays many features of the modern capitalist 
enterprise.  In brief, such a radical transformation of Athenian fiscal and economic 
practices represents nothing short of a “reorientation” of Athenian political economy.  
The term political economy is not in vogue among ancie t historians, as 
evidenced by Gauthier and Schütrumpf’s reticence to use this designation to characterize 
 18 
Xenophon’s project in the Poroi.54  This however is a mistake, for political economy as 
an analytic concept describes not only the intersection of politics and economics—which 
is beyond question in the ancient world—but also the moral obligation of the state to 
provide for its citizens and to augment private and public wealth.55  Such is the 
understanding of Adam Smith: 
Political oeconomy, considered as a branch of the sci nce of a statesman 
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful 
revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to 
provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to 
supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public 
services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.56 
 
People today tend to think of Smith as the progenitor of laissez-faire, non-interventionist 
economics; however in his time he was also known as a great moral philosopher who saw 
himself working within an ethical tradition dating back to the ancients.57  Despite the 
efforts of neo-classical economists to divorce all ethical, political, and social questions 
from the study of economics, Smith was unwilling to assign the state a morally neutral 
role vis-à-vis the support of its citizens.58  In fact, the 1998 Nobel Prize winner in 
                                                
54 For exceptions, see e.g., Meikle 1979 and Cartledge 2002b.  To my knowledge, Frolov 1973: 189 and 
Cartledge 1997: 166 are the only historians that refer to the Poroi as a work of “political economy.” 
55 For a concise introduction to modern theories of political economy, see Caporaso and Levine 1992.  
56 Smith, Wealth of Nations IV, Introduction = Smith 1981: 428 (emphasis mine). 
57 Before Smith wrote the Wealth of Nations in 1776, he was professor of moral philosophy at the
University of Glasgow.  For the influence of the classics on Smith’s thinking, see Vivenza 2001.  I do not 
mean to suggest that Smith’s ideas do not lend themselves well to the neo-classical worldview.  However, it 
is certainly a biased reading of Smith to deny outrigh  the ethical dimension of his economics.  The Fr nch 
economist Simonde de Sismondi, writing shortly after David Ricardo, recognized both aspects of Smith’s 
thought and noted how Ricardo and his followers completely abandoned his ethical doctrine (69).  He 
astutely noted that there are two “Adam Smiths.”  Today, scholars refer to the janus-faced nature of Smith’s 
economics as the “Adam Smith problem.”     
58 By neo-classical economists, I am referring to those who identify with and support the general 
movement in economics since 1871 (the year of William Stanley Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy and 
Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics), which has made the marginal theory of value a significant basis of 
economic analysis as opposed to the labor theory of value, as advocated by Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo.  For a concise introduction to neo-classical e onomics, see Weintraub 2002. 
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economics, Amartya Sen, acknowledges Smith as a source of inspiration for his own 
groundbreaking work in development and welfare economics.59  The example of Sen and 
others like him should serve to remind us that the stark dichotomy between “ethics” and 
“economics,” such as the one that figures prominently on the opening pages of Finley’s 
Ancient Economy, is problematic.60   Indeed, it ignores the longstanding and ongoing 
debate between neo-classical economists and those wrking within the classical tradition 
of political economy, whose origins can be traced back to Greeks.  This at least is opinion 
of John Ruskin (1819-1900), a notable early proponent of social welfare who criticized 
the neo-classical revolution in economics as “[having] no connection whatever with 
political economy as understood and treated of by the great thinkers of past ages.”61  
Ruskin’s own approach to political economy, he freely admits, “is literally only the 
expansion and explanation of Xenophon’s.”62   
Though Xenophon himself does not employ the term political economy 
(οἰκονομία πολιτική), his mission in the Poroi corresponds exactly to the goals of the 
science outlined by Smith: to provide the Athenians with plentiful revenues so that all 
                                                
59 Sen 1987: Chapter 1, esp. 22-7 and 2000: 24-5.    
60 According to Finley, ancient economic thought—indee , all economic thinking up through Hutcheson’s 
Introduction to Moral Philosophy (who incidentally held the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow before 
Adam Smith)—was solely concerned with “ethics” (17-8).  Modern economics, on the contrary, develops 
“rational” principles based upon “scientific” methods.  “There was no road,” Finley exclaims, “from the 
‘oeconomics’ of Francis Hutcheson to the Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith, published twenty-four years 
later” (20).  For two good treatments of the ethical basis of classical political economy and its foundation in 
the classical world, see Spengler 1980 and Petrochilos 2002.  
61 Ruskin 1907: Vol. 17, 147. 
62 Ruskin 1907: Vol. 37, 550; cf. Vol. 34, 547 and Vol. 37, 381.  Ruskin’s succinctly defines political 
economy in Munera Pulveris: “As domestic economy regulates the acts and habits of a household, Political 
Economy regulates those of a society or State, withreference to the means of its maintenance.”  By 
“maintenance,” Ruskin means “the support of its population in healthy and happy life” (Vol. 17, 147-8).  
For Xenophon’s influence on Ruskin, see Henderson 2000: 64-85.     
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Athenians have sufficient rophe and ample funds to perform public services.63  
Moreover, Xenophon is keenly aware that his measures will enrich not only the state but 
also private citizens and non-citizens alike (e.g., 3.1-2, 9-10, 4.31-32, 50).  This latter 
objective vitiates completely against Gauthier and Schütrumpf’s view that Xenophon’s 
perspective lies solely within the realm of “political” or “public” finance.”64  I do not 
mean to suggest that Xenophon was the world’s firstpolitical economist.  In truth, 
Xenophon’s aims were not unique: Athenian statesmen and politicians for at least a 
century had been vying with each other to provide th  city with the most revenues in 
order to lavish it with sumptuous festivals and monumental buildings, to feed the poor, 
and to enrich the fortunes of individuals who struggled on its behalf.  Yet what is 
completely revolutionary about Xenophon’s political economy are the means by which 
he attempts to achieve these ends.  Under Xenophon’s stewardship, the Athenians are to 
become prosperous by rejecting the economics of empir  and turning their energies to the 
cultivation of peaceful commerce and productive industry.  To quote Polanyi, the 
originality of the Poroi “lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the 
product of peace rather than war.”65  Thus, while Xenophon’s political economy is at 
once firmly rooted in the traditions of his native Athens, it also offers something radically 
new: a viable alternative to empire. 
                                                
63 For more on οἰκονομία πολιτική and Xenophon’s choice of Πόροι as the title of his work, see 
Addendum below and Appendix 1. 
64 Andreades 1933: 81-2 objects to the use of the term political economy, which he considers the “science” 
that “treats of the economics of the community or the people,” in favor of “public finance.”  While I agree 
that the outlook of thinkers like Pseudo-Aristotle in the Oeconomica is almost exclusively fiscal in 
character, the wholesale application of the term “public finance” discourages one to explore the ways poleis 
might have promoted the economic interests of their citizens.  My interpretation of the Poroi suggests that 
some Greeks did in fact advocate the notion that the s ate had a role in stimulating the economy and thus in 
augmenting private wealth.       
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Before we can begin to appreciate the novelty of Xenophon’s ideas, it is necessary 
to determine the genre in which he communicates thoe ideas and to establish some basic 
facts about his biography.  Thus, in Chapter 2, I briefly analyze the Poroi’s authorship, 
since some have denied this to be a genuine work of Xenophon.  After a careful review of 
the evidence, I support firmly the notion that he is indeed the author of the Poroi.  I then 
offer a biographical sketch of Xenophon’s later years, building the case that he returned 
to Athens shortly after the Athenians rescinded his exile sometime between 366/5 and 
362.  Consequently, I argue that he composed the Poroi while living in Athens.  I also 
uphold the traditional dating of the work to 355/4 and suggest an even more precise date 
in the summer months before the Amphictyonic League voted for war against the 
Phocians.  The bulk of the chapter examines the genre a d intended audience of the text.  
While the Poroi exemplifies the discursive properties of both epidictic and deliberative 
oratory, I contend that it is best understood as a deliberative discourse of the private or 
bouleutic variety, which Xenophon circulated as a pamphlet among a small reading 
audience of politicians and financial specialists re ponsible for policy formulation at 
Athens.  I suggest that the prologue supports the notio  that Xenophon had been 
philosophically engaging some of these politicians in the hopes that they would recognize 
the injustice of imperialism and the benefits of peac . 
In Chapter 3, I set out to substantiate Xenophon’s claim that the “poverty of the 
masses” was the primary cause of Athens’ imperialist policies in the fourth century.  To 
this end, I devote a significant portion of this chapter to examining Athenian foreign 
policy in light of such demographic pressure.  One of the main reasons for a detailed 
                                                                                                                                      
65 Polanyi 1977: 196. 
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treatment is that some respected historians have questioned the idea that Athenian foreign 
policy in the fourth century was imperialistic.  This school of thought maintains that the 
Athenians learned from the mistakes of the past and did not actively pursue a policy to 
reconstitute their fifth-century empire.  Athens’ objectives overseas were largely 
defensive, and whenever they did intervene in allied states, the Athenians respected their 
freedom and autonomy.  I dispute this view, however.  Adducing a rich variety of 
evidence, I demonstrate that Athens sought to recover its fifth-century empire and 
pursued imperialistic policies throughout the century, which fomented resentment and 
ultimately revolt among the allies.  Moreover, given that historians debate the causes of 
Athenian imperialism, I examine the evidence pertaining to Attica’s grain supply and 
conclude that domestic sources were inadequate for their needs and that the Athenians 
were unable to pay for imported grain without the proceeds from empire.  Consequently, 
my findings support the view that Xenophon’s plan to provide every Athenian with 
sufficient trophe (viz. a daily payment of three obols) is one strictly about food.  I 
therefore underscore the socio-economic orientation of his domestic program.     
The nature of Xenophon’s anti-imperialistic political economy is the subject of 
Chapter 4. I show how his program to expand domestic industry and to promote 
commerce—through which significant amounts of revenue are to be created for the 
purchase of imported grain—directly challenges the economics of empire.  This plan to 
pay for imported grain with the annual proceeds generated from Attica itself, I submit, 
marks a great transformation in Athens’ orientation away from a consumer-based to a 
producer-based economy.  In this chapter, however, I do not examine the specific details 
of his proposals, a task I reserve for Chapter 5.  Rather, here I explore the ideological 
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import of his views on war and peace and explain how is arguments have a unique anti-
imperialistic flavor.  One prime example of his anti-imperialistic rhetoric I consider is his 
use of a providential argument to justify his new peaceful world order.  According to 
Xenophon, during the creation of the universe the gods purposefully allotted to the 
Athenians both native goods particular to Attica and a geographic position suitable for 
exchanging these goods for needed imports.  In my judgment, he advances this argument 
to counter providential notions of Athenian imperialism, which ascribe Athens’ 
hegemonic position to divine will.  For Xenophon, the ordering of the universe suggests 
that the Athenians should trade with the world and not wage war upon it.  Moreover, I 
also demonstrate that Xenophon’s worldview flies in the face not only of Athenian 
imperialists but also of traditionalists like Plato and Aristotle, who aspire to the ideal of 
economic self-sufficiency (autarkeia).  In short, this chapter explores Xenophon’s 
attitude toward empire and situates his anti-imperialist c views in the context of Athenian 
political and intellectual culture of the fifth and fourth centuries.  I build a case that, 
unlike his contemporaries, Xenophon is a true anti-imperialist: in addition to opposing 
the imperial practices of his day, he objected to the very idea of empire. 
As noted previously, Xenophon advances a number of proposals that challenge 
Athens’ imperial economics.  In Chapter 5, I delve into the specifics of his program for 
improving the conditions of the metics, trade and commerce, and the silver mines at 
Laurion.  I make two broad interpretive claims.  The first is that Xenophon’s 
recommendations, especially those concerning metics and commerce, have as their aim 
the liberalization of economic relations between Athenians and foreigners, resulting in 
the (partial) breakdown of the status divide separating citizens from non-citizen outsiders.  
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Xenophon’s progressive attitude is simply that outsiders whose economic activities 
promote the welfare of all Athenians should partake in many of the same honors and 
privileges that citizens enjoy.  Second, and more significant for the history of economic 
thought, Xenophon frames his proposals for the creation of the capital fund and the mines 
in accordance with income-maximizing instrumental rationality.  This thesis calls into 
question one of the central tenets of substantivist hi orians, namely, that homo 
economicus did not exist in the ancient world because the predomination of politics in the 
lives of Greeks and Romans rendered him incapable of expressing himself rationally in 
economic matters.  Xenophon’s proposals, I maintain, presuppose that both he and 
members of his audience not only valued income maxiization as a desirable end but 
also tried to achieve that end in an instrumental rational manner.  In particular, Xenophon 
endeavors to mitigate risk so that the risk-reward balance may become acceptable to 
Athenian investors and entrepreneurs whose money and p rticipation are indispensable 
for the creation of the capital fund and the exploitation of the mines.  After all, these are 
the ingredients contributing to the success of his entire financial program for maintaining 
the poor and increasing revenues.     
 
Addendum: The Title Πόροι 
The title of the work, Πόροι, is best rendered in English as “Ways and Means” 
(cf. German: Mittel und Wege; French: voies et moyens).  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, “ways and means” refer generally to “the methods and resources 
which are at a person’s disposal for affecting some bj ct” (1.a), but in a legislative sense 
to “methods of procuring funds or supplies for the current expenditure of the state” (2.a).   
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In Greek the word πόρος is etymologically cognate with the verb πείρειν, “to pierce,” 
and thus originally denoted any means or way (ferry, bridge, path, etc.) of gaining 
passage over land or water (cf. English “pores”).  Later it was used to describe any means 
that enabled one to cope with a difficulty or to overcome financial straits and other 
deficits in resources.66  Thus, as Gauthier demonstrates convincingly, a poros is not a 
revenue (prosodos) but rather a means of obtaining revenue or a source of revenue.67  For 
instance, a two percent harbor tax is, technically speaking, a poros; the money collected 
from this tax is the prosodos proper.  Moreover, Gauthier distinguishes between two 
general types of poroi: 1) poroi as ways and means of creating new or augmenting 
existing prosodoi, which the polis applies to its regular expenses, uch as infrastructure, 
festivals, and defense; and 2) poroi as ways and means of acquiring money to pay for 
unexpected or emergency expenses.  In the Poroi Xenophon is concerned exclusively 
with the former kind of ways and means because he advises the Athenians to create new 
sources of revenue (e.g., hiring out publicly owned slaves) and to augment already 
existing revenues (e.g., taxes derived from trade) so that the state can meet its regular 
expenses and execute public services.    
Despite Xenophon’s focus on the sources of revenue rather than on the revenues 
themselves, many translators erroneously entitle the Poroi “On Revenues,”  “De 
Vectigalibus,” “ Einkünfte,” etc., in part because all the manuscripts save B (which does 
not begin until 1.5) include the addition of ἢ περὶ προσόδων.  Cobet long ago 
suggested its deletion, submitting that the accretion was the result of a scribal gloss, and a 
                                                
66 Dover 1980: 141 
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number of scholars have followed suit in their editions of the text.68  However, 
Breitenbach and Giglioni, citing the authority of Busolt and Swoboda, interpret this 
addition differently, suggesting that it was a remnant of what had been the original title: 
πόροι προσόδων.69  Gauthier has argued vehemently against this interpretation, calling 
the locution “barbaric as well as uncommon.”70  However, in his effort to distinguish 
sharply the two words, about which he argues persuasively, he overstates his case against 
Breitenbach and Giglioni.  First, Gauthier commits an egregious error when he asserts 
boldly that “the expression is found nowhere.”71  Not only do later parallels exist for 
πόροι προσόδων but Xenophon himself employs the expression in the Cyropaedia, 
albeit in the singular προσόδου πόρον.72  Furthermore, πόρος followed by a noun in 
the [objective] genitive case is good Greek, as evidenced by the more common 
expression πόρος/πόροι χρημάτων.73  In fact, πόροι προσόδων, which can be 
translated as “the ways and means for [increasing/creating] revenues” or better yet 
“sources of revenue,” actually confirms Gauthier’s basic interpretation: a poros is not a 
revenue but rather a way or mean to create or augment revenue.   
                                                                                                                                      
67 Gauthier 1976: 8-18 
68 Cobet 1858: 755-6 followed by Marchant 1920 and 1961 and Gauthier 1976: 7. 
69 Breitenbach 1967: 1753; Giglioni 1970: xi, n.22; cf. Busolt and Swoboda 1926: 1147: “With their 
[Eubulus and Lycurgus] task is connected the care for the welfare and increase of revenues [i.e. prosodoi] 
and the development of ways and means [i.e. poroi] necessary to that end.”   
70 Gauthier 1976: 7. 
71 Gauthier 1976: 8. 
72 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.6.10; cf. Necephorus Gregoras, Historia Romana vol. 1, p. 397.12 and vol.2, 
p.696, 21. 
73 Breitenbach 1967: 1753.  See, for example, Ps.-Xenophon, Athenaion Politeia 3.2; Euripides, Suppliants 
777; Xenophon, Hellenica 1.6.12. 
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The question then is whether the addition of ἢ περὶ προσόδων is due to a scribal 
error in the transcription of what might have been the original title, πόροι προσόδων, as 
Breitenbach and Bodei would have it, or to a scribal gloss on the word πόροι, as argues 
Cobet.  The latter interpretation is probably the correct one for two reasons.  First, we 
find similar glosses on other titles of Xenophon’s works.  For example, appended to the 
title Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους we find πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς and to Ἱέρων is added ἢ 
τυραννικός.  Both additions are so pedestrian it is difficult to imagine they came from 
Xenophon’s hand and not from a scribe.74  Secondly, the ancient testimonia are 
undisputedly certain on the matter: Menander, Diogenes Laertius, Athenaeus, and the 
author of the Etymologicum Magnum all cite the work as Πόροι.75  Thus ἢ περὶ 
προσόδων should be deleted, which leaves Πόροι as the likeliest title for the work.  
                                                
74 Of course, there is the possibility that Xenophon did not entitle the work himself, and that Πόροι is a 
later addition of an editor.  Yet, according to Diogenes (2.48), Xenophon himself seems to have been 
responsible for entitling at least one of his works, the Memorabilia, and therefore it is plausible that he 
affixed titles to all his works.        
75 Marchant 1920 and Gauthier 1976: 7. 
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Chapter 2: Biography, Genre, and Audience 
 
“This [the Poroi] is a work of a friend of Athens…”1 
 
Introduction  
Given the wealth of information the Poroi provides about the economy and 
society of fourth century Athens, it is only natural that scholars have studied this text 
mainly for historical purposes.  However, unlike many of Xenophon’s other works, such 
as the Anabasis, Hellenica, and Cyropaedia—all of which have immense historical value 
and yet have sustained considerable philological interest over the years—not one literary 
analysis of the Poroi exists.  Of the Poroi’s three major commentators, Thiel, Giglioni, 
and Gauthier, only Thiel examines the text philologically, albeit principally to establish 
Xenophon as the author.2  In this chapter, I seek to enrich our appreciation of the Poroi 
by analyzing, among other things, its place of compsition, literary antecedents, style, 
genre, and intended audience.   
My intent is not so much to fill a lacuna in the scholarship but to situate the Poroi 
in its proper philological and biographical context in order to understand better its 
historical meaning and significance.  As I discuss in the Introduction, it is commonplace 
among historians to assert that Xenophon’s ideas are conventional, whereas classicists 
generally maintain that Xenophon is a literary pioneer, whose works do not cohere to the 
literary conventions of the day.  However, if Xenoph n’s ideas are conventional, why 
does he choose to express them in such unconventional ways, especially considering that 
their acceptance depends on how readily an audience identifies their mode of delivery?  
                                                
1 Croiset 1947: 357. 
2 Thiel 1922: xiii-xxx; only pages xxviii-xxx explictly concern the form of the text.  
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One of the main methodological assumptions of this study is that to assess whether 
Xenophon’s ideas are conventional or unconventional we must first understand the Poroi 
in all its literary and ideological aspects.  This chapter, therefore, is foundational for the 
rest of the dissertation.    
I begin in Sections 2A-B by arguing that Xenophon is indisputably the author of 
the Poroi, and that he returned to Athens after the Athenians rescinded his exile 
sometime between 366/5 and 362 where he composed the work.  Section 2C concerns the 
date of the Poroi’s composition.  I uphold the traditional date of 355, which one scholar 
has recently disputed, and suggest an even more precise date in the summer months 
before the Amphictyonic League voted for war against the Phocians.  In Section 2D, 
which is the longest and most important of the chapter, I examine the Poroi in respect to 
its genre and intended audience, arguing that both topics must be analyzed in conjunction 
with each other.  I first contend that the Poroi partakes in the discursive properties of 
epideictic and deliberative oratory, though my discussion privileges the latter as the text’s 
primary mode of discourse.  This finding leads to a comparative analysis of the Poroi 
with the only surviving deliberative speech that deals with ways and means, 
Demosthenes’ First Philippic.  Ultimately, I argue that the Poroi is a deliberative 
discourse of the private or bouleutic variety, and was circulated as a pamphlet among a 
small reading audience of politicians and financial specialists who were responsible for 
policy formation at Athens.  In the final section (2E), I explore further the identity of 
these individuals and the nature of Xenophon’s relationship to his audience.  The opening 
paragraph of the work, I argue, reveals that Xenophon ad been critically engaging and 
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instructing some of Athens’ leading politicians to adopt a more just foreign policy toward 
the allies.  
 
2A. Authorship  
The question of authorship is a relatively recent one.  No one in antiquity to the 
middle of the nineteenth century ever doubted that Xenophon was the author of the 
Poroi.  It is almost impossible to reject the genuineness of the work on linguistic and 
stylistic grounds, especially since the diction of the Poroi corresponds entirely to that of 
the Anabasis and Cyropaedia, which, as L. Gauthier maintains, represent the “true 
written language of Xenophon.”3  Rather, the scholars who argue against Xenophon’s 
authorship rest their cases on perceived differences in the Weltanschauung of the Poroi 
and the rest of Xenophon’s works.  The arguments tend to be impressionistic, 
stereotypical, and hardly systematic.  Take, for example, the terse remark of Jaeger: “It 
seems to me that the mentality and interests of the author of Πόροι do not fit 
Xenophon.”4  Above all, what does not “fit”, according to this view, is Xenophon’s 
fondness for war, horses, hunting, and household management (pursuits befitting a 
gentleman), on the one hand, and, on the other, the in erest of the “author” of the Poroi in 
trade and manufacturing (which are allegedly anathema to gentlemen).5  Such 
dichotomies are difficult to maintain when one examines the full extent of evidence from 
fourth century Athens: many citizens engage in both commercial and traditional liberal 
                                                
3 L. Gauthier 1911: 135, n. 2.  For detailed analyses of the language and style in the Poroi and arguments 
for the genuineness of the work, see Zurborg 1874: 18-32, Richards 1907: 89-104, Thiel 1922: xvii-xxiii, 
and Marchant 1961: Praefatio; cf.  Giglioni 1970: ix and Gauthier 1976: 1. 
4 Jaeger 1938: 219, n. 14; cf. Rostovtzeff 1941: 74 
5 See the references in Gauthier 1976: 1-2; I would also add to his list Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979: 178.
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activities.  Furthermore, it is patently false to think that Xenophon is disinterested in 
commercial and money matters in works other than the Poroi.  Socrates’ conversation 
with Glaucon in the Memorabilia (3.6.1-12) should adequately dispel this notion, 
especially considering that Socrates adumbrates many topics of interest that Xenophon 
himself treats more fully in the Poroi.6   
Finally, the Poroi contains a host of ideas and expressions particular to 
Xenophon, which proves his authorship beyond a reasonable doubt.  I will restrict myself 
to two examples.7  First, in the two concluding sections of the Poroi, Xenophon twice 
employs the phrase εἰ λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον, which, incidentally, is part of the official 
oracular formula of question and answer in Athenian decrees.8 Outside of Xenophon’s 
works, where the expression occurs three other times, and a few fourth century Attic 
inscriptions, Plato is the only other classical author to make use of the phrase (Laws 
828a3).  Secondly, while Xenophon shares many ideas with his contemporaries, the 
system of rewards and incentives to achieve a variety of desired outcomes, such as 
“competition” (φιλονικία), is unique to Xenophon, especially as he indiscriminately 
applies it to various spheres of activity, both liberal and commercial: practice of cavalry 
maneuvers and horsemanship (Hipparchicus 1.26; Hellenica 3.4.16; Hiero 9.6); hoplite 
and light infantry maneuvers (Hellenica 3.4.16; Cyropaedia 1.6.18, 2.1.22-24); courage 
                                                
6 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 3 
7 Richards 1907: 89-104, Thiel 1922: xvii-xxiii, and Marchant 1961: Praefatio have collected most of these 
ideas and expressions.  In respect to the latter, I have corroborated the comments and observations of the 
aforementioned authors by searching the digital version of Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.  
8 For example, in an Attic decree of 352/1 concerning the restoration of boundary stones on sacred land 
belonging to the goddess Demeter in Eleusis (IG II2 204), the Athenians send an embassy to Delphi to 
enquire “if it is more desirable and better for the Athenian demos to lease out” sacred land currently being 
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on the battlefield (Hiero 9.6); household management (Oeconomicus 12.6); business 
contracts, agriculture, and trade (Hiero 9.6-10).  Although the bestowal of rewards make 
perfect sense in military contexts and, without a doubt, was practiced long before 
Xenophon endorsed it, his transference of it to commercial and business activities was 
not necessarily obvious.  Thus, when we read in the Poroi about recommendations to 
apply this system of rewards to polis finance (2.5; 3.3), we have good reason to assume 
that the same individual is responsible for them. 
 
2B. Place of Composition  
 Unfortunately, the ancient biographical tradition concerning Xenophon, of which 
Diogenes Laertius is the primary source, is extremely vague and, at times, contradictory, 
and Xenophon himself does not provide us with much autobiographical information 
except for what he says of his service in Asia.  A brief review of the latter half of 
Xenophon’s life is in order.9   
The Athenians exiled Xenophon sometime between 399-94 for reasons that are 
uncertain, but two explanations are commonly proffeed: laconism and/or friendship with 
Cyrus.10  Xenophon served with Agesilaus in Asia and returned with the king to Greece 
                                                                                                                                      
worked (24-6); lines 49ff. contain Apollo’s response: “The god responded that it is more desirable and 
better for the Athenian demos…”  For more examples, see Gauthier 1976: 219.      
9 For biographies of Xenophon, see Delebecque 1957, Breitenbach 1967: 1571-1578, Anderson 1974, 
Laforse 1997: 7-92, and Humble 2003. 
10 See Delebecque 1957: 117-23, Breitenbach 1967: 1575, Anderson 1974: 146-49, Rahn 1981, Tuplin 
1987, Green 1994, and Laforse 1997: 62-70.  Higgins 1977: 24 suggests that the real reason was 
Xenophon’s connection to Socrates, a provocative idea, but one Humble 2002: 80, n. 59 rightly dismisses.  
Along similar lines, Green 1994: 224-6 argues that Xenophon was preemptively exiled by the restored 
democracy, which feared that Xenophon would take the remnant of the 10,000 back to Athens in support of 
an oligarchic coup; Laforse 1997: 65-6, who accepts Green’s thesis, thus dates the exile to 399, between the 
time when Xenophon left Seuthes and Anaxibius sent him back to the Bosporus.  I find this hypothesis 
problematic because the evidence Green cites (Hellenica 2.4.43) concerning the oligarchs’ hiring of 
mercenaries at Eleusis in 401 leads to the murder of all the oligarchic generals involved.  Even if a desire to 
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in 394.  Some speculate that he fought with the Spartans at Coronea (Diogenes 2.51; 
Plutarch, Agesilaus 18).  He seems to have accompanied Agesilaus back to Sparta, where 
he lived awhile with his two sons, Diodorus and Gryllus.  According to Plutarch, 
Xenophon enrolled them in the agoge (Agesilaus 20.2).  The Spartans subsequently gave 
him an estate at Scillus, where he probably lived until c. 371/0 when the Eleans 
recaptured the city from the Spartans (Anabasis 5.3.7; Diogenes 52).11  From there 
Xenophon fled with his sons (his wife Philesia is not mentioned) to Corinth where he 
“took up residence” (αὐτόθι κατοικῆσαι) (Diogenes 2.53).   
Now sometime when Xenophon’s was living in Corinth the Athenians rescinded 
his exile.  All Diogenes says, on the authority of the third century B.C. historian Istrus, is 
that Xenophon “was banished by a decree of Eubulus and recalled by a decree of the 
same man” (2.59).  Most scholars reject the former claim because Eubulus, born c. 405, 
would have been too young to have effected Xenophon’s exile between the years 399-
94.12  Whoever proposed the original decree, it seems rea onable to believe that Eubulus 
                                                                                                                                      
hire mercenaries still existed two years later, who would have paid for such a large force?  Furthermore, 
this incident precipitates the amnesty about which Xenophon says, “still to this day both parties live 
together as citizens and the demos remains by their oaths [sc. not to bear ill-will against the oligarchs]” (ἔτι 
καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ τε πολιτεύονται καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος).  Though it is impossible to fix a 
date denoted by the phrase ἔτι καὶ νῦν, it most certainly post-dates 399.  Thus, the Athenians would have 
contravened their oaths by exiling a man whom they p rceived to be associated or who had sympathies 
with the oligarchic conspiracy of 401, and therefor Xenophon could not have written that they remained 
by their oaths “still to this day.”             
11 Diogenes does not date this incident, but scholars take Xenophon’s comments at Hellenica 6.5.3 about 
the Eleans’ refusal to swear an oath granting independence to the Scilluntians in 371/0 as a terminus post
quem for the capture.  The story in Pausanias (5.6.6) that claims Xenophon was tried by the Olympic 
Council for accepting the estate from the Spartans, was acquitted, and then allowed to live the rest of his 
days at Scillus is a fiction; Breitenbach 1967: 1573 is probably right to see this account as Elean 
propaganda.    
12 Cawkwell 1963: 63, n. 89 and Green 1994: 218.  Breitenbach 1967: 1575 offers an interesting solution 
by proposing that Istrus originally wrote something like “Xenophon was banished in the archonship of 
Euboulides” (394/3), and thus Diogenes carelessly conflated the names. 
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was responsible for Xenophon’s recall.13  Generally, historians have proposed two 
groups of dates, both of which rest on the assumption that laconism was the original 
cause for Xenophon’s exile.  The first is 387/6, the year of the King’s peace that ended 
the Corinthian war.14  The problem with this date, however, is that the Athenians did not 
subscribe to the peace willingly, and it is difficult to imagine them immediately recalling 
all their “pro-Spartan” exiles at this time.15  A period of more concerted Athenian efforts 
at reconciliation begins on the eve of the battle of Leuctra in 371 (Hellenica 6.3.1-17) and 
shortly after the brokering of the common peace in 370/69 (Hellenica 6.5.1).16  
Diogenes’ reference to Xenophon’s sons serving in the cavalry on behalf of the 
Athenians at Mantinea (362) is the commonly accepted terminus ante quem for the repeal 
of Xenophon’s exile.  Thus, sometime between 370/69-62 the Athenians lifted 
Xenophon’s decree of banishment.17  Unfortunately, neither Diogenes nor any ancient 
source says that Xenophon ever returned to Athens.  A majority of scholars, connecting 
Diogenes’ statement about Xenophon taking up residence in Corinth with his later claim 
(citing Demetrius of Magnesia) that Xenophon died in the same place (2.56), conclude 
that Xenophon never returned to Athens (though some speculate that he may have visited 
                                                
13 Historians often stress the link between Eubulus and Xenophon; see, for example, Cawkwell 1963: 56, 
who argues that much of “what Xenophon proposed [sc. in the Poroi], Eubulus enacted; cf. Andreades 
1933: 364.  Gauthier 1976: 223-31, 260ff, however, is much more sanguine on the matter; cf. Higgins 
1977: 178, n. 68: “the fact that Euboulos may have be n responsible for securing Xenophon’s recall from 
exile does not imply anything about their political friendship.  It can simply be seen as the act of an up-and-
coming politician trying to gain some publicity by sponsoring a measure involving a prominent person.”    
14 Cawkwell 1972: 15, n. 3 and Cartledge 1987: 61. 
15 Laforse 1997: 86. 
16 Breitenbach 1967: 1576, Anderson 1974: 192, 198, Higgins 1977: 128, and Laforse 1997: 86-7. 
17 Delebecque 1957: 339-40 perceives a noted increase in the level of detail in Hellenica 7 surrounding 
Athenian affairs for the year 366, and therefore has specifically dated Xenophon’s recall to this year.  
However, detail should not always be taken as a sign of autopsy, as Xenophon produces many vivid 
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the city on occasion).18  Nevertheless, this is only one inference among other possible 
alternatives.  Although there is no direct evidence for his return to Athens, in the 
following pages I examine six areas of evidence that strongly support the conclusion that 
Xenophon not only returned to Athens but also took up residence there and had an active 
role in the intellectual and political life of the city.19  
First, the less than friendly relationship between Athens and Corinth in the mid to 
late 360s calls into question the idea that Xenophon kept his abode in Corinth after the 
Athenians lifted his exile.  Despite significant Athenian support against the Theban 
invasion of Corinth in 369/8, which resulted in a rther humbled Theban retreat 
(Hellenica 7.1.19, 25; Diodorus 15.69), Corinth soon after (366/5) ordered the Athenians 
to remove their garrisons from the city under the treat of force (Hellenica 7.4.4).  
According to Xenophon, this dismissal stemmed from the Corinthians catching word of 
an Athenian decree ordering their generals “to see to it that Corinth be secure for the 
Athenian demos” (ὅπως καὶ Κόρινθος σῴα ᾖ τῷ δήμῳ Ἀθηναίων).  The Corinthians 
were, no doubt, correct in interpreting this phrase  a euphemism for an Athenian plot 
                                                                                                                                      
accounts for events he could not have possibly witnessed (e.g., Battle of Nemea at Hellenica 4.2.8); see 
Anderson 1986: 37-8, and Humble 2002: 75-6.   
18 E.g., Zurborg 1874: 42-3, Underhill 1900: lxxxi, Marchant 1925: xxvi, Luccioni 1942: 269-70 and 1953: 
162, Schaeffer 1966: I, 170, Breitenbach 1967: 1573, Anderson 1974: 192-3 and 1986, Gauthier 1976: 64, 
Cawkwell 1979a, 14, n.12 and 1979b: 17-9, and Pomery 1994: 4. 
19 With the exception of Delebecque 1957: 334-41, no o e has systematically argued for Xenophon’s 
return to Athens on a permanent basis, though many h ve asserted this view; see, for example, Grote 1869: 
481, Jaeger 1944: 158-9, Rose 1964: 306, Higgins 1977: 128ff., Tuplin 1993: 31-2, Laforse 1997: 88-92, 
and  Humble 2002: 83-4.  My arguments differ from Delebecque’s, who claims that Xenophon’s vivid 
narrative of Athenian events in Hellenica Book 7 evidences his return to Athens in 366/5 (see not  17 
above).      
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against the city, for Chares soon arrived in Corinth with a fleet of warships (7.4.5).20  
They did not allow Chares’ fleet to enter their harbor and sent it away along with all the 
Athenian hoplites present in the city.  Consequently, both cities were now hostile to each 
other, and Corinth pursued its own foreign policy with the help of mercenaries (7.4.6).  In 
the same year, the Corinthians made peace with Thebes, though they rejected a Theban 
offer of alliance (7.4.6-12); this peace treaty essentially marked the end of the 
Peloponnesian League.21  The key question is, if the Athenians had lifted Xenophon’s 
banishment by 366/5, would the Corinthians have allowed Xenophon, an Athenian and a 
former general, to remain in the city while the Athenians were seeking to master the 
place?22  The prospect seems highly unlikely, and thus the idea that Xenophon was 
recalled before 366/5 should be rejected.23   
However, supposing for a moment that Corinth was nonetheless willing to extend 
asylum to Xenophon whether he was an exile or not, an event in 362, which is also the 
terminus ante quem for Xenophon’s recall, surely compelled him to leave the city.  In his 
account of the battle of Mantinea, Xenophon admires the gallantry of the Athenian 
cavalrymen, among whom was Gryllus, who died in battle.  One of the reasons 
Xenophon cites for the cavalry’s outstanding conduct was its utter disregard for a recent 
loss suffered at Corinth (καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου τοῖς 
ἱππεῦσιν οὐδὲν τούτουἐπελογίσαντο) (Hellenica 7.5.16).  It would be a mistake to 
                                                
20 Cf. IG II2 123, 9, an Athenian decree of 356, which similarly commands that the island of Andros “be 
secure for the Athenian people”; the text explicitly mentions military intervention. For more on this “safe” 
clause, see Chapter 3, Section 3C.  
21 For the controversy surrounding Corinth’s neutrality, see Salmon 1984: 427-8.   
22 Rightly noted by Higgins 1977: 128. 
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conclude that the Thebans were responsible for thisdefeat at Corinth, though 
Epaminondas did wish to intercept the Athenians on their way to Mantinea (7.5.7), 
because Xenophon explicitly asserts that Epaminondas stopped his march not at the 
Isthmus but at Nemea to await the Athenians, and that the forces he hoped to engage 
were not the cavalry but the hoplite contingent.  Thus, the cavalry defeat of which 
Xenophon speaks must have resulted from an engagement between the Athenians and 
Corinthians when they tried to harass the Athenians s they passed through their 
territory.24  At this time, Timophanes was probably tyrant of Corinth, who may have 
found it politically expedient to abandon temporarily neutrality by ingratiating himself to 
Epaminondas and the Thebans.25  Given that Xenophon’s sons were among these riders 
                                                                                                                                      
23 Delebecque 1957: 339 is the primary proponent of the 366/5 date; however, most scholars date the recall
to ca. 371-69; see, for example, Breitenbach 1967: 15 6, Anderson 1974: 192, 198, and Higgins 1977: 128 
24 So Breitenbach, cited by Underhill 1900: 304, who also endorses this interpretation.  It is puzzling that 
Anderson 1986 fails to mention any of these events in his piece “Xenophon at Corinth.”  Needless to say, I 
have not taken seriously his claim that Xenophon stayed in Corinth because of his “failure both to establish 
himself in Athenian intellectual circles and to come face to face with the realities of Athenian finance and 
politics” (39).   
25 Scholars have dated Timophanes’ stint as tyrant to 366/5 for reasons that seem very dubious to me.  
Plutarch claims that after his murder of Timophanes, Timoleon did nothing of public concern for “nearly 
twenty years” (εἴκοσι σχεδὸν ἐτῶν) because of his grief (Timoleon 7.1).  The event that brought him out 
of his depression was the offer to command an army to liberate Syracuse, which Diodorus (16.65.2) dates 
to 346/5 but most likely occurred the following year in 345/4 (Bicknell 1984).  Scholars have found 
Plutarch’s twenty-year remark convenient because hi account of Timophanes’ seizure of power (Timoleon 
4.4) corresponds nicely with Xenophon’s narrative of the Corinthian dismissal of the Athenian garrison in 
366/5 (Hellenica 7.4.4-6).  There, it may be recalled, Xenophon claims that after the Athenians left the city, 
the Corinthians began to pay mercenaries for the protection of their city.  According to Plutarch’s account, 
Timophanes was put in command of a mercenary force for the protection of the city in the context of a 
battle between Corinth and Argos/Cleonae (4.4; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1306a20-25).  Thus, the two events 
concerning mercenaries of which Plutarch and Xenophon speak are one and the same, and therefore 
Timophanes’ seizure of power and murder at the hands of his brother occurred sometime in 366/5 
(Westlake 1952: 59-61; Salmon 1984: 384-6).  There a numerous problems, however, with this 
interpretation.  First, Plutarch does not say “twenty years” but “nearly twenty years.”  Therefore, a date of 
366/5 for Timophanes’ tyranny and murder cannot be maintained.  If one takes “nearly twenty years” to 
include nineteen through seventeen years from the tim of Timoleon’s acceptance of his command in 
345/4, then the date of Timophanes’ murder must have t ken place sometime between 364/3-362/1 (his 
actual seizure of power probably occurred in the same year judging from the accounts of Plutarch and 
Nepos, Timoleon 1).  Moreover, Aristotle says that Timophanes’ seizure of power is a perfect example of 
when oligarchs, distrusting the people during a state of war, vote to entrust a mercenary army to a leading 
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whom the Corinthians attacked, it is difficult to imagine that this event did not precipitate 
a break between Xenophon and his host city.  If this interpretation is correct, then the 
obvious question arises as to why Xenophon returned to Corinth at the end of his life.  
Though the chronology of events at Corinth in the 360’s is often confused, Timophanes’ 
assassination must have occurred shortly after Mantinea, and therefore the moderate 
oligarchy that originally had welcomed Xenophon was re tored by the mid 350’s.26  
Perhaps Xenophon was visiting the city in some private or public capacity. 
Secondly, as already mentioned, Xenophon sent his two sons, Gryllus and 
Diodorus, to fight among the Athenian contingent at Mantinea in 362.  This event 
indicates that the Athenians not only had recalled X nophon by this date, but that the two 
parties were completely reconciled.  Gryllus served in the cavalry, but Diodorus may 
                                                                                                                                      
man who then becomes tyrant.  This comment dovetails with Plutarch, who says Timophanes became 
tyrant during a state of war: “But when the Corinthans, fearing that they would lose the city and suffer the 
sorts of things they had previously at the hands of their allies, voted to maintain four hundred mercenaries 
and place Timophanes’ in command of them” (ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεδιότες, μὴ πάθοιεν οἷα καὶ 
πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν, ἐψηφίσαντο τρέφειν ξένους 
τετρακοσίους καὶ τούτων ἄρχοντα Τιμοφάνην κατέστησαν).  If one follows the traditional 
chronology, then Plutarch’s πρότερον makes no sense, because the only abuse we know that Corinth 
suffered from their allies was that committed by the Athenians in 366/5, when Chares and the garrison tried 
to take over.  Indeed, Xenophon mentions that the Corinthians began to employ mercenaries after this plot 
had been exposed, but his remarks must be taken to r fer to a general ongoing policy in the years following 
this event.  Lastly, the war with Argos and Cleonae do s not fit the period 369/8-366/5, because these are 
the years when the Athenians occupied Corinth.  We do learn of an Argive plot, under the leadership of 
some Corinthian exiles, to take over the city in the period after Leuctra (Diodorus 15.40.3 with Salmon 
1984: 374, n. 15), but the attempt failed and the conspirators were put to death.  A more serious attemp  to 
take over Corinth occurred in 369/8 during Epaminondas’ second Peloponnesian invasion.  The result of 
this particular attack on Corinth, however, demonstrated to all would-be conspirators that, as long as the 
Athenians were entrenched in the city, Corinth could not be taken without great losses.  Thus, a joint 
Argos/Cleonae attack on Corinth makes sense only after the Athenians had been kicked out of the city in 
366/5.  This chronology is preferable because it not o ly makes Plutarch’s πρότερον comprehensible but 
also explains well the oligarchs’ “fear” (Plutarch) and “distrust” (Aristotle) toward the demos.  As Salmon 
1984: 379, 385, n. 73 argues persuasively, the oligarchs feared not so much a “democratic revolution” but a 
demos that did not accept the foreign policy of the oligarchs (traditionally pro-Spartan but now in the late 
360’s perhaps pro-Theban).  Thus what the oligarchs eally feared was the Corinthian demos inviting the
Athenians back into the city.  According to Plutarch (4.1), Timophanes was the cavalry commander during 
the battle against Argos/Cleonae; could he have been p rsonally in command of a mercenary contingent of 
cavalry that attacked the Athenian cavalry on the way to Mantinea?              
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have fought as a hoplite, though his service in the cavalry cannot be ruled out (Ephorus 
70 F 85; Diogenes 2.54).27  Laforse points out that even if one accepts the tradition that 
Gryllus and Diodorus trained in the Spartan agoge, the two could not have learned more 
than the most basic horsemanship skills in Sparta, for cavalry training was not part of the 
regular curriculum.28  It is likely then that Xenophon’s sons trained as riders only when 
they arrived in Athens.  Once there, they must have been admitted to the citizen registers; 
only Athenian citizens could serve in the cavalry, and Xenophon’s presence in Athens 
would have been necessary to attest to their age and legitimacy before his native 
demesmen of Erchia.29  Naturally then it must be inferred from this that Xenophon’s 
patrimony was not only restored (that is, of course, if his estate was even confiscated in 
the first place) but was also substantial enough to support one, if not two, cavalrymen.30  
                                                                                                                                      
26 See previous note. 
27 Diogenes only mentions that “Gryllus was posted with the cavalry” (ὁ δὲ Γρύλλος τεταγμένος κατὰ 
ἱππέας) (2.54); yet, practically everyone since Grote 1869: vol. 8, 481 states uncritically that both served 
in the cavalry; see, for example, Delebecque 1957: 360, Breitenbach 1967: 1576, Tuplin 1993: 32, and 
Laforse 1997: 88. 
28 Laforse 1997: 83 
29 Breitenbach 1967: 1576, citing an early article by Wilamowitz.  There is little chance that his sons were 
registered prior to their arrival in Athens, because Gryllus, the eldest, was born no earlier than ca. 398-7 
(Delebecque 1957: 126-7) but probably after 392 (Laforse 1997: 81).  However, if one accepts the 394 date
of Xenophon’s exile, then it is entirely possible that Xenophon returned to Athens sometime after his 
campaign in Asia (for which there is no ancient evid nce) and had his son(s) registered in his p ratry, 
which would have offered some indication of their age and legitimacy to Xenophon’s fellow demesmen 
(Rhodes 1981: 499).  
30 Delebecque 1957: 360 and Laforse 1997: 88.  As Davies 1981: vi puts it: “…service in the cavalry 
…can and should be used as an objective index of wealth closely comparable, in the level of wealth it 
presupposes, to membership of the trierarchic panel of 1200…” even though the polis gave cavalry 
members in the fourth century a fodder grant (sitos) of 4 obols a day and a capital loan (katastasis) for the 
purchase of a mount (horses averaged 5 mina in 4th c.).  The latter had to be paid back to the state at 
retirement (see Kroll 1977: 97-100 and Rhodes 1981: 303-4, 565); and as Kroll 1977: 98-9 notes well, even 
if it is assumed that the state remitted the rider’s loan in case of a loss in war, he was probably requi d to 
make up the difference between the purchase price and the evaluation at the time of loss due to 
depreciation, which could amount to a mina per year (according to 3rd c. figures).             
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Given these considerations, neither financial nor plitical obstacles would have 
discouraged Xenophon from returning to his homeland.    
Thirdly, the aftermath of Mantinea provides tantalizing clues regarding 
Xenophon’s whereabouts and status among his fellow citizens.  Diogenes states on the 
authority of Aristotle that “innumerable authors wrote encomia and funeral orations for 
Gryllus, some, in part, to gratify his father” (ἐγκώμια καὶ ἐπιτάφιον Γρύλλου μυρίοι 
ὅσοι συνέγραψαν, τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι) (2.55; Aristotle, Fg. 68 
Rose).  Diogenes, citing the Peripatetic Hermippus, claims that even Isocrates wrote an 
encomium of Gryllus.  In fact, Aristotle entitled an early anti-rhetorical dialogue Gryllus 
(Quintilian 2.17.14; Fg. 69 Rose), which some interpret as a polemic against Isocrates 
and his brand of rhetoric.31  Apparently, this panegyrical movement surrounding Gryllus 
extended to the visual arts as well.  Not only did the painter Euphranor depict Gryllus 
conspicuously in a painting in the stoa of Zeus Eleuth rius but he actually portrays 
Gryllus himself mortally wounding Epaminondas (Pausanias 1.3.4; 8.9.8; 8.11.6; 9.15.5; 
Plutarch, Moralia 346b-e; Pliny, Natural History 35.129).32  Euphranor placed this scene 
                                                
31 Chroust 1965; cf. Tuplin 1993: 32, n.79.  What may h ve been so objectionable is that Gryllus figured 
predominately in the funeral oration itself; judgin from surviving examples (Pericles, Lysias, Plato, and 
Demosthenes) specific individuals are never named: rather it is the larger group of fallen that anonymously 
receive praise.  Demosthenes implicitly criticizes this new movement toward individual praise in his 
funeral oration written for the fallen at Chaeronea in 338: “I believe also that if someone were to ask those 
in the opposite ranks whether they thought they had won by their own deeds of valor or by a startling and 
cruel turn of fortune and by the skill and daring of their own commander, not one of them would be so 
shameless or audacious as to claim credit for what happened” (60.21).  The only parallel to the epitaphion 
of Gryllus is Hyperides’ funeral oration, written i 322, which gives pride of place to the general 
Leosthenes.  Interestingly, Xenophon, who is not adverse to giving individuals their due in the Hellenica, 
praises the fallen cavalry of Mantinea in the most re erved fashion, as if to distance himself rhetorically 
from the hyperbole surrounding his son’s name: “of these good men died” (αὐτῶν δ’ ἀπέθανον ἄνδρες 
ἀγαθοί) (7.5.17).       
32 Pomeroy 1994: 8, 265 notes the possibility that Xenophon set the conversation between Ischomachus 
and Socrates at the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherius in the Oeconomicus (7.1) in order to honor Gryllus; if true, 
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opposite the paintings of the twelve gods and the hero Theseus, thus elevating the cavalry 
skirmish to epic proportions.33 
Aristotle says these encomia and funeral orations were written, “in part to gratify 
his father” (τὸ μέρος καὶ τῷ πατρὶ χαριζόμενοι).34  As Tuplin rightly notes, there is 
no reason “to impugn the historicity of [this] motivation or to deny the conclusion one 
would otherwise naturally draw, that Xenophon was a figure of some standing in (at least 
some) Athenian circles in the late 360s and, in the absence of countervailing evidence, 
presumably later as well.”35  Though we do not know exactly what Aristotle means here 
by χαρίζεσθαι (commonly translated as “to gratify,” “to show favor,” or “to do a 
favor”), the verb, as it was commonly used in classical Athens, implies the existence of a 
nexus of social and political relationships between the person doing a favor and the 
recipient.36  Though Xenophon had been in exile for thirty some years, it is not 
improbable that he maintained ties with friends and family in Athens as many notable 
Athenian exiles had done in the past, men such as Themistocles and Alcibiades.  That 
                                                                                                                                      
then the Oeconomicus must have been published after 362, a date that is not at variance with Delebecque 
1957: 376.   
33 Vasic 1979: 345-8. 
34 The addition of τὸ μέρος presumably means that the main reason many wrote encomia and epitaphion 
was to praise Gryllus, but we cannot rule out other motives.  For one thing, the Athenians were proud f the 
cavalry’s performance at Mantinea, which was viewed as a victory of sorts—one which was not seen since 
the days of the Decelean war—and it would have been only natural that the hippeis wished to play up this 
popular perception (Bugh 1988: 150 and Laforse 1997: 8 ).  However I do not agree with Ollier 1959: 428, 
who suggests that the eulogies were only ostensibly in honor of Gryllus and more a means of defending 
Callistratus’ aggressive foreign policy than anything else.  This interpretation flies in the face of the visual 
evidence, which, under the influence of these encomia, gives pride of place to Gryllus himself.  
35 Tuplin 1993: 32; cf. Giglioni 1970: xi, n.23, Laforse 1997: 89-90, and Humble 2002: 84. 
36 For Aristotle’s discussion of charis, see Rhetoric 1385a15ff; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1133a1-5.  For the 
meaning of charis in its political and social contexts, see Hewitt 1927, Connor 1992: 35-54, Dover 1974: 
202-3, 276-8, and Ober 1989: 226-30.  It is interesting to point out that Aristotle says that those who are in 
exile have some of the most pressing “needs” for charis (Rhetoric 1385a24-5); though Xenophon was 
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Xenophon had sent his only two sons to fight and die for Athens, when he had only just 
been recalled, was a mighty token of his charis for his native city, and for this gift many 
Athenians felt obliged.  One well established way of “showing favor” in the Greek world 
was through literary enterprise.37  Indeed, in the Gorgias, Socrates even defines rhetoric 
as the “ability to gratify people” (χαρίζεσθαι ἀνθρώποις) (462c). 
Xenophon’s writing of Hipparchicus, On Horsemanship, and Poroi—the fourth 
area of evidence—is another indication Xenophon’s charis for the Athenians.  While 
Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, and Symposium, for example, are Athenian, not only in 
respect to their setting and characters but also in their themes and ideals, it is significant 
that Xenophon shifted his literary focus at the end of his life to include didactic and 
advice-driven works addressed directly to his fellow citizens.38  In the Hipparchicus, 
Xenophon counsels a would-be Athenian cavalry commander on how best to organize, 
train, supply, and discipline the cavalry corps.39  The work cannot be dated with absolute 
precision but it must belong to the years between 360 and 358, that is, several years after 
Xenophon’s exile had been lifted.40  A concerted effort on behalf of the cavalry, as 
                                                                                                                                      
probably recalled by the time these encomia were composed, some may have felt obliged to gratify 
Xenophon as a kind of back-payment for his past servic s.      
37 See, for example, Kurke 1991: Chapter 4 and MacLachlan 1993.  
38 For the Athenocentric interpretation of Xenophon’s Socratic works, see Croiset 1947: 402, Luccioni 
1953: 101-9, 161-3, and Higgins 1977: Chapter 7, esp. pp. 131-2.  
39 Much like the Poroi, the Hipparchicus is rich in details concerning Athenian customs, institutions, 
history, and topography (e.g., 1.2, 8, 9, 19, 26; 2.2 3.1-3, 6-7, 10-14; 7.1-4; 9.3-6). 
40 Originally, scholars were content to date Hipparchicus to the mid 360s because at 7.1-3 Xenophon 
claims that Athens “has rivals on its borders in the s ape of cavalry as numerous as its own and large fo c s 
of infantry”; he then goes on to name Thebes explicitly: “And remember, the Athenians are as proud of 
their ancestry as the Boeotians.”  This reference to Thebes, it is thought, is a warning to the Athenians on 
the coming storm before Mantinea in 362 (see, for example, Marchant 1925: xxviii and Higgins 1977: 131, 
177, n.27).  Ekman 1933: 31ff., on the other hand, argues that the text was written in two stages: 1) pre-
Mantinea, in which Xenophon instructs Gryllus on how t  take command of the Athenian cavalry; and 2) 
post-Mantinea, in which Xenophon turns his attention t  the general reader.  Little commends either of 
these dating schemes.  First, Xenophon’s phrase, “cavalry as numerous as its own,” makes no sense before 
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Mantinea had demonstrated well to all observant Athenians, could be counted upon to 
help the city significantly in achieving its military objectives.  Therefore, the job of the 
hipparch was crucial, especially since his task was to see that the cavalry remain 1,000 
riders strong, a number fixed by law.41  However, numbers were not everything (again 
demonstrated by Mantinea, at least according to Xenophon in Hellenica 7.5.16-17), and 
thus Xenophon goes to great lengths to show the hipparch how to make the cavalry the 
best fighting force possible.42  Who is this would-be hipparch to whom Xenophon 
counsels?  On Horsemanship, the companion piece to the Hipparchicus, provides an 
answer to this question.   
At the end of the work, Xenophon alerts the reader to the existence of the 
Hipparchicus, which indicates that On Horsemanship must post date the Hipparchicus: “I 
have written these notes, instructions, and exercises for the private person; those things 
                                                                                                                                      
Mantinea considering the Athenian cavalry was greatly outnumbered by the Boeotians and Thessalians at 
Mantinea (Hellenica 7.5.16; Diodorus 15.84.4); but Xenophon’s comment fits well to the period after 
Mantinea, when the Athenians successfully broke the T ssalians away from the Boeotian alliance in 361/0 
(GHI2 44).  Yet, it is important to note that the threat of Thebes was not neutralized after Mantinea.  As late
as the Poroi, which dates securely to 355 (see below, Section 2C), Xenophon still mentions the Thebans by 
name as a hazard to their territory (4.46).  Furthermore, in 357 the Boeotians invaded Euboea, which 
precipitated an Athenian counter-attack and invasion of the island (Demosthenes 8.74-5; Aeschines 3.85; 
Diodorus 16.7.1: note that Diodorus dates the invasion to 358/7, but he is mistaken since Diocles, the 
commander of the expedition, was general in 357/6 (see SIG3 190, 23; cf. IG II 2 124, which is the text of 
the peace treaty between the Euboeans dated under the a chonship of Agathocles = 357/6).  As Delebecqu 
1957: 430 rightly notes, there is no hint in the Hipparchicus of such events.  Thus, 357 is a convincing 
terminus ante quem for the work, “a time when the Athenians perceived the Thebans ready for war before 
they knew whether they would come against Euboea or Attica, or against Euboea by passing through 
Attica” (430-1).  However, Delebecque’s arguments for dating the work firmly in 357, based on perceived 
similarities with Aeneas Tacticus, cannot be maintained (see Appendix 1).  I therefore propose a date 
sometime between 360-58.   
41 Rhodes 1981: 303-4 and Bugh 1988: 76.  Kroll 1977: 97-8, n. 36 argues persuasively that Xenophon’s 
reference to a 40-talent a year expenditure on the cavalry should not be used to support the idea that the 
number of Athenian cavalry had dropped to about 650 in Xenophon’s day; as Kroll notes, the sitos payment 
at this time was 4 obols a day (and not one drachma), which, when divided into 40 talents, yields nearly 
1000 riders who are able to be maintained by the stat .    
42 Naturally, Xenophon’s talents lent themselves well to this enterprise; after all, he “had a long experience 
of service in the cavalry” (On Horsemanship 1.1).  See Breitenbach 1967: 1573, Anderson 1974: 15-18, 55-
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which are appropriate for a cavalry commander to knw and do have been explained in 
another work” (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ὑπομνήματα καὶ μαθήματα καὶ 
μελετήματα γεγράφθω ἡμῖν. ἃ δὲ ἱππάρχῳ προσῆκεν εἰδέναι τε καὶ πράττειν 
ἐν ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ δεδήλωται) (12.14).  The “private person” of which Xenophon speaks 
is, in fact, the same individual(s) he addresses at the outset; there Xenophon says he 
wishes to explain the art of horsemanship “to his younger friends” (τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν 
φίλων) (1.1).43  Though Xenophon may seem to be making an implicit contrast in these 
two works between the private individual, on the one hand, who rides horses as part of 
some idle aristocratic pastime and, on the other, t politically engaged hipparch who is 
always ready for war, nothing could be further from the truth.  In On Horsemanship, not 
only do the learning of horsemanship and service in the cavalry go together but 
horsemanship and a career in politics intersect as well.44  Accordingly, when Xenophon 
points his younger philoi in the direction of the Hipparchicus, he is telling them not 
where they may learn how to become a good and competent hipparch in any state but a 
good and competent hipparch in Athens specifically.  For Xenophon, helping friends 
advance their public careers, a primary duty of a “good friend” according to Socrates 
(Memorabilia 2.4.6), relates directly to his program of benefiting and serving the polis.  
As Higgins puts it, Xenophon is “not the man who hunted and farmed abroad in Skillous, 
                                                                                                                                      
57, and Laforse 1997: 16-31 for the arguments, which are not always persuasive, concerning Xenophon’s 
possible service in the cavalry during the latter half of the Peloponnesian war and under the Thirty.  
43 The view of Delebecque 1957: 243 that τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων refers to Xenophon’s sons is quite 
a stretch and is rightly rejected by Breitenbach 1967: 1764.      
44 2.1-2; 11.8-13; 12.1-13; cf. Memorabilia 3.3.3-4 and Oeconomicus 11.17, where Xenophon has 
Ischomachus  spend his private time on his estate pr cticing cavalry maneuvers for war.   
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much less the man who fought for Cyrus, but the return d Socratic advising his fellow 
Athenians…what he thinks best for the city.”45   
The fifth area of evidence concerns Xenophon’s relationship to his 
contemporaries.  Xenophon did not restrict his post-exile literary activity to advice-giving 
treatises but wrote many different kinds of works that seem to be in dialogue with the 
leading Athenian intellectuals of the day.46  On the one hand, there is the ancient 
biographical tradition, which mentions, for example, the rivalry between Xenophon and 
Plato or how Xenophon achieved great fame by publishing Thucydides’ History 
(Diogenes 2.57-8; 3.34; cf. Athenaeus 504e-505b).  However, many of these anecdotes 
only serve to highlight the points of contact and allusions in the works of Xenophon and 
his contemporaries, and these allusions are likely to be the source of the anecdotes 
themselves.47   For example, Aulus Gellius’ claim (14.3) about Plato’s Laws being a 
response to the Cyropaedia no doubt stems from a passage in the Laws where the 
Athenian stranger criticizes Cyrus’ “education” (694c-695b).48 For the most part, 
scholars have tended to assert Xenophon’s indebtedness to what they perceive to be the 
“greater minds” of the era; naturally, Plato, Aeschines Socraticus, Antisthenes, and 
Isocrates influenced Xenophon but not the other way around.49  Caution is needed, 
                                                
45 Higgins 1977: 132; cf. Luccioni 1953: 163. 
46 Scholars have yet to establish satisfactorily the c ronology of Xenophon’s works, but Hiero, Hellenica 
6-8, Memorabilia 3-4, Agesilaus, Oeconomicus 6-21, and Cyropaedia likely postdate Mantinea.  In general, 
see Delebecque 1957.  Higgins 1977 overstates the unitarian thesis and goes too far in rejecting 
Delebecque’s analytic approach, but he is perhaps right to point out that there is no evidence that makes it 
incumbent upon us to date any of Xenophon’s works pior to the mid 360s.   
47 Münscher 1920: 1-35 is still the best introduction t  Xenophon’s influence in the fourth century.   
48 Higgins 1977: 58 and Tatum 1989: 226. 
49 The bibliography on Xenophon’s relationship to Plato is extensive, especially because of their 
connection to the figure of Socrates; see, above all, Gray 1998: 1-25 for an introduction to the key issues 
and previous scholarship; for specific works, see Delebecque 1957: 388-9, Tatum 1989: 38-41, 225-34, 
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especially because the works of Xenophon’s contemporaries cannot always be dated with 
precision.50  Moreover, the “influence” model is not always the b st way of addressing 
textual similarities between authors; I prefer to see Xenophon and his contemporaries in 
dialogue with one another, responding to and “correcting” each other’s views.  This 
scholarly debate over influence and indebtedness underscores the main issue at hand: 
does Xenophon’s treatment of his contemporaries’ ideas and theirs of his indicate that 
Xenophon was just an accidental tourist of Athens during the last part of his life or a 
serious intellectual whose presence in Athens preciitated vigorous responses, especially 
from his fellow Socratics?   
The foregoing arguments, as inferential as they may be, suggest strongly that 
Xenophon returned to Athens shortly after Mantinea in 362 as a man of social standing 
and prestige.  No one argument enjoins this interpretation, but taken cumulatively they 
are more persuasive than the arguments (or rather, the lack of arguments as is often the 
case) put forward in support of the idea that he resided in Corinth until his death.51  
Surprisingly, scholars have not fully exploited allthe evidence on this issue, largely 
                                                                                                                                      
Gera 1993: 12-14, and Humble 2002: 74-5 for Republic, Laws and Cyropaedia; for the two Symposiums, 
Thesleff 1978; the two Apologies, Danzig 2003; the Meno and Memorabilia, Mitscherling 1982.  For 
Xenophon’s indebtedness to Thucydides, see Henry 1967: 54-89 and Hornblower 1995: 50-51.  See 
Pomeroy 1994: 72-3, 229, 233-4, 260, 264 for the shadowy figure of Aeschines Socraticus and the 
relationship between his Aspasia and the Oeconomicus.  The connection between Xenophon and Isocrates 
is perhaps the most controversial; see Mathieu 1925: 181-5, Luccioni 1948: 205-6, 283, Delebecque 1957: 
474-5, Bringmann 1965: 73, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, Giglioni 1970: xxiii-xxiv, xxvi, xxviii, Higgins 1977: 
138, Schütrumpf 1982: 53-65, Tuplin 1993: 33-4, Dillery 1993: 6-7 and 1995: 54-8, and Gray 2000.     
50 This is especially the case with Isocrates’ On the Peace and Areopageticus—two works that are often 
dated before the Poroi, in part, because the similarities between the two authors are assumed to evidence 
Xenophon’s indebtedness to Isocrates; see Norlin 1931, Jaeger 1940, Bringmann 1965: 59, and Wallace 
1986.   
51 See Anderson 1986, who fails to address any of these six areas of evidence in support of Xenophon’s 
return to Athens.  Strangely, he rests much of his case on what he sees to be the “impracticality of some of 
the advice offered in the Poroi,” which is “due to the fact that the author was writing from a distance” (36).     
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ignoring the textual clues Xenophon himself provides in the Poroi.52  This is the sixth 
and final area of evidence.  Xenophon’s use of deictics is particularly insightful in this 
regard.  Deictics, from the Greek δείκνυμι, “to point out,” are words that specify 
identity, spatial location, or temporal location relative to the speaker or hearer in the 
context in which communication occurs; they usually include but are not restricted to 
demonstratives, pronouns, tense, and aspect.53  As indexical signs, deictics generally 
point to referents outside the text or, if performed, outside the utterance of the speaker; 
they bring a reader or listener to the origo of a utterance, a nexus of “here”/“now”/“I.”54  
The examination of deictics, therefore, can provide valuable insights into the context or 
location of a given text or speech act.   
Xenophon richly contextualizes his utterances for his audience (and for us, for 
that matter) with many spatial and temporal deictics.  First, Xenophon’s repeated use of 
locatives such as Ἀθήνησι (1.1; 2.6, 7; 5.4) and place names like Ἀθήναι (1.6, 8; 3.2; 
5.2, 10), Ἀττική (1.2), Πειραιεύς (3.13), etc. clearly situate the audience and, more 
importantly, the speaker squarely in Athens.  Xenophon’s employment of the spatial 
deictic ἐνθάδε, “here,” twice at the beginning of the Poroi confirms this interpretation: 
“The extreme mildness of the seasons here is evidenced by the very products of the land.  
                                                
52 Thiel 1922: xxv and Delebecque 1957: 475, 496, n. 28 are the two notable exceptions but they mention 
these textual clues only in passing.   
53 For discussions of deictic theory and its application o classical literature, see Felson 1999 and Bakker 
1999, who cites his previous work on the subject. 
54 Felson 1999: 3 paraphrasing Bühler, Theory of Language 137-57.  As will be clear from the following 
discussion, I am arguing that Xenophon’s use of deictics is “literal,” that is, he employs them as a 
demonstration ad oculos not as an “imagination-orientated deixis (Felson 1999: 3, n.8).  The latter is more 
common in fictional narratives and is the subject of Felson’s and Bakker’s work on Greek poetic narrative.  
While Xenophon is not adverse to using focalization in his historical writing, I think it would be a stretch to 
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At any rate products that cannot even grow elsewhere in the world grow here” (οὐκοῦν 
τὸ μὲν τὰς ὥρας ἐνθάδε πρᾳοτάτας εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα μαρτυρεῖ· ἃ 
γοῦν πολλαχοῦ οὐδὲ βλαστάνειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἐνθάδε καρποφορεῖ) (1.3).  This 
adverb of place in Xenophon always means “here,” from the point of view of the speaker, 
and contrasts sharply with ἐκεῖ, “there.”55  Interestingly, when Xenophon talks about the 
mining district of Attica, which was situated about 40 miles southeast of the city center of 
Athens, he uses ἐκεῖ instead of ἐνθάδε (4.26, 49)  Accordingly, the deictic center or 
orienting point of the text is Athens itself with Xenophon firmly situated in its midst.  
This is strong evidence that Xenophon composed the Poroi while living in Athens.   
While one may object that place of composition and permanent place of residence 
are two distinct issues, the proem demonstrates that Xenophon composed the Poroi over 
a period of several years, which therefore indicates that his return to Athens was more or 
less permanent. 
Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται 
ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι 
προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον 
οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους 
πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς 
πόλεις… 
 
                                                                                                                                      
argue that Xenophon’s extensive use of deictic markers suggests he was writing the Poroi in Corinth and 
not Athens.  The deictics of the proem point in the dir ction of a face-to-face dialogical context.      
55 See, for example, Cyropaedia 1.3.15-16; Memorabilia 2.9.3; 3.3.14; Oeconomicus 7.2.3; Hellenica 
2.3.24; 2.3.37; 6.5.45; cf. the locution οἱ ἐνθάδε, “men here” (Cyropaedia 8.6.6; Plato, Symposium 182c5; 
Phaedo 109e4, 110e4; Theages 122e9) versus οἱ ἐκεῖ, “men there” (Thucydides 6.11.4; Plato, Apology 
41c4).  See also the comments of Richards 1907: 95 and Frisch 1942: 91-98, who claims the distinction 
between ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ is generally maintained in Greek after ca. 400 BC. 
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I have always held the opinion that states’ constitutions are determined by 
the character of its leading politicians.  However, when some of the 
leading politicians at Athens kept saying that they understood justice no 
less than other men, but on account of the poverty of the multitude they 
felt that they were compelled to be rather unjust in heir treatment of the 
allied cities… (1.1). 
 
Xenophon’s use of the deictic adverb ἐπεί, “when,” which modern translators usually 
ignore, brings us to a time and situation that make int lligible the remarks of both 
Xenophon and the prostatai.56  On the one hand, ἐπεί points generally to a time when 
Athens’ unjust treatment of the allies was a point of contention, that is, to the period 
before the Social War, which began in 357.57  On the other hand, ἐπεί points also to a 
discursive context in which certain prostatai were saying that they “understood justice no 
less than other men.”  This discursive context was di logic in nature, involving numerous 
exchanges between Xenophon and the prostatai, as indicated by the imperfect tense of 
ἔλεγον (another deictic marker).  As Gauthier rightly observes, the expression 
γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων is Socratic 
and therefore points directly to the Memorabilia, where Xenophon has Socrates converse 
with certain Athenian prostatai about τὸ δίκαιον.58  It is important to stress that these 
conversations occur in Book IV, which dates generally to the period after Mantinea.59  
While the setting and characters belong to the fifth century, the ideas and sentiments that 
                                                
56 In Xenophon, ἐπεί with the indicative often means “when,” but “since” cannot be ruled out (Richards 
1907: 89).  To my knowledge, only Moyle 1697 and Giglioni 1970 translate ἐπεί in its causal sense.  
However, the two sentences are connected syntactically by the μέν...δέ construction, and therefore ἐπεί 
should be taken as a temporal follow-up of ἀεί.  
57 Gauthier 1976: 37 and Thiel 1922: 3. 
58 Gauthier 1976: 37-8, citing Memorabilia 4.2.20; cf. 4.4.1-25 and Luccioni 1953: 163. 
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the characters express are thoroughly grounded in the experiences of the late 360s and 
350s.  It would seem then that Xenophon not only returned to Athens but that he actively 
engaged certain Athenian prostatai about the injustice of the Athenian empire and the 
nature of justice more generally.60   
 
2C. Date of Composition  
 
According to the traditional dating scheme, to which I subscribe, Xenophon 
finished the Poroi in 355/4 and probably circulated it immediately afterwards.61  First, in 
his discussion of the amount of money obtained from slave labor in the Attic mines 
before the Spartan occupation of Decelea in 413, Xenophon exhorts his readers to 
corroborate his figures, that is, he asks, “if there a e still some old enough to remember” 
(εἴ τινες ἔτι εἰσὶ τῶν μεμνημένων) (4.25).  This phrase implies that the generation to 
which he himself belongs (those born ca. 430-25) was quickly dwindling.  Thus, scholars 
posit reasonably a terminus ante quem of ca. 350-45, for there would have been very few 
octogenarians left at this time.  Xenophon’s references to the campaigns of Lysistratus 
and Hegesilaus to aid the Arcadians in 364 and 362 respectively (3.7) provide a terminus 
post quem.  Moreover, Xenophon twice refers to recent wars just concluded (4.40; 5.12).  
Given the upper and lower dating parameters, there are only three possibilities: Mantinea 
(362); the Social War (355/4); and the war against Philip and the Third Sacred War (346).  
                                                                                                                                      
59 Delebecque 1957: 476-95; cf. Luccioni 1953: 104.  
60 As I argue in Section 2E, Xenophon’s relationship with these prostatai must be understood 
“Socratically,” which for Xenophon entails the active and direct involvement in the affairs of one’s philoi 
for their benefit. 
61 “Traditional,” because Moyle 1697: 57-62 was the first to offer a scholarly treatment for dating the ext, 
which more or less corresponds to the arguments of he ollowing: Zurborg 1874: 2-17, Thiel 1922: viii-
xiii, Giglioni 1970: vii-viii, Gauthier 1976: 4-6, 171, 209-10, and Bloch 2004. 
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Mantinea can be ruled out, because Xenophon qualifies the recent war with the phrase 
κατὰ θάλαττα, “by sea” (5.12).  Besides, Xenophon says the war greatly affected 
Athenian finances: “if someone examines the question, he will find out that even now in 
the present circumstances because of the war many of our revenues have ceased and what 
did come in were exhausted on all kinds of expenses” (γνώσεται δ’, ἢν σκοπῇ, καὶ ἐν 
τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ διὰ μὲν τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τῶν προσόδων πολλὰς ἐκλιπούσας 
καὶ τὰς εἰσελθούσας εἰς παντοδαπὰ [πολλὰ] καταδαπανηθείσας).  This kind of 
financial devastation is not only unattested after Mantinea but is also improbable given 
the nature of Athens’ income, which was derived from the “contributions” of coastal and 
island allies and taxes on sea-born commerce.  Thus, only two possible dates fit the 
evidence: 355/4 or 346. 
Historians have favored 355/4 for a variety of reasons, but two are particularly 
convincing.  First, Xenophon says that there are “some Athenians who wish to recover 
the hegemony” (ἡγεμονίαν βουλόμενοί τινες ἀναλαβεῖν) (5.5; cf. 5.8: 
ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας).  Xenophon’s subsequent narrative makes it certain that 
he is referring to the political milieu in the aftermath of the Social War.  He describes 
how the Athenians first acquired the hegemony over th  Greeks in the Persian Wars and 
subsequently lost it when “the city was stripped of its empire” after the Peloponnesian 
War (5.6).  Nevertheless, argues Xenophon, Athens’ allies were still willing to offer it 
“the leadership of the fleet again” (a reference to the formation of the Second Athenian 
Sea League in 378/7), and Thebes “placed itself under the hegemony of the Athenians” 
(that is, when the two cities formed an alliance in 379/8 after the Spartan seizure of the 
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Cadmea) (5.6-7).62   Thus, sometime after 379/8 the Athenians once again lost their 
hegemony over the Greeks, and the only time this occurred was in 355 at the end of the 
Social War.  Considering that Isocrates echoes similar sentiments in On the Peace (355) 
for recovering the lost hegemony (6, 138, 142, 144), Xenophon’s comments fit better to 
the period immediately after the termination of theSocial War than in 346, when concern 
for Philip was the primary foreign policy topic of the day. 
Second, Xenophon also alludes to the Phocian capture of Delphi, which 
precipitated the Third Sacred War:  
εἰ <δὲ> καὶ ὅπως τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερὸν αὐτόνομον ὥσπερ πρόσθεν 
γένοιτο φανεροὶ εἴητ’ ἐπιμελούμενοι, μὴ συμπολεμοῦντες ἀλλὰ 
πρεσβεύοντες ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν ἂν οἶμαι 
θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁμογνώμονάς τε 
καὶ συνόρκους καὶ συμμάχους λάβοιτε ἐπ’ ἐκείνους, οἵτινες 
ἐκλιπόντων Φωκέων τὸ ἱερὸν καταλαμβάνειν πειρῷντο63.  
 
Moreover, if you were openly trying to make the Delphic shrine 
autonomous just as it was in the past, not by joining in war but by sending 
embassies up and down Greece, I think that it would be the least bit 
surprising if you found all of the Greeks of one mind, joined in oaths, and 
                                                
62 Zurborg 1874: 3-4, Thiel 1922: viii, and Gauthier 1976: 207. 
63 Scholars have long made too much fuss over this line, and the manuscript reading ἐπειρῶντο should 
probably be restored.  Boeckh 1976: 600-1, n. 503, Cobet 1858: 761-3, Zurborg 1874: 37-8, and Thiel 
1922: xi-xii were all troubled by the imperfect tens  of the verb ἐπειρῶντο, which they felt obliged them 
to take the genitive absolute ἐκλιπόντων Φωκέων as referencing an event that had already happened: 
“because the Phocians have abandoned…”—an apparent ref rence to the events of 346; Holzapfel 1882: 
243ff. makes much of this in his arguments in favor of dating the Poroi to 346 (more below).  Madvig 
1871: 364, who got caught up in this confusion, found a way out by emendating ἐπειρῶντο to πειρῷντο: 
“If the event to which Xenophon refers has already happened, then πεπείρανται should have been 
written.  But he is refering to an uncertain future event (οἵτινες): πειρῷντο.”  This emendation has been 
universally accepted in all modern additions of the Poroi.  Yet, as the manuscript sentence reads, we have a 
normal past general condition (protasis = optative; apodosis = imperfect) with the exception that the 
indefinite relative pronoun ὅστις introduces the apodosis, a usage, though uncommon, is elsewhere attested 
(see, for example, Xenophon, Anabasis 1.1.5; cf. Smyth 2569).  The sentence can be translated as follows 
with no distortion in meaning to the traditional interpretation: “I think that it would be the least bi  
surprising if you found all of the Greeks of one mind, joined in oaths, and allies against those, whoever 
they are, that would ever try to seize the shrine if the Phocians one day abandoned it.”           
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allies against those, whoever they may be, that would try to seize the 
shrine if the Phocians abandon it (5.9). 
 
Although the chronology of the Third Sacred War is confused and a source of scholarly 
controversy, the Phocian seizure of the shrine, under the leadership of Philomelus, dates 
generally from spring/summer 356 to spring 355, with the latter date being preferable.64  
The Locrians immediately sent forces against the Phocians but were defeated handily.  
They then appealed to the Thebans, who voted for war and sent delegates to members of 
the Amphictyonic League, whose biannual meeting metin the fall of 355.  Meanwhile 
Philomelus too sent his own embassies to Athens, Sparta, and many other Greek cities to 
plead his case before the meeting of the Amphictyonic League.  Philomelus secured an 
alliance with Athens, Sparta, and a few other cities, whereas the Amphictyonic League 
voted for war against the Phocians.  Accordingly, Xenophon’s suggestion to send 
embassies throughout Greece indicates that the hostilities had reached a temporary lull, 
and therefore it is reasonable that the Poroi dates between the spring and fall of 355 as 
these negotiations were taking place.65  Because the peace ending the Social War was 
most likely concluded in midsummer, and that Xenophon refers to the war as the “recent 
war” (4.40), the Poroi should be dated squarely to late summer or early fll 355/4.66 
                                                
64 For the chronology of the Third Sacred War and the main issues, see Hammond 1937 and Sealey 1976: 
444-8, 463-8; Hammond advocates for spring/summer 356, whereas Sealey for spring 355.  The main 
ancient source is Diodorus 16.14.3-5; 16.23-33; 16.35-8.   
65 Gauthier 1976: 210 notes well that Xenophon’s idea of sending an embassy suggests a “pause” in 
hostilities, but, following Thiel 1922: xi-xii and Giglioni 1970: vii-viii, Gauthier assumes incorrectly hat 
this pause was between the Amphictyonic League’s declaration of war in fall 355 and “Onomarchus’ grand 
offensive in spring/summer 354;” thus all three scholars place the Poroi in the winter 355/4.   However, it 
is significant that both Hammond and Sealey place Onomarchus’ campaigns in spring/summer 353, and 
thus a winter 355/4 date does not fit chronologically.     
66 Hammond 1937: 74-5, 78; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 52-3.    
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 The arguments against 355/4 in favor of 346 are feeble and do not need to be 
rehearsed here, especially because Zurborg and Thiel hav  addressed them adequately.67  
However, over two decades ago Cataudella resurrected this old position and added one 
new argument to the mix, which recently has elicited he response of Bloch, who 
reaffirms the dating scheme for 355/4.68  Let me briefly summarize Cataudella’s new 
argument and then Bloch’s reply.  Cataudella maintains that Xenophon’s reference to at 
least two eisphorai levied during the recent war (4.40) cannot be corrobo ated by the 
evidence for the period 357-55, which, he claims, attests to only one.  The key passage is 
from Demosthenes, Against Androtion, written on behalf of Euctemon (22.48-9): 
οὗτος Εὐκτήμονα φήσας τὰς ὑμετέρας ἔχειν εἰσφορὰς καὶ τοῦτ’ 
ἐξελέγξειν ἢ παρ’ αὑτοῦ καταθήσειν, καταλύσας ψηφίσματι 
κληρωτὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ἐπὶ τὴν εἴσπραξιν 
παρέδυ.  δημηγορίαν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιούμενος, ὡς ἔστι 
τριῶν αἵρεσις, ἢ τὰ πομπεῖα κατακόπτειν ἢ πάλιν εἰσφέρειν ἢ 
τοὺς ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν, αἱρουμένων εἰκότως ὑμῶν τοὺς 
ὀφείλοντας εἰσπράττειν. 
 
He [sc. Androtion] said that Euctemon was retaining your taxes, and he 
undertook to prove the charge or pay the sum out of his own pocket.  On 
that pretext he got you to vote for the dismissal of an official appointed by 
lot, and so wormed his way into the office that collects the eisphorai.  He 
delivered sundry harangues on the subject, telling you that you had a 
choice of three courses, whether to break up the sacred plate, or to impose 
another eisphora, or to squeeze the money out of the defaulters; and you 
naturally chose the last (trans. Vince, slightly adapted).  
 
Euctemon delivered this speech in 355, which shows that Androtion was indicted in this 
year.  From this Cataudella reasonably assumes (as have most historians) that Androtion 
must have served as councilor in the previous year (356).  Since the Athenians voted that 
                                                
67 See, for example, Hagen 1866, Holzapfel 1882, and Sealey 1955: 76. 
68 Cataudella 1984 and Bloch 2004; cf. Tuplin 1993: 32, n.81, who responds briefly to Cataudella. 
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Androtion collect the unpaid eisphorai, Cataudella argues that the Athenians could not 
have imposed new eisphorai either in 356, because they decided to collect arrears 
instead, or in 355, because this would be the year Androtion was to collect the tax.  
Following Thomsen’s rather confused account of this speech, Cataudella supposes 
Euctemon was similarly engaged in collecting arrears in 357, and infers from this that no 
eisphora was levied in this year either.  Thus, Xenophon’s reference to multiple isphorai 
in 4.40 cannot be maintained for the years 357-5; but since two eisphorai were known to 
be collected in 347/46, Cataudella dates the text to 346.   
Against these rather tortured arguments, Bloch rightly points out that among 
Demosthenes’ alternatives, the orator states “imposing another eisphora” (πάλιν 
εἰσφέρειν), which even Thomsen takes to be an indication that the Athenians levied an 
eisphora in the first year of the Social War.69  Furthermore, Bloch takes issue with the 
logic of Cataudella, who reasons that eisphora cannot be levied when arrears were being 
collected; voting for collecting arrears does not necessarily exclude choosing one of the 
other two alternatives.70  I would also add that very little is known about the collection 
and payment of eisphorai at this time, and there is no evidence to my knowledge that 
eisphorai were collected in the year following their authorizat on—a point Cataudella 
takes for granted.  Lastly, and more convincingly, Isocrates in On the Peace also speaks 
of eisphora in the plural: “if we make peace…each day we shall advance in prosperity, 
relieved of eisphorai…” (καθ’ ἑκάστην δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν πρὸς εὐπορίαν 
ἐπιδώσομεν, ἀναπεπαυμένοι μὲν τῶν εἰσφορῶν) (20).  Cataudella may be correct 
                                                
69 Bloch 2004: 13 and Thomsen 1964: 230. 
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in viewing this sentence not as a statement of fact but of general truth, but as Bloch 
contends, Isocrates’ arguments for peace would be sev rely weakened if the Athenians 
had not been subject to at least some eisphorai during the Social War; why else should 
they vote for peace if the war had not been financilly taxing?  Given these troubles with 
Cataudella’s interpretation and the very persuasive arguments in favor of 355/4, we must 
reject 346 as the Poroi’s date of composition. 
 
2D. Genre and Audience  
The Poroi is a unique document of ancient political and economic discourse.  No 
other work from antiquity is akin to it, and like many of Xenophon’s works, it is very 
difficult to determine its literary antecedents and genre.  The only extant work that treats 
financial matters at length and with any kind of profundity is the second book of the 
Pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica, which is undoubtedly the work of an author different 
from that of the first book and dates reasonably to the last quarter of the fourth century.71  
In Siegecraft Aeneas Tacticus speaks of a book of his on procurement (ἡ Ποριστικὴ 
βίβλος) in the context of a chapter on how to promote homonoia among the citizens of a 
besieged city (14.1-2).72  The work is lost, and nothing is known about it apart from what 
Aeneas says in passing.  As I explain in Appendix 1, both Oeconomica and Procurement 
have little in common with the Poroi and therefore are not useful comparanda.  Besides 
these, no other works on finance from antiquity are either mentioned or alluded to in the 
                                                                                                                                      
70 Bloch 2004: 14. 
71 Van Groningen 1933: 34-7, 41-7. 
72 The Loeb edition translates Ποριστικὴ as “Finance”, which seems to me to be a bit misleading.  
Though finance was an important part of providing supplies for an army, it was not the only consideration; 
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works of other authors.  This is certain, at least for he period before Xenophon composed 
the Poroi, because when Aristotle was writing Book 1 of the Politics no such work 
existed: “A collection ought to be made of the scattered accounts of methods according to 
which some people have had success in making money…as it is also useful for statesmen 
to be acquainted with these financial schemes [sc. government monopolies], for many 
states are in need of money-making and the ways and means of acquiring money” (ἔτι δὲ 
καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, δι’ ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι, δεῖ 
συλλέγειν…χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. πολλαῖς γὰρ 
πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων) (1259a4-6, 33-35).73  While there 
are instances of works written on personal finance and household management during the 
fifth and fourth centuries, the Poroi was undoubtedly the first devoted to polis finance.74 
It is interesting that historians and writers of Greek literature textbooks have 
labeled the Poroi variously as an “essay,” “tract,” “treatise,” “pamphlet,” and “brochure,” 
terms which imply that the Poroi not only belongs to a specific genre but to a genre that 
                                                                                                                                      
hence LSJ cites this title under the entry for ποριστικός, translating it as “treatise on supply”; cf. 
Whitehead 1990 whose excellent translation bears the title Procurement. 
73 The date of the Politics is controversial.  Most date it generally to Aristotle’s Lyceum period 335-23.  
My own feeling is that Aristotle wrote Book 1 late as a second attempt at an introduction to the work (the 
original beginning being what is currently Book 2; see Jaeger 1934: Chapter 10).   
74 For works written on household management in addition o Xenophon’s own Oeconomicus, see 
Pomeroy 1994: 7-8, 46-50.  In Nicomachean Ethics 1096a6-10 Aristotle may be speaking of actual “works” 
on the subject of the money-making life (ὁ χρηματιστική) or of “arguments” in favor of money being the 
end for which humans seek: “The life of money-making is one of compulsion, and wealth is clearly not the 
good we are seeking…yet many arguments/works have been laid down in support of them (καίτοι πολλοὶ 
λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται).”  Unfortunately, LSJ confounds that matter even more under the 
entry for καταβάλλω (s.v. II. 7); while they cite Diogenes (9.13) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1.1) in 
support of the definition, “to be the author,” “to c mmit to writing,” they also include this passage as an 
example of the metaphorical definition: “fundamental.”  At any rate, whatever these λόγοι were, their 
orientation was clearly toward personal/household an not state finance, as the context of Aristotle’s 
remarks suggest. 
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more or less corresponds to a modern type.75  While the ancients made generic 
distinctions among their writings, their categories do not always correspond to those of 
the modern period.  This is particularly true of short-to- moderate-length prose work in 
the classical period.  In general, the Greeks referr d to them simply as “compositions” 
(συγγράμματα/συγγραφαί) and made no further generic distinctions as we do to ay 
with designations like essay, tract, treatise, etc. With the exception of ‘pamphlet’, to 
which I return at the end of this section, these modern terms are of limited value for the 
present analysis of the Poroi.  
In light of the Poroi’s subject matter, it is expedient to look to genres more 
appropriate to the expression of political views, and in Athens political discourse was 
essentially public in nature and the province of orat ry.  Indeed, researchers have 
detected many rhetorical features in the Poroi, even arguing that the work specifically 
takes the form of a public speech.  First, there is the view of Thiel, who argues that the 
Poroi specifically belongs to the genre of epideictic or “display” rhetoric.76  Thiel does 
not elaborate, but the idea has merit.  Chapter 1, in fact, is a veritable panegyric of 
Athens, its climate, geography, and products of the earth.  Here Xenophon employs many 
of the topoi found in epideictic speeches and discourses.  For example, Loraux notes the 
similarity between Pericles’ praise of Athens as a commercial center in the Funeral 
Oration with Poroi 1.7: “Moreover, though not entirely surrounded by the sea, just like 
an island all the winds bring to Athens the goods that it needs and sends out whatever 
                                                
75 Essay: Fowler 1923: 292, Rose 1934: 308, Jaeger 1944: 159, Murray 1957: 322; treatise: Mahaffy 1880: 
285, Jebb 1890: 114, Croiset 1947: 403, Doty 2003: 4; pamphlet: Müller 1971: 198-9, Jaeger 1938: 73, 
Giglioni 1970: xii, Anderson 1974: 193, Finley 1999: 163; brochure: Marchant 1923: xxv.  
76 Thiel 1922: xxx; cf. Andreades 1933: 382, n. 12: “In literary style it is akin to the epideictic speech s.”  
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exports it wishes; for Athens has sea on both sides.  And the city imports many goods 
over land as well; for it is on the mainland” (καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα ὅμως 
ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ 
βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι.  καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· 
ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν).77  Interestingly, Menander Rhetor, in his work on the 
classification of epideictic speeches, cites the Poroi in a chapter entitled, “How one must 
praise a country,” as a notable example of how to ex l a land partaking in the advantages 
of land and sea.78  Earlier, Isocrates expressed similar sentiments: “For Athens 
established the Piraeus as an emporium in the middle of Greece, an emporium having 
such an abundance that goods, which are difficult to get from other countries (usually one 
thing from each country), are easily able to be procu ed at Athens” (ἐμπόριον γὰρ ἐν 
μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατεσκευάσατο, τοσαύτην ἔχονθ’ ὑπερβολὴν 
ὥσθ’ ἃ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν παρ’ ἑκάστων χαλεπόν ἐστιν λαβεῖν, ταῦθ’ 
ἅπαντα παρ’ αὑτῆς ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πορίσασθαι) (Panegyricus 42).  The idea that the 
Piraeus is the center of Greece is one Xenophon echoes at Poroi 1.6, and judging from 
Libanius’ criticism, it had become hackneyed in epid ictic speeches and discourses by 
                                                
77 Loraux 1986: 86 citing Thucydides 2.38.2: “Because of our city’s greatness all things from all parts of 
the earth are imported here, and it so happens that we enjoy the products of other nations with a familiarity 
no less than our own” (ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ 
ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ 
καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων).  Loraux notes well the affinities between deliberative oratory and 
symbouleutic speech (78). 
78 Menander, Διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν p.345, ll.20-21 (Spengle). 
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late antiquity.79  One such discourse is the Panathenaicus of Aelius Aristides, who 
exploits these and other epideictic opoi to the fullest in his praise of Athens.  As 
Brinkmann and others have shown, chapters 13-17 of the Panathenaicus have striking 
parallels to Poroi 1.3-8.80   
Furthermore, the style of the Poroi at times is surprisingly rhetorical.  I say 
“surprisingly” because, among ancients and moderns, Xenophon is known best as a 
master of the simple, unaffected Attic style, though the appellation “rhetor” he receives in 
some of the manuscripts would seem to contradict this view.81  Generally, he avoids long 
periods, preferring the running style to balanced cola, but on occasion, he does employ 
the long period for rhetorical effect (e.g., 4.21) and even paromoeosis in the Gorgianic 
manner: οὐχ οἱ πολύσιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύοινοι οὐχ οἱ ἡδύοινοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι, 
τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι 
(5.3).82  In respect to figures of speech, Xenophon displays his usual fondness for 
assonance, variation, and anaphora, often in combination with one another.83  
Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, before scholars began to analyze seriously the 
style of Xenophon’s works, some took the rhetorical fe tures of the Poroi as indications 
                                                
79 Libanius, Orations 11.14: “I shall not be persuaded to comply with the usage of most orators, who strain 
themselves to show whatever particular place they ar  praising is the center of the earth” (trans. Downey). 
80 Brinkmann 1912: 135-37, Thiel 1922: 4-5, Oliver 1968: 95, and Gauthier 1976: 52-3.  
81 For ancient criticism, see Diogenes Laertius 2.57; Hermogenes, On Types of Speech 2.12; Aelius 
Aristides, Art of Rhetoric 2.13.1, 2; Quintilian 10.83; Tacitus, Dialogus 31; among modern criticism, see 
the references in Pomeroy 1994: 10-15 and note 85 below. 
82 For Xenophon and Gorgias, see L. Gauthier 1911: 11-12, Thiel 1922: xvii, and Gauthier 1976: 120-1.   
83 E.g., 3.5; for a collection of these figures of speech, see L. Gauthier 1911: 111-129 and Thiel xvii-xix.  
Aristotle notes how repetition of words (anaphora) produces a “dramatic effect” (Rhetoric 1413b21).  
However, I would not go so far as to say that the Poroi is meant to be read aloud because it evidences 
rhyme, anaphora, etc. (see Cole 1991: 78-9).  I tend o agree with Richards 1907: 11 and Thiel 1922: xxx,
who view the Poroi as a reading text (more below). 
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that Xenophon was not the author.84  Thanks to the efforts of Schacht, Norden, L. 
Gauthier, and many others, Xenophon’s rhetorical ability is no longer in question.85  
However, while many of these rhetorical devices arecertainly common in 
epideictic speeches, they abound in forensic and deliberative oratory as well.  Isocrates, 
for example, employs the Gorgianic figures of antithesis and parisosis in all his speeches, 
albeit to a varying degree.  Moreover, the diction f the Poroi is characteristically 
Xenophon’s, that is, it displays those particularities, and peculiarities for that matter, of 
language unique to Xenophon.  His penchant for poetic and rare words, non-Attic forms, 
idioms rarely found in classical prose, and particles ike μήν, καί...δέ, καί...γε, τε 
consequential, and ἀτάρ would have been exceedingly jarring to an Athenian audience 
that had grown to expect an epideictic orator’s innovation to come in his style and 
arrangement not necessarily in his diction.86  Similarly, Xenophon’s unwillingness to 
avoid hiatus and to make use of any recognizable prose hythms would have confounded 
the audience’s generic expectations.  Lastly, and more importantly, beyond the 
encomiastic sections of Chapter 1, the rest of the Poroi is antithetical to the goals of 
epideictic oratory.  Whereas Aelius Aristides, for instance, mentions the mines of Attica 
as a display (epideixis) of Athens’ greatness, Xenophon discusses mining at length as a 
proof (apodeixis) of Athens’ economic potential to solve its financial woes.  Concern 
with the future and the giving of advice is not appropriate to epideictic oratory, which, in 
                                                
84 Most notably Hagen 1866 and Beckhausen cited in Thel 1922: xvi 
85 In general, see Schacht 1890, Norden 1971: 101-3, L. Gauthier 1911: 109-29, and A. and M. Croiset 
1947: 367-72; for analysis of individual works, see Lange 1931 for Anabasis; Ekman 1933 for 
Hipparchicus; Pomeroy 1994: 15-17 for Oeconomicus. 
86 In general, see L. Gauthier 1911; for Poroi: Richards 1907: 89-94 and Thiel 1922: xxi-xxiii. 
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theory, concerns present time and praise and blame.87  Given these traits, it is best to 
conclude, contrary to Thiel, that the Poroi is not epideictic in form but rather a text that 
shares in some of the discursive and generic properties of epideictic oratory.   
In that Xenophon assumes the role of the city’s financial and political advisor, the 
Poroi has distinct protreptic and deliberative qualities, and thus Hagen long ago 
suggested that the Poroi generally takes the form of a political speech but specifically of 
two speeches that were actually delivered in the ass mbly.88  Hagen’s primary reason for 
thinking the Poroi an assembly speech is Xenophon’s repeated use of the second person 
plural as a mode of address.  The problem with this interpretation, as Richards and Thiel 
point out, is that Xenophon uses the second person plural in the Hipparchicus as well to 
address the hipparch and his men, and no one assumes this work an assembly speech.89  
Furthermore, nowhere in the Poroi does Xenophon employ common formulae such as ὦ 
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, “oh Athenian gentlemen”—a topos Demosthenes, for instance, 
includes in the exordium of every one of his deliberative speeches.  The political 
                                                
87 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1358b11-20; in general, see Kennedy 1963: 152-73. 
88 Hagen 1866 followed by Mahaffy 1880: 284-5.  Hagen specifically argues that the Poroi is comprised 
of two separate speeches, which were delivered not by Xenophon but by two different speakers on two 
different occasions.  His view rests on two erroneous assumptions.  First, he thinks the diction of the Poroi 
is not Xenophon’s—a view that no longer has any traction given the research of Richards 1907: 89-94 and 
L. Gauthier 1912: 135, n.2 and passim.  Second, Hagen claims that the peaces mentioned at 5.12 and 4.40 
are different; the latter referring to a peace on la d and sea, the former strictly to a peace on the seas 
(Zurborg 1874: 13-18, Thiel 1922: ix-x, and Bloch 2004: 9-11 demonstrate convincingly that the notion of 
two peaces cannot be maintained).  Moreover, Hagen contends that the second oration begins at 4.34, 
which is very difficult proposition to accept considering that 4.34 is connected to 4.33 both syntactic lly 
(by a μὲν...δέ construction) and in logically (Thiel 1922: xxix).  To get around this obstacle, Hagen argues 
that the beginning of the second speech had fallen out of the text by citing Etymologicum Magnum, p. 644, 
4. There the lexicographer glosses the rare word ὀφειλή with a reference to the Poroi, where the word, in 
fact, does not exist in any surviving manuscripts; so Hagen assumed that the Etymologicum Magnum had a 
different text of the Poroi that contained a prologue to this part of the text, which is no longer extant.  The 
absence of this word from our text of the Poroi, however, is better ascribed to an error of the lexicographer 
(so Thiel 1922: xxix). 
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speeches of Isocrates, which are deliberative in nature but not actually composed for 
delivery, are excellent examples of how the pretenses of an actual assembly speech are 
maintained throughout.  At the beginning of On the Peace we find Isocrates generalizing 
about orators like himself who come before the audience (οἱ παριόντες ἐνθάδε) to 
counsel the Athenians (συμβουλεύσειν); on this particular occasion, says Isocrates, 
“we come here to the assembly to deliberate about war and peace” (ἥκομεν γὰρ 
ἐκκλησιάσοντες περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης) (8.1-2).  In the Poroi nothing 
commends itself to the idea that it was actually delivered before an assembled civic 
audience, and thus Thiel and Richards are certainly correct in rejecting Hagen’s idea.  
However, Thiel, in particular, is much too quick in dismissing the Poroi’s relationship to 
deliberative oratory, failing to realize that a study of genre must extend far beyond a 
text’s outward form.90  In the following pages, I contend that the style, subject matter, 
mode of argumentation, and the ultimate aims of the Poroi correspond to those found in 
deliberative oratory. 
Aristotle’s discussion in the Rhetoric provides a useful point of departure.  
Though his analysis tends to be normative, Aristotle’s prescriptions are not entirely 
divorced from the praxis of everyday rhetoric.91  Aristotle divides rhetoric into three 
                                                                                                                                      
89 Richards 1907: 95 and Thiel 1922: xxviii. 
90 Thiel 1922: xxx. 
91 Trevett 1996 argues that Aristotle’s rhetorical examples derive entirely from oral tradition, as he 
apparently does not cite specific speeches from deliberative and forensic oratory; specific examples from 
epideictic rhetoric, on the other hand, are ubiquitous.  From these observations, Trevett draws the 
conclusion that forensic speeches and deliberative spe ches in particular were not frequently circulated let 
alone written down in the first place. Hudson-Williams 1951 argues similarly that political speeches wre 
not written down in the fifth and early fourth centuries and notes that forensic speeches were probably 
written out in advance.  I generally agree with Trevett’s interpretation, but I find it curious that he makes no 
mention of Aristotle’s citation of Isocrates’ On the Peace, which is deliberative in form (Aristotle actually 
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distinct types according to category of listener, who acts as a “judge” or “spectator” of 
the speech: deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν/δημηγορικόν), forensic (δικανικόν), and 
epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν).92  The judges of deliberative speeches are people in the 
assembly who decide about future events, whether a particular action should (τὸ 
προτροπή) or should not be taken (τὸ ἀποτροπή).93  If the speech is protreptic, the 
orator aims at convincing the audience that the proposed course of action is expedient or 
advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον); if apotreptic, the speaker tries to persuade the audience 
that the proposed course of action will bring harm (τὸ βλαβερόν).  Aristotle claims that 
other considerations such as justice and injustice (δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικαιον) or the honorable 
and dishonorable (καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν) should be introduced only as subsidiary aids to 
the argument (1358b21-29).94  Expediency, however, is not the aim or end of a 
deliberative discourse but only the means of achieving the end, and for Aristotle, the 
ultimate or final end is “happiness” (εὐδαιμονία).95  Moreover, in respect to the topics 
                                                                                                                                      
refers to it as Symmachikos, 1418a30).  While it may be correct to view On the Peace as an epideictic 
speech, Aristotle certainly did not, as he includes it in a discussion concerning the difficulty of 
“deliberative speaking” (τὸ δημηγορεῖν; cf. καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύειν  κατηγορεῖ).    
92 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1258b1ff́; cf. Politics 1298a4.  For similar tripartite divisions, see Anaximenes, 
Rhetoric to Alexander 1421b10; Dionysius, Lysias 16; Cicero, On Invention 1.5.7; Quintilian 3.4.12-15.     
93 It should be noted that at 1366a18 Aristotle seems to include the “present” as a consideration for 
deliberative oratory; cf. Cope 1973: I, 53, who cites Demosthenes On the Crown 192 : “No one proposes 
deliberation about the past; it is the present (τὸ παρόν) and future that call the statesman to his post.” 
94 Cf. Anaximenes, Rhetoric to Alexander 1436b10.  Kennedy 1959 argues persuasively that 1) the 
deliberative speeches of the fifth century tend to focus on one kind argument only, either that of expediency 
or justice but not of both and; 2) that the fourth century practice was generally one of combing arguments 
around the themes of justice, expediency, and honor.  It would seem then that Aristotle is speaking in 
normative terms here. 
95 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1362a15-20 and 1360b1ff; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1112b11: “We deliberate not 
about the ends but the means to attain ends.”  Aristotle does not define udaimonia here as he does in 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 as “an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence” but in its sundry popular 
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on which deliberative orators speak, Aristotle claims that they must be in the realm of the 
possible (δυνατά) (1359a28-1359b1).  By “possible,” Aristotle means actions that are 
“practicable” through human agency.96  He then lists five main matters “on which all 
men deliberate and on which deliberative speakers make speeches”: “ways and means, 
war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and legislation” (περί τε πόρων, 
καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας, καὶ τῶν 
εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, καὶ νομοθεσίας) (1359b19-21).97  Though the total 
number of topics appropriate to deliberative oratory varies among different authors, the 
inclusion of poroi seems to have been conventional.  Anaximenes and Demosthenes both 
include poroi among the kinds of topics upon which all statesmen d liberate.98  In a not 
too dissimilar passage from the Memorabilia, which, it has been suggested, may have 
served as the model for Aristotle’s own division, Socrates encourages Glaucon to 
examine the city’s “sources of revenue” (i.e. poroi) so that he may become a better 
                                                                                                                                      
senses (see Cope 1973: I, 73): e.g., “well-being with virtue,” “independence of life,” “the pleasurable life 
combined with security,” and “the abundance of posses ions and slaves.” 
96 This definition is implicit in the Rhetoric but explicit in Nicomachean Ethics 1112b27-35 and 1112a31. 
97 Aristotle’s understanding of poroi goes beyond contemporary notions.  On the one hand, he talks about 
poroi as ways and means to acquire new and increase existing revenues; but, on the other hand, he includes 
poroi in a discussion about reducing excessive expenditures and eradicating needless expenditure: “for 
cities become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by reducing their expenditure” 
(οὐ γὰρ μόνον πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων).  Neither Anaximenes nor Xenophon say anything about the 
reduction or abolition of expenditures in their discu sions of poroi, though Xenophon includes it in a 
general conversation about state finance in the Memorabilia 3.6.4-13.   
98 Anaximenes, Rhetoric to Alexander 1423a25 and 1446b17; Demosthenes, On the Crown 309.  Both use 
the phrase περὶ πόρου χρήματων, which can have the more specific sense of “source of funding,” 
usually for some specific, emergency measure (cf. Xenophon, Hellenica 1.6.12; Demosthenes 4.29; IG I2 5, 
1000.1), but as the context of both passages suggest, th y should be taken in a more general manner (see 
Gauthier 1976: 11).  
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statesmen (Memorabilia 3.6.4-13).99  Ways and means, therefore, was a special function 
of deliberative oratory, and as will be seen in more detail below, an important concern of 
statesmen.   
Aristotle’s discussion of deliberative oratory affords interesting points of 
comparison to the Poroi.  First, while Xenophon is largely concerned with f nding new 
and expanding existing revenues, it is noteworthy tat he explicitly discusses all of 
Aristotle’s deliberative topics: imports and exports and trade more generally (Chapters 2 
and 3); national defense (4.41-48); war and peace (Chapter 5); and legislation (3.6).100  
In fact, Xenophon envisages that legislation will be necessary to implement most of, if 
not all, his proposals (3.6), and therefore the work evidences the first step in the 
legislative process.  The legislative character is particularly conspicuous at the end of the 
work: “If you should decide to implement these plans, I would advise you to go to 
Dodona and Delphi and inquire of the gods…(εἴ γε μὴν ταῦτα δόξειεν ὑμῖν 
πράττειν, συμβουλεύσαιμ’ ἂν ἔγωγε πέμψαντας καὶ εἰς Δωδώνην καὶ εἰς 
Δελφοὺς ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς)” (6.2).  The phrase ταῦτα δόξειεν ὑμῖν evokes 
the enactment formula of Athenian decrees and leaves th  impression that Xenophon 
                                                
99 Gaisford cited by Cope 1973: I, 63.  Socrates: “Now tell me, from what sources are the city’s revenues 
currently derived and what is their total?  For it is clear that you have considered this in order that you raise 
them if any revenues are deficient and provide in addition any that are lacking?”  Though Xenophon uses 
the word prosodoi and not poroi, the sources of those revenues he speaks of, properly speaking, are the 
poroi (see Chapter 1, Addendum). 
100 The themes of the surviving deliberative speeches from the fifth and fourth centuries are generally 
singular in nature, but some overlap is common.  For example, in Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs and Philippics 
the topics of national defense and war/peace bleed into one another; and, on occasion, as Philippic 1 
demonstrates well, war, national defense, and the ways and means to pay for them are intimately 
connected.   
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views his proposals as probouleumata to be enacted in the assembly.101  Consequently, 
the presence of the verb συμβουλεύειν leaves no doubt that Xenophon is casting 
himself in the mold of the deliberative orator.  Persuading his fellow citizens to adopt his 
proposals was a task to which he was particularly well suited.  Dio Chrysostom 
appreciates Xenophon’s rhetorical ability, as he encourages his readers to emulate his 
protreptic speeches (e.g., those in the Anabasis), “whether for speaking before the 
assembly or in the council chamber” (εἴτε ἐν δήμῳ λέγων εἴτε ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ) 
(Oration 18.14.4).  
Moreover, Xenophon’s proposals are concerned with the future.  The past 
occasionally comes into play, but only when Xenophon brings in historical evidence as 
exempla in order to argue that his proposals are feasible (3.7; 4.14-16, 25, 40; 5.5-8).  In 
fact, Aristotle says “historical exempla are most appropriate in deliberative oratory” 
(ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα) because the future is unknown 
and inferences drawn from the past afford the only means of demonstration.102  
Appropriately, Xenophon continually stresses the expediency of his schemes (2.1-2, 4; 
3.4, 13; 4.13; 4.35-6).103  For the moment, it is irrelevant that historians have branded 
                                                
101 On probouleusis, see Rhodes 1972 and 1998: 11-15, 21-23 and de Laix 1973.  In these two concluding 
sections of the work, Xenophon twice employs the phrase λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον, which is part of the official 
oracular formula of question and answer in Athenian decrees (see note 8 above).  Such official language 
further contextualizes the Poroi in a legislative context.     
102 Rhetoric 1418a1; cf. Rhetoric to Alexander 1439a1.  The first orator to articulate the use of historical 
exempla in deliberation rhetoric seems to be Andocides, On the Peace with Sparta 2, 29 (although Harris 
2000 has questioned the authenticity of this speech); cf. Isocrates 1.34-5; 2.35; Lysias 2.6. 
103 Although appeals to expediency seem to be Xenophon’s primarily mode of argumentation, it is 
important to note that his whole discussion of increasing Athens’ revenues is embedded in the theme of 
justice.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, Xenophon’s motivation for writing the Poroi stems from 
the injustice of the Athenian empire and the need to bring about the “most just” solution to Athens’ 
inability to take care of its poor.  
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Xenophon’s ideas “utopian.”104  The important point is that Xenophon thinks his 
proposals are practicable, asserting frequently that his ideas are in the realm of the 
“possible” (δυνατόν, οἷόν τε ἐστί, etc.) (e.g., 3.14; 4.18, 21, 32; 6.1).  Furthermore, 
what ultimately concerns Xenophon is making Athens peaceful and “prosperous with 
security” (μετ’ ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσαν) (6.1).  Eudaimonia is thus the t los of the 
work properly speaking.  Interestingly, in the Rhetoric Aristotle offers many different 
popular definitions of eudaimonia, and among these, he includes the idea of possessing 
“wealth” (πλούτος): 
πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος <καὶ> γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις 
πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ἔτι δὲ ἐπίπλων 
κτῆσις καὶ ἀνδραπόδων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλήθει καὶ  κάλλει 
διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα οἰκεῖα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια 
καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστιν δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπιμα, 
ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν κάρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ 
πρόσοδοι… 
 
Wealth consists in abundance of money and of land, ownership of land 
and properties, and further of moveable goods, cattle, and slaves, 
remarkable for number, size, and beauty, if they ar all secure, liberal, and 
useful.  Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has 
enjoyment for its object is more liberal.  By productive I mean that which 
is a source of income (1361a11-16; trans. Freese, slightly modified).  
 
Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia is not necessarily one to which Xenophon subscribes 
in every point of detail, but there are points of cntact (e.g., the abundance of money and 
slaves, which are both productive and secure).  More importantly, however, it exemplifies 
a notion of eudaimonia that would have been agreeable to audiences of deliberative 
speeches, and therefore the capping of the Poroi with a promise of making Athens 
                                                
104  I address this question in Chapter 5, Section 5D; cf. Gauthier 1976: 260-6.   
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“prosperous with security” serves to highlight Xenoph n’s manipulation of the generic 
topoi of deliberative oratory.   
The argumentative style and rhetorical arrangement of the Poroi evidence further 
its relationship to deliberative oratory.  The Poroi conforms to a basic two-part 
arrangement of thesis (ἡ πρόθεσις) or problem (τὸ πρόβλημα) and proof (ἡ πίστις) 
or demonstration (ἡ ἀπόδειξις) (Rhetoric 1414a35).  At 1.1 Xenophon states clearly the 
“problem” for his audience: the poverty of the masses has led Athens to treat its allies 
unjustly; therefore, ways and means need to be found to alleviate the condition of the 
masses, and for Xenophon this can be achieved entirely through the effective exploitation 
of its domestic resources (1.2).  The rest of the discourse, properly speaking, is devoted to 
“proving” or “demonstrating” the validity of this thesis (apodeixis).  Moreover, 
considering that Xenophon ends his discussion with a kind of recapitulation (6.1), not of 
the specifics of his plans but of their benefits more generally, one could make a case that 
the Poroi also has an epilogue of sorts (1419b10).  Indeed, Anaximenes recommends 
ending the epilogue with an “exhortation” (προτροπή) (1439a34-39): Xenophon ends 
notably with three! “I should advise you to send to D dona and Delphi and to inquire of 
the gods…I would say to ask what gods…for with god helping us in our activities it is 
likely that they will proceed in a manner that is better for the state (συμβουλεύσαιμ’ 
ἂν ἔγωγε πέμψαντας καὶ εἰς Δωδώνην καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐπερέσθαι τοὺς 
 70 
θεοὺς…φαίην χρῆναι ἐπερωτᾶν τίνας θεῶν…σὺν γὰρ θεῷ πραττομένων 
εἰκὸς καὶ τὰς πράξεις  προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὸ λῷον καὶ ἄμεινον ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει).105 
The Poroi’s argumentative style is also characteristic of deliberative oratory. 
Anaximenes, for instance, commends certain rhetorical strategies for combating hostility 
toward a speaker and his proposals.  In particular, he advises that a speaker employ 
προκαταλήψις, that is, the “anticipation” of possible objections (rhetoricians later 
called this figure of reasoning hypophora), especially when prejudice exists against 
certain subjects of deliberation such as taxation or peace proposals (1437b19-40; 1439b1-
11).  In fact, Rufus of Perinthus claims that the us  of hypophora is most appropriate in 
deliberative speeches for this very reason.106  In that some of Xenophon’s ideas are 
controversial, one would expect Xenophon to employ this rhetorical strategy, and, 
indeed, he does with great frequency.107  To this I would also add Xenophon’s 
employment of the other so-called figure of thought, t e rhetorical question (e.g., 4.16, 
21, 42; 5.4-7). 
Concerning the deliberation of poroi more specifically, Xenophon utilizes the 
very rhetorical tactic with which Anaximenes concludes his discussion on way and 
means: “When introducing proposals about ways and means it is necessary to say that 
they are applied equally to all citizens, permanent, a d significant” (δεῖ περὶ πόρων 
                                                
105 Compare, for example, the epilogue of Demosthenes’ On the Symmories: note the presence of the verb 
συμβουλεύω in the first line and the use of conditionals in conjunction with the exhortations (cf. 9.76).  
106 Rufus of Perinthus, Art of Rhetoric p. 469 (Spengel). 
107 See 4.10, 19, 22, 28, 34, 46, 48; 5.5, 11, 13.  This compares to only one other usage in his minor works 
(Hipparchicus 5.4).  The fact that these instances coalesce in his chapters on mining and peace support 
Anaximenes’ claim; it must be remembered that, in order to implement his plans for the intensification of 
the mines, Xenophon envisions the levying of eisphorai.    
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εἰσηγούμενον ἀποφαίνειν αὐτοὺς ἴσους τοῖς πολίταις καὶ πολυχρονίους καὶ 
μεγάλους ὄντας) (1425b29-30).  Along these lines, Xenophon emphasizes repeatedly 
how his schemes will generate large revenues for the benefit of all citizens (2.7; 3.6; 
4.40), because Xenophon demands that all Athenians will contribute to the capital fund 
(3.9-10).  Xenophon also assures his audience that his plans for economic rejuvenation 
will produce not fleeting prosperity but long-term growth and stability (4.3, 26-7; 5.2; 
6.2-3).  Interestingly, on one occasion, Xenophon actually employs Anaximenes’ 
adjective πολυχρονίος in the superlative to describe how the permanence of the polis 
will guarantee regular monetary returns to the citizens who invest in it (3.10).108   This 
analysis could be taken even further, but I think I have demonstrated sufficiently 
Xenophon’s utilization of the discursive and generic topoi of deliberative oratory in the 
Poroi.109   
A reasonable conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that Xenophon is 
addressing a wide civic audience comprised of those who would go to the assembly to 
vote on his proposals.  In this case, when Xenophon addresses his audience by “you all” 
                                                
108 Cf. Hyperides, In Defense of Euxenippus 37: “The good citizen, gentleman of the jury, is not a man to 
make some small additions to the public funds in way which cause ultimate loss, nor one who, by 
dishonestly producing an immediate profit, cuts off the city’s lawful source of revenue.  On the contrary, he 
is the man who is anxious to keep what will be profitable to the city in the future (εἰς  τὸν ἔπειτα 
χρόνον)…” (trans. Burtt).    
109 For example, I would remind the reader of Xenophon’s frequent use of the second person plural in 
addressing his audience (e.g., 4.1, 32, 40; 5.9, 10; 6.2).  As mentioned above, this usage in and of itself 
does not qualify the Poroi as a deliberative speech (as Hagen thought), but taken in conjunction with the 
other topoi just outlined, it certainly enhances the deliberative character of the text.  By way of contrast, in 
the Athenaion Politeia Ps.-Xenophon never  addresses his audience with the second person plural; rather 
we find him employing the second person singular (1.8, 9, 10, 11).  Such a usage is common in elegy, 
where the single addressee represents a larger group of real or imagined readers/listeners, and it may be 
reasonable to assume that the work was read at a sympo ium (so Kalinka in Frisch 1942: 202 and Richards 
1907: 58-61).  Contrast, for example, the public elegies of Solon (Fg. 4 and 4c) and Mimnermus (Fg. 1), 
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(ὑμεῖς), he is referring to the entire Athenian demos.  However, there are two obstacles 
to this interpretation.  First, if the discursive pro erties of the Poroi fit so decisively into 
the mold of deliberative oratory, why did Xenophon not compose it in the form of an 
assembly speech?  Certainly Xenophon was quite capable of writing a speech of this 
kind.  As mentioned above, Dio Chrysostom praises Xenophon for his protreptic 
speeches and urges his readers to use them as models in the assembly or council.110  The 
argument that Athenian politicians did not circulate their deliberative speeches because 
there was no interest in them as literary works holds no weight because Isocrates’ On the 
Peace and Plataicus take the form of assembly speeches.111  Secondly, the symbouleutic 
rhetoric of the Poroi would have been appropriate not only in the assembly but in private 
situations as well.  Indeed, Aristotle says deliberative oratory is for “those who give 
advice in private and those who speak in the assembly” (γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ 
συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες) (Rhetoric 1358b9-10).  Anaximenes  
describes deliberative oratory similarly but situates “private” counsel specifically in 
“council-chambers” (ἔν τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις) (Rhetoric to Alexander 1423a15), a point 
that fits with Dio’s claim that Xenophon’s speeches were well suited to the assembly and 
council-chamber.  In that Xenophon explicitly claims the necessity of legislation to 
implement his proposals, it would have been essential first to convince the council, 
whose approval was required before measures went to the assembly for a vote.  By the 
                                                                                                                                      
where the second person plural is the common form of address, with the sympotic elegies of Theognis, 
where the singular is preferred. 
110 Oration 18.14-16; cf. the speeches of Euryptolemus (Hellenica 1.7.16-33); Polydamas of Pharsalus 
(6.1.4-16); Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus (6.3.4-17).  
111 So Trevett 1996.   
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time Xenophon was composing the Poroi, finance was already becoming the province of 
specialists who worked closely with the council, and the assembly generally deferred to 
them on all matters of finance, “trusting” them to administer practically the entire 
state.112  Before progressing any further, perhaps it would be useful to review what we 
know specifically about the legislative process at Athens involving ways and means. 
Generally speaking, evidence suggests that ways and means were treated as a 
separate topic of discussion before the assembly.113  Any Athenian citizen probably had 
the right to introduce proposals on ways and means to the assembly in the form of a 
motion, but there seems to have been a formal process involved as evidenced by the 
existence of an official office charged with such matters.  We learn from Antiphon and 
Aristophanes of the πορισταί, who, as their name would suggest, made up a board of 
financial officers responsible for poroi.114  It is unknown when this office was created 
                                                
112 Aeschines 3.25: “on account of the trust that you had for Eubulus, those who were elected 
superintendents of the Theoric fund…administered practically the entire state” (διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς 
Εὔβουλονγενομένην πίστιν ὑμῖν οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι ἦρχον μέν…καὶ 
σχεδὸν τὴν ὅλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως).  Of course, there is some hyperbole here (Rhodes 
1981: 515), but it is important to note that, with the exception of the military offices and the overse r of the 
wells, only the financial positions in the state were lected (Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 43.1).  On these 
changes in general, see Andreades 1933: 372-81, Buchanan 1962, Cawkwell 1963, Mossé 1973: 26-29, and 
Rhodes 1972: 102-8, 1980: 309-15, 1981: 513-17, and Davies 2004. 
113 Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades 33: “It is said that at a time when the Athenians 
were meeting in the assembly about ways and means, Alcibiades of his own accord gave ten talents from 
his own estate” (λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι ποτὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκκλησιαζόντων περὶ πόρου χρημάτων 
αὐτεπάγγελτος οἴκοθεν ἐπιδέδωκε δέκα τάλαντα). The specific occasion referred to is unknown, 
but Olympiodorus’ testimony seems correspond to the call for an epidosis ca. 425 (Plutarch, Alcibiades 
10.1 with Bresson 1983: 121-2 and 1992: 10-11). Cf. Scholia in Aristophanes, Plutus 169 and Epictetus, 
Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae 3.22.84.    
114 Antiphon 6.49; Aristophanes, Frogs 1505; LSJ s.v. 2; cf. Aeschines 3.9.  In general, see Boeckh 1976: 
166, Beloch 1884, Rogers 1919: 228-9, and Andreades 1933: 369, 375-6.  The only other official of a 
similar title in the Greek world known to me is the “superintendent of ways and means” (ἐπιμελητὴς 
πόρων) attested on a dedication to Zeus Olympios from the Roman period (?) (SEG 41, 1376, 3-4). 
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but the evidence points to a date before 419.115  Considering the financial straits in which 
the Athenians found themselves during the mid to late 420s, the creation of the office was 
likely a wartime measure.  The anonymous author of the Lexica Segueriana glosses 
πορισταί as “a certain office in Athens, which investigated ways and means” (ἀρχή τις 
Ἀθήνῃσιν, ἥτις πόρους ἐζήτει) (p. 249, line 19).  Their number is uncertain butten is 
likely on analogy with other financial officials, such as the apodektai and poletai, and it 
is reasonable to infer from Antiphon 6.49 that they ad secretaries to assist them.  Only 
the scholium to Aristophanes’ Frogs offers some insights into the nature of their positi n, 
which refers to πορισταί as “those who introduce proposals about sources of revenue” 
(τοὺς περὶ πόρου χρημάτων εἰσηγουμένους).116  The verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι in 
classical prose is the standard word for “making a proposal” or “introducing a motion” in 
the assembly, whether by an individual or a body of officials (LSJ s.v. 1, 2).  However, 
evidence from the Hellenistic period indicates that the verb was commonly used to 
describe individuals or groups of individuals who introduced proposals to the council for 
                                                
115 A terminus post quem of 419 is certain because Antiphon 6 is firmly dated to this year.  Blamire 2001: 
110, n.77 suggests the office was the brainchild of Cleon, and perhaps Aristophanes, Knights 773-6 
strengthens this identification: “O Demos, how could there be any citizen who loves you more than I? / In 
the first place it was I who, when I gave counsel, made much money for you / in the treasury, torturing a d 
strangling some and demanding money from the rest, / not caring a bit for the citizens, as long as I gratified 
you” (καὶ πῶς ἂν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλόν σε φιλῶν, ὦ Δῆμε, γένοιτο πολίτης; ὃς πρῶτα μέν, ἡνίκ’ 
ἐβούλευον σοὶ χρήματα πλεῖστ’ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοὺς μὲν στρεβλῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἄγχων, 
τοὺς δὲ μεταιτῶν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οὐδενός, εἰ σοὶ χαριοίμην); cf. Rhodes 1972: 88 
who takes ἡνίκ’ ἐβούλευον as an indication of Cleon’s stint as bouleutes.       
116 Scholia in Aristophanes Frogs 1505.  The source of the gloss probably originates with the second 
century C.E. lexicographer Aelius Dionysius, who comments on Thucydides’ use of πορισταί at 8.48.6: οἱ 
τοὺς πόρους εἰσηγούμενοι. 
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preliminary consideration.117  This interpretation is probably the correct one given Ps.-
Xenophon’s testimony that the council deliberated “on many issues concerning sources 
of revenue” (πολλὰ δὲ περὶ πόρου χρημάτων) (Athenaion Politeia 3.2).  Thus, it 
seems that the πορισταί had two separate but related duties: 1) the investigation of 
sources of revenue; and 2) the formal introduction of their findings to the council who 
ultimately decided whether to send their proposals to the assembly in the form of a 
motion. 
Unfortunately, it is unknown whether the office of the poristai existed in the 
fourth century.  Some have inferred from Demosthenes’ metaphorical usage of πορισταί 
in the First Philippic that the office was still functioning in 352/1: “and if you make 
yourselves treasurers and providers of the funds” (τῶν μὲν χρημάτων αὐτοὶ ταμίαι 
καὶ πορισταὶ γιγνόμενοι) (4.33).118  A better indication comes from Aristophanes’ 
Ecclesiazusae (391).119  Late in the play the Dissident scoffs at Praxagor’s introduction 
of communism because, in his opinion, such financial measures were commonplace and 
ultimately ineffective.  He mentions two notable examples: a mysterious measure 
concerning salt and a decree that sanctioned the use of ilver-plated bronze coins (812-
                                                
117 Rhodes 1997: 558-60.  If the interpretation in the pr vious note is correct, that the gloss of the scholium 
to Aristophanes ultimately derives from Aelius Dionysius, it is almost certain that the verb εἰσηγεῖσθαι is 
being used not in its strict classical sense of introducing proposals to the assembly.     
118 Boeckh 1976: 166, however, is skeptical.  Thucydides perhaps employs πορισταί metaphorically 
(8.48.5), though I am inclined to take this literally, and Aristotle mentions how pirates in his day 
euphemistically refer to themselves as πορισταί (Rhetoric 1405a25).        
119 For a useful summary of the debate over the dating of the Ecclesiazusae, see Sommerstein 1998: 1-8.  
Sommerstein’s arguments for a 391 production date (cf. Seager 1967: 107, n. 110) is more convincing than 
those of  Rogers 1919 and Ussher 1973, who put the play in 393. 
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23).  He then cites a recent example of a financial proposal that initially looked fruitful 
but turned out to be a bust. 
Αν. τὸ δ’ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν / τάλαντ’ ἔσεσθαι 
πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει / τῆς τετταρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ’ 
Εὐριπίδης; / κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην. / ὅτε δὴ δ’ 
ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο / ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ’ οὐκ 
ἤρκεσεν, / πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.  
 
Dissident: And just recently, didn’t we all swear that the city was going to 
get five hundred talents from the two-and-a-half-per-c nt tax that 
Heurippides had devised—and straight away everyone was covering 
Heurippides with gold?  Then, when they examined it closely and it turned 
out to be the same old story and the thing failed to yield enough, everyone 
turned around and started covering Heurippides withpitch! (824-29; trans. 
Sommerstein; my emphasis). 
 
The identification of this Heurippides with the Heurippides, son of Adeimantus of the 
deme Myrrhinus, is almost certain; he appears to have been an active politician at the end 
of the fifth century and in the 390s.120  The fact that the whole city was caught up in the 
proposal would seem to indicate that Heurippides’ two-and-a-half-percent tax was an 
eisphora or “property” tax, which only the assembly could decree.121  After its 
introduction to the assembly, the proposal went to the council to be thoroughly examined, 
                                                
120 The mss. read “Euripides,” but Sommerstein 1998: 210 identifies him with Heurippides, the son of 
Adeimantus of the deme Myrrhinus; see LGPN Euripides 11 (PA 5949 = 5955 = 5956). 
121Boeckh 1976: 493-4, Rogers 1919: 128, Ussher 1973: 189, and Sommerstein 1998: 209.  Rogers and 
Ussher cite the gloss of the scholiast: “This man wrote a two-and-a-half-percent tax to be paid as a property 
tax into the treasury” (Οὗτος ἔγραψε τεσσαρακοστὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας εἰς τὸ κοινόν).  
Thomsen 1964: 184-5, however, argues that the tax cannot be an eisphora: “The whole context shows that 
Euripides [sic] had found quite a new source of taxa ion, certainly some indirect tax or other, which did not, 
however, yield very much” (185).  I am unaware of what this “indirect tax” could have been though 
(Rogers 1919: 128).  Raising the duty on imports and exports from 2 to 2 ½ percent would not have even 
come close to raising 500 talents, as the income from the 2 percent in 401/0 brought in only 36 talents 
(from this number Isager and Hansen 1975: 51-2 calculate the total foreign trade at 2300 talents per 
annum).  The only other possibility is the eikoste, that is, the 5 percent tax the Athenians levied on all goods 
carried on the sea in 413 (Thucydides 7.28.4; in general, see Kallet 2001: 123-6, 195-226 and Appendix 2), 
which was revived around this time, perhaps by Thrasybulus (IG II2 24, 4-6 and GHI2 18, 7-8; cf. Diodorus 
14.94.2).         
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as indicated by the participle ἀνασκοπουμένοις.  The council, or a committee within 
the council, rejected the propsoal on gounds that i did not yield the amount of revenue it 
purported.  The fiasco appears to have ruined Heurippides’ career.122  The key question 
is in what capacity did Heurippides propose this tax: as a private citizen or as a member 
of the poristai?  The phrase ἣν ἐπόρισ’ Εὐριπίδης is suggestive, possibly indicating 
that Heurippides was serving as a poristes.  In fact, Ussher explains the verb πορίζειν 
along these lines: “raised as a ποριστής.”123  Aristophanes’ history of poking fun at 
inept and corrupt poristai (Frogs 1503-5) strengthens this interpretation.  However, 
πορίζειν also has the sense of “contriving” or “inventing” (LSJ s.v. II), and may only 
indicate that Heurippides “had devised” the tax, as Sommerstein translates.  Perhaps it is 
best to remain agnostic on this issue, especially since the author of the Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia fails to mention the poristai, which is probably the best indication that 
the office died out sometime in the fourth century.   
At any rate, by the middle of the fourth century it appears that politicians and 
statesmen became intimately involved in the investigation and proposal of ways and 
means—a development that in all likelihood rendered the office of poristai irrelevant.  I 
have already noted the general relationship between fina ce and statesmanship at Athens, 
so it is not particularly surprising to find politicians investigating sources of revenue and 
introducing their proposals to the assembly (presumably in consultation with the council).  
In fact, “discovering” sources of revenue is a mark of great statesmanship.  For instance, 
                                                
122 So Sommerstein 1998: 210. 
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in On the Crown Demosthenes attacks Aeschines for not speaking on any matters that 
bring “advantage” (συμφορή) to the polis:    
καίτοι ταύτης τῆς μελέτης καὶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας, Αἰσχίνη, εἴπερ ἐκ 
ψυχῆς δικαίας ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα 
προῃρημένης, τοὺς καρποὺς ἔδει γενναίους καὶ καλοὺς καὶ 
πᾶσιν ὠφελίμους εἶναι, συμμαχίας πόλεων, πόρους χρημάτων, 
ἐμπορίου κατασκευήν, νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεις, τοῖς 
ἀποδειχθεῖσιν ἐχθροῖς ἐναντιώματα. τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων ἦν 
ἐν τοῖς ἄνω χρόνοις ἐξέτασις, καὶ ἔδωκεν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος 
πολλὰς ἀποδείξεις ἀνδρὶ καλῷ τε κἀγαθῷ, ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ σὺ 
φανήσει γεγονώς, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ 
τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἕκτος, οὐχ ὁποστοσοῦν, οὔκουν ἐπί γ’ 
οἷς ἡ πατρὶς ηὐξάνετο.  
 
Yet if all that assiduous practice [i.e. of speaking], Aeschines, had been 
conducted in a spirit of honesty and of solicitude for your country’s well-
being, it should have yielded a rich and noble harvest for the benefit of us 
all—alliances of states, new ways of financing, development of commerce, 
useful legislation, measures of opposition to our enemies.  In days of old 
those services afforded the recognized test of statesmanship: and the time 
through which you have passed supplied to any upright politician many 
opportunities of showing his worth; but among such men you won no 
position—you were neither first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, nor 
anywhere in the race—at least when the power of your c ntry was to be 
enlarged (18.309-19 trans. Vince, slightly modified). 
 
Interestingly, Demosthenes divides political speech into separate categories not unlike 
Aristotle in the Rhetoric, but for Demosthenes, these categories also serve as a kind of 
“test” according to which one can examine whether politicians are benefiting the polis or 
not.  Perhaps these categories should also be understood as spheres of action since 
Demosthenes considers an orator’s speech and his ability to translate words into action as 
two sides of the same coin.  A good orator not only speaks on matters of war and peace, 
                                                                                                                                      
123 Ussher 1973: 189; cf. Rogers 1919: 118: “It seems to me that Euripides…was one of the officers 
(πορισταί) whose duty it was both to devise and levy taxes.” 
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finance, and legislation, but he also makes alliances, discovers new sources of revenue, 
and passes laws.  In a word, politicians must perform ἔργα for the benefit of the polis.  
The statesman Lycurgus, in contrast to Demosthenes’ d piction of Aeschines, is 
remembered precisely because of his ἔργα.  In a fragment of a speech on behalf of his 
children, Hyperides imagines what people would say about Lycurgus as they pass by his 
grave: “This man lived his life in moderation, who, when appointed as administrator of 
finances, discovered new sources of revenue, built the theater, Odeum, docks, and 
triremes, and constructed harbors as well” (οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως· ταχθεὶς δὲ 
ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ 
ᾠδεῖον, νεώρια, τριήρεις, ἐποιήσατο λιμένας) (Fg. 118).  This veritable epitaph of 
Lycurgus not only accentuates his discovery of ways nd means but also elevates this 
activity to that of the erga themselves.  In an honorary inscription from 196/5, the 
Athenians memorialize the statesman Cephisodorus for his life-long service to the state, 
and among the deeds for which he is praised, “he gave advice about new sources of 
revenue that were both fair and just” (καὶ πόρους χρημάτων ἴσους καὶ δικαίους 
συμβεβουλευκώς).124 
In sum, the preliminary investigation of ways and means was the special function 
of the poristai, who probably worked in close consultation with a politician or statesman.  
They introduced their proposals to the council who to k the initial action on whether to 
                                                
124 Meritt 1936: 419-28, Inscription 15, ll. 16-17; cf. Pausanias 1.36.5 and SEG 51, 786, 7ff.  The idea that 
citizens who enrich their cities deserve praise and glory is as old as Xenophanes’ elegy on the futility of 
Olympic victors (DK B2) (as Jack Kroll has reminded me).  There Xenophanes complains that his 
“wisdom” has more practical value to the city because it “enriches the city’s store-chambers [treasuries].”    
 80 
reject or approve them before their formal introduction to the assembly.  Although no 
deliberative speeches explicitly concerning poroi survive (most deal with matters of war 
and peace and defense in general), many of Demosthenes’ orations indirectly address 
ways and means, especially those dealing with offensiv  and defensive actions against 
Philip of Macedon.  In the First Philippic in particular, Demosthenes is predominately 
interested not only in galvanizing support against Philip but in providing the Athenians 
with the necessary tools to wage a successful war in the first place, and for Demosthenes, 
adequate financing is fundamental to this enterprise.  A thorough examination of this 
speech, therefore, will shed significant light on the deliberative process of ways and 
means, confirming many details of my interpretation outlined above. 
After spending the first twelve chapters narrating Philip’s crimes and arguing that 
war is both necessary and unavoidable, Demosthenes proceeds to discuss his plan of 
action:  
 Ὡς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντας ὑπάρχειν 
ἅπαντας ἑτοίμως, ὡς ἐγνωκότων ὑμῶν καὶ πεπεισμένων, 
παύομαι λέγων· τὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἣν ἀπαλλάξαι 
ἂν τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων ὑμᾶς οἴομαι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὅσον, 
καὶ πόρους οὕστινας χρημάτων, καὶ τἄλλ’ ὡς  ἄν μοι βέλτιστα 
καὶ τάχιστα δοκεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, καὶ δὴ πειράσομαι λέγειν, 
δεηθεὶς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοσοῦτον.  
 
Well, assuming that you are thoroughly convinced that you must all be 
ready and willing to make this necessary effort, I say no more on the point.  
But as to the nature and size of the force which I think adequate to relieve 
the situation, the ways and means of defraying the costs, and the best and 
speediest method of providing for its equipment, I shall now endeavor to 
state my views, making just this appeal to you, Athenians (4.13 trans. 
Vince, slightly modified). 
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From here on, Demosthenes elaborates for the Athenians (1) the nature and size of the 
force and how best to equip it (16-27) and (2) the costs involved (28-29).  Demosthenes 
then turns to the ways and means to acquire money for the war, stating that his 
investigations into sources of revenue have culminated in specific plans that are ready to 
be put to the vote:  
πόθεν οὖν ὁ πόρος τῶν χρημάτων, ἃ παρ’ ὑμῶν κελεύω 
γενέσθαι; τοῦτ’ ἤδη λέξω. 
ΠΟΡΟΥ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ 
Ἃ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεδυνήμεθ’ εὑρεῖν ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· 
ἐπειδὰν δ’ ἐπιχειροτονῆτε τὰς γνώμας, ἂν ὑμῖν ἀρέσκῃ, 
χειροτονήσετε, ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς 
ἐπιστολαῖς πολεμῆτε Φιλίππῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις. 
 
I will now tell you the sources from which we will finance the war and 
which I urge you to provide: 
Schedule of Ways and Means 
These are the plans, Athenians, which we have been able to discover; 
when you vote on these motions, if they are acceptable, you will be voting 
to wage war against Philip not only with decrees and letters but with deeds 
as well (29-30). 
 
Although Demosthenes’ specific financial plans have fall n out of the text, the immediate 
context allows us to draw a number of conclusions.   
First, because Demosthenes refers to his plans as γνῶμαι, the document from 
which he reads contained at least two separate but rela ed motions upon which the 
assembly was to vote.125   As Grote notes, these financial proposals “must have been 
more or less complicated in [their] details; not a simple proposition for an eisphora or 
                                                
125 It is almost certain that these motions would have be n introduced in the assembly separately from the 
main question at hand, which is whether to go to war against Philip, and therefore the speech as we hav it 
is composite of at least three different speeches. 
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property tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator’s speech.”126  
This implies that the sources of revenue of which Demosthenes speaks involved some 
research and prior consideration.127  Furthermore, Demosthenes mentions that these 
plans were “discovered” in conjunction with other individuals, because he never uses the 
word ἡμεῖς to refer to himself alone.128  According to Sandys, these other individuals 
are “certain financial officers” or “political friends.”129  While the latter cannot be ruled 
out absolutely, the fact that Demosthenes speaks of his “plans” specifically as “motions” 
(γνῶμαι) gives credence to the idea that these were drafte, in part, by a special 
committee of financial experts or the poristai themselves, that is, if this board still existed 
in the fourth century.  Demosthenes introduced his γνῶμαι as probouleumata, and thus 
prior consultation with the council would have been required.130  Given that 
Demosthenes’ plans are drafted in the form of motions to be introduced to the assembly 
for a vote, it is curious that the lemma does not readγνῶμαι Δημοσθένους on analogy 
                                                
126 Grote 1869: XI, 117.  E. Müller in Sandys 1924: 101 points out that λέξω, “I will relate” is not 
synonymous with ἀναγνώσομαι, “I will read,” “as Demosthenes doubtless accompanied the reading of 
the items of  his ‘statement of ways and means’ with explanatory remarks.”  At 21.130 Demosthenes 
explicitly distinguishes between these two verbs.   
127 In fact, Demosthenes says that in the lead up to war the Athenians “investigate ways and means” (περὶ 
χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν) as a matter of course (36).   
128 Sandys 1924: 101. 
129 Sandys 1924: 101; cf. Vince 1930: 85. 
130 Accordingly, ἡμεῖς probably include councilors as well (so Seebeck in Schaefer 1966: ΙΙ, 68).  
Interestingly, Demosthenes seems to take a large amount of the credit for these proposals, as he claims to 
have written the document himself: “what is necessary for you to do, I have written in my resolution” (ἅ δ’ 
ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ’ ὑμῶν, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἁγὼ γέγραφα) (33).  Though there are exceptions (e.g., IG I3, 
89, 55; 92, 5; 127, 6-7), most decrees were introduce  by a single person, who “made the motion” (εἶπεν).  
Even though his financial schemes were formed in consultation with other people, it would not be unusual 
for Demosthenes to refer to them strictly as his own, as he, in fact, does here.  Moreover, even if 
Demosthenes had introduced his motions as nomoi and not psephismata—a procedure which during the 
middle of the fourth century would have required consultation with the nomothetai—the same argument 
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with ψήφισμα Δημοσθένους or γνώμη βουλῆς found elsewhere in Demosthenes 
(e.g., 18.21, 116).  The presence of πόρου ἀπόδειξις, therefore, suggests that the phrase 
is a technical term used to label specific kinds of financial documents in deliberative 
speeches.  Considering that this document is the only text outside the Poroi to contain 
πόρος in the title, it is essential that we examine its nature more closely. 
The phrase πόρου ἀπόδειξις has been translated variously as “a memorandum 
of ways and means” (Vince), “statement of ways and means” (Sandys), “exposition of 
ways and means” (Jaeger), and “schedule of ways and means” (Pickard-Cambridge).  
While Jaeger’s translation comes closest to the sense of the Greek, Pickard-Cambridge’s 
is preferable in that, originally, a schedule is “an appendix to an Act of 
Parliament...containing a statement of details that could not conveniently be placed in the 
body of the document.”131  As argued above, Demosthenes’ financial schemes were 
probably too complex to introduce in the assembly without a separate written document 
from which he could draw in his oral presentation.  Although we are missing the 
substance of the document, it spelled out in detail not only the sources of revenue but 
ultimately how the new system of revenues would be put into practice, for Demosthenes 
emphasizes that voting for his financial gnomai will be sufficient for waging war against 
Philip (cf. 33).  The specific locution πόρου ἀπόδειξις occurs nowhere else in the 
                                                                                                                                      
holds true.  For instance, the nomos concerning silver coinage from 375/4 was “resolved by the 
nomothetai” but on the motion of Nicophon (Stroud 1974: 157).    
131 Oxford English Dictionary s.v. 2b.  Given that Demosthenes speaks of his financial s hemes in the 
plural, one would expect to find the title πόρων ἀπόδειξις.  However, authors in the fifth and fourth 
centuries seem to use πόρος in the singular and plural with no apparent difference in meaning.  Moreover, 
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Greek Corpus, but there are two examples of the periphrastic construction ἀποδείκνυμι 
+ πόρος, which denotes at one and the same time the acts of reating sources of revenue 
and exhibiting them publicly by written notice.132   
In his panegyric of Herod the Great, Josephus praises the king for his 
contributions to the Olympic Games: 
τούτους γὰρ δὴ καταλυομένους ἀπορίᾳ χρημάτων ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ 
μόνον λείψανον τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἑλλάδος ὑπορρέον, οὐ μόνον 
ἀγωνοθέτης ἧς ἐπέτυχεν πενταετηρίδος εἰς Ῥώμην παραπλέων 
ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ διηνεκὲς πόρους χρημάτων 
ἀπέδειξεν, ὡς μηδέποτε ἀγωνοθετοῦσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν μνήμην 
ἀπολιπεῖν. 
 
For seeing that the games were in decline due to a lack of funds and that 
this unique relic of ancient Hellas was sinking into decay, he not only 
became president of the games for the quadrennial celebration at the time 
when he was sailing to Rome, but he endowed the games with permanent 
funds to the end that he left behind an everlasting memorial of his 
presidency (Jewish War 1.426-27).  
 
                                                                                                                                      
the singular and plural is employed interchangeably in conjunction with the noun χρηµάτα.  In the First 
Philippic, Demosthenes uses both πόρος χρημάτων (29, 36) and πόροι χρημάτων (13).   
132 Generally speaking, when ἀποδείκνυμι, “to point out,” “exhibit,” “publish,” “demonstrate,” etc. 
takes a direct object, it often has the particular sense of “to render,” “make,” or “create” (LSJ s.v. II, 1).  
However, the verb generally retains its primary sense of “to exhibit.”  For example, in Lysias’ Against 
Nichomachus, the speaker implicates the defendant Nichomachus in the Thirty’s persecution of the 
demagogue Cleophon.  Fearing that they could not gain a conviction in the law court, the Thirty turned to 
Nichomachus, who had been a agrapheus for the republication of Solons laws, “to produce a law that 
required the Boule to partake in the trial” (νόμον ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς χρὴ καὶ τὴν βουλὴν συνδικάζειν); 
“and so it turned out that on the day of the trial he produced the law” (ὥστε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἡ κρίσις 
ἐγένετο ἀποδεῖξαι τὸν νόμον) (30.11).  Considering the speaker intimates that Nichomachus “forged” 
this law, ἀποδεῖξαι has the idiomatic sense of “to create.”  Yet Nichomachus clearly produced the law by 
means of a public demonstration, that is, by exhibiting it in court, and thus ἀποδεῖξαι simultaneously 
means both “he made” and “exhibited.”  Elsewhere in Lysias the verb has this double sense (Adams 1905: 
303, commenting on Lysias 32.17: τοὺς δ’ ἐμοὺς ἀδικεῖς, οὓς ἀτίμους ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκβαλὼν ἀντὶ 
πλουσίων πτωχοὺς ἀποδεῖξαι προθυμεῖ; “ἀποδεῖξαι: often nearly equal to ποιῆσαι; here it 
combines the idea of making the children beggars with that of exhibiting their sad condition to the world.”  
Cf. Herodotus’ use of ἀποδείκνυμι + λόγος (2.18.1; 7.118, 119.1).   
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According to Josephus, Herod seems to have found a permanent solution to the financial 
woes of the Olympic Games, but the historian does not elaborate the nature of Herod’s 
financing.  In that this passage occurs in the context of Herod’s “benefactions” 
(εὐεργεσίαι), it may be assumed that he made a personal gift of money to the treasury 
of the Eleans, who were administering the games at this time.  In the parallel account in 
Jewish Antiquities, Josephus says that Herod “made the games more honorable by 
establishing revenues” (τιμιώτερον ἐποίει χρημάτων προσόδους καταστήσας) 
(16.149; cf. Jewish War 1.423-4).  While there is no dearth of evidence concerning the 
interest of Hellenistic monarchs in managing a city’s revenues, the most likely 
explanation here is that Herod made an endowment.133  Such foundation documents 
abound during this period, thus providing the necessary background to elucidate 
Josephus’ account.134   
These monetary gifts are commonly referred to as “revenues” (προσόδοι) 
because the cities that received them usually lent the money back out to the public at 
interest, and thus the gains accrued from this enterpris  were, properly speaking, 
revenues.135  For instance, we learn from a decree concerning the administration of the 
Dionysian cult at Athens (176/5 BCE) of a certain benefactor named Dionysius, who 
“increased the treasury’s revenues” (τὰς τε κοινὰς προσόδους έπηύξησεν) by 
                                                
133 For the interest of Hellenistic monarchs in arranging revenues in general, see Diogenes Laertius 5.75;
SIG3 344, 109ff.; for earlier revenue programs: Plutarch, Lysander 3 and Xenophon, Hellenica 3.2.8.   
134 See, for example, OGIS 763, 51-59; SIG3 672, 13-87; 577, 9-80; 578; SEG 1.366, 36-54; in general, 
see Jones 1940: 222-31 and Veyne 1990: 102-7.     
135 OGIS 763, 55; SIG3 672, 7-14; 1100, 22-4; cf. SEG 1.366, 36-54. 
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donating to the cult.136  The text then goes on to state: “and concerning [the use of] these 
monies for the future, clear accounts were provided by the man through public 
documents” (καὶ περὶ ἁπάντων τούτων ὑπά[ρ]χουσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ὑπὲρ 
τ’ανδρὸς σαφεῖς διὰ τῶν χρηματισμῶν εἰς τὸν ἃπαντα χρόνον).137  There is 
little doubt that αἱ ἀποδείξεις διὰ τῶν χρηματισμῶν are written documents outlining 
the regulations of the endowment, and Dittenberger is probably correct to maintain that 
these documents would have been preserved in the archives of the cult.138  This 
particular decree offers no specifics about these rgulations, but other documents exist 
that contain detailed accounts (σαφεῖς αἱ ἀποδείξεις), specifying every aspect of the 
financial management of the endowment down to the minutest detail.139  In many cases, 
these documents were published on stone.  Once in the public domain any citizen could 
have examined the document and made sure that the endowment and the revenues that 
were accruing from it were being administered propely.  If the endowment were 
included in a decree or law, then certain legal actions and fines could be initiated for any 
malfeasance against those administering the revenues.140 
These parallels suggest strongly three aspects of Herod’s contribution to the 
Olympic Games: 1) he presented a gift of money in the form of an endowment; which 2) 
                                                
136 SIG3 1101, 12-19; cf. 1100, 23-4. 
137 SIG3 1101, 19-21; cf. Andocides 2.3: “and when I reported these things to the councilors with clear and 
secure evidence” (καὶ τούτων ἀποδεικνύντος μου τοῖς βουλευταῖς σαφεῖς τε καὶ βεβαίους τὰς 
ἀποδείξεις). 
138 Dittenberger 1920: 254, n.8 with LSJ s.v. III, 4.   
139 See, for example, SIG3 577, 578, and 672. 
140 See, for example, the entrenchment clauses in SIG3 577, 24-6, 64-68; 578, 39-60; 672, 13-21; 976, 
86ff. 
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included a written account specifying the regulations for the management of the fund; 
and 3) this account was most likely published.  A one-time monetary gift for the 
construction of, say, a wall, portico, or stoa would not have required a written statement 
prescribing the management of the fund since most, if not all, of the monies would 
eventually be expended.  Perennial games, rites, sacrifices, etc., on the other hand, 
required long-term planning, and it was the prerogative and in the best interest of the 
benefactor to specify in writing how his/her money should be preserved in perpetuity.  
Thus, when Josephus specifically claims that Herod πόρους χρημάτων ἀπέδειξεν, he 
is indicating that Herod not only “created sources of revenue” for the games by means of 
his endowment, but that he also produced an account of how the Eleans should manage 
the endowment for the future.     
The second example of the locution ἀποδείκνυμι + πόρος is from Cassius 
Dio’s account of how Augustus solved the financial problem of maintaining and 
rewarding the legions through the creation of the military treasury (τό ταμιεῖον 
στρατιωτικόν).141  The funding of the treasury was precarious though, and thus 
Augustus set out to find new ways and means (πόροι) to keep the coffers filled with 
money.  Augustus accomplished this through a decree of the Senate:   
δι’ οὖν ταῦτ’ ἀπορῶν χρημάτων, γνώμην ἐς τὴν βουλὴν 
ἐσήνεγκε πόρον τινὰ διαρκῆ καὶ ἀείνων ἀποδειχθῆναι, ὅπως 
μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν λυπουμένου ἀφθόνως ἐκ τῶν 
τεταγμένων καὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ γέρα λαμβάνωσι. καὶ ὁ μὲν 
ἐζητεῖτο… 
                                                
141 Cassius Dio, Roman History 55.24.9-55.25; cf. Res Gestae 17.2; Suetonius, Augustus 49.2; Tacitus, 
Annals 1.78.  According to Brunt and Moore 1967: 60, Cassius Dio is mistaken about the treasury paying 
soldiers’ wages in addition to rewards. 
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Now because Augustus lacked funds for all these troops, he introduced a 
proposal in the senate that a way of raising money i  sufficient amount 
and continuing from year to year should be cr ated, so that the soldiers 
might receive in abundance from the taxes levied their maintenance and 
bonuses without any outside source being put to annyance.  The means 
for such a fund were accordingly being sought (55.24.9). 
 
Interestingly, Cassius Dio begins in a similar manner to Josephus by noting the general 
lack of funds available (ἀπορῶν χρημάτων; cf. ἀπορίᾳ χρημάτων).  Due to this 
funding problem, Augustus introduces a bill in the S nate so that “a way of raising 
money in sufficient amount and continuing from year to year should be created.”  Again, 
the similarities to Josephus’ account are stark: both not only use the expression 
ἀποδείκνυμι + πόρος but they also note the long-term goal of Augustus and Herod’s 
programs (ἀείνων; cf. τὸ διηνεκὲς).142 
Moreover, according to Dio Augustus proceeded at first in the manner of a 
Hellenistic monarch: “because no source of revenue was discovered that satisfied anyone, 
even though the matter was being investigated, practically all were distressed” (ἐπειδὴ 
μηδεὶς πόρος ἀρέσκων τισὶν εὑρίσκετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ πάντες ὅτι καὶ 
ἐζητεῖτο ἐβαρύνοντο); and so “Augustus made contributions himself to the fund and 
promised to do so annually, and he also accepted voluntary contributions from kings and 
certain communities (55.25.1-3).  However, as Cassius Dio goes on to relate, 
endowments proved to be a feeble means of financing the military treasury, so Augustus 
                                                
142 Cf. the Cyrenaean honorary decree for Apollodorus (SEG 28, 1540, 37-41): “...writing that there was 
an insecure fund of money, he offered a fund; for he established for all men an immortal demonstration 
of…” (ὑπογράφων ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν κτῆσ[ιν] ἀβέβαιον ἐπέχ[ει] κτῆσιν, διέτελε γὰρ ἅπασιν 
[ἀν]θρώποις ἀθάνατ[ον] ἀπόδει[ξιν...). 
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ordered all senators “to seek out sources of revenue, each independently of the others, to 
write them in books, and give them to him to consider” (βουλευταῖς ζητῆσαι πόρους 
ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστον, καὶ τούτους ἐς βιβλία γράψαντας δοῦναί οἱ 
διασκέψασθαι) (55.25.4).  In the end, Augustus rejected the proposed schemes of the 
senators, introduced his own plan, a five percent inheritance tax, and “thus increased the 
revenues in this way” (τὰς μὲν οὖν προσόδους οὕτως ἐπηύξησε) (55.25.6).  In fact, 
Cassius Dio declares that Augustus “found this tax written down in Caesar’s memoranda” 
(καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Καίσαρος ὑπομνήμασι τὸ τέλος τοῦτο γεγραμμένον εὑρών).  
Although the funding proved to be difficult, in the end Augustus discovered a permanent 
and sufficient way of raising money that met the stipulations of his motion in the Senate.  
The bill became a senatus consultum, which presumably outlined in detail the inner 
workings of the tax: its scope, collection, management, etc.143      
In light of these, albeit non-classical, parallels, πόρου ἀπόδειξις appears to have 
been a written document that outlined in detail andin some public fashion sources of 
revenue and specified how the state should administer those revenues.  In fifth-century 
Athens, this document would have been drawn up by the poristai, but during the fourth 
century, by a politician or statesman, who submitted i  to the council for preliminary 
approval, and then to the assembly as a probouleuma or probouleumata.  If the motion(s) 
passed and became a decree or law, it was either inscribed on a white tablet and placed in 
                                                
143 Much like Demosthenes’ proposals, the schemes of the Senators and Augustus’ final solution appear to 
have been complex, because in the former case Augustus ordered that their proposals be “written in books,” 
whereas Augustus’ own plan was discovered in Caesar’s memoranda.      
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the archives or formally published on a marble stele.144  If the assembly rejected the 
motion, however, the original document most likely disappeared from the historical 
record.  Given this dynamic, it is no wonder that no examples of this financial document 
exist in the surviving deliberative speeches.  Generally speaking, such documents are 
what Aristotle calls “unartful persuaders” (ἄτεχνοι πίστεις), that is, “proofs” or 
“evidentiary material” that “have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in 
existence,” such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, l w  and oaths.145  “Artful persuaders” 
(ἔντεχνοι πίστεις), by contrast, are modes of persuasion which the speaker must 
“invent” (εὑρεῖν; cf. inventio in Latin) through his own effort.  Though Aristotle says 
unartful persuaders are “particular to forensic oratory” (ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν 
δικανικῶν), they also apply to deliberative oratory as well.146  Cole speculates that 
                                                
144 Of this latter category there are many examples, though most are from the fifth century and concern 
imperial revenues; see, for example, IG I3 34, 52, 60, 68, 71.  The Athenians always considered tribute 
(φόρος) to be a part of their revenues (προσόδοι) (Thucydides 2.13.2-3; Xenophon, Anabasis 7.1.27), and 
therefore deliberations about imposing new imperial taxes, for instance, were couched in terms of ways and 
means.  In the fourth century, a notable example is Agyrrhius’ grain tax law of 374/3 (Stroud 1998).     
145 Rhetoric 1355b35-40, 1375a22ff; cf. Rhetoric to Alexander 1428a16ff.  I have taken the translation 
“unartful persuader” from Cole 1995: 89-90, which is compatible with Grimaldi 1988: 20, who argues that
πίστεις should be translated as “evidentiary material” in that Book 2 opens with the phrase “From these 
[sc. ἄτεχνοι πίστεις] one must make arguments for persuading and dissuading…” (cf. Gagarin 1990: 24, 
n.8); for “unartful persuaders” in general, see the notes of Cope 1973 and Grimaldi 1988, Gagarin 1990: 
23-26, and Mirhady 1991. 
146 Aristotle mentions how citing laws are useful for “both persuading and dissuading” (καὶ 
προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα) (1375a25-27), from which commentators (Cope 1973: I, 270 and 
Grimaldi 1988) infer that Aristotle considered unartful persuaders to apply also to deliberative oratory.  
Mirhady 1990: 394-6, however, argues against this wider application, claiming that all καὶ προτρέποντα 
καὶ ἀποτρέποντα indicates is an acknowledgement on Aristotle’s part of the potential for political 
terminology to enter the courtroom.  Nevertheless, at the beginning of Book 2 Aristotle states explicitly that  
ἄτεχνοι πίστεις must be employed in “persuading and dissuading, praising and blaming, and accusing 
and defending” (καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγεῖν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ 
ἀπολογεῖσθαι)—the very definitions of deliberative, epideictic, and forensic  rhetoric given by Aristotle 
at 1358b7-12!   
 91 
these unartful persuaders may have been originally “extratextual persuaders”—materials 
presented during the course of a trial by someone els  other than the speaker, which 
therefore had a tendency to be excluded from the text in the first place, or evidence too 
specific and particular to a given case that would not be useful to future speakers.147  
Cole even suggests that economic material in deliberativ  orations was a kind of 
extratextual persuader.148  This may explain why Demosthenes’ financial plans 
mentioned under the heading πόρου ἀπόδειξις were not included in the published 
version of the text—they were quite literally “outside” the speech itself, composed on a 
separate piece of papyrus.149  
                                                
147 Cole 1995: 90, 107. 
148 Cole 1995: 107.  Cole bases this claim on Thucydides 2.13.3-6, where the historian has Pericles 
address the Athenians about the finances of war in indirect speech.  This choice suggests to Cole that such 
economic material did not usually enter into an orator’s deliberative speech (cf. Kallet-Marx 1994: 234, n. 
30).  Interestingly, at 2.13.9 Thucydides concludes thi  section by claiming, “Pericles also said many other 
things that was his custom to demonstrate that the Athenians would win the war” (ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα 
οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ).  Given this sentence follows 
Pericles’ demonstration about the salutary state of the Athenians’ financil and military resources, it would 
seem, then, that Thucydides is using ἀπόδειξις here in the specific sense of a demonstrative discourse of a 
technical sort.  As I argue below, such discourses w re different from non-technical deliberative speeches 
in that the speaker probably delivered his speech by adumbrating a technical document he read in the 
council or assembly.          
149 Jaeger 1938: 120 makes the provocative suggestion that Demosthenes omitted the πόρου ἀπόδειξις 
when he republished the speech because the economic proposals in this section “no longer satisfied 
Demosthenes and had in the meantime been outdistanced by more effective measures [i.e. using the 
Theoric money].”  Trevett 1996: 427-8 argues against the republication of Demosthenes’ speeches, 
contending that  1) the section could have been cut out by an editor who “judged it to be of no literary 
interest;” 2) that it may have never appeared in the speech in the first place because it would have been read 
by the clerk of the assembly; or 3) that if the section was read by Demosthenes, it probably was “written on 
a separate piece of papyrus, and subsequently became detached from the rest of the speech.”  Of these 
possibilities, only the last holds up to scrutiny.  Demosthenes’ complex financial schemes in O the 
Symmories 14-22, for instance, should caution against the view that such material was of little literary 
interest to future readers.  Furthermore, the fact tha Demosthenes says, “If, men of Athens, you first 
provide these funds of which I have spoken” (ἂν ταῦτ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πορίσητε, τὰ χρήματα 
πρῶτον ἃ λέγω) (33), clearly undermines the idea that a clerk read Demosthenes’ schemes.  Given that 
Demosthenes speaks of his schemes as γνῶμαι suggests strongly that they were written on a separate 
piece of papyrus; for, if the assembly had passed his motions, how else would a scribe have transcribed 
them (whether on white tablets or stone) unless there was a separate copy from which to work?    Thus, 
Trevett’s third option and Jaeger’s interpretation are compatible.  I suspect that the First Philippic is 
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Returning to the Poroi, the preceding discussion brings into clear focus the 
essential nature of Xenophon’s literary enterprise.  As already argued, the Poroi is not 
only protreptic but apodeictic as well, for Xenophon aims to convince his audience with 
clear demonstrations that his financial plans will be beneficial to the city.  Xenophon 
quite literally “demonstrates” new sources of revenu  and indicates how those revenues 
should be managed.  In many respects, the Poroi functions generically as an “exposition 
of ways and means” (πόρου ἀπόδειξις).  This financial document, as it seems, has its 
origins in the procedure whereby poristai and/or statesmen came together to “investigate” 
(σκοπεῖν) possible sources of funding for a given enterprise.  At the beginning of the 
Poroi, Xenophon too says he has been “investigating” the financial situation of Athens 
(σκοποῦντι δή μοι ἃ ἐπενόησα τοῦτο μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνεφαίνετο, ὅτι ἡ χώρα 
πέφυκεν οἵα πλείστας προσόδους παρέχεσθαι) (1.2), which leads him to the 
conclusion that Athens can supply itself with an income large enough to maintain its 
population.  Remarkably, Xenophon encourages his readers to “investigate” (σκοπεῖν) 
the details of his plans and even to “run the numbers” (λογίζεσθαι) in order to 
corroborate their viability (e.g., 4.18, 34; 5.11, 12).  Here Xenophon is looking to his 
audience as colleagues in the deliberative process, which is precisely the dynamic we find 
between poristai/statesmen and the council.  Moreover, Xenophon’s uderstanding of his 
plans as probouleumata (6.2) evidences the last stage of the legislative process whereby 
proposals on ways and means were framed specifically as motions (γνῶμαι) to be 
                                                                                                                                      
probably a composite of three separate speeches, and therefore the exclusion of Demosthenes’ financial 
schemes was the result of an editor, who, in fact, may have been Demosthenes himself. 
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introduced to the assembly, such as we find in the First Philippic under the title πόρου 
ἀπόδειξις.  However, whereas Demosthenes’ proposals are already gnomai, 
Xenophon’s are inchoate, that is, they are in the process of becoming gnomai.150  
Perhaps, then, the identification of the Poroi with πόρου ἀπόδειξις is not entirely 
apropos.   
Demosthenes’ remarks with which he introduces his gnomai, however, should be 
recalled at this point.  The orator says that he will “relate” (λέξω) to his audience the 
sources of revenue, which is not synonymous with ἀναγνώσομαι, “I will read.”  In 
Demosthenes ἀναγνώσκειν means to read verbatim from a document, whereas λέγειν, 
which can also mean “to read,” especially as an imperative, more commonly signifies to 
read with explanatory remarks.151  Consequently, λέξω indicates that Demosthenes 
himself read the exposition of ways and means so that he could explain the finer points of 
his proposals and clarify any difficulties.  There is no doubt that these “explanatory 
remarks” would have been similar to the ones he used in the council as he was persuading 
the bouleutai of the efficacy and solvency of his proposals.  Thediscursive properties of 
πόρου ἀπόδειξις, therefore, are not fixed to one performative context only, as a 
“demonstration” would have been required in both the council-chamber and assembly.  
Thus, we may speak of πόρου ἀπόδειξις, on the one hand, specifically as the title of an 
official Athenian financial document and, on the other, more generally as a kind of 
                                                
150 For instance, Xenophon advocates implementing his proposals piecemeal, which would require an 
iterative legislative process (4.35-8).   
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speech genre within deliberative oratory.152  Accordingly, I submit that the Poroi is the 
literary representation of these two modes of discourse, in that it includes both a formal 
exposition of ways and means and “explanatory remarks,” or what Aristotle calls “artful 
persuaders” (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις), arguments and proofs that the author “invents” himself 
for a given occasion.  Xenophon’s literary genius lie  in the fact that he gives literary 
form and expression to what most Athenians would have considered a sub-literary 
financial document. 
I now return to the question of audience.  The preceding observations would seem 
to indicate that Xenophon is specifically addressing the council, as the inchoate nature of 
his proposals evinces the preliminary stage of the legislative process.  A number of 
textual features strongly support this interpretation.  First, Xenophon’s exhortation to his 
audience to “examine” (σκοπεῖν) the details of his plans is appropriate in the context of 
probouleusis, “prior consideration.”  In fact, Xenophon’s expression σκοπῶν ὁ 
βουλόμενος κρινέτω (4.18) invokes the official language of probouleusis, when the 
council grants “to whomever wishes” (τῷ βουλομένῳ) the right “to examine” 
                                                                                                                                      
151 E. Müller in Sandys 1924: 101 citing Demosthenes 21.130, where the two verbs are explicitly 
contrasted. 
152 The idea of speech (oral and written utterances) bing governed by recognizable codes or conventions, 
which depend on specific social, political, and cultural situations, occasions, or contexts, is that of Bakhtin.  
See, for example, his essay, “The Problem of Speech Genres” in Bakhtin 1986: 60-102, esp. 78-80.  
Perhaps the reason why there are no surviving examples of public, assembly deliberative speeches on ways 
and means is because all such speeches would have been delivered initially in the council-chamber.  If my 
argument is correct, when it came time to introduce proposals to the assembly, they were in the form of 
motions, which in some cases needed to be read aloud with explanatory remarks.  These remarks 
apparently do not make it into published versions of peeches, as in the First Philippic.  
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(σκοπεῖν) proposals before they are sent to the assembly and, in some cases, to “draft” 
(γράφειν) additional proposals of their own.153   
Moreover, Xenophon’s invitation to “run the numbers” (λογίζεσθαι) strongly 
suggests an audience experienced in financial matters.  Interestingly, Xenophon does not 
calculate the total amount of startup capital needed but assigns this task to his audience 
(4.34).  In order to compute this number, a person w uld have had to consider many 
factors, such as the market price of slaves, depreciation costs, money needed for 
maintenance of the slaves, etc.  Perhaps calculation was a function of special advisors, 
but generally the council dealt with the nitty-gritty details of finance.154  Indeed, 
Xenophon’s use of hypophora is illuminating in this respect, given that seven out of the 
ten examples of this figure of thought are found in the sections on the mines, which are 
the most technical, quantitatively oriented, and controversial of the work.155  As answers 
to “imagined” objections, hypophorae intimate the type of audience best able to raise 
objections in the first place.  For example, Xenophon’s objection at 4.28 “imagines” a 
person familiar with the mining industry: “Then why, someone may say, are there not as 
many new cuttings now as there were in the past” (τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, 
ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ καινοτομοῦσιν;)?  There are only two ways someone 
                                                
153 Gauthier 1976: 145 rightly notes the connection.  The relevant texts are IG I3 64, 6; 133, 11; 
Andocides, On The Mysteries 83-4; Demosthenes 24.18, 23; Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 29.2 with 
Rhodes 1981: 374.  The phrase τῷ βουλομένῳ also occurs in publication clauses in Athenian decre s 
(e.g., IG I3 84, 26). 
154 In general, see Rhodes 1972: 88-113, esp. 105: “Only the boule had access to the information which 
would show whether extra taxation was needed, or whether the city could afford some new charge in its 
resources, and this must be the reason for the boule’s financial predominance.” 
 96 
could have gained the kind of knowledge required to raise this question: to be 
experienced with the mining industry through either direct participation or political 
oversight, involving the examination of the leasing records.  Incidentally, it was the 
council’s responsibility to publish the mining leass, including the “new cuttings” 
(καινοτομίαι) Xenophon mentions here.156  That Xenophon is in dialogue with these 
specialists and policy makers is evidenced by the verb ξύμφημι, “I agree,” at 4.51: “If 
my proposals are put into practice, I agree that the city will not only be more financially 
solvent but will become more obedient, disciplined, and capable in war as well” 
(πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα ξύμφημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν 
εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ 
εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι).157  The Poroi therefore is dialogical, encouraging 
responses from the audience, while, on occasion, even giving voice to anterior discourse 
between Xenophon and other statesmen and financial specialists.158   
In the final analysis, Xenophon could never have comp sed the Poroi as an 
assembly speech because its primary audience is a smaller group of Athenian citizens 
                                                                                                                                      
155 Poroi 4.10, 19, 22, 28, 34, 46, 48; 5.5, 11, 13.  It is also telling that the other three usages come from 
the sections where Xenophon advocates a universal peace policy, which, to say the least, was a divisive 
issue.     
156 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 47.2-3.  I discuss the mining industry in Chapter 5, Section 5D. 
157 Richards 1907: 102 suggests that the text should rea φημί because “the proposal and the anticipation 
are put forward as entirely the writer’s own.”  Despite the awkwardness produced by retaining ξύμφημι, 
there are no good paleographical reasons to explain the presence of the prefix ξυν.   At any rate, Marchant 
1925: 223, n.1: “If the text is right, one naturally asks “With whom?”  Thiel 1922: xxv, n. 1 suggests 
Eubulus but the connection between the two men is rightfully questioned (Gauthier 1976: 223-31, 260ff). 
158 For the term “dialogical,” as opposed to “monological,” see Bakhtin’s essay “Discourse in the Novel” 
in Bakhtin 1981: 257-422, esp. 275-331 and “The Problem of the Text” in Bakhtin 1981: 103-131.  While 
Bakhtin’s ideas are largely applied to fictional discourse, he was also interested in the dialogic aspect  of 
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responsible for policy formation.  In other words, Xenophon does not aim to persuade the 
entire Athenian citizenry straightaway with his exposition but rather those who would 
introduce his proposals to the assembly as specific motions.159  The Poroi, therefore, is 
best categorized as a deliberative discourse (συμβουλευτικός λόγος) of the private or 
bouleutic variety.  In fact, if my interpretation is correct, the Poroi is the only surviving 
example of such a discourse from Athens of the Classic l period.160  However, it is 
important to note that I do not say “speech.”  Although no deliberative speeches 
addressed to the council are extant, there are a few examples concerning non-deliberative 
matters, such as the crowning and scrutiny of public officials.161  All these speeches 
begin with the introductory formulas ὦ βουλή or ὦ ἄνδρες βουλευταί, forms of 
address that would have been mandatory given the audience’s stature.  The fact that 
Xenophon does not employ these suggests that the Poroi, in its present form, is not a 
                                                                                                                                      
prose writing and rhetoric in general.  In the next section, I will further elaborate the anterior discourse that 
informs the composition of the Poroi by examining the dramatic context. 
159 That is not to say Xenophon is disinterested in covincing a wider civic audience.  In order for his 
schemes ultimately to succeed, the arguments Xenophon uses to persuade his fellow financial specialists 
and politicos had to register in the assembly as well.  The fact that Aristotle and Anaximenes distinguish 
between private and public deliberation and yet do not differentiate the discursive properties appropriate to 
each would seem to indicate the fluidity of deliberative rhetoric.  A complete study on the rhetoric of 
private deliberation, especially as directed to councils and other smaller deliberative bodies, remains to be 
written; in general, see Stevens 1933.  It is most unfortunate that Aristotle’s Περὶ συμβουλίας, “On 
Counsel,” Aristippus’ Πρὸς τὸν συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντα, “To the one who tried to be a 
counselor,” and Simon’s Περὶ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, “On Deliberation” (Diogenes Laertius 5.24; 2.84, 123) 
are no longer extant, as they would no doubt provide many answers to the issues raised here.   
160 I say “Athenian” because there are examples of this kind of speech delivered by non-Athenians; see, 
for example, the speeches of Archidamus and the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas in Thucydides 1.79-86 (we 
can be sure this is a private deliberation because Thucydides notes, on the one hand, that the Spartans 
“deliberated by themselves” apart from the Lacedaemonian League and, on the other, that when war was 
decided, Sthenelaidas then put the question to the “Spartan assembly” (1.87).    The only examples from 
Athens that approximates private deliberative speech s are those of the Sausage-Seller and Cleon narrated 
in indirect discourse in Aristophanes’ Knights 624-82.    
161 See, for example, the speeches of Critias and Theramenes in Hellenica 2.3.24-51; Lysias 16, 25, 31; 
Demosthenes, On the Trierarchic Crown. 
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council speech.162  It could be argued that Xenophon initially read the ext in the council 
and revised it for a reading audience, but such an interpretation would completely miss 
the point of Xenophon’s project.  Deliberative speeches address particular issues on 
specific occasions.  An orator does not speak generally about war and peace but about 
specific proposals for war and peace at a precise moment in time.163  The Poroi, by 
contrast, is general in its orientation, and therefore does not lend itself well to delivery on 
any one occasion.  Xenophon is interested in curing Athens of the disease of empire and 
transforming the city into an instrument of peace.164  In order to achieve these aims, 
sufficient revenue is needed, which itself is attainable only through the gradual 
implementation of numerous proposals on ways and means.  Therefore, the Poroi 
requires multiple occasions of delivery to realize ts ultimate aims.  In political terms, 
Xenophon needed to convince not just one prytany of councilors but practically a whole 
“generation” of councilors, both those of the current bouleutic year and those in the 
several years to come.165     
                                                
162 Though it is interesting to note the striking similarity between the proem of Critias’ bouleutic speech at 
Hellenica 2.3.51: Ἐγώ, ὦ βουλή, νομίζω προστάτου ἔργον εἶναι οἵου δεῖ, ὃς ἂν ὁρῶν τοὺς 
φίλους ἐξαπατωμένους μὴ ἐπιτρέπῃ with that of the Poroi:  Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, 
ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι.     
163 Even in On the Peace, which is intended for a reading audience, Isocrates keeps up the pretences of an 
actual assembly speech by situating his address in the context of the specific occasion when the prytanies 
brought forward proposals making peace with the Chians, Rhodians, Byzantines, and Coans (15-16).  
164 At 3.9 Xenophon explicitly says that when poleis are t war they are “sick” (νοσήσωσι).  
165 In the Hipparchicus, Xenophon suggests to the hipparch that he have “suitable representatives” 
(ῥήτορας ἐπιτηδείους) in the council to speak on his behalf (1.8) (for such advocates, see Perlman 1963: 
344-6).  Perhaps among Xenophon’s philoi (see Section 2E) numbered such rhetores, upon whom he relied 
to introduce his proposals to the council.    
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It necessarily follows from this conclusion that Xenophon circulated the Poroi 
among political circles as a pamphlet.166  The term may not be entirely appropriate to an 
ancient context, especially since pamphlets and pamphleteering emerged in the early 
modern period as a result of a complex historical process involving, among other things, 
increased literacy, the emergence of a reading culture, and the advent of cheap printed 
materials that could be circulated widely.167  Naturally, without the printing press, texts 
in Athens were disseminated on a relatively small sca e, and, though the extent of literacy 
is still a contested issue, even by early modern sta dards few Athenians in the fourth 
century could read or read well enough to make sense of texts like the Poroi.168  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that texts were circulated for political or partisan 
purposes among a reading public, however small, as early as the end of the fifth 
century.169  As in the early modern period, pamphlets assumed any literary forms 
including forensic and deliberative orations, such as Isocrates’ Areopagiticus, which, of 
course, was the literary inspiration for Milton’s imaginary parliamentary address of the 
                                                
166 So e.g., Müller 1971: 198-9, Jaeger 1938: 73, Sealey 1955: 7, Giglioni 1970: xii, Anderson 1974: 193, 
and Finley 1999: 163. 
167 So Raymond 2003, whose study of the genre focuses on its origins in Britain during the 16th and 17th 
centuries. On political pamphlets in the classical age, see Schoell 1890, Wilamowitz 1893, I, 169-85, II, 
13ff., Adams 1912, Jaeger 1940: 440-50, Jacoby 1949: 71- 9, 129-31, 210-15, and Rhodes 1981: 22-24. 
168 In general, see Havelock 1982, Knox 1985, Harris 1989, and Thomas 1989 and 1992. 
169 The main examples that are usually cited as pamphlets are: Stesimbrotus of Thasos’ On Themistocles, 
Thucydides, and Pericles (FGrH 107 F 10a), which may be an early example of politica  biography (see 
Rhodes 1981: 22); the defense speech of Theramenes in the Heidelberg papyri collection (Rhodes 1981: 
22), though recent discoveries of fragments would sggest it belongs to a narrative history (Loftus 2000); 
the Athenaion Politeia of Ps.-Xenophon; Antiphon’s defense speech, On Revolution (Thucydides 8.68.2; 
with Rhodes 1982: 22 and Gagarin 1997: 248); Thrasym chus of Chalcedon’s Peri Politeias and On Behalf 
of the Larissans and On Constitution (DK 88, B 1-2); the Peri Politeias ascribed to Herodes Atticus but 
most the work of a fifth century oligarch, quite possibly Critias (Wade-Gery 1945); Andocides, Against 
Alcibiades (Raubitschek 1948).  
 100 
same name.170  What is unclear is the precise role the pamphlet played in the context of 
Athenian political culture, which offered many avenu s to citizens and non-citizens alike 
for expressing political views (e.g., assembly, council, law courts, and dramatic 
festivals).171  Though more work needs to be done, Adams’ analysis is a good point of 
departure.  He proposes four types of individual for whom the pamphlet was useful: 1) 
the man who sought to propagate political doctrines and political movements that could 
not be discussed openly; 2) the man who for any reason had no access to the bema and 
wished to influence public opinion; 3) the man who wished to reach a small reading class 
about ideas that demanded more deliberate thought than could be expressed in the 
assembly; and 4) the man who wished to influence public opinion in other states.172  Of 
these four categories, it is the third that fits extr mely well with Xenophon’s objectives in 
                                                
170 The key question that has not been satisfactorily answered is whether these deliberative orations were 
first composed as speeches for oral delivery and then circulated (cf. Lysias’ speech in Plato, Phaedrus 
227a-234c) or originally written specifically for a reading audience.  By the middle of the fourth century, 
there is little doubt that Isocrates composed his “speeches” in the latter manner, but it is debated whether 
orators like Demosthenes ever circulated their deliberative speeches at all (see Adams 1912 and Trevett 
1996).   
171 All Athenian citizens had the privilege of isegoria, the equal right to address the assembly.  At the 
beginning of each meeting, as a part of normal procedure, the herald made the general proclamation: “Who 
wishes to speak?” (τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται) (Aristophanes, Acharnians 45, Thesmophoriazusae 379, 
Ecclesiazusae 130; Aeschines, Against Timarchus 1.23, Against Ctesiphon 3.4; Demosthenes, On the 
Crown 18.170; Plutarch, Moralia 784 c-d).   Even though the council by and large set th  agenda for the 
assembly, proposing specific recommendations to be vot d on (probouleuma), in many cases the council 
issued an open probouleuma to the assembly at which any one could bring recommendations forward 
(Rhodes 1997: 12-13).  Even if the recommendation of the council was not open, citizens still had the right 
to propose amendments or alternative motions (see, for xample, Xenophon's narrative (Hellenica 1.7.1-35) 
of the debate over the fate of the six Athenian generals after Arginusae in 406).  In fact, on one daya month 
disenfranchised citizens and even foreigners could ad ress the assembly on any matter public or private 
(Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 43.6 with Rhodes 1982: 527-8; cf. Demosthenes 9.3).  Naturally, the right to 
speak in the law courts was somewhat circumscribed, especially in private cases where only the injured 
party could initiate proceedings (dikai), but in matters of public concern any Athenian (ὁ  βουλόμενος) 
had the right to prosecute another (g aphe).   
172 Adams 1912: 8-9; cf. Kennedy 1963: 204 who suggests that the publication of political speeches may 
have originated among aliens who “were desirous of influencing Athenian political opinions, but who were 
barred from speaking in the assembly.”  This view cannot be maintained in light of Aristotle, Athenaion 
Politeia 43.6 (see previous note).   
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the Poroi.  The multiplicity of schemes, the technical subject matter, and the need for 
quantitative analysis and computation would have requi d multiple readings and readers.  
Unlike some of the pamphlets from the end of the fifth century that take the form of 
public speeches, which were in all likelihood read aloud, little in the Poroi, both in 
respect to form and content, lends itself to the ida that it was “performed” at small 
political gatherings, although the idea should not be ruled out completely. 
The Poroi, therefore, may rightly be considered a “reading text.”  With reading 
texts oral presentation is not needed or even preferred, as Cole explains: “What 
delivery…is to an entire oral performance and its success with an audience, such is style 
to a piece whose presentation the factor of delivery does not enter.  The performer 
delivers the whole text of his role to the audience; and, in corresponding fashion, style 
“delivers” the contents of the role into a written text.  It is, to use the expression of a 
modern critic, a kind of ‘writing out loud’...the written word’s effort to do the work of the 
spoken word.”173  Interestingly, Cole argues that reading texts developed during the 
fourth century as a consequence of professional speech writers composing speeches for 
their clients of limited speaking abilities that “might suggest the real person, real moral 
commitment (prohairesis), and real character (ethos) behind the words it contained.  In 
this way they were contributing to the development of a medium so successful for 
projecting another person before an audience that orators [and Plato and Isocrates as he 
goes on to argue] eventually decided to use it for self-projection as well.”174  The idea of 
                                                
173 Cole 1991: 122; the “modern critic” Cole speaks of is Roland Barthes. 
174 Cole 1991: 123. 
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“self-projection” in reading texts is instructive for our analysis of the Poroi because it 
helps to explain two stylistic and linguistic oddities.   
First, Xenophon is fond of making strong first person assertions by frequently 
employing the pronoun ἐγώ and the intensive ἔγωγε—a tendency unparalleled in his 
other works.175  Second, the diction of the Poroi is so characteristic of Xenophon that it 
confounded L. Gauthier’s attempts to categorize Xenophon’s works according to 
dialectical variation.  For instance, the diction of the Memorabilia and Hellenica 
approximates the pure Attic dialect more so than any of Xenophon’s other works, and 
thus Gauthier naturally assumed that Xenophon composed these texts for an Athenian 
audience.  However, if true, why does the Poroi, which Xenophon undoubtedly wrote for 
Athenian consumption, display so many un-Attic usages?176  The inclusion of these two 
features may have been unconscious on Xenophon’s part, but considering the nature of 
his literary enterprise, another interpretation recommends itself.  By writing a discourse 
on a topic that traditionally belonged to deliberative oratory and yet, in his case, was not 
suitable for oral delivery, it was necessary, rhetorically speaking, for Xenophon to project 
himself before his reading audience.  For modern readers of Xenophon, and a fortiori for 
                                                
175 In fact, Xenophon employs ἐγώ or the emphatic ἔγωγε eleven times in the Poroi, a number that is 
matched only by Hipparchicus, a work which, keep in mind, is significantly longer than the Poroi; cf. On 
Horsemanship = 2; Constitution of the Lacedaemonians = 5; Agesilaus = 6; Apology = 2.  Pearson 1976: 
114 argues similarly that Demosthenes’ extensive use of ἐγώ in On Symmories is a way for the relatively 
“unknown speaker” to distinguish himself from his contemporaries who are more familiar to the Athenian 
public. 
176 L. Gauthier 1911: 135: “The true language of Xenophon is that of the Anabasis and Cyropaedia.  It is 
in these works that the particularities of Xenophon are the most apparent, especially in respect to the 
lexicological order.  When looking at it from the point of view of the Memorabilia, we see that the 
Hellenica was composed for the Athenian public; the aim of the work it to persuade Athens to reconcile 
herself with Sparta in order to confront a common enemy: Thebes.  In these circumstances it is not 
improbable that the author made an effort to conform more strictly to Attic usage.”  “We have to admit that 
Revenues does not offer any support to my hypothesis.  Its language is that of the Cyropaedia, etc.” (135, n. 
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an Athenian readership, Xenophon’s style and diction are immediately recognizable.  
Similarities in respect to diction and style between Xenophon’s own speeches in the 
Anabasis and the Poroi bear this statement out.  However, when Xenophon composes 
speeches for others, he tries to project the speaker’s ethos, not his own.177  Thus, 
Xenophon’s self-projection in the Poroi demonstrates his desire to distinguish himself 
and his ideas from those of his Athenian contemporaries. 
By way of concluding this section on the genre and u ience of the Poroi, it 
behooves us to consider briefly the political orientation of Xenophon’s rhetoric.  In her 
book-length study of Andocides’ deliberative speech, On the Peace, Missiou argues 
persuasively that the orator’s rhetoric is decidedly “subversive,” because he refuses “to 
conform to the democratic code of rhetorical behavior.”178  According to Missiou, an 
orator who employs this democratic code composes his speech in such a way that it 
explains “what is to be done and why and how it should be done” so that “it enables the 
many to participate in the process of weighing up a situation and reaching a decision in 
favor of their interest in terms of gain and loss.”  For Missiou, Demosthenes’ On the 
Symmories (the occasion of which was a meeting of the assembly that was to decide 
whether the Athenians should go to war with the Persians) exemplifies this democratic 
code because he tells the Athenians “what has been done wrong and why it is wrong and 
                                                                                                                                      
2).  For examples of Xenophon’s use of Doric, Ionic, Hellenistic, and rare poetic forms, see L. Gauthier 
1911 passim and Thiel 1922: xxi-xxiii.  
177 So Gray 1989 in respect to the H llenica.  It should be noted that she also speaks of Xenophon obeying 
the “rule of propriety” (τὸ πρέπον), which posits that the style of writing match or be appropriate to the 
subject matter (183).   
178 Missiou 1992: 176.  Harris 2000 has rightly questioned the authenticity of this speech, but for my 
purposes here its genuineness is irrelevant. 
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what ought to be done and why and how it can be done.”179  By contrast, Andocides 
“preached peace but did not demonstrate its usefulness to his audience” nor show how 
peace could be maintained given the current politica  circumstances.180  Missiou’s notion 
of a democratic code operating within Athenian deliberative rhetoric is helpful for 
understanding the ideological orientation of the Poroi.  Throughout the work, Xenophon 
explains thoroughly to his readers what is to be done with Athenian finances and why 
(see next section) and how his financial proposals should be carried out.  Noother work 
of deliberative oratory exhibits the Poroi’s level of detail in the elaboration and 
demonstration of how a plan should be executed.  For example, in On the Peace Isocrates 
is certainly meticulous in describing what the Athenians have done wrong to the Greeks 
and why (8.18-131), but when it comes to offering specific ways on how they can change 
course and act justly (132), Isocrates comes up short, giving three very general and 
generic recommendations that seem more of an afterthought than serious proposals for 
reform (133-5).  In fact, only one of Isocrates’ suggestions—electing the kind of men to 
run the state who administer their private affairs well (133)—involves the democratic 
process, that is, voting.  Xenophon, as argued above, views his proposals specifically as 
probouleumata, encouraging his readers to calculate their value in the hopes that they 
both consider them beneficial for the polis and introduce them into the assembly.  In 
short, because the Poroi is dialogical, welcoming active participation in the deliberative 
process, it is a splendid piece of democratic rhetoric. 
 
                                                
179 Missiou 1992: 152-3, quoting Pearson 1976: 29. Cf. Demosthenes 3.10: “Perhaps someone would say 
that we all know that it is necessary to send help, and we will send help, but tell us how.” 
180 Missiou 1992: 142. 
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2E. Xenophon’s Civic Pedagogy  
In this last section, I would like to consider one last aspect of Xenophon’s 
rhetoric, namely his framing of the work in terms of a civic pedagogy.  Xenophon aims 
not simply to persuade his audience of the expediency of his plans but also to educate 
them about their merits for making a citizenry virtuous.  This should not come too much 
as a surprise, because the rhetor who possessed specialized financial knowledge 
functioned much like a teacher within the Athenian democracy.181  The Athenian demos 
by and large was ignorant of finance and hence needed the rhetor to teach them not only 
the intricacies of money matters but also how they r lated to the functioning of the 
democracy and the perpetuation of democratic values.  According to Kallet-Marx, what 
connections the rhetor above all tried to insinuate were those between moey, power, and 
empire; money was necessary for power and power for empire, and empire itself was 
fundamental to the functioning of the democracy, because imperial revenues subsidized 
payments for political participation.182   
Xenophon, however, departs from his contemporary rhetores in that he challenges 
these identifications, drawing attention to the negative repercussions of Athenian imperial 
finance.  Because he addresses a limited audience of the Athenian demos, he is able to 
speak more frankly and, indeed, more philosophically.  The long, complex opening 
sentence of the Poroi evidences well Xenophon’s civic pedagogy, which establishes a 
distinctive pedagogical relationship with his audienc :  
Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται 
ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι 
                                                
181 Kallet-Marx 1994. 
182 Kallet-Marx 1994: 239-48. 
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προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον 
οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους 
πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις, 
ἐκ τούτου ἐπεχείρησα σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ’ ἂν οἱ πολῖται 
διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν, ὅθενπερ καὶ δικαιότατον, νομίζων, 
εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἅμα τῇ τε πενίᾳ αὐτῶν ἐπικεκουρῆσθαι ἂν καὶ 
τῷ ὑπόπτους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι.    
 
I have always held the opinion that states’ constitutions183 are determined 
by the character of its leading politicians.  However, when some of the 
leading politicians at Athens kept saying that they understood justice no 
less than other men, but on account of the poverty of the multitude they 
felt compelled to be rather unjust in their treatment of the allied cities,184 I 
accordingly tried to examine whether the citizens could be maintained in 
some way from their own territory, which indeed would be the most just 
solution, because I thought that if this were so, they would be relived not 
only of their poverty but the suspicion that exists among the Greeks as 
well (1.1). 
 
Unlike Xenophon’s other works, only the Poroi begins notably with a gnome.  On the 
syntactic level, the μέν…δέ construction directs the reader to take this gnomic statement 
with the following sentiments of the prostatai.  Nevertheless, as a direct response to the 
gnome their remarks seemingly make little sense.  Xenophon only asserts that he has 
“always held the opinion that states’ constitutions are determined by the character of its 
leading politicians,” and in reply to this generaliz tion, the prostatai defend themselves 
                                                
183 Though I have translated τὰς πολιτείας as “constitutions,” the parallel passage in the Cyropaedia 
makes it all but certain that Xenophon is using politeia in the more general sense of the “political 
community,” that is, the citizens of the state (so Gauthier 1976: 35); cf. Cicero, Epistles to His Intimates 
1.9.12: quales in republica principes essent, tales reliquos s lere esse cives.    
184 Commentators have interpreted τὰς πόλεις as “allies,” but it must be stressed that this designation 
includes all poleis allied with or subject to Athens, not just those states that are members of the Second 
Athenian Sea League.  Xenophon refers to the League members specifically as the “islanders” (5.6).  
Moreover, elsewhere in the Poroi (2.1, 3.11, 4.8, 4.9, 5.2, 5.8), αἱ πόλεις means Greek cities more 
generally.   
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specifically against the charge of being “unjust” toward the allied states.185  Their 
apologia would be non-sequitur unless, that is, Xenophon had been expressing his 
disapproval with them for some time.  In other words, the gnome contains latent criticism 
of the prostatai and their policies toward Athens’ allies.  Properly speaking, then, the 
passage is analeptic, because it recalls anterior discourse between Xenophon and the 
prostatai about the injustice of empire.  As argued above (Section 2B), the deictic adverb 
ἐπεί brings us to the origo or context of their remarks.  This discursive context seems to 
have been dialogic in nature, involving numerous exchanges between Xenophon and the 
prostatai, as indicated by the imperfect tense of ἔλεγον.  While a number of 
interpretations may commend themselves, there are good reasons for believing that these 
exchanges were personal and didactic in nature. 
First, the introductory gnome is identical to the one Xenophon expresses in the 
Cyropaedia (8.8.5), which explains why he says, “I have always held the opinion.”  
However, as the commentators correctly point out, the notion of citizens exhibiting the 
same character as their leaders is not unique to Xenophon, because the idea was a topos 
at the time.186  It is found primarily in protreptic discourses, of which Isocrates’ To 
                                                
185 As there is no stated subject governing the verb εἶναι in the indirect statement introduced by ἔφασαν, 
the subject refers back to the prostatai: it is they who are specifically actingly “rather unjust.”  Xenophon is 
being coy.  It was commonplace for the demos to deflect criticism aimed at their policies by blaming the 
leadership, whose names were prominanetly inscribed on all laws and decrees (see Thucydides 8.46.6).     
186 Thiel 1922: 3 and Gauthier 1976: 36; cf. Rosenbloom 2004: 92, who refers to the idea as a “trope.”  
Demosthenes’ citation of the idea implies that it was a commonplace: “Though you probably know it, I will 
nonetheless tell you: whatever sort of men you apper to court and preserve, these are the men you will 
seem to be like” (ὡς ἐκεῖν’ εἰδόσιν μὲν ἴσως, ὅμως δ’ ἐρῶ· ὁποίους τινὰς ἂν φαίνησθ’ 
ἀγαπῶντες καὶ σῴζοντες, τούτοις ὅμοιοι δόξετ’ εἶναι) (22.64).  The same sentiment is found also in 
Memorabilia 3.5.14; Isocrates 2.31; 3.37; 7.22; 8.53; Demosthenes 20.13; Polybius 9.23.6-8; 11.29.11.   
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Nicocles and Nicocles are the two earliest examples.187  Scholars refer to these texts and 
others of their ilk with various designations, such as “wisdom literature,” “instructional 
literature,” or “instruction of princes.”188  In this genre, a speaker adopts the persona of a 
pious wise man who encourages his readers/listeners to turn away from vice (protreptic) 
by giving positive counsel on how to live a virtuous life (parainesis).  The advice tends to 
be traditional, gnomic, and practical and is usually ddressed to the speaker’s philoi, 
among whom numbered princes, kings, and even tyrants.   
The reason the idea of the ruled mirroring the character of the rulers finds 
expression in such protreptic contexts is because the successful moral conversion of the 
one necessarily leads to the conversion of the many.  “But if a man should turn to virtue 
those who control the people,” Isocrates reasons, “he would assist both of them at once, 
both those that hold sovereignty and those who are subject to them” (εἰ δέ τις τοὺς 
κρατοῦντας τοῦ πλήθους ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, ἀμφοτέρους ἂν ὀνήσειεν, 
καὶ τοὺς τὰς δυναστείας ἔχοντας καὶ τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς ὄντας) (2.8).  According to 
this pedagogy, the leader serves as an ethical model (παράδειγμα) to the multitude (τὸ 
πλῆθος); as long as he is “above suspicion of immoral conduct” (πορρωτάτω...τῶν 
                                                
187 In To Demonicus, Isocrates speaks of those who “compose hortatory essays to their friends” (τοὺς 
ἑαυτῶν φίλους τοὺς προτρεπτικοὺς λόγους συγγράφουσι) (3).  For Isocrates, λόγος 
προτρεπτικός is a particular kind of work in which a sophist exhorts young readers to become competent 
orators.  Isocrates therefore eschews this title for his hortative works, preferring to call them “moral 
instructions” (παραινέσεις) because of the heavy emphasis on gnomic instruction.  Perhaps for this 
reason, the philosophers of the fourth century entitl d their hortative works Προτρεπτικός in order to 
distinguish their advice from the traditional, gnomic counsels of Isocrates (Diogenes Laertius 2.85; 5.22; 
6.2, 16).  Despite Isocrates’ preference for the term parainesis, modern scholars prefer the designation 
“protreptic” (e.g., Jebb 1876: 81-4, following the Renaissance s holar Jerome Wolf (1570) or “logos 
symbouleutikos” (Jaeger 1934: 55; cf. Jaeger 1944: 308, n.3).     
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τοιοῦτων ὑποψιῶν), the multitude are “wont” (φιλεῖ) to take him as a pattern for their 
own conduct (3.37; 2.31).  The benefits of this relationship are reciprocal: the leader 
gains security (ἀσφάλεια) in his position of power (1.43; 2.8, 36; 3.54, 56) and the state 
as a whole becomes prosperous (εὐδαίμων) (2.39; 3.10, 32, 63).189  Even though the 
gnome in question probably has its origins in the instruction of princes genre, it found 
traction in the rulers and ruled dynamic of the Athenian democracy because the prostates 
embodied and performed the communal identity in a manner analogous to kings.190  
Thus, the deployment of this gnome so prominently a the beginning of the Poroi 
recommends the view that the exchanges between Xenopho  and the prostatai originated 
in a discursive context similar to the one in which Isocrates frames his protreptic 
discourses. 
Furthermore, the expression γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον 
τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων has a Socratic ring and is reminiscent of certain co versations 
from Books III-IV of the Memorabilia between Socrates and other Athenian prostatai 
                                                                                                                                      
188 See, for example, Jaeger 1934: 54-60 and 1944: 84-105, West 1978: 3-30, Martin 1984, and Gray 
1999: 159-77. 
189 It is interesting to note that in the Cyropaedia Xenophon sets up a similar dynamic with Cyrus as the 
model (παράδειγμα) of conduct for his people (7.5.85; 8.1.39).  When Cyrus was alive, the empire was 
virtuous and prosperous; but as soon as he died and his sons took over, they failed to heed their father’s 
deathbed advice, and so the empire turned to wickedness and wrongdoing (8.8.5).  In a sense, by 
interjecting the gnomic idea of citizens embodying the moral character of its leaders, Xenophon provides 
an etiology not only for the moral decline of the empire but its initial success and prosperity under the 
leadership of Cyrus.   
190 Rosenbloom 2004: 92 and Connor 1992: 115.  The quintessential passage evidencing the connection 
between the prostates of the demos and monarchy is Herodotus 3.82.4: “whoever is leader of the 
demos…appears to be a monarch” (ἂν προστάς τις τοῦ δημοῦ...ἐφάνη μούναρχος ἐών) (cf. 
Thucydides 2.65.9).  Accordingly, to Rosenbloom, it was an “ideological imperative” for those hostile o 
democratic leadership to oversimplify the relationship between leaders and followers by ignoring the fact
that at any given time there were several prostatai   of the people (92).  Of course this cut both ways, as the 
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about justice.191  Although the setting and characters in these passages belong to the fifth 
century, the ideas and sentiments the characters exp ess are representative of the political 
milieu of late 360s and 350s.  Xenophon therefore portrays not accurate historical 
conversations between Socrates and his p iloi but largely fictive dialogues between a 
Socratic figure and largely generic characters about problems and concerns particular to 
the middle part of the fourth century.  While one cannot know the extent to which 
Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates is historically accurate, it is difficult to deny that his 
representation of the philosopher was, in part, a literary invention.  Recently V. Gray has 
argued persuasively that Xenophon specifically “frames” the Memorabilia in the tradition 
of instructional wisdom literature in order to produce a coherent image of Socrates that 
rejoins the capital charges the Athenians brought aainst him.192  By depicting Socrates 
as a traditional wise man who both honors the gods and benefits his friends and city by 
dispensing practical advice, Xenophon ably vindicates him of the charges of impiety and 
corrupting the young.  Gray’s observations are instructive because they reveal that 
Xenophon was not only thoroughly familiar with the g nre of instructional literature but 
also interested in modernizing and even “Socratising” i structional literary traditions.193   
Moreover, it is also apparent from his instructional works that Xenophon is keen 
on “Socratising” his relationships with his own philoi.194  In On Horsemanship, 
                                                                                                                                      
demos was suspicious of oligarchic leaders turning themselves into tyrants as well (e.g., Alcibiades).  These 
dynamics played out in a similar fashion in the fourth century (see Ober 1989: 318-24).         
191 Gauthier 1976: 37-8, citing Memorabilia 4.2.20; cf. 4.4.1-25 and Luccioni 1953: 163. 
192 Gray 1998: 159-192. 
193 Gray 1998: 194-5 suggests interpreting the Hi ro, Cyropaedia, Symposium, and Oeconomicus in this 
manner. 
194 I am thinking primarily of Hipparchicus, On Horsemanship, and Cynegeticus.  I follow Richards 1907: 
111-127 and Gray 1985, who argue that the Cynegeticus is an authentic work of Xenophon.  
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Xenophon says that he wants to demonstrate to “his younger friends” (τοῖς νεωτέροις 
τῶν φίλων) what he considers to be the “most correct way to deal with horses” (1.1).  
Presumably, his younger friends knew only the “wrong” way, and Xenophon proceeds to 
give practical advice on horsemanship.  Some of this advice is traditional because he 
includes recommendations from the fifth-century equitation writer Simon.  The inclusion 
of Simon’s opinions squares with Socrates’ attitude toward traditional advice in the 
Memorabilia: “And the treasures that the wise men of old have left behind in their books 
I open up and go through with my friends, and if we se  anything good, we consider it; 
and we count it a great profit if we become useful to one another” (1.6.14).  In the 
Hipparchicus, Xenophon concerns himself with the formation of Athens’ political leaders 
in particular by advising the would-be hipparch on how best to carry out his duties for 
“himself, his friends, and polis” (σαυτῷ δὲ καὶ φίλοις καὶ τῇ πόλει) (1.1).  Socrates, 
we are told, consorts with his friends so that “they are able to do their duty to their 
household, family, relatives, friends, polis, and fellow citizens” (καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις 
καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι) 
(Memorabilia 1.2.48; cf. 4.5.10).   
Judging from these passages, it appears that Xenopho  not only had a personal 
interest in his philoi’s education but that he framed his relationships with his philoi 
Socratically by assuming the part of the wise, practic l advisor.195  Such is his role 
                                                
195 Cf. Luccioni 1953: 163, who speaks of Xenophon placing “his projects of reform [sc. in the Poroi] 
under the patronage of Socrates;” his notes on this page draw further parallels between Socrates’ 
recommendations in the Memorabilia and Xenophon’s own in the “technical treatises.”  However, perhaps 
it is a mistake to distinguish so sharply between Xenophon and Socrates.  After all, Socrates did not leave 
any writings behind, and therefore it is just as likely a proposition that the similarities between the 
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implicit at the beginning of the Poroi, I submit.  For Gauthier the prostatai’s claim of 
understanding τὸ δίκαιον is clear proof they had a “Socratic education.”196  Although 
the idea of a formal Socratic education may be somewhat of a reach, we should not 
discount the notion that the prostatai acquired their knowledge of Socrates and his 
philosophy not only from reading works like the Memorabilia but also directly from 
Xenophon himself (e.g., in private conversation, at symposia, in letters, etc.).  It would 
seem, then, that Xenophon actively sought out politica  leaders in order to teach them 
how to improve the polis by first improving themselves.  Socrates’ conversation with 
Pericles the Younger in the Memorabilia illustrates well how seriously Xenophon took 
this pedagogical mission.  “What can the Athenians do,” asks Pericles, “to recover their 
former excellence?” (νῦν οὖν, ἔφη, τί ἂν ποιοῦντες ἀναλάβοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν 
ἀρετήν;).  “By imitating those who are currently of the first rank and practicing their 
habits,” responds Socrates (τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι καὶ τούτοις τὰ 
αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντες) (3.5.14).  But Pericles is dubious because, as a general, he knows 
how incredibly insubordinate (ἀπειθεστάτοι) and undisciplined (ἄτακτοι) the 
Athenians are in war.  Nevertheless, as long as a few examples of good conduct continue 
to exist, Socrates urges Pericles not to “think the wickedness of Athenians so utterly past 
remedy” (οὕτως ἡγοῦ ἀνηκέστῳ πονηρίᾳ νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους) (18).    
Nonetheless, the prostatai’s defense against the charge of being unjust toward the 
allies reveals a serious breakdown in Xenophon’s civic pedagogy.  The poverty of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Memorabilia and On Horsemanship et al. result not from Xenophon “Socratising” these works but from 
Xenophon “Xenophonizing” Socrates.      
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masses, they claim, necessitates their unjust behavior.  In this regard, they are echoing a 
common Athenian conception about poverty, namely, that poor people are more likely to 
commit crimes in the hope of escaping destitution.197  By this admission, they turn 
Xenophon’s entire educational paradigm on its head: the leaders reflect the character of 
the ruled, not the other way around.  Yet, by proposing measures that seek to improve the 
material condition of the Athenian masses in the “most just” (δικαιότατον) manner, 
Xenophon attempts to neutralize this defense and make the prostatai accountable for their 
behavior.  Xenophon promises that “if the plans which I have proposed are carried out, I 
say that not only will the polis be better off in respect to its revenues but also more 
obedient, disciplined, and successful in war” (πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα 
[ξύμ]φημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι) (4.51).  There 
are three notable aspects of Xenophon’s contention. 
First, by making the polis χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν, Xenophon ensures that 
justice will once again return to the state because the prostatai will no longer feel 
compelled to relieve the poverty of the masses through the unjust treatment of the allies.  
Accordingly, instead of being a “cause of suspicion” the Athenians will become “more 
agreeable to the Greeks…and more glorious” (προσφιλέστεροι μὲν τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι…εὐκλεέστεροι) (6.1).  Recall that, according to Isocrates, the leader-exemplar 
must be “above suspicion of immoral conduct” for the multitude to take him as a pattern 
                                                                                                                                      
196 Gauthier 1976: 37, 43. 
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for their own conduct.  Secondly, and more importantly, the implementation of 
Xenophon’s plans will ultimately help realize the goals of his civic pedagogy, for the 
polis will recover its “former excellence” by becoming “more obedient, disciplined, and 
successful in war.” Lastly, Xenophon boasts that by making the polis χρήμασιν 
εὐπορωτέραν he will render it “secure in its prosperity” (μετ’ ἀσφαλείας 
εὐδαιμονοῦσαν) (6.1).  As demonstrated above, Isocrates too offers his advisees the 
hope of security (ἀσφάλεια) and prosperity (εὐδαιμονία) as rewards for following his 
instructions.  For Xenophon, then, the defense of the prostatai does not lead him to 
abandon his civic pedagogy but to transform it by acknowledging that the material 
condition of humans and their societies can be both a indrance and a means for 
achieving arête.  In the final analysis, the Poroi is not only a collection of ways and 
means for improving the material prosperity of Athens but a poros for its citizens to live 
the good life.   
 
Conclusion 
As I argued in Section 2B, the philological, historical, and circumstantial evidence 
strongly suggest that Xenophon returned to Athens after his exile had been lifted shortly 
before the battle of Mantinea, and thus that Xenophon composed the Poroi while living 
in Athens.  The genre analysis given in the previous section strengthens significantly this 
interpretation.  Introducing proposals of ways and means was the province not only of 
financial experts like the poristai but by the middle of the fourth century it was becoming 
one of the most important functions of an Athenian statesmen.  The level of engagement 
                                                                                                                                      
197 Dover 1974: 109-12 and Rosivach 1991.   
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in the political and economic affairs of the city tha  the Poroi presupposes casts serious 
doubt on the idea that Xenophon was only a casual visitor to the city.  He returned not 
only as a citizen but also as an actively engaged citizen.  As Anaximenes asserts: “A 
good citizen…is one who procures for the state abundant revenues” (πολίτης δὲ 
ἀγαθός ἐστιν…ὅστις πλείστας προσόδους παρασκευάζει) (1446b33).  
Moreover, considering that Xenophon crafted the Poroi specifically as a deliberative 
discourse of the private or bouleutic variety, we must take seriously the practicality of 
Xenophon’s proposals, which he treats as inchoate probouleumata, which will eventually 
be introduced into the assembly.  This last stage in the legislative process was, of course, 
contingent upon the number of policy makers that Xenophon could convince of the 
expediency of his schemes.  The dramatic context of the Poroi’s prologue reveals that 
Xenophon possessed a network of political philoi, whom he had been instructing and 
encouraging to behave in a just manner toward Athens’ allies.  These were the 
individuals on whom Xenophon especially counted to implement his financial proposals.  
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Chapter 3: Poverty, Trophe and Athens’ Imperial Economy 
 
Whoever lives in poverty lives not as he wishes, 
because want is ready to cause him to do bad things.1 
 
Introduction  
At the end of the previous chapter, I examined the prologue of the Poroi, in which 
Xenophon articulates the purpose of the work: to reliev  the poverty of the Athenian 
citizens by maintaining them from their own domestic resources.  Xenophon deems this 
plan the “most just solution,” because, as some Athenian political leaders alleged, “the 
poverty of the masses compelled them to act rather unjustly toward their allies.”  
According to Xenophon, curing the Athenians of their poverty will ameliorate Athens’ 
standing among the Greeks, who were suspicious of the A henians because of their abuse 
of the allies.  By framing the prologue in such a mnner, Xenophon impugns not only the 
unjust behavior of certain Athenian politicians but also the entire imperial economy on 
which the Athenians depended for their sustenance.  From the very beginning of the 
work, therefore, Xenophon aims to set his financial and economic proposals apart from 
imperial modes of acquisition, creating anticipation n the reader that his program will be 
new, innovative, and, indeed, an alternative to empire.  For the Poroi’s originality, 
Polanyi contends, “lies in the thought that wealth, power, and security can be the product 
of peace rather than war.”2  It is with good reason, then, that Higgins considers 
Xenophon’s economics “essentially anti-imperialist.”3   
                                                
1 Philemon Fg. 157 (Edmonds); cf. Hesiod, Works and Days 498-9. 
2 Polanyi 1977: 196. 
3 Higgins 1977: 140. 
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A number of scholarly controversies and misconceptions about the Poroi, 
however, complicate the foregoing interpretation.  First, some historians who approach 
the fourth century from the perspective of class interpret Xenophon’s recommendations 
in the Poroi as a case study in the Athenian elite’s efforts to mitigate social and political 
tensions created by an increasing gap between rich and poor, especially because of the 
effects of the Social War.4  The evidence for class conflict in fourth century Greece is 
well attested, but in Athens open class antagonism and widespread class-consciousness 
were virtually non-existent.5  That is not to say that tensions between rich and poor did 
not exist, but it seems that the Athenian democracy itself, its institutions, laws, and public 
fora, played a significant role in reducing class conflict.6  Some Athenians did advocate 
materialistic solutions to ameliorate class tension though.  For instance, to avoid socio-
economic stasis in Greek poleis Isocrates proposed resettling the indigent and other 
undesirables, who advocated the cancellation of debts and/or the redistribution of 
property, in conquered territories outside the Greek world.7  The problem is that in the 
Poroi there is not even a hint of such social instability.  As argued in Section 2B, 
Xenophon most likely composed the Poroi over many years, beginning before the 
outbreak of hostilities, and thus it is problematic to assume the work responds exclusively 
to the adverse economic conditions caused by the Social War.  To my mind, Xenophon is 
                                                
4 E.g., Pöhlmannn 1984: 240-51, Payrau 1971: 50-8, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 348-9, Schütrumpf 
1982: 32 and 1995: 298, and Azoulay 2004: 221-30. 
5 Dover 1972: 37-41, Pecirka 1976: 17-18, Ste. Croix 1981: 284, and Ober 1989: 198.  For discussions and 
analyses of class and class conflict, see Pöhlmannn 1984: 251-65, Mossé 1962: 137-55, 407-9 and 1973: 
16-17, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 20-5, Wood and Wood 1978: 41-64, Ste. Croix 1981-278-300, 
Finley 1983: 1-23, 97-121, Strauss 1986: 55-9, and Ober 1989: Chapter 5 and 1991.  Austin and Vidal-
Naquet 1977: 338-51 have collected the most relevant fourth century sources.  
6 This is the thesis of Ober 1989, which was first proposed by Ste Croix 1981: 284. 
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quite clear and direct on the issue: the poverty of the Athenians has led to unjust actions 
not at home but abroad; accordingly, a reduction in poverty, brought about through 
increases in domestic resources, will relieve the Athenians of the suspicion running 
rampant in the greater Greek world.8  The main conflict here is between ruler and subject, 
not rich and poor.  I do not mean to suggest that an analysis of class has no place in the 
Poroi, but rather that it contributes little to our understanding of Xenophon’s primary aim 
in composing the Poroi.9 
A second obstacle to understanding Xenophon’s anti-imperialistic economics is 
the interpretation of the term τροφή.  In the prologue, Xenophon contemplates whether 
“the Athenian citizens can be maintained (διατρέφεσθαι) from their own domestic 
resources,” a question he answers later in the work when he declares that “sufficient 
maintenance for all Athenians” (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν) is possible if 
the city adopts his proposals (4.33; cf. 4.13, 52).  Some historians take trophe to mean 
quite literally “food” or “payment for food,” while others, claiming that rophe is a 
veritable synonym of misthos, argue that it refers to a payment or wage in exchange for 
                                                                                                                                      
7 See, above all, Baynes 1955: 144-67 and Fuks 1972; cf. Green 1996: 21: “What Isocrates really wants, in 
short, is protection for property owners…”  Cf. Aeneas Tacticus, Siegecraft 14. 
8 Similarly at 5.1-4, where Xenophon speaks of peace, he concentrates almost exclusively on how the 
greater Greek world benefits, and at 6.1 he begins his enumeration of the benefits of his program not with 
Athens but the Greeks.  Indeed, he does say in this same passage that his program will have the benefit of 
“releasing the rich from the expenses of war.”  Yet, this admission does not necessarily mean that the ric  
had been the primary financiers of Athens’ welfare system.  One of the main objectives of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that the vast majority of funds to subsidize trophe for the demos came from the Athenian 
empire.   
9 It is noteworthy that the term πλῆθος, “multitude,” which elites seem to have used to connote the poor 
“commons” (e.g., Ath. Pol. 2.1 with Rhodes 1981: 88-9), is what Xenophon puts in o the mouths of the 
prostatai, whereas he himself employs the class-neutral word πολῖται, “citizens.”  In other words, some 
prostatai wished to turn the injustice of Athenian imperialism into a class issue, but Xenophon refused to 
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services rendered to the state.  The difference of meaning gives rise to two radically 
different interpretations of the Poroi.  If trophe indicates “food” or one of its concomitant 
translations, such as “nourishment,” “livelihood,” or “sustenance,” then Xenophon’s 
perspective is largely economic, that is, in its strictest sense of satisfying material needs 
and wants.10  If trophe, on the other hand, is synonymous with misthos, signifying pay 
for services rendered to the state, then Xenophon’s ultimate purpose in composing the 
Poroi is political, because he aims to free the Athenians from the toil of work so that they 
might engage in politics full time.11  Given the stakes of this debate, I devote Section 3A 
to the analysis of trophe in the Poroi.  I firmly support the view that trophe refers strictly 
to food and/or money for food and thereby endorse the economic orientation of the work.  
In Section 3B, I investigate the related issue of pverty in fourth century Athens, 
examining in particular what Xenophon means by the “poverty of the plethos.”    
Lastly, many historians in the last thirty years have questioned seriously the idea 
that Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century was imperialistic.  This school of 
thought contends that Athens learned from the mistake  of the past and did not actively 
pursue a policy to reconstitute its fifth-century empire.  Athens’ objectives overseas were 
largely defensive, and whenever they did intervene in allied states, the Athenians 
respected their freedom and autonomy.  Because this interpretation flies in the face of 
Xenophon’s depiction of Athens as a parasitic state, I d vote a significant portion of this 
chapter to examining Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century.  I maintain that 
                                                                                                                                      
countenance such an explanation and placed the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of all Athenians 
(cf. 4.33: πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις).               
10 Thiel 1922: 55, Cawkwell 1963: 63, note 92, Schütrumpf 1982: 15-38, 65-72, and Doty 2003: 5-9. 
11 Herzog 1914: 473-4, Wilhelm 1932: 43-4, Gauthier 1976: 20-32, 241-53 and 1984. 
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Athens did aim to recover its fifth-century empire and pursued imperialistic policies 
throughout the century, which fomented resentment and, ultimately, revolt among the 
allies (Section 3C).  In Section 3D, I explore the causes of this renewed imperialism.  I 
argue that securing trophe for the demos significantly influenced Athenian foreign policy, 
thus supporting Xenophon’s framing of the Poroi in terms of “empire for food.”   
 
3A. Trophe and Misthos 
The historians who have studied the classical attest ions of trophe and misthos 
generally maintain that the Greeks used these terms interchangeably down until the 
advent of large mercenary armies in the middle of the fourth century.12  For Pritchett, 
who deals primarily with the evidence from Thucydides concerning the remuneration of 
soldiers, trophe/misthos referred strictly to money for rations: “Just as dikastic pay was 
for maintenance, so the stratiotic pay made to citizens in the fifth century was for 
purchase of rations.”13  Greeks in the fourth century commonly deemed these ration-
payments with such terms as εἰς σῖτος, σιτηρέσιον, or simply σῖτος.  Loomis has 
challenged this interpretation, contending that trophe/misthos means gross pay, that is, 
pay plus ration-money.14  He rests his argument on two claims: 1) Thucydides’ use of 
misthos for mercenary pay suggests more than ration-money, because “[m]ercenaries are 
unlikely to fight for someone else…unless they expect to ‘net’ some money over and 
above whatever they have to pay for food;” and 2) rations could have been purchased for 
2 to 3 obols per day, which is about half the averag  sum attested for pay before ca. 412; 
                                                
12 Pritchett 1971: 3-28, Will 1975, Gauthier 1976: 20-32 and 1984: 192, Gabrielsen 1981: 67-81, and 
Loomis 1998: 32-61.  
13 Pritchett 1971: 6. 
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consequently, misthos must mean something more than ration-pay.15  Recently, Kallet 
has cast serious doubts on both interpretations with her studious examination of 
Thucydides’ financial terminology.16  The historian’s usage of trophe at 1.11.2, which 
undoubtedly refers to rations, cautions against taking trophe and misthos as synonyms.  
Moreover, in Book 8 Thucydides employs the term t ophe predominantly in reference to 
Spartan expectations of receiving subsistence payments only, not full pay.17  Kallet 
therefore proposes that “Thucydides uses trophe as a kind of subcategory of misthos, to 
connote mere subsistence...”18  Apparently, at the end of the fifth century the Greeks 
were beginning to distinguish between wages for servic s and money for rations.19   
This view of trophe and misthos accords well with Gabrielsen’s analysis of these 
terms in fourth-century authors.  Though he ultimately concludes that the two words were 
synonyms, Gabrielsen nevertheless asserts that misthos “conveys no particular meaning 
other than the general one for payment or wages,” whereas trophe “bears an additional 
implication as to the usage of a given payment, i.e. to cover one’s food expenses.”20  
                                                                                                                                      
14 Loomis 1998: Chapter 2. 
15 Loomis 1998: 35. 
16 Kallet 2001: 295-308. 
17 Kallet 2001: 297-99. 
18 Kallet 2001: 299. 
19 Schütrumpf 1982: 69-70 makes a similar point, citing Ps.-Xenophon, Athenaion Politeia 1.3, 16; Lysias 
27.1; and Plato, Gorgias 515e6. 
20 Gabrielsen 1981: 70; cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 68-9 and Gauthier 1984: 192 n.15.  On pages 72-3 
Gabrielsen backs away from drawing this distinction, because, as he claims, four passages (Demosthenes 
4.28-9; 18.260; Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 42.3, 62.2) call into question that fourth-century authors 
distinguished the terms consistently.  Such a view is a mistake in my opinion, as Gabrielson’s 
interpretations of these passages are unsound.  His reading of Demosthenes 4.28-9 is so mistaken that it is 
sufficient to cite the analysis of Loomis 1988: 52-3.  Demosthenes 18.260, which refers to Aeschines’ 
receiving a misthos of “tipsy cakes, cracknels and currant buns,” has nothi g to do with the system of state 
pay and therefore should not be used as an example of how misthos could denote “payments in kind.”  
Furthermore, the passages in the Athenaion Politeia indicate, according to Gabrielsen, that the sums for 
trophe/sitos payments were sometimes higher than misthos payments.   At 62.2 Ps.-Aristotle says that the 
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Surprisingly, Gabrielsen ignores the evidence from Xenophon, who makes this same 
distinction consistently in his works.  In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon says that Cyrus 
“provided misthos and trophe for many” (8.5.23), which speaks strongly against the
synonymy of the two words.  Throughout the work, Xenophon, in a sense, glosses trophe 
for us by frequently mentioning τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, “the necessaries of life,” in conjunction 
with trophe, which suggests that Xenophon is referring primarily to food, though τὰ 
ἐπιτήδεια may also mean the necessities of clothes and shoes (e.g., Plato, Republic 
369d).21  Interestingly, in the Hellenica, Xenophon links trophe specifically with food 
and misthos with clothes and shoes:   
Οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Χίῳ μετὰ τοῦ Ἐτεονίκου στρατιῶται ὄντες, ἕως μὲν 
θέρος ἦν, ἀπό τε τῆς ὥρας ἐτρέφοντο καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι μισθοῦ 
κατὰ τὴν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ χειμὼν ἐγένετο καὶ τροφὴν οὐκ εἶχον 
γυμνοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι, συνίσταντο ἀλλήλοις καὶ 
συνετίθεντο ὡς τῇ Χίῳ ἐπιθησόμενοι. 
 
The troops that were in Chios with Etonicus, subsisted from the produce 
of summer until harvest time and worked for a w ge up and down the 
land; but when winter came, they did not have food and were naked and 
without shoes, so they came together and agreed to make an attack on 
Chios (2.1.1) 
 
Etonicus’ troops became naked and shoeless not becaus  they were deprived of their 
trophe but because they could no longer work for misthos.  This passage allows us to 
                                                                                                                                      
archons received four obols for εἰς σίτησιν, whereas dicasts got a comparable three obols misthos.  “[B]y 
comparing the three obols misthos of the dicasts,” he argues, “and the one drachma eis sitesin given to the 
archon for Salamis, or the one drachma eis trofen received by the sophronist (Ath. Pol. 42, 3) we can see 
that the two latter terms refer to sums that are relativ ly greater than misthos.”  This argument is cogent but, 
by no means, necessary.  The discrepancy in payments is better explained by the fact that archons and other 
magistrates had to maintain dependents and/or slaves.  For example, the nine archons had to support a 
herald and piper out of their funds (Loomis 1998: 26).    
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draw the conclusion that trophe, which here denotes rations, but elsewhere in Xenophon 
may also mean “ration-payment,” refers strictly to fo d.  Misthos, on the other hand, was 
a wage that, in theory, provided enough money to buy other necessities, such as shoes 
and clothing.22  In the Anabasis, soldiers expected their misthos to be large enough not 
only to cover the necessities for themselves but also to yield some savings to help their 
families back home (5.6.19-29).  For Xenophon then, trophe means both food and ration-
payment, whereas misthos indicates gross pay; misthos may implicitly refer to trophe, but 
trophe never signifies misthos per se.  The inclusion of trophe within the category of 
misthos does not indicate an equivalence of the two terms.23  
 The real issue, in my opinion, is whether trophe must always denote either 
payment in kind or ration-payment as compensation for services rendered, a conclusion 
Gabrielsen seems to reach.24  Given that the remuneration of state-officials is hi  primary 
concern, it is understandable that Gabrielsen advocates this interpretation.  Yet, 
Xenophon uses trophe countless times in non-payment situations.25  For instance, the 
immediate context of Xenophon’s remarks in the prologue about “maintaining” 
(διατρέφεσθαι) the Athenians has nothing to do with remuneration.  In fact, in Chapter 
1 Xenophon concerns himself exclusively with persuading his readers that Attica and its 
resources can “feed” (τρέφει) countless people (1.5).  Hence, one cannot assume that 
                                                                                                                                      
21 Cyropaedia 1.6.15; 2.3.8; 4.5.17; 5.4.28; cf. Anabasis 5.6.32; 7.3.8; Memorabilia 2.8.2; and 
Oeconomicus 4.5-6, where Socrates proves that the Persian king is a diligent farmer because he supplies his 
army with trophe. 
22 In fact, Xenophon, Anabasis 6.2.4 is the earliest attestation of the word σιτηρέσιον with the meaning 
ration-payment. 
23 Cf. Hellenica 5.1.17. 
24 Gabrielsen 1981: 74. 
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trophe implies payment for services rendered without examining the immediate context 
in which the word is deployed.26  Let us now turn to the two most contested passages 
(2.1 and 6.1) and investigate how scholars have interpreted them.    
In a short section on metics, Xenophon declares: “For the revenue from the metics 
seems to me to be one of the best, because they do not receive state-pay for the many 
benefits they render to cities all the while supporting themselves and paying the special 
metic tax” (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ πρόσοδος τῶν καλλίστων ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐπείπερ 
<αὐτοὶ> αὑτοὺς τρέφοντες καὶ πολλὰ ὠφελοῦντες τὰς πόλεις οὐ λαμβάνουσι 
μισθόν, ἀλλὰ μετοίκιον προσφέρουσιν) (2.1).  Gabrielsen claims this passage 
proves that Xenophon treats misthos and trophe synonymously:  
The inference to be made on analyzing the relevant se tences is that τοὺς 
αὐτοὺς [sic] means that the Athenian metics earned their living by means 
of private enterprise, therefore in no way burdening the state; moreover, 
that their actual earnings from these activities are, in view of the verbal 
form τρέφοντες, to be identified with the substantive trofé.  These 
logically implied trofé payments earned by the metics are actually seen to 
be used by Xenophon interchangeably with the misthós payments, which 
proves their synonymity.27 
 
Gabrielsen reasons soundly but his conclusion is by no means compulsory.  As argued 
above, misthos may implicitly refer to trophe but cannot be used interchangeably with 
trophe, because misthos means gross pay, whereas trophe means either ration or ration-
payment.   All Xenophon says is that metics have enough money to feed themselves 
despite receiving no political misthos.  In the Hellenica, for example, Xenophon employs 
                                                                                                                                      
25 For non-payment uses of trophe in Xenophon, see, for example, Hellenica 6.3.6; Memorabilia 4.3.5; 
4.3.10; Oeconomicus 5.5; 15; 17.14; Symposium 4.41; De republica Lacedaemoniorum 2.5.7.  
26 In addition to the prologue, Xenophon mentions trophe and its verbal derivatives seven other times in 
the Poroi (2.1; 4.13, 33, 49, 52 (2); 6.1), while misthos occurs only once (2.1).   
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the verbal forms of trophe to denote the maintenance of troops and sailors with misthos 
(5.1.24; 7.4.33), but he also uses these forms to signify their support with rations (e.g., 
6.1.11; 6.2.37).  The point of the former is that misthos allowed for the purchase of 
rations, and thus it is accurate to say that misthos “maintained” (τρέφειν) a fleet or army.  
What Xenophon does not say is that rations or ration-payments are equivalent to misthos.   
Moreover, Gauthier argues that Xenophon’s reference to metics receiving no 
misthos contains an implicit contrast with the practice of compensating citizens with 
misthos for political service, the implication being for Gauthier that Xenophon in the 
Poroi must be thinking primarily about Athenian civic misthoi, regardless of the term he 
employs.28  For the moment, I am willing to overlook that Xenophon is generalizing in 
this passage, referring to Greek poleis more broadly, and accept that he is implicitly 
contrasting the non-payment of metics in the Greek world with civic misthoi at Athens.  
Nevertheless, it is specious to make such a contrast the heuristic basis for analyzing all of 
Xenophon’s proposals vis-à-vis trophe, especially his initiative of supplying all 
Athenians with a daily allowance of three obols.29  As I examine more fully in Chapter 5, 
Section 5C, Xenophon intends to fund this program by citizen and foreign participation in 
capital funds, of which the public purchase of slaves in the mining industry is the most 
notable example.  The proceeds from these funds bear no similarity to the dynamic of 
misthos, in that the participants render no service or labor eyond fronting the startup 
                                                                                                                                      
27 Gabrielsen 1981: 70; cf. Gauthier 1976: 32-3 who offers a similar interpretation of this passage. 
28 Gauthier 1976: 27; cf. Gabrielsen 1981: 70. 
29 The calculations that Xenophon gives at 3.9-10 prove that he intends to provide every Athenian with a 
daily  triobolon (cf. 4.33) (see Marchant 1925: 203, n. 1 and Gauthier 1976: 93-4).  This rate is also 
confirmed by Xenophon’s remarks at 4.17, where he proposes increasing the number of slaves until there 
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capital.  The initial outlay of the citizens may best be understood as a kind of epidosis, 
“gift,” to the state, but one that yields monetary returns for the individual as well as 
revenues for the state.  The participants are not “wage earners” (μισθωτοί), as Gauthier 
would have it, but “investors.”  One of the main problems with Gauthier’s interpretation 
of this passage, which also holds true for much of is analysis of the Poroi, is that he 
denies Xenophon’s creativity, because, as he sees it, Xenophon did “not pass for having 
had intelligence or an exceptional imagination.”30  The originality of Xenophon’s 
financial scheme, which requires citizens to act as “economic animals,” speaks strongly 
against Gauthier’s interpretation. 
In the second passage in question, Xenophon summarizes the benefits he thinks 
his financial schemes will generate for the city: 
Ἀλλ’ εἴ γε μὴν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδύνατον μὲν μηδέν ἐστι μηδὲ 
χαλεπόν, πραττομένων δὲ αὐτῶν προσφιλέστεροι μὲν τοῖς 
Ἕλλησι γενησόμεθα, ἀσφαλέστερον δὲ οἰκήσομεν, 
εὐκλεέστεροι δὲ ἐσόμεθα, καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει, οἱ 
δὲ πλούσιοι τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης ἀπαλλαγήσονται, 
περιουσίας δὲ πολλῆς γενομένης μεγαλοπρεπέστερον μὲν ἔτι ἢ 
νῦν ἑορτὰς ἄξομεν, ἱερὰ δ’ ἐπισκευάσομεν, τείχη δὲ καὶ νεώρια 
ἀνορθώσομεν, ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ 
πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν… 
 
Now indeed, if none of my proposals is difficult nor impossible, and if 
they are implemented, then we shall become more favored by the Greeks; 
we will live in greater security; we will be more est emed; the Athenian 
people will have an abundance of trophe; and the rich will be released 
from the burdens of funding our wars.  Moreover, with a large surplus [of 
revenue], we will conduct our festivals more magnificently than we do 
now; we will restore our temples and repair the walls nd naval yards; and 
                                                                                                                                      
are three for every citizen; because he expects each sl ve to bring in an obol a day net (4.14, 23), this yields 
three obols a day per citizen (see Doty 2004: 6).        
30 Gauthier 1976: 22. 
 127 
to the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry we ill restore their 
ancient privileges (6.1). 
 
Traditionally, the debate over this passage has focused on 1) whether the phrase ὁ μὲν 
δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει refers to political payments and, if so, which ones; and 2) 
whether the phrase ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια 
ἀποδώσομεν alludes to the remuneration of priests, the council, magistrates, and 
cavalry.  Expanding upon Wilamowitz’s interpretation f “trophe for the demos” as kind 
of “state-pension,” Herzog contends that in 6.1 Xenophon is thinking primarily about 
misthos for civic functions.31  He buttresses his claim by citing 4.52, where Xenophon 
remarks that Athenians, serving in a variety of defense duties, will carry out their duties 
better, “if trophe is given for each of these tasks (ἐφ’ ἑκάστοις τῶν ἔργων τῆς 
τροφῆς ἀποδιδομένης).  Thiel, however, vigorously resisted the identification of ὁ 
μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει with civic misthos, because, as he correctly points out, 
Xenophon intends all citizens, both rich and poor, t  receive the same three obol rate.32  
This uniformity does not suggest payments for civic services and offices, since the rates 
of pay for these varied significantly.  Thiel noneth less follows Herzog’s lead in reading 
ἱερεῦσι…τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν as Xenophon’s political manifesto to remunerate 
                                                
31 Herzog 1914: 473-4; cf. Wilamowitz 1893: I, 212 and Wilhelm 1932: 38-40. 
32 Thiel 1922: 55; cf. Andreades 1933: 389, n.7 and Cawkwell 1963: 63, n.92. 
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priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry by reinstating their former rates of pay, which 
had been reduced or abolished by the time Xenophon was composing the Poroi.33 
Capitalizing upon this reading ofτὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν, Gauthier attempts to 
revive Herzog’s political interpretation of the phrase ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει.  
He contends that the word “demos” denotes the people not as an economic or social 
entity but as a political body.34  Since τὰ πάτρια represents a return to the traditional 
misthoi paid to the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry, the “trophe of the demos,” 
argues Gauthier, must represent the misthoi paid to the rest of the citizens who likewise 
served in some political capacity, namely, in the assembly and courts.  Moreover, 
Gauthier asserts that Xenophon intends to fund these political payments in two different 
ways.  The immediate increase in revenue, especially the monies derived from the capital 
fund (3.9), will result in the creation of a euporia of trophe for the demos; the ventual 
increase in revenues accrued from the leasing of mining slaves, a plan Xenophon says 
requires gradual implementation (4.35-40), will one day provide the rest of the citizenry 
(priests, council, etc.) with the misthoi they once received in the past.35  Xenophon’s 
promise to guarantee “a sufficient trophe for all Athenians” (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν 
Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν) (4.33) points, then, to the future when all Athenians will collect a 
daily three-obol payment in compensation for their political activity.  Accordingly, one 
                                                
33 Thiel does not say when these rates were reduced or xplain why; Herzog 1914: 474 speculates that pay 
rates fell during the Social War.  Cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 26-8 and 1995: 298 and Azoulay 2004: 225-6 who
likewise interpret τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν as referring to political misthos. 
34 Gauthier 1976: 24 and 1984: 190-1. 
35 Gauthier 1976: 27-30, 242-45. 
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must distinguish between Xenophon’s short-term goals and his long-term ideals.36  But 
this leads to an inevitable “contradiction” in ideals, Gauthier insists, because the creation 
of a permanent leisure class of citizens, who devote themselves entirely to the political 
life, undermines Xenophon’s program for economic recov ry, which is predicated upon 
the entrepreneurial activities of these very citizens.37  In short, Gauthier concludes that 
modern commentators and even Xenophon himself have f il d to recognize this 
fundamental opposition between the ideals of h mo politicus and those of homo 
economicus. 
Though Gauthier presents the most compelling case for the political significance 
of trophe, it suffers from a number of fatal flaws.  As Hanse  argues persuasively, the 
word “demos” never refers to the dikasterion but only to the ekklesia, and thus the 
opposition in 6.1 between the “demos” and “the wealthy” (ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς 
εὐπορήσει, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι) strongly enjoins the interpretation that “the meaning of 
demos in this passage is ‘the common people’, ‘the poor’ and not the people acting as a 
body of government (= the kklesia).”38  In other words, the phrase ὁ μὲν δῆμος 
τροφῆς εὐπορήσει fulfills Xenophon’s promise in the prologue to relieve the “poverty 
of the masses” (τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν).  As Thiel argued rightly long ago, “trophe 
for the demos” has nothing to do with political misthos.  In fact, the very phrase cited by 
Gauthier, “a sufficient trophe for all Athenians” (ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις 
                                                
36 Gauthier 1976: 22 and 1984: 187. 
37 Gauthier 1976: 238-53. 
38 Hansen 1978 and 1979: 20-1, n.23.  
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τροφὴν), calls his entire interpretation into question, because all the fourth-century 
examples of the locution ἱκανός + trophe refer explicitly to food.39    
Furthermore, the explanation ofτὰ πάτρια in terms of political pay runs into 
similar interpretive problems.  The phrase ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ 
ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν is “an embarrassingly vague statement.”40  But 
supposing that it does signify political misthos, then only two interpretations are 
admissible, as Hansen demonstrates: 1) misthos for the priests, council, magistrates, and 
cavalry had been abolished some time before Xenophon composed the Poroi; or 2) 
misthos for the priests et al. had been reduced in comparison with an earlier period.41  
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that any these political payments had been 
abolished between the end of the fifth century and ca. 355.42  A year later Demosthenes 
actually mentions that the priests, council, and cavalry were remunerated.43  Nor is there 
                                                
39 E.g., Isocrates, Busiris 13, 15; Plato, Protagoras 322b and Critias 110d; Demosthenes, Exordium 3; 
Aristotle, Politics 1256b11 and Oeconomica 1344b3.  Interestingly, the construction ἱκανός + misthos is 
not attested until late antiquity. 
40 Hansen 1979: 15. 
41 Hansen 1979: 15; cf. Gabrielsen 1981: 103-5.     
42 Gauthier 1976: 29, n. 13 cites Demosthenes 39.16-17 and 45.3-4, which mention the inability of the 
state to pay misthos for the dikasterion in times of war.  Given that the remuneration of the courts is not the 
issue but that of the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry, I do not see the relevance.  Besides, 
Demosthenes does not say that misthos ceased for all those serving in the courts but that dike-suits were 
suspended; graphe cases continued to be introduced and tried.  Hansen 1979 argues cogently that misthoi 
for magistrates were suspended after 403/2, although he stakes much on an argument from silence.  He also 
does not examine all the evidence, and it is certainly possible that these payments were passed over in 
silence in the sources because they were “negligible” (Gauthier 1976: 28).  At any rate, if magistrates did in 
fact stop receiving misthos in the fourth century, my argument still holds, as it is certain that the council, 
priests, and cavalry were paid throughout the century (see Loomis 1998: Chapters 1 and 2 with Appendix 
1: 261-70). 
43 Demosthenes 24.96-101 with Gabrielsen 1981: 104: “Did Athens succeeded [sic] in accumulating in 
less than a year the large surplus dreamt of by Xenophon?  Our sources referring to the financial history of 
Athens do not contain the slightest indication as to the occurrence of such a miracle, and hence it is 
improbable that the payments mentioned by Demosthenes had just been reintroduced.”  Moreover, 
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any indication that the rates for political misthos decreased during this time.44  The 
period from 403 to 330 in general saw a steady rise in wages.45  It also should not be 
inferred that the effects the Social War led to a temporary reduction in political misthos, 
because during the Corinthian War, when Athenian revenues were abysmally low, the 
Athenians increased assembly pay from one to two obols and then to three by 393, a level 
that was maintained down to the King’s Peace of 387/6.46  Of the four civic/military 
functions Xenophon mentions, only pay for the cavalry was reduced in the fourth 
century, dropping from one drachma to four obols.47  This payment, however, was most 
likely ration-money for both rider and horse and continued down until the time Xenophon 
was composing the Hipparchicus (ca. 357) (1.19).48  If Xenophon had wished to increase 
misthos for the cavalry, it is surprising that we hear nothing of it in the Hipparchicus.  On 
the contrary, Xenophon thinks the existing payments to be sufficient not only to motivate 
the cavalry to practice their horsemanship but to train efficiently for war.  Such is 
                                                                                                                                      
Gabrielsen’s interpretation of Isocrates, Areopagiticus 24-5 (89-93), which Jaeger 1940 dates to the early 
350s, corroborates Demosthenes’ testimony.     
44 Gabrielsen 1981: 104-5, citing no evidence, cautiously admits the possibility.  
45 See Loomis 1998: 241-2.  Though the evidence is not particularly rich, it appears that the wage for 
serving in the council (at least for the prytaneis) in the fourth century increased by a 100% in comparison to 
the fifth, and payments made to priests and priestesses stayed roughly the same and, in some cases, 
increased slightly. 
46 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 41.3; Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 183-8, 300-10 and Wealth 329-30.  
For the economy in postwar Athens, see Strauss 1986: 42- 9. 
47 The decrease came in 403/2 at the suggestion of Theozotides (see Lysias, Against Theozotides, Fg. 10C 
with Todd 2000: 382-4 and n.10), whose motives are unclear: he may have wished to punish the cavalry for 
their support of the Thirty or been compelled by fiscal necessity. These two interpretations of Theozotides’ 
motives hinge on the restoration of lines 77-8: “whereas the hippotoxotai should receive eight obols instead 
of two [obols/drachmas?]…”  If “drachmas” is the correct reading (Loomis 1995), then it seems certain that 
Theozotides’ measure was fiscally motivated; alternatively, if “obols” is to be preferred, Theozotides seems 
to have had political objectives.    
48 For the 4 obol sitos-payment, see Kroll 1977: 97-8, n. 36.  In 351 Demosthenes proposes to pay the 
cavalry 30 dr./month (1dr/day) to campaign against Philip (4.28), which suggests that rates may have 
occasionally increased for certain operations.  I am inclined, therefore, to interpret Theozotides proposal as 
a fiscal measure intended to bring war rates of payment back to peacetime levels.    
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Xenophon’s point in the Poroi when he avows that the Athenians will carry out their 
military duties better if the state provides trophe (4.52).  It is undeniable that Xenophon 
saw a reciprocal relationship between rewards and performance, but nothing compels us 
to assume that remuneration had to take the form of isthos.  For Xenophon, trophe was 
a necessary but sufficient incentive.   
How then should ἱερεῦσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππεῦσι τὰ πάτρια 
ἀποδώσομεν be interpreted?  Demosthenes’ speech Against Timocrates, which was 
delivered a year after Xenophon composed the Poroi, is instructive.  Demosthenes 
declares that, when revenues are lacking, the busines  of the state suffers for “the people 
(assembly), the cavalry, the council, the sacred sphere (i.e. the priests), and the civil 
authority (i.e. the magistrates)” (δῆμον, ἱππέας, βουλήν, ἱερά, ὅσια) (24.101).  The 
overlap of civic offices and posts with those in the Poroi is significant.  I think it 
imperative, therefore, to take ἱερεῦσι…τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσομεν together with 
Xenophon’s comments that immediately precede it about h w a revenue surplus will 
allow the Athenians to celebrate festivals more magnificently, to restore temples, and to 
repair walls and docks—three salient examples of state business neglected in times of 
fiscal insolvency.  The word τὰ πάτρια, according to this reading, would refer to these 
very prerogatives the priests, council, magistrates, and cavalry once possessed when 
financing was abundant, perhaps during the fifth century before the Peloponnesian War.  
Consequently, increases in revenues would have helped the magistrates execute their 
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duties, for which they received glory and praise from the Athenians for jobs well done.49  
For example, in the fourth century ten elected magistrates received 30 minai a year (= ½ 
talent) to repair the temples, whereas in the fifth century, the state had allocated ten 
talents a year to temple restoration.50  The council too had numerous financial 
responsibilities and duties, such as the inspection of the walls and naval yards and the 
right to allocate money for their repair.51  
Increases in revenues would have also benefited the priestly class, because the 
financing of sacrifices and festivals in the 350s seems to have been precarious.52  
Demosthenes quotes a decree moved by Epicrates calling for a meeting of the nomothetai 
“in order that the sacrifices may be offered, that t e financing be sufficient, and that any 
lack of funds for the celebration of the Panathenaic Festival be made up…(ὅπως ἂν τὰ 
ἱερὰ θύηται καὶ ἡ διοίκησις ἱκανὴ γένηται καὶ εἴ τινος ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τὰ Παναθήναια διοικηθῇ) 
(24.27).  Demosthenes charges that Epicrates drafte this decree “under the pretext of 
finance and the urgency of the festival” to help steamroll Timocrates’ legislation about 
state-debtors introduced on the following day and thus intimates that no shortfall in funds 
existed (28).  Yet, even if we countenance Demosthenes’ accusation in this particular 
                                                
49 In the fourth century, Athenian magistrates were given an annual allowance to finance their activities 
(Rhodes 1972: 103).  Cf. the epitaph of Lycurgus: “This man lived his life in moderation, who, when 
appointed as administrator of finances, discovered new sources of revenue, built the theater, Odeum, docks, 
and triremes, and constructed harbors as well” (οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως· ταχθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ 
διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὗρε πόρους, ᾠκοδόμησε τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ᾠδεῖον, νεώρια, τριήρεις, 
ἐποιήσατο λιμένας) (Hyperides Fg.118).  On the financial duties and responsibilities of magistrates, see 
Chapter 2, Section 2D and Chapter 3, Section 3A.     
50 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 50.1; IG I3, 52 B, 5-12 = ML 58 with Rhodes 1981: 573. 
51 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 47.1; Aeschines 1.80.  The council was also responsible for providing 
prizes for the games (49.3; 60.1), and thus would have been the body responsible for the bestowal of 
rewards under Xenophon’s plan to honor magistrates who adjudicate commercial cases justly and 
expediently (3.3).   
52 See Rhodes 1972: 100-1. 
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instance, it is difficult to accept that such a pretext could have ever held water with the 
Athenians, unless the adequate funding of festivals at this time was problematic.  In 354/3 
Epicrates introduced another law, resolved by the nomothetai, dealing with festival 
finance.53   The law is lacunose, but enough of the prescript survives to establish that the 
sacrifices to Hephaestus and Athena Hephaestia, presumably at the Hephaesteia festival, 
lacked funds, which were to be obtained henceforth from the mining and coinage 
industry.  On both occasions, then, Epicrates appears to have been motivated by the same 
civic spirit operating in the Poroi, which was to make festivals as “beautiful as possible” 
(ὡς κάλλιστα) (24.28; cf. Poroi 6.1: μεγαλοπρεπέστερον).  Even the cavalry had 
important roles at such events, for Xenophon recommends making the cavalry 
processions “displays as beautiful as possible” (ὅπως ᾗ δυνατὸν κάλλιστα ἐπιδείξει) 
(Hipparchicus 3.1).  The magistrates, priests, cavalry, and counil did not need a wage to 
perform their civic duties but sufficient financing. 
In sum, very little commends itself to the political interpretation of trophe in the 
Poroi.54  Gauthier’s conclusion that there is a fundamental contradiction between 
Xenophon’s short-term goals and his long-term ideals f lls flat.  While I am sensitive to 
the temporalities of Xenophon’s economic program, Gauthier arbitrarily connects 
Xenophon’s proposals with his analysis of 6.1.55  He is surely mistaken to think two 
separate plans exist for creating the triobolon, of which one (3.9) will go to pay 
                                                
53 Agora I, 7495.  Although the law has yet to be published, M.B. Richardson presented a preliminary text 
at the 1997 annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Chicago.     
54 There is no denying that Xenophon foresees real political benefits resulting from the implementation f 
his program to supply the Athenians with sufficient trophe, but it is a mistake to disavow, as Gauthier 
1976: 39 does, the fundamental economic orientation of the Poroi. 
55 See the excellent comments of Schütrumpf 1982: 70-1. 
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immediately for assembly and jury pay, while the other (4.17) will fund the remaining 
civic misthoi in the future.56  As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, Sections 5C-D, Xenophon 
only sketches the basic workings of the capital fund at 3.9, which he then fleshes out in 
his discussion of the mines.  He may have intended th  Athenians to expand the capital 
fund to include other investments (e.g., the public leasing of ships at 3.14), but he does 
not spell this out for his readers.  We must read 3.9 and 4.17 in conjunction with each 
other, which leads inevitably to the conclusion that Xenophon aims to provide trophe for 
the demos by leasing public slaves in the mining industry.  Moreover, as my reading of 
6.1 strongly suggests, the Poroi is largely but not exclusively about trophe, as Xenophon 
also endeavors to augment revenues so that the polis can meet all of its expenses and 
effectively deliver public services.     
 
3B. The Poverty of the Demos 
It now behooves us to consider exactly what Xenophon means by “the poverty of 
the multitude” (τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν).  The nouns πενία and πένης, which 
traslate roughly as “poverty” and “poor person” resp ctively, do not carry the connotation 
of desitution they do in English.57  The term destitution more aplty applies to πτωχεία, 
“beggary,” and πτωχός, “beggar,” that is, one who does not have the necessiti s of life.  
Aristophanes famously observes the distinction betwe n πένης and πτωχός: “The life 
of the destitute, which is what you’re taking about, is to live having nothing.  The life of a 
poor man is to live frugally, keeping at one’s work, to have no surplus but not to have a 
                                                
56 Gauthier 1976: 28, n.11, 242-4. 
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shortfall either” (πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἐστιν μηδὲν ἔχοντα· 
τοῦ δὲ πένητος ζῆν φειδόμενον καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντα, περιγίγνεσθαι δ’ 
αὐτῷ μηδέν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ’ ἐπιλείπειν) (Wealth 553-4).  Indeed, πενία and πένης 
derive from the verb πένομαι (cf. πόνος), which means to “work” or “toil.”  Lacking 
leisure the penetes labored in a variety of trades, but farming seems to have been the most 
representative field of activity.58      
However, it must be acknowledged that the penetes did not form a homogenous 
class with equal resources, as the term seems to cover a wide spectrum of the population, 
including members of the hoplite census as well as poor thetes.  Around 358/7 the 
Athenians passed the law of Periander, which stipulated that the richest 1,200 citizens be 
divided into twenty symmories for the trierarchy.  Previously, and after 340 when 
Demosthenes reformed the system, only the 300 richest citizens were subject to this 
military liturgy.59  According to Demosthenes, during this interim period, “the liturgies 
were now falling upon the penetes.”60  Apparently, around 900 penetes became subject to 
the trierarchy, which cost a talent per year, though the members of a symmory shared this 
financial burden.  Given that the Poroi post-dates Periander’s law, the reference to “the 
rich” (οἱ πλούσιοι) being released from the burdens of funding wars (6.1) probably 
includes these 900 or so penetes.  On the other end of the spectrum, some penetes were 
                                                                                                                                      
57 Hemelrijk 1925: 28-54, Hands 1968: 62-66, Dover 1974: 109-11, Gauthier 1976: 38-9, Davies 1981: 10-
12, Markle 1985: 267-71, Rosivach 1991, and Sealey 1993: 22-4. 
58 Jones 1957: 13-4, 79-80, Ste. Crox 1981: 286, Davies 1981: 52-4, and Rosivach 1991: 192-3. 
59 See Davies 1981: 13-28, who refutes the position frst advanced by Jones 1957: 85-88 that 1,200 
represents the “normal” number for the trierarchic register; see, however, the reservations of Rhodes 1985: 
4-5.  On the law of Periander with references to earlier scholarship, see Rhodes 1982, Cawkwell 1984: 342-
3, and MacDowell 1986.      
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ἄποροι, “without resources,” that is, dangerously close to becoming πτωχοί.61  If one 
had to refer to these extremely poor penetes and ptochoi collectively, some evidence 
suggests that the Athenians characterized them generally also as penetes.62 
Demographically speaking, the rich made up only 4% of the 30,000 of the adult 
male population during the fourth century, which means that 96% of Athenians were, 
technically speaking, penetes.63  Of these, about 9,000 were relatively well off, owning 
property worth more than 2000 drachma—the cutoff for serving as a hoplite.64  The 
average hoplite plot was probably in the range of 4 to 6 hectares, which was not large 
enough to yield a significant surplus but sufficient for meeting the needs of the oikos.65  
Greek terminology notwithstanding, these p netes were not the poor Xenophon is talking 
about in the Poroi, because they lived above the subsistence level.  The remaining 20,000 
of the Athenian adult population, then, comprised the moderately-to-extremely poor, 
among whom numbered ptochoi.  Taken together these two sub-hoplite groups 
correspond to the Solonian thetic class.  According to Dionysius Halicarnassus, the 
Athenians in 403 proposed a law that only those owning land should be citizens, which 
                                                                                                                                      
60 Demosthenes 20.18; cf. 18.104, 108 with Davies 1981: 13.  
61 Markle 1985: 268-9.  
62 Rosivach 1991: 189-90 citing Plato, Symposium 203b-c. 
63 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 1132-3 put the Athenian male population in 391 at more than 30,000.  
Granted this number is “conventional” (Herodotus 5.97.2 and Menander, Epitrpontes 1088-9 with 
Sommerstein 1998: 235), but so too is the 20,000 figure in Wasps 708 and Athenaion Politeia 24.3.  
Hansen 1985 presents the most convincing case that the adult male population at the end of the fourth 
century was around 30,000, which contrasts with the 21,000 figure of Ruschenbusch 1984 (see Section 3C 
below).     
64 Jones 1957: 28-29, 81-7.   
65 For the 4 to 6 hectare plot size, see Cooper 1978: 1 0, Jameson 1977-8: 125, n.13, and Garnsey 1988: 
92.  As I argue below (Section 3D), a hectare produce  on average 471.8kg (= 15 medimnoi) of wheat or 
635kg (= 24 medimnoi) of barley per year.  An “average” Greek needed to consume 77 kg/day 
(281kg/year) of wheat or 1.12 kg/day (410kg/year) of barley.  Thus, a four-hectare plot could produced 
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would have resulted in the disenfranchisement of 5,000 people.66  Thus, of these 20,000 
poor about 15,000 were small property owners, that is, those holding less than four 
hectares but probably averaging around 20 plethera (= 1.8 ha).67  This figure is 
significant because it indicates that half of Athenian citizens were at or below the 
subsistence level.  In the fourth century, crop failures were frequent for wheat and 
leguminous crops, though less so for barley, leading to numerous “food crises” or to what 
some call “subsistence crises.”68  “Each food crisis,” Garnsey explains, “occupies a place 
on a continuum leading from mild shortage to disastrous famine.”69  Subsistence farmers 
attempt to minimize the deleterious effects of such crises, but in traditional societies like 
Athens, many peasants look to their communities for alimentary support and to the state 
to have the prescience and power to avoid crises in the first place by managing the food 
supply.70   
The remaining 5,000 landless poor, it is reasonable to assume, were comprised 
mainly of the indigent and urban proletariats (μισθωτοί), although some of them may 
have worked as seasonal labors in the fields.71  Those workers who were skilled (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                      
2540kg of barley or 1887kg, which would have comfortably feed a family of six, which is the size of 
Foxhall and Forbes 1982 “hypothetical” Greek family (1 adult male, 2 adult females, and three children). 
66 Dionysius Halicarnassus, Argumentum ad Lysiam 34.  The historicity of this claim has not been 
seriously challenged; see Jones 1957: 79-80 and Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 79.       
67 Jones 1957: 81 (5 acres = 2 ha = 22 pl) and Cooper 1978: 170.  My demographic figures differ from 
these authors, who start from a total adult population of 21,000 and 25,000 respectively.           
68 E.g., Scott 1976: 13-34, Garnsey 1988: 6-16, and Gallant 1991: 5-7. 
69 Garnsey 1988: 6. 
70 In general, see Polanyi 1957: 50-5 and 1968: 9-19, 25, 148-57, 207-37, Scott 1976: 27-8, Finley 1983: 
40. Garnsey 1988: 137-49; cf. 69-86 enumerates the four main strategies the Athenians employed in the 
fourth century to avoid food crises and to lessen their effects: diplomacy, incentive, regulation, and, most 
importantly for the present discussion, imperialism (see Section 3D). 
71 In theory it would have been possible for the poor to lease public lands for farming, but the evidence 
suggests that it would have been very difficult because of the long lease period (usually a minimum of 10 
years) and the high rents that are attested (see Walbank 1991; cf. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 188-90).  On 
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bricklayers and stonemasons), receiving 2 to 2 ½ dr. per day, probably made just enough 
to support their families, but the total number of skilled workers compared to that of 
unskilled workers, who made around 1 ½ dr. per day, was relatively small, and thus a 
vast majority of these 5,000 lived below the subsistence level.72    Thus, when Xenophon 
identifies “the poverty of multitude” as a cause of Athenian imperialism, I submit that he 
is really talking about these two groups of Athenians, peasants and urban proletariats, 
who were just at or below the subsistence level.  Their total number was most likely just 
                                                                                                                                      
the supposed town/country rift in post-War Athens (e.g., Mossé 1976: 12, 30), see Strauss 1986: 59-63, 
who systematically dismisses the notion.  The cornerstone of this thesis is  a passage from Aristophanes, 
Ecclesiazusae 197-8: “We need to launch a fleet: the poor man say yes, but the rich and farmers say no” 
(ναῦς δεῖ καθέλκειν· τῷ πένητι μὲν δοκεῖ, τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς οὐ δοκεῖ).  But as 
Strauss argues well, the phrase τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς expresses not two categories but one 
(note the absence of the definite article forγεωργοῖς).  The construction is therefore an example of 
hendiadys, and thus we must read the phrase as “the rich farmers” (Strauss 1986: 62-3; cf. Missiou 1992: 
165 and Sommerstein 1998: 155). Thucydides’ comments about the majority of Athenians living in the 
countryside at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War are instructive and probably hold true for the first 
half of the fourth century: “But they found it difficult to move, as most of them had always been used to 
living in the country” (2:14; cf. 2.16).  Rhodes 1981: 297, no doubt, is correct in reading Ps.-Aristotle’s 
claim (Athenaion Politeia 24) about Aristides persuading the Athenian country folk to move to the city as 
an unhistorical piece of “later theorising.”       
72 For rates of pay for Athenian μισθωτοί, see Loomis 1998: Chapter 7.  Unlike the peasant, who in 
theory grew or raised most of what the oikos needed, the proletariat had to purchase most houseld 
necessities (e.g., wine, meat, cheese, olives, oil, h ney, figs, clothing, fuel, etc.) in the market and even had 
to pay rent as well if he did not own his own house (IG II2 1590a gives an indication of the annual rent-
levels for an oikia, with prices ranging between 126 to 175 drachmas; Finley 1952: 255, n. 73 suggests that 
these rents were high; rents for synoikia or apartments were probably lower).  Because of the large number 
of festival days and other holidays, it has been reasonably estimated that workers labored on no more than 
260 days a year (see Sinclair 1988: 225-7; cf. Markle 1985: 296-7).  For unskilled workers, this would have 
netted them just under 400 dr. per year.  Add to this number, 45 dr. for attending the assembly (presuming 
these meetings did not overlap with working days) and the theorikon (Jones 1957: 81), and we get a 
maximum of just under 450 dr. per year.  Would this ave been sufficient to support a family of four?  
Because it is impossible to calculate even roughly t e daily costs of living (for one such attempt, see 
Markle 1985 279-81, 293-97), no satisfactory answer can be given to this question.  However, if we take  
three obol maximum daily allowance (daily ration (trophe) of public slave in 329; IG II2, 1627, 4-5, 42-3, 
117-8, 141-2) and a two obol minimum (daily ration f r disabled person with property less than three mnai; 
Ps.-Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 49.4) for each adult person, we get 183 dr. and 122 dr. per year respectively.  For 
children, one obol seems to have been standard (SEG28, 46.9-10), which yields 61 dr. per year.  In total, a 
family of four (two adults and two children) at the maximum level needed 488 dr. per year or 366 dr. at the 
minimum level; a family of six (three adults and three children), 732 dr. and 549 dr. respectively.  Thus, a 
wage of 450 dr. per year probably was sufficient to feed a family of four, but add in the cost of fuel, 
clothing, which was very expensive (see Pritchett 1956: 203-10), and other household necessities 
(furniture, utensils, etc.), there was probably nothing left over at the end of the year.             
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under 20,000 strong.  It necessarily follows from this conclusion that Xenophon is not 
addressing some contemporary food crisis precipitated, for example, by the Social War or 
the drought of the late 360s; rather, he is responding irectly to the long-standing 
impoverished condition of the Athenian masses.73   
What would have been the economic impact on those citizens receiving three 
obols a day under Xenophon’s plan?  In theory, the recipients of the triobolon could have 
used it to buy any foodstuff, but most of this amount would have been spent on grain, 
because around 75% of an Athenian peasant’s diet probably consisted of grain, as Foxhall 
and Forbes have ably demonstrated.74  How much grain did three obols buy in Athens?  
In Section 3D, I argue that a “typical” Athenian need d to consume around 1.12 kg or 
2.03 choinikes of barley per day or .77 kg or 1.2 choinikes of wheat.  Assuming that the 
average price for a medimnos of barley was around three drachmas or .375 obol for a 
choenix, a family of four needed 3.05 obols a day to buy grain; with a six drachma 
average price for a medimnos of wheat (.75 obol/ choenix), a family of four required 3.6 
obols.75  Naturally, for families with more than four individuals three obols would have 
been insufficient to cover grain purchases, whereas for those smaller than four this 
amount would have been enough to buy grain and additional foodstuffs like wine and 
cheese.  But on average, three obols would have contributed significantly to alleviating 
                                                
73 The Social War interpretation is that of Schütrumpf 1982: 32 and is rightly citicized by Gauthier 1984: 
191-2.   
74 Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 71-73, 86-7 and Section 3D below. 
75 Given that this number corresponds exactly to Xenophon’s rate of return from the capital fund, we have 
further proof that he conceives of trophe strictly as money to purchase food.  Note that thisfigure is 
significantly higher than Markle 1985: 277-81, who follows Foxhall and Forbes’ outdated figures for the 
weight of barley, arguing that 1.65 obols would have provided “a family of four with the most essential p rt 
of their diet.”  For the price of grain in classical Athens, see Pritchett 1956: 186, 196-8, Markle 1985: 279-
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the poverty of the Athenian poor.  In good years, however, the triobolon could have 
contributed to the creation of a surplus, which so many penetes lacked.  As I argue in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5D), a surplus would have theoretically freed many better-off penetes 
from the constraints of the “safety first” oriented peasant economy, emboldening them to 
participate in riskier economic ventures, such as mining, upon which Xenophon’s plan 
for financial recovery is largely based. 
 
3C. Athenian Imperialism in the Fourth Century 
In the following section, I take it for granted tha imperialism existed in the 
ancient world, even though the Greeks or the Romans h d no word for it.76  I use the 
term loosely and in a non-theoretical way to describe “the interventionist and 
expansionist foreign policy pursued by the Athenians in connection with their empire,” 
                                                                                                                                      
80, 293-4, and Stroud 1998: 74.  I follow Markle and Stroud, who use the three-drachma figure in their 
calculations.   
76 The term was invented in 19th century first to describe the regime of Louis Napleon and then the foreign 
policy of the British Empire under Gladstone (Koebnr and Schmidt 1965: xiii-xxv).  As Cartledge argues, 
though the “Greeks may not have had a word for imperialism…philotimia (ambition, competitive love of 
honor), polypragmosunê (activism, meddlesomeness) and pleonexia (greed for material aggrandizement) 
between them come close to covering the semantic range of ‘imperialism’, at least in its psychological 
aspect; and it is possible to find a broad, objectiv  definition of the term that will subsume all particular 
instances, ancient as well as modern” (Cartledge 1987: 86-7; cf. Griffith 1978: 143-4 and Balot 2001: 99-
135 and 2006: 138-42).  Any definition of imperialism is to a certain extent arbitrary, satisfying some but 
not all readers.  Yet formulating an ideal type of imperialism, as Cartledge suggests, has the distinct 
advantage of being able “to include historical examples which encompass a variety of eras and states under 
a variety of political, social, and economic organizations” (Zevin 1972: 321; cf. Finley 1978: 1-2).  Such a 
definition would approximate what “the man in the street” thinks, who knows imperialism when he see it 
(Finley 1978: 1).  One definition that comes close to achieving this goal is the principle or policy of a 
people to exert power and influence (politically, militarily, economically, and/or culturally) over other 
peoples and territories that infringes upon or negates their autonomy, however defined (see Hammond 
1948: 105-6).  Notice that this definition presumes nothing about causes, purposes, motives, and methods 
of imperialism—topics that have no place in a definitio  of imperialism but are nonetheless indispensable 
to any analysis of it (Zevin 1972: 319).  Contrary to some scholars’ definitions (e.g., Balot 2006: 141-2), I 
do not think the “consent,” or the lack thereof, of the subject is “the crucial indicator of imperialism.”  In 
my opinion, the existence of willing/unwilling subjects indicates not the presence/absence of imperialism, 
but rather the type of imperialism.  In the Greek conception, rule over willing subjects is monarchic in 
nature, whereas rule over unwilling subjects is tyrannical.  In the Cyropaedia, for example, Xenophon 
emphasizes that Cyrus ruled over many peoples who freely accepted their fate, but he never for a moment 
considers that this rule is anything but an empire (Nadon 2001: Chapters 4 and 5).  
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that is, their “rule” (ἀρχή) over others.77  Writing about the oligarchic revolution of 411, 
Thucydides asserts that the conspirators found it diff cult to deprive the demos of its 
freedom, because “it was not only free during that whole period [sc. from the end of the 
Peisistratid tyranny], but for well over half of that time it was accustomed to rule over 
others” (καὶ οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισου τοῦ χρόνον 
τούτου αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα) (8.68.4; cf. Hellenica 2.3.24).  This “habit” of 
empire was an integral part of the Athenian national ethos.78  When young men entered 
into military service and swore the ephebic oath, they avowed to “defend things sacred 
and profane and not hand over (to their descendents) the fatherland smaller, but larger 
and better” (ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσιῶν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάττω παραδώσω τὴν 
πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω).79  Although the oath does not qualify “larger,” 
indicating whether it means augmenting the state through internal and/or external growth, 
the politicians of the fifth century brilliantly exploited this ambiguity to further their own 
imperialistic and expansionist designs.  Pericles, for instance, invokes this line to 
                                                
77 Raaflaub 1994: 104, n.2; cf. W.V. Harris 1979: 1, 4.  The intersection between imperialism and 
expansionism in the fifth and fourth centuries is evid nced particularly well by the institution of cleruchies.  
The settlement of Lesbos in 427 after the Mytilenian revolt is instructive (Thucydides 3.50.2).  The 
Athenians divided the whole island, except for the territory of Methymna, into three thousand allotments, 
which were then parceled out to Athenian citizens chosen by lot.  However, the Athenians did not work n 
the plots themselves, but leased them out to the Lesbians, who paid them an annual rent of two minai for 
each allotment.  Since this amount corresponds to that of hoplite pay, it has been argued that these cleruchs 
were of hoplite status serving as a resident garrison ( ee the references in Hornblower 1991: 440).  Thus, 
the cleruchy at Lesbos demonstrates the Athenian imperialist impulse both to expand its territory and to 
rule over others.  See Walbank 1991: 154, Agora XIX, L2, and Aelian 6.1 for evidence of other cleruchies 
arranged in a similar manner.           
78 Cf. 1.70.  For a good account of Thucydides’ view of imperialism as part and parcel of the Athenian 
“national character,” see Forde 1989: 17-56 and Balot 2006: 170-1; cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 47.  Balot 2006: 
146-7 credits Herodotus (8.7) with the discovery of situating the roots of imperialism in culture; cf.Evans 
1991: 23-8.  On imperialism as a phenomenon of cultures in general, see Said 1993: 3-14.   
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encourage the Athenians to defend not only the fatherland but the empire as well: “And 
we must not fall behind them [sc. our ancestors], but must defend ourselves in every way 
against our enemies and try to hand down to our descendants these things undiminished” 
(ὧν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούς τε ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς 
ἐπιγιγνομένοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι).80  The last phrase, 
“these things (viz. an empire) undiminished,” accords well with Pericles’ strategy “to not 
add to the empire” during the war (Thucydides 1.144), but it was only a matter of time 
until more ambitious politicians advocated handing down the empire “larger and better” 
as a matter of principle.    
According to Plutarch, Alcibiades “often put the eph bes in mind of the oath 
which they had made at Aglauros, to the effect that t ey would account wheat and barley, 
and vines and olive, to be the limits of Attica; by which they were taught to claim a title 
                                                                                                                                      
79 GHI2 88, 9-10; cf. Lycurgus, Leocrates 77, Pollux 7.105, and Stobaeus 4.1.8.  On the oathin general, 
see the excellent analysis of Siewert 1977. 
80 Thucydides 1.144.4.  See Siewart 1977: 104, who rightly takes αὐτά, translated here as “empire,” back 
to the clause in the previous sentence: those things which “our fathers…advanced…to the present state.”  I  
is also interesting to point out that Pericles substitutes the middle form ἀμύνεσθαι for the active 
ἀμύνειν.  In Greek ethical thought, it was justifiable to defend oneself by “striking back” against an 
assailant.  According to Hesiod, this translated into the right to requite not quid pro quo, but two times what 
one had suffered: “if he wrongs you first, offending i  either word or deed, remember to repay him double” 
(Works and Days 710-11; cf. Antiphon 4.2.2-3; 4.4.7; Demosthenes 23.50; Laws 880a; Republic 464e).  
Interestingly, in Sophocles’ Trachiniai Zeus punished Heracles for killing Iphitus, not so much because he 
committed murder, but because he killed by treachery and not by “openly fighting back” (ἐμφανῶς 
ἠμύνατο) (278).  Thus, Pericles’ use of the middle in the context of international relations strongly 
suggests that he and his fellow Athenians considered it justifiable to go on the offensive when another state 
attacked the empire and/or Athenian imperial interests (cf. Thucydides 2.42.4).  While Alcibiades also 
acknowledges this principle, he takes the bold step in asserting that it is justified to fight back by 
“anticipating the attacks of those coming against you” (6.18.2).  This nascent conception of preemptive war 
is unparalleled in Greek ethical thought.        
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to all land that was cultivated and productive.”81  The speech Thucydides puts into the 
mouth of Alcibiades on the eve of the Sicilian expedition fleshes out nicely this 
imperialistic ideology:  
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ’ 
ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, 
τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ’ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς 
κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ 
ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε. 
 
It is impossible for us to control the limits to whic  we wish to extend our 
empire but a necessity to conspire against some and not relax our hold on 
others, since we have put ourselves into this position (i.e. of ruling over 
others), for if we do not rule over others, we run the risk of being ruled 
ourselves.  You cannot regard inaction from the same point of view as 
others, unless you change your habits so as to resemble theirs.82 
 
Indeed, the “habit” of empire was hard for the Athenians to break.  Change was possible, 
Alcibiades intimates, but “the safest course for humans,” he argues, “is to govern 
themselves by their current habits and customs without changing them a bit, even if it be 
for the worse” (6.18.7).  The worse came in 404 when the Athenians lost the 
Peloponnesian War and barely escaped utter annihilation.   The fundamental question to 
answer then is whether the Athenians’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War did anything to 
change their habit of ruling over others. 
The conventional interpretation of Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century 
supports firmly the idea that the Athenians never abandoned their hopes of regaining their 
                                                
81 Plutarch, Alcibiades 15.7.  The clause in the oath reads: “Witness are the gods Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo, 
Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Heracles, and the boundaries of the 
fatherland, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees” (GHI2 88, 16-20).  
82 Thucydides 6.18.3.  I have relied heavily on the notes of Marchant 1914: 155 in my translation of this 
passage.   
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empire.83  Ambitions to return to an aggressive foreign policy came as early as 395, 
when the Athenians, motivated not simply by a desire to thwart Spartan designs on 
central Greece, started to reassert themselves belliger ntly in areas they had dominated 
and controlled during the fifth century.  Through the efforts of Conon and Thrasybulus, 
the Athenians rebuilt their walls and fleet, regained naval supremacy over the Spartans, 
and began to challenge Persian spheres of influence in Asia Minor.84  The expedition of 
Thrasybulus in 391 resulted in numerous alliances with poleis in the northern Aegean, the 
Hellespont, and Anatolia, which became subject to Ahenian taxes and other forms of 
imperial control.85  As Seager summarizes:   
Thus it appears that the constant determining factor of Athenian policy 
between the restoration of the democracy and the peace of Antalcidas is 
the refusal of the mass of Athenians to accept the fact that the empire had 
been lost and their desire to attempt to recreate it in fact soon as or even 
before the time was ripe…It was this longing for empire which determined 
the actions of the Athenians throughout the period…86 
 
Though the Peace of Antalcidas temporarily put an end to Athenian aspirations of 
reconstituting their fifth century empire wholesale, the Persian king and the signatories of 
the Peace formally recognized Athens’ claim to the islands of Lemnos, Scyros, and 
                                                
83 The list of scholars subscribing to this interpretation is too long to produce here; see, above all, Marshall 
1905, Cawkwell 1963, 1976, and 1981, Seager 1967, Perlman 1968, Mossé 1973: Chapter 2, Hamilton 
1980, Hornblower 1982a: 183-218 and 1982b, Badian 1995, and Ruzicka 1998.  For helpful surveys of 
Athenian policy from the Peloponnesian War to the mid fourth century, see Cloché 1934, Accame 1941, 
Mossé 1973, and Sealey 1993.   
84 Perlman 1967: 366 and Badian 1995: 85.  Cawkwell 1976: 276 argues that the main bone of contention 
between Conon and Thrasybulus was Persia, but Strauss 1984: 46-7 expresses doubt. 
85 Seager 1967: 110-1, Perlman 1968: 264-5, Cawkwell 1976: 270-1, Badian 1995: 82-86; cf. Strauss 
1986: 150-7. 
86 Seager 1967: 115; cf. Seager 1968: 267 and Cawkwell 1976: 270 
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Imbros.87   There the Athenians once again set up cleruchies, a dreaded word among 
subjects but the crowning prize of Athenian imperialists.   
From 387/6 to 378/7, the Athenians abided by the terms of the King’s Peace, 
concluding only defensive alliances with former allies, such as Chios, Byzantium, and 
Methymna.88  These alliances provided the framework for the cration of the Second 
Athenian Sea League in 377, nominally a defensive alliance of approximately 60 to 75 
poleis to ensure that the Spartans leave the Greeks free and autonomous, living in peace, 
and in the secure possession of their own territory.89  As leaders of the alliance, the 
Athenians gave many assurances to their allies: freedom and autonomy; the right of self-
                                                
87 I find it troubling that scholars have not called into question Athens’ right to possess Lemnos, Scyros, 
and Imbros.  Historians generally agree that the Greks universally recognized these islands as Athenian 
territory (see, for example, Brunt 1966: 80, Jones 1957: 171, Meiggs 1972: 424, and Stroud 1998: 31 and n. 
57; in general, see Figueira 1991: 253-6).  But this universal recognition did not exist until the King’s 
Peace of 387/6.  The Persian king’s granting of the islands to the Athenians on grounds that they were 
“ancestral” is tantamount to the Munich agreement of 1938, which transferred the Sudetenland to Hitler, 
who had long maintained that that region of Czechoslovakia traditionally belonged to Germany.  The 
Athenians alone claimed that these islands were their ancestral possessions, and so the Peace confirmed 
and, to a certain extent, condoned the original expulsion of the non-Greek Pelasgians and Dolopians in the 
early fifth century (Hammond 1986: 193, commenting on the Athenian cleruchies and colonies of the late 
6th century in Lemnos and the Chersonese, rightly notes that: “The reduction of neighbors to dependent 
status and the imposition of cleruchies were the first signs of imperialism in Athens).  In the case of 
Lemnos, some Greeks did consider the eviction to be unjust, most notably the historian Hecataeus.  The 
Athenians defended their actions through the invention and propagation of myths that both justified 
Athenian racial superiority over the Pelasgians and r tionalized their expulsion from the island by Miltiades 
sometime after 500 (Herodotus 6.137-40 with How and Wells: 1912: 122-24).  For instance, accordingly to 
one version of the myth, in recompense for the Lemnian abduction of the Athenian women at the festival of 
Artemis at Brauron, the Lemnians promised the Athenians that they could possess the island when a ship 
was able to sail in the very same day from Athens to Lemnos (6.139.4).  Miltiades, who had just captured 
Elaeus in the Chersonese, sailed to Lemnos in one day, and then reminded the Lemnians of their promise, 
arguing that Elaeus was now a part of Attica.  The people of Hephaestia agreed to relocate, but the people 
of Myrina refused, challenging the sophistic identification of Elaeus with Attica.  But the Athenians were 
able to overcome them (6.1401-2).  Whether the Athenians expelled all the Pelasgians at this time is 
unclear, but it is noteworthy that when Athens lostits right to Lemnos and the other islands in 404, the city 
of Myrina became independent (Cargill 1995: 12-12 citing IG xii (8) 2, a proxeny decree passed ca. 400 by 
the boule and demos of “the Myrinaeans,” which differs from the prescript formula “the Athenians in 
Myrina” during times of Athenian control (cf. Rhodes 1997: 253-4).      
88 For the foundation of the Second Athenian League, se  Cawkwell 1973, Hamilton 1980, Cargill 1982: 
51-82, and Morstein-Marx 1985.  
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determination; and immunity from garrisons, governors, and tribute.  They even promised 
to give up their land-holdings and real estate in allied territory.  Just as the raison d’être 
of the Delian League had been to combat Persian aggression against the Greeks, the 
Second Athenian Sea League similarly came into being to resist the tyranny of the 
Spartans, and so the question eventually arose, as it h d after the Peace of Callias in the 
fifth century, about the relevance and purpose of the League once Sparta became allies 
with Athens after 370/69.90   
A violent precedent, however, was set three years elier (373/2) when Paros 
revolted.  The Athenians and the other allies forcefully brought the Parians back into the 
League, who were required to bring an ox and panoply t  the Panathenaic festival and an 
ox and phallos to the Dionysia—obligations the Athenians demanded of all members of 
their empire in the fifth century.91  Other revolts followed in the 360s, the most notable 
being that of Ceos in 362.  After retaking the island, the Athenians (and not the allies) 
ordered the Ceans to pay arrears in syntaxeis and demanded that legal suits against 
Athenians be settled in Athens, which was a violatin of the Ceans’ autonomy.92  Athens 
also began to forcefully levy syntaxeis (a euphemism for phoros93) from their allies and 
to send out cleruchies, governors, and garrisons—the very heavy-handed policies that the 
                                                                                                                                      
89 IG II2 43, 9-11 = GHI2 22.  Cargill 1981: 45-7 estimates that the total number of names inscribed on the 
Decree of Aristoteles was around 60, whereas Aeschines gives 75 (2.70) and Diodorus 70 (15.30.2) for the 
total number of allied members.    
90 Rightly noted by Tod 1948: 69; cf. Mossé 1962: 415, Hamilton 1980: 100-5, and Sealey 1993: 71-2.  
91 GHI2 29; cf. Cargill 1981: 163-4 and Sealey 1993: 63-4. 
92 GHI2 39, 9-17, 45-50, 73-75 with Marshall 1905: 46 and Accame 1941: 184; cf. GHI240, 20ff. and IG 
xii (5) 528, 538 with Hornblower 1982b: 237.  For other examples of Athenian judicial interference, see IG 
II 2 179, 9, 12, 14 (Naxos); Hesperia 26 (1957): 231-3 (Siphnos); GHI2 28, 73 (Delos). 
93 For the forceful exactions of syntaxeis, see below.  The identification between syntaxis and phoros is 
made by Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 98; Isocrates 12.116; Plutarch, Solon 15.2; OGIS 1, 11-15. 
 148 
Athenians explicitly disavowed in 377.94  These demonstrations of power were so 
effective that in 369 the Greeks and Persian king formally recognized the Athenian claim 
to the long-sought-after prizes of Amphipolis and the Chersonesus.95  Athenian abuses 
escalated in the 360s, causing deep resentment among the allies.96  First, in 365 the 
Athenians sent a cleruchy to Samos, which occasioned some debate in the Athenian 
assembly, and then in 361/0, contrary to a long-standing Athenian policy of supporting 
democracies, Chares stirred up civil war on Corcyra by backing the oligarchic faction.97  
Writing in 355 Isocrates attests to a general state of disgust with Athens in which the 
Greeks were denouncing the Athenians for “harassing them and extorting money.”98  For 
many scholars, these heavy-handed, imperial actions precipitated the revolt of the allies 
                                                
94 Cleruchies: Unknown 370/69 (IG II 2 1609, 88-111 with Sealey 1957: 99-100); Samos 365/4 (Diodorus 
18.18.9) and 352/1 (Philochorus 328 F 154); Potideia 361 (GHI 146); Chersonese 353/2 (16.34.4; IG II 2 
1613, 297-8) and not later than 343/2 (Philochorus FGrH 328 F 158).  Garrisons: generally: Xenophon, 
Hellenica 6.4.1: in 371 the Athenians “withdrew their garrison  from the cities” (τὰς τε φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν 
πόλεων ἀπῆγον)—implying they had been there at least since the peace of 375; Demosthenes 13.6; 
Cephallenia (IG II 2 44, 17); Abdera (Diodorus 15.36.4; Aeneas Tacticus 15.8); Amorgos (GHI2 51, 9): 
Andros (GHI2 52; Aeschines 1.107); Mytilene (Hesperia 9 (1940): 318); Euboea (Diodorus 15.30.5); 
Corinth (Xenophon, Hellenica 7.4.4-7); Corcyra (Aeneas Tacticus 11.13-15).  Governors: Hellespont IG II 2 
133, 23-25; Amorgos (GHI2 51, 4-5); Chersonesus (Demosthenes 23.159); Crithote (Demosthenes 23.161); 
Ios (IG xii (5), 1000 with Accame 1941: 185).  In general, see Marshall 1905: 42, 61, 111, Accame 1941: 
184ff, Cawkwell 1981: 51-2, and Cargill 1981: 146-10, and 1995, and Figueira 1991: 241-9 
95 Demosthenes 7.29; 9.16; 19.137, 253 and Aeschines 2.32 with Sealey 1993: 74-77; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 
51-2 and 1981: 52-3. 
96 There are some indications about the ill treatment of locals by Athenian governors and magistrates: 
Timarchus on Andros (Aeschines 1.107-8) and Aristophon on Ceos (scholium to Aeschines 1.64). 
97 For Samos, see Diodorus 18.18.9 and Aristotle, Rhetoric 1384b32-5, who mentions how one Cydias 
“harangued the people about the cleruchies at Samos; for he demanded the Athenians imagine themselves 
with the rest of the Greeks standing around them who ould not only hear but also see what they were 
about to decree.”  It is unknown whether Cydias wasthe only dissenter.  For Corcyra, Diodorus 15.95.3 and 
Aeneas Tacticus 11.13; cf. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 99-100 with Cawkwell 1981: 51, 54-5.  
98 On the Peace 8.125, 142.   Anti-Athenian feelings are attested even earlier than this.  There were anti-
Athenian riots on Delos in 376/5 (GHI2 28, 134-40; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 190-1 with n. 60) and an 
Athenian proxenos on Ceos was murdered by an oligarchic faction shortly before 362 (GHI2 39, 27ff. with 
Meiggs 1972: 218). 
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in 357.99  In short, the ultimate cause of the Social War was Athens’ successive attempts 
to reconstitute its fifth-century empire.  The Second Athenian Sea League, therefore, as 
the Delian League had before it, degenerated into a empire.  As one historian maintains, 
the Athenians in the fourth century were possessed by the “ghost” of Pericles’ empire, 
which they, even in periods of defeat, were never fully able to exorcise from their 
national ethos.100 
During the past twenty-five years, scholars have begun to challenge the foregoing 
interpretation, conceding that the Athenians did aim to restore their empire between 395 
and 387 but disputing vehemently the notion that the Second Athenian Sea League 
degenerated from a defensive alliance into a full-blown empire between 374 and 357.101  
Rather, the Athenians learned from their past mistakes and, for the most part, pursued a 
defensive foreign policy.  Scholars in this camp focus almost exclusively on Athens’ 
treatment of its allies in the League.  The most notable are Philip Harding and Jack 
Cargill.  Cargill points out that no evidence attests to cleruchies on allied territory, as 
Samos, Potideia, and the Chersonesus were not League members; the cleruchies on 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros were universally recognized as Athenian possessions and 
produced no resentment among the Greeks.102  In respect to garrisons and governors, he 
concedes their existence in allied territory but insists that as long as host poleis invited 
                                                
99 E.g., Marshall 1905: 103-7, Ryder 1965: 89, Cawkwell 1981: 52-4, Hornblower 1982a: 206-8, Davidson 
1990, and Badian 1995: 94-9. 
100 Badian 1995: 81. 
101 The most conspicuous of this group of scholars are Griffith 1978, Cargill 1981, 1982, and 1983, 
Ostwald 1982: 48-9, Mitchell 1984, Sealey 1993: 50-108, and Harding 1995; cf. Ste. Croix 1972: 45-9 and
1981: 292-3 and Meiggs 1972: 401-3, who are reticent to problematize Athenian imperialism.  
102 Cargill 1981: 148-50 and 1982: 99; cf. Sealey 1957: 108, Griffith 1978: 138, and Harding 1995: 115. 
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them with the approval of the allied synedrion there was no breach of autonomy.103  
Moreover, notwithstanding Theopompus’ cynical identification of syntaxis with phoros, 
which Cargill dismisses on grounds that the historian was generally hostile to Athens, 
syntaxis was just “a new name for a new type of assessment, collected and disbursed in 
co-operation with the allied council (synedrion), and not known ever to have been used 
for any purpose which was not designed to benefit the League members as well as the 
Athenians.”104   
In regard to Athenian abuses, Cargill and Harding contend that the apparent 
resentment resulting from Chares’ actions on Corcyra in 361 is questionable, because 
Diodorus, the disseminator of the tradition, was following Ephorus, a student of Isocrates 
who had it out for Chares.  Aeneas Tacticus’ account, o  the contrary, is preferable 
because he states only that Chares was present with a garrison.105  Besides, Corcyra was 
not a League member as once thought, though they were allied with Athens.106  Samos 
likewise was never in the League nor allied with Athens.  Cargill argues further that, 
whereas the resettlement of the island in 352/1 wascomprised solely of Athenians, 
mostly Samian democrats in exile since the Peloponnesia  War made up the cleruchy in 
365/4.107  Their restoration to the island should be understood in the context of 
Timotheus’ defensive policy to challenge Persian encroachments into the Greek islands.  
Sometime before the seizure of Samos, the Persian satrap Tigranes had sent a certain 
                                                
103 Cargill 1981: 151-60 and 1982: 99; cf. Griffith 1978: 132, Sealey 1993: 106-7, and Harding 1995: 115.
104 Cargill 1982: 98; cf. Griffith 1978: 135, Mitchell 1984, Harding 1995: 110-11, and Sealey 1993: 64-5. 
105 Cargill 1982: 100 and Harding 1995: 119. 
106 Cargill 1981: 40-41, following Bradeen and Coleman’s findings that [Κερκυ]ραίων on line 97 of the 
Decree of Aristoteles cannot possibly fit the line, and Cargill 1982: 100.   
107 Cargill 1983 and 1995: 17-19; cf. Sealey 1993: 106. 
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Cyprothemis to garrison the island with support of he local oligarchs, which they argue 
was a contravention of the King’s Peace; thus its capture and settlement was entirely 
justifiable.108  Beyond Corcyra and Samos, other Athenian abuses were limited to the 
period of the Social War and perpetrated primarily by the hawkish Chares.109  Lastly, 
Cargill and Harding reject Isocrates’ On the Peace as an accurate source of Athenian 
transgressions, because his citations of specific Athenian abuses derive not from the 
fourth but the fifth century.110  Accordingly, they doubt seriously that Athenian 
aggression and imperialism caused the Social War.  Instead, they favor other 
interpretations for the outbreak of the war, such as Theban and/or Persian encroachments 
against Athens’ allies and Athenian/allied interests.111  This benign characterization of 
Athenian foreign policy culminates in Harding’s analysis, which likens it to the American 
policy of containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  While they may 
have made some mistakes, “the Athenians gave more than they took.”112 
While this reinterpretation occasionally sets straight Athens’ record with its 
League allies, it suffers from a number of problems in analysis and an overall, 
                                                
108 Cargill 1983: 328-31 and 1995: 19; cf. Griffith 1978: 139, Sealey 1993: 88, and Harding 1995: 118. 
109 Cargill 1982: 100, Griffith 1978: 135, Sealey 1957: 108 and 1993: 106-7. 
110 Cargill 1982: 100 and Harding 1995: 114-5; cf. Sealey 1993: 107-8, 114-16.  Note that Davidson 1990: 
21-4, 30 argues persuasively that Isocrates does not periodize the history of the Athenian empire (as 
Xenophon does, for example, in the Poroi 5.5-8) but treats the entire period from 478 to 355 as a thematic 
whole.  
111 Cargill 1981: 161-88, Sealey 1995: 78-93, and Harding 1995: 117. 
112 Harding 1995: 119; cf. Cargill 1982: 102: “Whether mainly from weakness, or perhaps also from 
having learned a bitter and painful lesson, fourth-century Athenian policies were essentially defensive 
rather than imperialistic.  It is reasonable to suggest that the Second Athenian League represented a 
development in Athenian foreign policy that was more realistic and more enlightened than the imperialism 
of Pericles) or its abortive reinstitution, prior t the establishment of the King’s Peace, by Thrasyboulos.”   
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unmistakable penchant for apology.113  That fourth-century Athenian foreign policy 
should be judged solely by Athens’ relationships to its League allies is a red herring.  An 
unbiased account of Athenian foreign policy must take into account Athens’ conduct 
toward all peoples and poleis, both Greek and non-Greek.  This interpretive prejudice of 
Athenian foreign policy, in truth, has its antecedents among the apologists of Athenian 
aggression in the fourth century.  Isocrates, for instance, defends Athens’ enslavement of 
Melos and the destruction of Scione precisely because they were not allies, offending 
Athens with their independence (Panegyricus 100-102).  “A much clearer proof that we 
administered the affairs of our allies benevolently,” Isocrates boasts, “is seen in the fact 
that among the states that remained our loyal subjects not one experienced these 
disasters.”  In the Panathenaicus, Isocrates’ casuistry is even more outrageous, absolving 
Athenians’ behavior because they injured only “islets so small and insignificant that 
many of the Hellenes do not even know their existence” (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ συνέπεσε 
περὶ νησύδρια τοιαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα τὸ μέγεθος ἐξαμαρτεῖν, ἃ πολλοὶ τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων οὐδ’ ἴσασιν) (70; cf. 89).  To put it into modern terms, Isocrates excuses 
Athenian aggression because it was directed at the Gre k “Third World.”114  But the 
argument is specious, because the evidence suggests th  complete opposite, that the 
affairs of small poleis greatly concerned both Greeks and non-Greeks.  The terms in the 
Peace of Antalcidas, which stipulate that “with theexception of Clazomenae and Cyrpus, 
                                                
113 Hornblower 1982b: 237 calls Cargill an “apologist” of Athens; Badian 1995: 91, n. 36 deems Cargill’s 
interpretation of the Samian cleruchy as “a tour de force of apologia; cf. Sherwin-White 1982: 271 who 
calls Cargill’s approach “Athenocentric.”   
114 For the idea of the Greek Third World, see Gehrke 1986.  I use the term more strictly than Gehrke, in 
that I tend to limit its application to small to medium states that were generally poor and lacking in native 
resources—essentially Gehrke’s fourth and fifth “types.” 
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the rest of the Hellenic cities, those both small and large (τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας 
πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας) shall be free and autonomous,” evidences well that 
even “islets small and insignificant” were in the purview of powerful states.115  The 
abuse of small states is precisely what the Athenians regretted after their defeat in 404.  
According to Xenophon, “they were thinking how they had no way out except to suffer 
the very things which they made others suffer, people f small states (μικροπολίτας) 
whom they wronged not out of any revenge for crimes committed but because of hubris, 
and for no other reason than that they had allied th mselves with the Spartans” (Hellenica 
2.2.10; cf. 2.2.3).   
Blowback for Melos and Scione did not come to pass in 404, but the fact that 
Greeks were still recalling these two incidents in the middle of the fourth century 
suggests strongly that some still feared that Athens could perpetrate such crimes again.  
These fears were well founded.  In 353/2 Chares captured Sestos, slew the adult 
inhabitants, and enslaved the rest—an incident difficult to defend considering it was not 
wartime, though some scholars have tried to exonerate the Athenians.116  Perhaps 
Diodorus, the commemorator of this event, should not be trusted, because he may have 
                                                
115 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.1.31.  The πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας clause is of fifth century origin 
(Thucydides 5.77.5; Ps.-Xenophon, Athenaion Politeia 2.3; Plutarch, Pericles 17).  Aeschines 2.120 reports 
that Clearchus of Chalcis states as a general princi le that “small states…feared the secret diplomancy of 
greater states” (τοὺς γὰρ μικροπολίτας...φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα). 
116 Diodorus 16.34.3.  Sealey 1993: 118-9 implies thatSestos’ strategic position made it a necessary and 
legitimate target.  Cargill 1995: 26-7, on the other and, argues that Sestos was pro-Persian (though there is 
no evidence for this assumption) and thus “Chares’ attack on Sestos may reasonably be seen as another 
chapter in the Athenians’ struggle with the Persian…His bloody treatment of the captured city’s 
population might reflect exasperation with Sestos’ hi tory of switching sides depending on whose forces 
were most powerful in the region at the time: he finally ‘disposed’ of them, and replaced them with 
Athenian settlers whose loyalty could be trusted.  Cruel, but intelligible, and analogous to certain atrocities 
of the Peloponnesian War period.”  Many atrocities in the West, I may add, have been dismissed, at one 
time or another, by the casuistry of historians.   
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been following Ephorus, who had it out for Chares much like his teacher Isocrates.  
Alternatively, maybe the right interpretation should be one from silence, that since we 
hear no condemnation of what transpired at Sestos nobody cared or worried about it, even 
though Greeks did care about Melos, Scione, and Alexander’s destruction of Thebes in 
335.117  In the Panegyricus, written around 380, Isocrates attempts to refute those who 
reproach the Athenians for their cleruchies, claiming that the Athenians sent them “into 
depopulated poleis for the protection of their terri o ies and not for material 
aggrandizement” (ἃς ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰς ἐρημουμένας τῶν πόλεων φυλακῆς ἕνεκα 
τῶν χωρίων, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ πλεονεξίαν ἐξεπέμπομεν) (107).  Twenty-five years 
later Isocrates’ tune on the subject of cleruchies a  changed: “it is possible for us to cut 
off a piece of Thrace large enough so that not only wi l we have abundance but also be 
able to furnish a sufficient livelihood for those of the Greeks who are in need and wander 
around because of their poverty” (8.24).  Yet, the Athenians never invited other Greeks to 
settle in the Chersonese and Sestos per Isocrates’ suggestion and they certainly did not 
send these cleruchies into depopulated areas.118  Apparently, by 353/2 pleonexia did 
motivate the Athenians to settle abroad.  Where did the resentment over these cleruchies 
go?  At least in the case of Samos, honorary inscriptions of the city from the early 
Hellenistic period attest to a large number of poleis that aided and housed Samian 
                                                
117 So Griffith 1978: 143: “This single sentence represents the sum of our knowledge about Sestos at this 
time.  What can the Athenians have thought they were doing?  What can the world have thought of it?...But 
more surprisingly (and more depressingly) it did not st p other Greeks from associating just as freely with 
Athens as though it never happened…In spite of Sestos, and Samos, the Greeks were not all of a tremble 
now about what Athens would do to them next (and rightly not)” (emphasis mine).    
118 The Athenian names mentioned in the sources are mostly those of magistrates sent to the Chersonese.  
Cargill 1995: 90-2 mentions the possibility of a few individuals of Sestian origin but argues that they were 
pro-Athenian, and thus allowed to remain in their native polis. 
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refugees of the post-365 diaspora.119  Greek sympathy with the Samians’ plight ran high, 
and I suspect that Athenian massacre and enslavement of the citizens of Sestos troubled 
many Greeks as well. 
On the question of garrisons and governors, the argument resting on “invitation” 
is suspect.  Invitation proves nothing except that ere were some people in a given polis 
who stood to gain by collaborating with the Athenians, whereas for others Athenian 
intervention and occupation were anathema.  Examples abound throughout history of 
such invitations by “puppet” regimes or sympathizers of imperial rule.120  Interesting for 
consideration in this respect is the so-called “safe” clause in Athenian documents 
concerning the dispatch of governors and garrisons.121  In an honorary decree for one 
Apollonophanes of Colophon (ca.427/6), the Athenians command “that he guard the 
territory of Dios Hieron (Dioseritai) in order that it be safe for the Athenians” (τ[ο δὲ 
χορ]ίο Διὸς hι[ε]ρο ἐπιμέλεσθαι αὐ[τὸν τε]ς φυλακες hόπος ἂν σοον εἶ 
Ἀθεν[αίουσ]ι).122  We learn from Thucydides that the Athenians at this ime had 
intervened at Notium, the port of Colophon, on behalf of an anti-Persian party that was in 
exile, which had previously collaborated with the Persians in their first attempt to take the 
city during civil strife (3.34).  After the Athenian general Paches restored these exiles, the 
Athenians sent out colonists and set up Apollonophanes as their proxy in the area.  Thus, 
                                                
119 See Hornblower 1982b: 238 and Sherwin-White 1982: 271 for the references.      
120 For example, in 1979 the Karmal government technically invited the USSR to intervene in 
Afghanistan, who cited their 1978 bilateral “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness” 
with Afghanistan, though the US considered it an “invasion” and in contravention of international law. 
121 IG I3, 65, lines 11-14; GHI2 52, 7-8; Xenophon, Hellenica 7.4.4; IG II2 404, 6; IG II 2 44, 22-23.  Cargill 
1982: 156-7 argues against the idea that this clause ha  anything to do with the installation of a garrison, 
but he fails to take IG I3, 65 into consideration, which explicitly refers to ἡ φυλακή. 
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when we read that the Athenians ordered a general to be sent to Andros in 365 “so that 
[it] might be safe for the people of Athens and thepeople of Andros” (ὅπως [ἂ]ν 
Ἄνδ[ρος] ε[ἶ] σ[ᾶ] τῶι δ[ή]μωι τῶι Ἀθη[να]ίων [καὶ] τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀνδρίων), 
the historian should be circumspect of the Athenians’ motives.123  The word “safe” was 
ambiguous enough to cause suspicion among certain groups within allied cities.  The 
Corinthians in 366/5 ordered the Athenians to remove their garrisons from the city when 
they caught wind that Athens had just passed a decree ordering their generals “to see to it 
that Corinth be safe for the Athenian demos” (ὅπως καὶ Κόρινθος σῴα ᾖ τῷ δήμῳ 
Ἀθηναίων) (Hellenica 7.4.4).  The Corinthians’ fears were well founded, because 
Chares soon arrived with a fleet of warships, which resulted in an open break between the 
two cities (7.4.5).   
Concerning the causes of the Social War, the poor state of the primary sources 
will never yield an interpretation satisfactory to most historians, and so it is best not to 
put too much stock in any one explanation.  But the s ortcomings of the apologists’ 
interpretation must be pointed out, who seek to mini ize Athens’ part in the revolt by 
pinning the blame instead on the Persians and/or the Thebans.  A major obstacle to this 
interpretation is Cos, which was one of the four main defectors singled out by Diodorus 
(16.7.3).  Because it was not a League member (though the apologists assume wrongly 
that it was), Cos’ participation in the revolt can be explained as resulting neither from 
Theban pressure (Diodorus 15.79.1 says that Epaminondas tried to persuade Rhodes, 
Chios, and Byzantium alone to help Thebes achieve na al supremacy in 364/3) nor from 
                                                                                                                                      
122 IG I3, 65, 11-14; cf. Gomme 1956: 296 and Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 124.   
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Persian/Carian encroachment (Cos was a democracy and, in theory, would have turned to 
Athens for assistance against the aggression of the oligarchic-backing Persians and 
Carians).124  But Cos did ally itself with Mausolus, and thus another interpretation must 
be sought.  The situation at Rhodes affords the best parallel, which was also democratic 
at the time of the revolt.  As Hornblower reasons: “it was the Rhodian democrats who 
turned to Mausolus and broke away from Athens, thereby slitting their throats 
politically…Athens must have given such democrats reason to prefer even a satrap to 
Athens, and it is the historian’s job to ask why.”125  To draw one reasonable conclusion, 
Mausolus and Persia’s role was only a “precipitating,” not an “underlying” cause of the 
Social War.126  Any explanation that seeks to assign blame should include an 
examination of the part played by Athens.  
Nonetheless, Ruzicka has recently reexamined Thebes’ connection to the revolt.  
Epaminondas’ diplomatic mission to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium in 364/3, according 
to Diodorus, intended to wrest these cities from Athens by inviting them to participate in 
the creation of a Theban naval hegemony.  Already at this time, Thebes’ fleet was so 
formidable that they drove away the Athenian general Laches, who had been sent to 
intercept Epaminondas, resulting in these “cities bcoming Thebes’ own” (ἰδίας τὰς 
                                                                                                                                      
123 GHI2 52, 7-8; cf. Cargill 1982: 155-7.  
124 Sherwin-White 1978: 42 argues convincingly that Cos was not a member of the League; cf. Sherwin-
White 1982: 271 and Hornblower 1982b: 237 and 1982: 209.  
125 Hornblower 1982b: 238; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 209-12, Sherwin-White 1982: 271, and Badian 1995: 
98.  According to Theopompus (FGrH 115 F 62) Byzantium was also a democracy, and as there is no 
evidence to the contrary, Chios was probably democratic at this time also (see Appendix 1, n. 34 and 
Ruzicka 1998: 66). 
126 Hornblower 1982a: 208. 
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πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίους) (Diodorus 15.79.1).127  The reason that Rhodes, Chios, and 
Byzantium entertained Epaminondas’ offer, Ruzicka argues, is that they feared Athens’ 
renewed presence in the eastern Aegean “would lead to hostilities between Athens and 
Persia and that continued alliance would put them at great risk in the event of an 
Athenian-Persian war.”128  In other words, because Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium were 
democracies, the real fear was that if Athens lost in its bid against Persia, they would be 
replaced with oligarchies.  Furthermore, war would raise “the specter of economic 
disaster,” as these cities were important commercial states along the busy trade routes 
paralleling the western Anatolia coastline.129  Ruzicka speculates that the three poleis 
actually defected from the League as early as 364/3.  But by 358/7 the situation had 
changed dramatically: Epaminondas was dead, as was the Theban attempt at naval 
supremacy (Plutarch, Philopoemen 14.1-2).  Citing Isocrates 8.36 Ruzicka claims that 
Athens began to deliver ultimata to these defectors t  return to the League or face the 
threat of attack.  What kept Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium from yielding to Athens was 
evidently an invitation from Mausolus to join a new alliance (Demosthenes 15.3)—a 
charge implying that without Mausolus there would have been no alliance and no Social 
War.130  This is a fresh and interesting argument that takes a number of steps in the right 
direction.  Nevertheless, I would like to clarify a few points.   
                                                
127 Ruzicka 1998: 60 citing Hornblower 1982a: 200, n.137, who argues that ἰδίας, translated as “friendly” 
(Cawkwell 1972: 270) “is too weak.”  I agree, but does this phrase mean that “Epaminondas established 
formal alliances between Thebes and Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium,” as Ruzicka argues?  This seems 
unlikely, because such a significant breach of the Second Athenian Sea League would have resulted in a 
concerted Athenian effort to win them back.    
128 Ruzicka 1998: 65. 
129 Ruzicka 1998: 66. 
130 Ruzicka 1998: 68. 
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First, the evidence seems to indicate that only Byzantium defected in the late 
360s.131  This makes sense given Isocrates’ remarks about the Thebans sending triremes 
to Byzantium alone at this time (Philip 53).  Diodorus does not say where the sea-battle 
took place that resulted in the defeat of the Athenian fleet under Laches, but it is 
reasonable to infer that they fought somewhere in the Hellespont—an event that would 
have certainly breathed confidence in the Byzantines to revolt from Athens.  The 
Byzantines immediately began to seize Athenian grain fleets and confiscate their cargoes 
(Demosthenes 50 dates these events to 362 and 361).  The Athenian response was to 
dispatch a fleet under the command of a general to the Hellespont every autumn to guard 
the grain-transports.  However, most of these generals between 363 and 359 failed in 
their missions and were subsequently prosecuted for ereliction of duty.132  The fact that 
Chabrias was sent out in 358 with only one ship proves that the situation had improved 
dramatically by this year.  Timotheus’ capture of Byzantium, then, must be placed 
sometime between 361-59.  Regrettably, we know nothi g more of this episode, but it is 
reasonable to assume given Nepos’ language (Byzantios bello subegit) hat the recapture 
of Byzantium was a bloody affair, which must have aroused fear in the other disaffected 
allies that they would be next.133  The events in Byzantium from ca. 364 to 357 
                                                
131 Revolt is reasonably inferred from the belligerent actions of the Byzantines against the Athenian grain-
fleet (Demosthenes 5.25; 45.64; 50.6, 17; Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 1346c29-39l and 1347b24-5; cf. 
Cassius Dio 75.12); see Marshall 1905: 97, Accame 1941: 179, n. 3; Ryder 1965: 84, Hornblower 1982a: 
203 and 1982b: 237, Cargill 1982: 169, and Sealey 1993: 91.  The only other revolt attested for this time 
period is that of Ceos (GHI 141 and 142). 
132 For the evidence, see Marshall 1905: 99 and Sealey 1993: 90-1, 253-5; cf. Rosivach 1993.  
133 Nepos, Timotheus 1.2.  The historicity of Nepos is questioned by Cargill 1982: 169, n.13 and Ruzicka 
1998: 67, n.27 but confirmed by Hornblower 1982b. 237.  Ruzicka argues that had Timotheus taken 
Byzantium “Isocrates surely would have mentioned it in the Antidosis.”  Yet Isocrates’ panegyrical 
digression is not an accurate historical recounting of Timotheus’ exploits and omits many other 
achievements of the general.  Besides, it was not in Isocrates’ interests to promote the idea that Timotheus 
conquered a democratic ally, even though it was recalcitrant. 
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strengthen the interpretation that the Social War ws more “a process than an event,” 
which was brought on by years of Athenian aggression.134      
Secondly, by privileging Diodorus’ account Ruzicka silently dismisses 
Demosthenes’ explanation of the war as resulting from 1) Athenian plotting against 
Chios, Byzantium, and Rhodes (ᾐτιάσαντο μὲν γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὑτοῖς 
Χῖοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι) (15.3); and 2) the Athenian recovery of what was its 
own (τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες) (15.15).  Though 
Demosthenes’ testimony presents some interpretive problems, I do not think this 
evidence can be ignored.  Cawkwell provides two possible interpretations of the 
ambiguous phrase τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα ὑμῖν φθονήσαντες.135  First, 
Demosthenes uses κομίσασθαι τὰ ὑμέτερα elsewhere in reference to the recovery of 
both Amphipolis and the Chersonese.  But the phrase may also refer to the recovery of 
what Isocrates describes as “the possessions in the ci ies” (τὰς κτήσεις ἐν ταῖς 
πόλεσι) (8.6) or what Andocides deems “the colonies, estat , and loans” (τὰς 
ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα) (3.15).  Cawkwell endorses the first 
reading, reasoning that φθονήσαντες “would be an odd choice of word if what 
Demosthenes meant by ‘what belongs to you’ was what he well knew the members of the 
confederacy thought belonged to themselves.”  But as B dian correctly points out, the 
aorist tense of κομίσασθαι “shows that the Athenians have in fact already received what 
                                                
134 Hornblower 1982b: 237. 
135 Cawkwell 1981: 52-3; cf. Hornblower 1982a: 208. 
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belonged to them (or was due) to them.”136  Cawkwell’s first option, the recovery of 
Amphipolis and Chersonese, is unconvincing, since th  Athenians never recovered 
Amphipolis and the Chersonese was not regained until 353/2.  The allies therefore appear 
to have resented the Athenians for having already recovered their property that was 
obtained in the fifth century and maybe even during the short-lived empire under 
Thrasybulus and Conon.  The “plotting” that Demosthenes speaks of is an additional 
charge but one not necessary unrelated to the recovery of property.  I do not wish to 
speculate on what these machinations could have been, but Badian’s remarks are 
probably not too far from the truth: “Demosthenes’ words about conspiring against the 
allies are best taken as referring to a far from unjustified suspicion that Athens was 
preparing to tear up the compact of the League that s e had initiated and return to 
unlimited imperialism.”137  In sum, these alternative explanations for the origins of the 
Social War sufficiently put the onus back on those who maintain that Athenian 
imperialism in the 360s was an insignificant factor in instigating the conflict. 
Lastly, the apologist interpretation of Athenian foreign policy tends to limit the 
discussion to political and militaristic forms of control and dominance, largely ignoring 
the economic aspects of Athenian imperialism.138  This is an inexcusable lacuna.  I am 
not talking about the economic incentive of imperialism and expansionism—a theme 
                                                
136 Badian 1995: 98, n.54.  Badian’s correction effectively negates the counter-argument of Harding 1995: 
117, who criticizes Cawkwell’s claim that the recovery of Amphipolis led to the outbreak of the Social War 
on grounds that “the Athenians wasted little time, oney, or manpower in the quest to regain it.” 
137 Badian 1995: 99; cf. Figueira 1991: 245-6 on the rol  of Athens’ aspirations to recover fifth-century 
colonies in fomenting allied disaffection.  
138 Harding 1995: 113 actually countenances the existence of economic forms of control but restricts his 
analysis entirely to the political and military realms, because these, he claims, are “customary” areas of 
concern in discussions about Athenian imperialism.    
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which I address below (Section 3D)—but forms of imperial control and dominance that 
are economic in nature.   
As the great historian of imperialism, John Hobson, remarks: “The clearest 
significance of imperialist finance…appears on the side…of taxation.”139  According to 
Hobson, democracies have a difficult time supporting imperialism by direct taxation of 
incomes or property and resort to other methods of raising revenue, such as indirect 
taxation and foreign investment.140  So it was with the Athenians, who viewed all forms 
of direct taxation as marks of tyranny.141  To be sure, in times of fiscal emergency, the 
Athenians levied eisphorai, direct taxes on citizens, but such levies were unpopular, 
especially among the wealthy who contributed the greatest share of money but received 
little recognition for their sacrifices.142  For the most part, the Athenians seem to have 
held two related views about imperial finance: 1) that empire should pay for itself; and 2) 
that non-Athenians and allies should pay as many of the imperial expenses as possible.  
The fifth century sources commonly refer to Athens’ allies as ὑποτελεῖς, which literally 
                                                
139 Hobson 1938: 97.  
140 Hobson 1938: 98.  
141 Andreades 1933: 126-30 and Finley 1985: 95 and 230, n.1, who both cite Tertullian, Apologeticum 
13.6: direct taxes are “marks of bondage” (notae captivitatis).  Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 135-6 contest 
this conception, noting the ubiquity of tithes or ten-percent taxes on land in the Greek world.  However that 
may be, the existence of a ten-percent at Athens (Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 155, no. 58a, l.7), which may not 
even be a land tax, says nothing about the attitude Ath nians had to direct taxation in the first place.  Not 
even Plato (Laws 955d ff), whom they cite as a counter-example to taxa ion being a “sign of tyranny” 
(137), was clear on the issue: in the R public (567a ff) Plato links tyrants’ war mongering with their policy 
to tax the people.  Also overlooked in this regard is Aristotle’s analysis of tyranny in the Politics 
(1313b26), who claims that tyrants directly tax their citizens in an effort to make them so poor that they 
cannot plot against them (cf. 1314b15).  In fact, tyrants are so associated with the imposition of taxes that 
their reduction or abolition are signs of their mildness (e.g., Aristotle Fg. 611.20 (Rose), Ps.-Aristotle, 
Athenaion Politeia 16.6-7, and Thucydides 7.54.5). 
142 The general loathing Athenians felt toward eisphorai can be inferred from the fact that it was illegal to 
even propose a property tax unless a decree of immunity (adeia) was passed first (IG I3 52b, 15-19 = ML 
58).  See also Boeckh 1976: 18, Andreades 1933: 342-4, Thomsen 1964: 1 and 1977: 137, and Pritchett 
1991: 481. 
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means, “subject to taxes.”143  Of the six hundred talents Thucydides says the Athenians 
received annually in income from their allies on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, 
“tribute comprised the greater part” (2.13.3).  Since this number does not correspond to 
the existing figures in the tribute lists, which average less than four hundred talents per 
annum, the most reasonable assumption is that the remaining two hundred talents were 
derived from other imperial revenues, such as rents from sacred lands overseas, 
cleruchies, mines, and other taxes.144   
During the Peloponnesian War and especially after 415, the Athenians began to 
privilege taxation as a source of income when tribue payments from the allies began to 
wane.145  In 413 the Athenians abolished the collection of tribute altogether, levying in 
its stead a five percent tax (εἰκοστή) on all sea-borne commerce, and in 411 they 
imposed a ten percent (δεκατή) transit tax on goods traveling in and out of the Black 
                                                
143 Thucydides 1.56.2, 66.1; 2.9.4; 5.111.4; 7.57.4 
144 So Kallet-Marx 1993: 99-101; cf. Figueira 1991: 186-90.  The controversy surrounding the 
interpretation of the phrase ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου (translated above as, “tribute comprised the greate 
part”) in 2.13.3 is unfortunate.  Gomme 1956: 17 suggests translating the phrase as “generally,” “by and
large,” or “as a rule.”  While these translations suit ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, the dependent genitive φόρου 
suggests another alternative (as Kallet-Marx 1993: 100, n.72 correctly notes, Gomme’s own parallels lack a 
dependent genitive and therefore are not apropos).  LSJ s.v. πολύς IV.4c cite this passage and Plato, 
Politicus 294e for ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ meaning “for the most part.”  To these citations, I would also add 
Aeschylus Fg. 424c (Mette): ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ γραῶν τὸ φόρημα ἦν.  Therefore, the idea that φόρου is 
a gloss is not convincing, as ATL 3:132 and Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 88 suggest.   
145 Kallet-Marx 1993: 144-8 locates this change during the settlement of Mytilene in 427, when the 
Athenians chose not to impose tribute on the island but rather to divide the island up into three thousand 
allotments and collect rent from the Lesbians who cultivated the land (Thucydides 3.50).  That Athens was 
having difficulty collecting its tribute is evidenced by a series of decrees in the early 420s: the Cleonymus 
decree on collecting tribute in 426 (IG I3 68 = ML 68); the reassessment of tribute in 425/4 (IG I3 71 = ML 
69); and quite possibly (see Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 121 and Mattingly 1996: 316-18) the Cleinias decre 
in the 420s (IG I3 34 = ML 47).  
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Sea.146  The Athenians reintroduced both these taxes ca. 391, but historians have 
assumed, erroneously in my view, that the terms of the King’s Peace prohibited the 
Athenians from collecting them after 387/6.  In Appendix 2, I examine the evidence and 
conclude that the Athenians did impose both the eikoste and dekate periodically from ca. 
370 to at least 357.  I also address the reception of both these taxes in the Athenian 
empire, contending that the Greeks considered them, especially the dekate, extortionate 
and piratical.  Hence, the continued existence of these taxes in the fourth century speaks 
strongly in favor of the idea of continuity between fifth- and fourth-century imperial 
practices.   
During the period of the Second Athenian Sea League, th  Athenians also 
received “contributions” (συντάξεις) from their allies.147  The nature of these 
contributions is controversial because the evidence for them obtains from a later period of 
the League’s history. First, the sources tend to make syntaxis synonymous with phoros.  
According to Harpocration, “At the suggestion of Callistratus, they [sc. the Athenians] 
used to call also tribute ‘contributions’, as Theopompus says in Book 10 of the 
Philippica” (ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ τοὺς φόρους συντάξεις, ἐπειδὴ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἱ 
Ἕλληνες τὸ τῶν φόρων ὄνομα, Καλλιστράτου οὕτω καλέσαντος, ὥς φησι 
Θεόπομπος ἐν ι Φιλιππικῶν).148  Scholars who argue that the Second Athenian Sea 
                                                
146 Thucydides 7.28.4; Aristophanes, Frogs 363; Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.22; Diodorus 13.64.2; Polybius 
4.44.4.  In general, see Boeckh 1976: 325, 401, Beloch 1884: 44, Romstedt 1914: 36-46, Andrews and 
Dover 1970: 408-9, Meiggs 1972: 349, Kallet 2001: 136-40, 195-226, and Appendix 2, 
147 Marshall 1905: 38-42, Accame 1941: 131-4, Wilson 1970, Cargill 1981: 124-8 and 1982: 97-8, 
Mitchell 1994, Brun 1983: 74-142, Pritchett 1991: 462, and Sealey 1993: 64-5. 
148 Harpocration s.v. συντάξις = Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 98; cf. Isocrates 12.116; Plutarch, Solon 
15.2; OGIS 1, 11-15. 
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League was just an instantiation of the fifth-century empire have made much of 
Theopompus’ interpretation, but it must be recognized that there were some significant 
differences.149   First, Athens did not unilaterally impose yntaxeis on the allies, but 
rather the allied synedrion worked in close conjunction with the Athenian council in the 
assessment process.150  Secondly, the contributions went straight to fund the allied war 
effort, especially the federal fleet, and not to subsidize Athenian-building programs, as 
tribute had in the fifth century.151  The true litmus test for assessing the relationship 
between phoros and syntaxis, however, is whether these payments were voluntary or not.  
Hansen states the problem well: “Members of a symmachia might have to pay tribute, in 
the Delian League called phoros, in the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy called 
syntaxis.  If the tribute was enforced by a hegemonic city, it was an infringement of the 
autonomia of the member states; if the members of their own free will had agreed to 
paying it, there was no violation of the autonomia of the members.”152  It is prima facie 
likely that, at least in the beginning, the allies did pay their syntaxeis voluntarily.  By the 
late 370s and 360s, however, when allies became disgruntled and started to defect from 
the League and stopped paying their contributions, Athens seems to have forcefully 
exacted syntaxeis.153   
                                                
149 E.g., Tod 1948: 69 and Marshall 1905: 37, 130. 
150 Marshall 1905: 37, Andreades 1933: 313, Accame 1941: 132, Cargill 1981: 124-28 and 1982: 98, Brun 
1983: 115, Harding 1995: 110, and Badian 1995: 91-2. 
151 For snytaxeis for the fleet, see Xenophon, Hellenica 6.2.1 with Underhill 1900: 225 and Isocrates 7.2; 
IG II2 123, 9-21 = GHI2 52 mentions how syntaxeis fund the garrison on Andros in 356.  Cf. Cargill 1982: 
98, Brun 1983: 99, 115, and Harding 1995: 110. 
152 Hansen 1995: 29 and cf. 31-2 and Ryder 1965: 21-2. 
153 With powerful cities like Thebes, who had stopped paying by 374 (Xenophon, Hellenica 6.2.1), the 
Athenians did not force the issue, but with smaller states Athens could afford to be heavy handed.    
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In 372 Xenophon reports that Iphicrates “first sailed to Cephallenia to exact 
money; some contributions were voluntary, others forced” (πρῶτον μὲν εἰς 
Κεφαλληνίαν πλεύσας χρήματα ἐπράξατο, τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἑκόντων, τὰ δὲ παρ’ 
ἀκόντων) (Hellenica 6.2.38).  Previously, Timotheus had won over the cities of 
Cephallenia in 375 (Diodorus 15.36.5) and two inscriptions of the same year attest that 
they had concluded an alliance with Athens (IG II2 98), having sent ambassadors to 
Athens formally requesting entrance into the League (IG II2 96 = GHI2 24).  However, of 
the four cities on the island (Pronnoi, Same, Kranaioi, nd Pale), only Pronnoi’s name is 
inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles (l.108).  In the succinct analysis of Cawkwell, 
“[s]omething had gone wrong.”154  For whatever reason Same, Kranaioi, and Pale did 
not ultimately wish to join the League, but they were nonetheless bound to the 
stipulations of the alliance, which as Cargill argues, was not a bilateral treaty but an 
alliance with Athens and the League analogous to the one concluded with Corcyra (IG II2 
97 = GHI 127).155  According to this kind of alliance, the Cephallenians were to act “in 
accordance with the resolutions of the Athenians and the allies” (κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ 
Ἀθηναιων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων) (l. 15, 34).  Apparently, by 372 these cities were not 
in compliance, and Iphicrates subjected them to the will of Athens and the League 
(Hellenica 6.2.33; cf. 6.2.13-4).156  Isocrates attests to these extortionate practices, when 
                                                
154 Cawkwell 1981: 46.  Cf. Cargill 1981: 74-5. 
155 Cargill 1981: 75. 
156 The way I read Hellenica 6.2.38, “[Iphicrates] first sailed to Cephallenia to exact money; some 
contributions were voluntary, others forced,” is as follows: the people of Pronnoi paid voluntarily; those of 
Same, Kranaioi, and Pale did not pay willingly.  Though Xenophon uses the generic term χρήματα 
ἐπράξατο, “he exacted money,” he must be referring to syntaxeis, which the Athenians and allies voted to 
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he says, “we sail the sea in many triremes and force the allied cities to pay their 
contributions” (ἢν τὴν θάλατταν πλέωμεν πολλαῖς τριήρεσι καὶ βιαζώμεθα τὰς 
πόλεις συντάξεις διδόναι) (8.29).  Other methods included threats of banning “those 
who were unwilling to pay their contributions from sailing the sea” (μηδὲ τὴν 
θάλατταν πλέοντας τοὺς μὴ τὰς συντάξεις ἐθέλοντας ἡμῖν ὑποτελεῖν)—an 
obvious return to the heavy-handed practices of the ifth century (8.36).157  Such a threat 
would have been effective against restive allies, who, though unwilling to defect from the 
League, were on the losing end of the vote when the allied synedrion assessed syntaxeis.  
The resolutions of the League were passed by a simple ajority, and as Brun points out, 
those in the minority were, in a sense, “compelled” against their will to pay their 
syntaxeis.158  As hegemon, Athens’ enforcement of the collection of syntaxeis was a 
clear infringement on the autonomia of the member states.  Perhaps it was for this reaon 
that Theopompus considered syntaxeis to be another form of tribute. 
It is debated whether the Athenians levied syntaxeis regularly or only sporadically 
as the need arose.  According to Aeschines, the Athnians (ca. 346) “exacted sixty talents 
in contributions a year from the miserable islanders” (τοὺς μὲν ταλαιπώρους 
νησιώτας καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν) 
                                                                                                                                      
collect in accordance with the stipulations of alliance (κατὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἀθηναιων καὶ τῶν 
συμμάχων).   
157 For Athenian control of the sea, see, for example, Old Oligarch, Athenaion Politeia 2.2-3 + 2.11-12; 
Methone Decree, IG I3 61, 32-41; and Thucydides 1.120.2; 3.86.3-4, 6.90.2   The threat to ban allies from 
sailing the sea was especially pertinent after Leuctra in 371 when the Spartans and Athenians were allies.  
According to Cawkwell 1981: 48, the only explanation the Athenians could have given to their allies for 
the continuance of the League after 370/9 was to pay for “policing of the Aegean,” which was infested with 
pirates and privateering in the 360s (see De Souza 1999: 33-6). 
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(2.71).  It is not entirely clear if this statement refers strictly to the period in question or to 
the entire history of the League.  For Brun, who sees a watershed in Athens’ relations 
with its allies after the Social War, Aeschines must be talking about the procedure of the 
340s, because such “automatic” payments from the start would have rendered the 
synedrion’s part in assessing the allies irrelevant.159  However, Aeschines’ καθ’ 
ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν need not imply that these payments were automatic, but simply that 
the synedrion voted for them every year.160  One may object that, given the problems 
Athens had with its allies in the 360s and 350s, the League would never have voted for 
syntaxeis every year.  Yet, as disgruntled League members stopped sending their 
representatives to Athens and began to defect, the remaining loyal allies would have 
continued to bring resolutions touching syntaxeis to the vote.  A simple majority would 
have been easy to achieve in this political climate.  Backed with support from the League, 
the Athenians would have had the authority to forcefully exact payments from whomever 
they thought they could.  As the treaty between Athens and Ceos of 362 demonstrates 
                                                                                                                                      
158 Brun 1983: 99. 
159 Brun 1983: 99 
160 Brun 1983: 97-99 argues wrongly, in my view, that after the Social War the Athenians assessed the 
allies directly without the consultation of the synedrion.  His argument rests on a statement of Demosthenes 
(ca.341), who says that Charinus brought a gr phe paranomon against a decree on the syntaxis of Aenos, 
which “Thucydides introduced” (ὅ Θουκυδίδης εἶπε) (58.37-8).  According to the assessment procedures 
he himself outlines (reconstructed reasonably on the basis of IG II2 112, 12-17 = GHI2 41), the allies would 
have brought their dogma concerning the assessment of an ally directly to the Athenian council, which then 
deliberated about it (94-5).  Naturally, the probouleuma that came out of this body would carry the name of 
the Athenian who proposed and introduced it to the assembly for a vote.  Thucydides’ name, therefore, is 
not proof that the Athenians assessed without the approval of the allies.  Furthermore, the decree 
concerning Tenedos of 340/9 (IG II2 233, 27-8 = GHI2 72), indicates clearly that the synedrion still had the 
prerogative of assessing syntaxeis. 
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well, the Athenians even saw to the collection of arre rs in contributions that had accrued 
during the years an allied city was in revolt.161 
Furthermore, Aeschines’ testimony implies that the Athenians introduced 
syntaxeis at the inception of the League, though the stele of Aristoteles makes no mention 
of the League’s finances, except for the provision prohibiting the Athenians collecting 
tribute from the allies (IG II2 43, 23 = GHI2 22).  Plutarch’s reference to Chabrias’ 
dispatching of Phocion to “collect the contributions from the islands” (ἐπὶ τὰς 
νησιωτικὰς συντάξεις) after the battle of Naxos, which took place on 16 Boedromion 
376, suggests that syntaxeis were collected from the start (Phocion 7.1; cf. Polyaenus 
3.11.2).162  Some historians, however, have expressed doubt about the accuracy of 
Plutarch’s source and opt for a 373 date, privileging the testimony of Demosthenes, who 
mentions Timotheus’ payment to his crews “from the common contributions” (ἐκ γὰρ 
τῶν κοινῶν συντάξων) in 373 (49.49).163  While 373 cannot be ruled out, a date 
coterminous with the beginning of the League is more likely.  First, Mitchell rightly 
insists that the provision in the decree of Aristoteles about the confiscation of goods 
becoming the “common property of the allies” (κοινὸν ἔστω τῶν συμμάχων) (l.46) 
requires the existence of an allied treasury.164  The Athenians and their allies, he argues, 
would never have created a treasury for such an irregular source of income as that 
                                                
161 IG II2 111, 6-17 = GHI2 39 with Brun 1983: 122. 
162 Marshall 1905: 38, Cloché 1934: 62-3, Accame 1941: 132, Wilson 1970: 322-35, Mitchell 1984, and 
Badian 1995: 91-2, n. 37.S 
163 Cawkwell 1963: 91-3 and 198: 48, n. 31, Brun 1983: 95-8, and Sealey 1993: 65 
 170 
accruing from confiscated goods.  It is thus reasonble to infer that a regular source of 
income, namely syntaxeis, necessitated the creation of this treasury.  Secondly, because 
the large maritime states, such as Chios, Mytilene, Rhodes, and Byzantium, most likely 
contributed to the League in the form of ships and crews, smaller cities that could not 
make such commitments, must have contributed financally for the maintenance of the 
federal fleet instead.165  Finally, Xenophon mentions that by 374 the Athenians were 
ready to make peace, because, in part, the Thebans “were not contributing money for the 
maintenance of the fleet” (χρήματά τε οὐ συμβαλλομένους εἰς τὸ ναυτικόν) 
(Hellenica 6.2.1).  Would Xenophon have provided this detail if syntaxeis had been a 
recent invention?  Nay, the tenor of the passage sugests that Thebes had not been paying 
for some time.166 
Lastly, the amounts of the syntaxeis themselves are uncertain.  According to 
Aeschines, the contributions totaled about 60 talens a year.  This contradicts 
Demosthenes’ figure of 45 talents (18.234).  The discrepancy is troubling since 
Demosthenes and Aeschines were talking about the sam period: ca. 346.167  However, 
Demosthenes stood to gain by making the number appear as small as possible so that the 
total gained under his leadership would seem all the more impressive.168  Brun is 
undoubtedly correct to argue that Demosthenes’ number represents what was actually 
                                                                                                                                      
164 Mitchell 1984: 25-7.  Brun 1983: 109-111 tentatively asserts that the League did not have a common 
treasury.  However, he does not consider IG II2 125, 16, which attests to its existence ca. 357/6.  The line 
has been restored, but the reconstruction is sound and has not been seriously challenged.   
165 Badian 1995: 91; cf. Sealey 1993: 65.  For military service and ship contributions, see Brun 1983: 111-
14. 
166 Badian 1995 92, n.37. 
167 Brun 1983: 117. 
168 Brun 1983: 117. 
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received, whereas Aeschines’ corresponds to the theoretical number of what should have 
been received.169  Most scholars take sixty talents as a minimum and reasonably assume 
a higher total for the period before the Social War.  Using tribute payments from the fifth 
century as a basis of comparison, Brun provides some convincing estimates.170  Of the 
62 cities inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles only about 33 remained by ca. 346.  Taking 
averages of tribute payments from 454/3 through 426/5 for these cities, that is, before the 
Athenians increased tribute assessments, Brun calculates approximately 67 talents.171  
This number is too close to Aeschines’ 60 talents to be a coincidence, and therefore using 
the same procedure for the 370s he estimates that the Athenians received around 195 
talents in syntaxeis.  It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the Atnians based the 
allied syntaxeis on the traditional tribute rates of Aristides.172  While this number 
represents probably only half of what Athens received in tribute at the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War, it was still a significant sum, not “chickenfeed,” as Griffith rashly 
deemed it.173 
In conclusion, very little commends itself to the vi w that Athens in the fourth 
century did not desire to reconstitute and, for the most part, succeed in reconstituting its 
fifth-century empire.  Erstwhile imperial institutions and means of control such as 
                                                
169 Brun 1983: 118. 
170 In this respect, Brun is following the lead of Beloch 1967: 166-8, Accame 1941: 135-6, Wilson 1970: 
322-4, and Griffith 1978: 135.    
171 Brun 1983: 127-35. 
172 Though perhaps only a piece of Athenian imperial ideology, the allies considered the assessment of 
Aristides to be just (Plutarch, Aristides 24).  In 421 we learn of six Chalcidic poleis who agreed to pay the 
tribute of Aristides according to the terms of the P ace of Nicias (Thucydides 5.18.5).  Hansen 1995: 31-2
argues persuasively that the payment of tribute wasnot considered a breach of these cities’ autonomy.  
Thus, one cannot assume that the allies of the Second Athenian Sea League were not autonomous just 
because they were paying traditional tribute rates.  
173 Griffith 1978: 135. 
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cleruchies, garrisons, governors, taxation, and tribute remained firmly in place in the 
fourth century.  Terrible atrocities committed against other Greeks continued, though 
they did not achieve the same kind of notoriety as those perpetrated during the 
Peloponnesian War.  This Athenian empire redivivus was undoubtedly smaller in scale 
than its predecessor, and while the development of Athenian imperialism in the fourth 
century did not follow a seemingly logical and consistent trajectory as it did in the fifth 
century (or so Thucydides leads us to believe about the growth of Athenian power in 
1.23.6), resulting in the Peloponnesian War, the failure of the Athenians to eradicate their 
lust for empire from their foreign policy fueled discontent and anger among the allies, 
which in turn contributed significantly to the outbreak of the Social War. 
It is unfortunate that historians have largely ignored Xenophon’s insights in the 
Poroi about Athenian imperialism in the fourth century.  For he claims that the Athenians 
not only treated the allies “unjustly” but also lost the hegemony over the Greeks precisely 
because of their brutality toward the allies:  
τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονίαν βουλόμενοί τινες ἀναλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, 
ταύτην διὰ πολέμου μᾶλλον ἢ δι’ εἰρήνης ἡγοῦνται ἂν 
καταπραχθῆναι, ἐννοησάτωσαν πρῶτον μὲν τὰ Μηδικά, 
πότερον βιαζόμενοι ἢ εὐεργετοῦντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἡγεμονίας 
τε τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ ἑλληνοταμιείας ἐτύχομεν. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ὠμῶς 
ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν ἡ πόλις ἐστερήθη τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐ καὶ 
τότε, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν 
ἑκόντων προστάται τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα; οὔκουν καὶ 
Θηβαῖοι εὐεργετούμενοι ἡγεμονεύειν αὑτῶν ἔδωκαν Ἀθηναίοις; 
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ βιασθέντες ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ἀλλ’ εὖ 
πάσχοντες ἐπέτρεψαν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας θέσθαι 
ὅπως βούλοιντο. νῦν δέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχὴν 
παραπεπτωκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ πόνων καὶ 
ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ ἄνευ δαπάνης ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας. 
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Some who wish to recover the hegemony for the city think it can be 
achieved more easily by war than peace.  Let them first recall the Persian 
Wars.  Did we gain the leadership of the fleet and the stewardship of the 
League funds by benefiting the Greeks or compelling them?  Furthermore, 
after the city with its reputation for excessive savagery was stripped of its 
empire, did not the islanders willingly bestow the leadership of the fleet at 
that very point when we abstained from committing ijustice?  Did not 
even the Thebans because of our benevolences give the hegemony to the 
Athenians?  And again the Lacedaemonians entrusted themselves to the 
Athenians in regard to the hegemony to arrange it as hey saw fit not 
because they were forced but because they were treat d well by us.  Now 
because of the disorder in Greece I think it has befallen the city to win 
back the Greeks without toil, danger, and expense (5.5-8).   
 
As Xenophon is uninterested in scolding the Athenians for their wrongdoings but rather 
intent on demonstrating how they can recover a leadership role among the Greeks, he 
glosses over the details of the years intervening between the conclusion of the alliance 
with the Spartans in 370/69—to which Xenophon alludes here—and the end of the Social 
War.  But something went terribly wrong during this period, as evidenced by the word 
ἀνακτᾶσθαι, “to win back”: the Athenians had once again lost the hegemony.  Though 
Xenophon does not discuss the specific incidents that occasioned this event, he does 
identify the general causes: historical penchants for war, violence, and injustice.  
Xenophon is confident though that the Athenians can regain the hegemony but only by 
turning from their imperialistic ways and embracing peace and justice.  Xenophon claims 
the Athenians can do this “without toil, danger, and expense.”  With this tricolon, 
Xenophon directly challenges Athenian imperial ideology, which vigorously promoted 
the ideas that the Athenians submitted themselves fr ely to every danger, toiled 
constantly for the empire, and had a unique imperial economy that enabled them to 
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outspend their enemies in war.174  The rhetoric in this passage, no doubt, has “imperialist 
overtones,” as Cartledge observes, but Xenophon invokes the language of empire only to 
call it into question.175  As I argue in Chapter 4, Section 4D, Xenophon’s hegemony of 
peace is anti-imperialistic to the core.  
 
3D. The Causes of Athenian Imperialism  
When Xenophon reports that the poverty (i.e. the lack of sufficient trophe) of the 
demos necessitated the unjust treatment of the allis, the historian should take seriously 
his claim that economics played a decisive role in Athenian imperialism.  Two notable 
early theorists of European imperialism, Hobson andLenin, maintained that economic 
incentives drive all forms of imperialism and expansio ism, and a generation of 
classicists and ancient historians writing under their influence explained Athenian 
imperialism largely in terms of economic motives.176  Cornford’s thesis on the origins of 
the Peloponnesian War is the most notorious in thisre pect.  Rejecting outright 
Thucydides’ explanation of the cause of the war (i.e. the growth of Athenian power), 
Cornford argues that in the decades leading up to the war, commercial, industrial, and 
nautical interests in the city began to rival the traditional, agricultural based economy, 
coalescing into a political force known as the “Piraeus party.”  It was this party that 
forced Pericles to enact the protectionist Megarian decrees in the hopes of financially 
                                                
174 Pericles’ speeches in Thucydides best articulate this ideology; see 1.141.5-142.1; 2.39.1-4; 2.62.1-5; cf. 
1.70.8; 1.83.2; Lysias, Funeral Oration 55; Isocrates, Panegyricus 83; Xenophon, Agesilaus 7.1.  For 
discussions about the restlessness of the Athenians, see Loraux 1986: 152-4 and Forde 1989: 17-40; for 
Periclean conceptions of Athenian imperial finance, see Kallet-Marx 1993. 
175 Cartledge 1997: 228.  On Xenophon’s manipulation of imperial rhetoric, see Dillery 1993 and Chapter 
4, Sections 4A and 4C. 
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devastating Megara, who rivaled Athens in the east/we t trafficking of merchandise.177  
Cornford’s modernist thesis, with its predilection for assimilating the Athenians to turn-
of-the-20th century British imperialists, was an easy target for criticism. 
Hasebroek was the first to contest such economic interpretations of Athenian 
imperialism, contending that “the aims of ancient imperialism were never economic in 
the sense of seeking advantage for citizen merchants or producers; and they were 
never…national.  They were exclusively political.”178  Hasebroek formulated this thesis 
by examining two areas where modern and ancient Athenian imperialism intersected: 
colonization and taxation.  Unlike states in the agof mercantilism, the Athenians never 
imposed protective tariffs, but rather duties on exports and imports “for revenue purposes 
only.”179  Similarly, the Athenians colonized “not to secure markets for domestic export 
and cheap raw materials,” as the British would go on to do in the 18th century, but to 
dominate militarily and maintain a ready source of c nsumable supplies.180 Hasebroek’s 
political interpretation of Athenian imperialism has informed numerous studies of 
Athenian foreign policy in the fifth and fourth centuries,181 and now it is taken for 
                                                                                                                                      
176 Hobson 1902 and Lenin 1939.  See for example, Cornford 1907: 15-51, Gernet 1909: 282-3, Weber 
1978: 913-21, Bonner 1923, and Grundy 1948: I. 186-90.  On economic imperialism in general, see the 
quintessential readings in Boulding and Mukerjee 1972. 
177 Cornford 1907: 15-51. 
178 Hasebroek 1965: 135; cf. 100-1. 
179 Hasebroek 1965: 100-1. 
180 Hasebroek 1965: 135; cf. 100-1. 
181 See, for example, de Romilly 1963, Meiggs 1972, Finley 1982, and Schmitz 1988. Perhaps de 
Romilly’s interpretation has gone the farthest in dvorcing economic considerations from the Athenian 
imperialism.  For de Romilly, financial profit “inspired only a secondary and intermittent course of action.  
Many people adopted an imperialistic attitude without ever considering the financial aspect, and those who 
did think of filling the treasury intended merely to use the money for further conquests: wealth led to 
power, not power to wealth” (77).  Indeed, Thucydides speaks of the Athenians’ greed, but “this desire i  
rooted in psychological forces which remained independent of the straightforward idea of material gain” 
(77).  Greed, argues de Romilly, “depends upon two basic emotions, the love of action and the need for 
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granted that, at least in the way Hasebroek framed th  debate, Machtpolitik (power 
politics) and not Handelspolitik (commercial politics) prompted the overseas actions f 
the Athenians.182   
It is important to stress, however, that Hasebroek did countenance the role of the 
food supply (trophe) in Athenian imperialism.  In his estimation, “[t]he life and 
independence of the State was…conditioned by its food supply and the provision of other 
necessaries.”183  For those states that were not economically self-sufficient, conquest and 
expansion were natural solutions to ensuring a ready food supply.184  Athens was 
particularly well suited to this enterprise because of its navy, which exercised complete 
control of the seas and concomitantly the flow of fodstuffs.  In short, the “Athenian 
thalassocracy was the handmaid of supplies.”185  The prologue of the Poroi factors 
significantly into Hasebroek’s analysis, because it p omizes this imperialistic dynamic: 
“The writer assumes in his readers the unquestioning belief that the well-being of the city 
is normally conditioned by the measure of its exercis  of power over its subjects, and 
depends not upon the development of its own economic resources by native labour and 
industry and trade, but upon the contributions to its maintenance which its subjects 
supply.”186  Hasebroek then not only underscores the part the food supply played in 
motivating Athenian imperialism but also identifies it as the primary cause. 
                                                                                                                                      
power” (77).  “What in fact inspires the Athenians is the desire which they have for fame, renown, and
honors.  In its highest form, their ambition aims at glory, in its lowest at the use of power” (79).    
182 Hasebroek 1965: 103-4; cf. Finley 1982: 54, 56-7, Ste. Croix 1972: 214-20, and Schmitz 1988. 
183 Hasebroek 1965: 139.        
184 Hasebroek 1965: 140.  See Raaflaub 2004: 192-3, who questions this general notion that “an 
‘imperialist impulse’ was firmly embedded in the Greek idea of freedom.”      
185 Hasebroek 1965: 145, 136. 
186 Hasebroek 1965: 137. 
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While some may consider Hasebroek’s mono-causal explanation of Athenian 
imperialism to be reductionist or even facile, a signif cant number of historians have 
followed suit, countenancing the role of trophe in shaping Athenian foreign policy.187  
The evidence in support of this thesis is overwhelming.  In every prytany, the Athenians 
held a sovereign meeting of the assembly to discuss the grain supply, and as noted last 
chapter, both Xenophon and Aristotle include grain/trophe as one of the most important 
concerns of the politician.188  Xenophon calls this an “immense task” (παμμέγεθες 
πρᾶγμα), because one must calculate “how long domestic sources of grain will maintain 
the city and how much is needed annually” to make up inevitable shortfalls.  For 
                                                
187 Gernet 1909: 382-3 (cf. 357), Glotz 1926: 293, Treves 1937: 131-4 (distinguishes the trophe 
imperialism of Thrasybulus with the Panhellenic imperialism of Pericles and Conon), Grundy 1948: I, 186-
90, Momigliano 1944: 7, Will 1972: 204-210, Ste. Croix 1972: 46-9 and 1981: 292-3, Pecirka 1982, and 
Sealey 1993: 24-6; cf. Missiou 1992: 76-8.  Even Filey 1978: 11 and 1982: 55-8 and Harding 1995: 119 
aver in this direction.  Some historians have questioned the role of the food supply motivating Athenian 
imperialism, but their attempts are futile (e.g., Nesselhauf 1933: 63, Mossé 1962: 404, de Romilly 1963: 
71-4, Meiggs 1972: 272, Bloedow 1982, and Garnsey 1988: 117-33).  Bloedow, who offers the most 
spirited critique, argues that Corinth, which had only a slightly smaller population density than Athens (114 
inhabitants per sq. km. to Athens’ 127) and relied just as heavily on imported grain in the fifth century as 
Athens but did not turn to imperialism to procure its grain (24-25), proves that the need for grain was not 
the cause of Athenian imperialism (29).  The major problem with this interpretation is that it takes for
granted that Corinth’s territory had the same propotion of cultivable land as Athens and that both 
territories were equally fertile.  Until these two assumptions can be substantiated with evidence, we cannot 
take seriously Bloedow’s argument from analogy.  Garnsey 1988: 117-44, producing a new set of 
demographic and grain-import figures, argues more generally that Athens’ reliance on imported grain has 
long been overstated, and that imperialism is only e response among many to which the Athenians turned 
to solve food supply problems (e.g., diplomacy, trade, incentive, and regulation).  I deal more fully with 
Garnsey’s argument below.   
188 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 43.4.  Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.6.13; Aristotle, Rhetoric 1359b21-3: 
“imports and exports” but at 1360a12 discussed under the heading “trophe.”  The statesman must also see 
to it that “that grain shipments be conveyed to the Piraeus along friendly coasts” (Demosthenes 18.301)  At 
Athens there were also special magistrates called “guardians of grain” (sitophylakes), who administered the 
selling and weighing of gain (Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 51.3 with Rhodes 1981: 577-9 and Stroud 1974: 
80).  For Athenian laws pertaining to the buying/selling and exporting/importing of grain, see Plutarch, 
Solon 24; Lysias 22.6; Demosthenes 34.37; 35.50, 51; 56.6, 11; Lycurgus 1.27; Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion 
Politeia 51.4 with Isager and Hansen 1975: 28-9 and Rosivach 2000: 44-57).  
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Xenophon, the question is not “if” but “when” domestic grain supplies run out.189  In the 
debate over the Sicilian expedition, Nicias reminds hi  audience that Sicily has the 
distinct advantage over the Athenians because “they grow their grain at home instead of 
importing it” (6.20.4).  Demosthenes, writing in 355/4, asserts that “[the Athenians] 
relied on imported grain more than all the rest of mankind; and the grain imported from 
the Pontus is equal to all the grain that comes to Athens from other places of export” (ὅτι 
πλείστῳ τῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμεῖς ἐπεισάκτῳ σίτῳ χρώμεθα. πρὸς 
τοίνυν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπορίων ἀφικνούμενον ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου 
σῖτος εἰσπλέων ἐστίν) (20.31; cf. 18.87).  He then provides the figure of 400,000 
medimnoi imported from the kingdom of Bosporus (ἐκ τοῦ Βοσπόρου) annually—a 
number he says the sitophylakes can corroborate (20.31-2).  If we take Demosthenes at 
his word and conflate grain from the Black Sea and the Bosporus, it would appear that 
the Athenians imported some 400,000 medimnoi of grain per year from this region, 
which produces an absolute minimum of 800,000 medimno  of total grain imports.  Yet, 
we learn in Against Lacritus that “Pontus” is not a “stylistic variant” for “Bosporus,” 
which calls Demosthenes’ reasoning into question.190  How much grain, then, did the 
Athenians import from the Pontus as a whole?  It is likely that the amount imported from 
                                                
189 In a speech of Procles of Phleius at Athens in 369(Hellenica 7.1.4, 7), Xenophon says that “the 
livelihood for most of you comes from the sea” and that “your entire safety depends on the sea,” which 
Cartledge 1987: 274 interprets thus: “Prokles did not mean that most Athenian citizens attending the 
Assembly were professional soldiers, traders or fisherman, but rather that the mass of poor Athenians were 
more or less dependent for their very survival on the regular annual importation of wheat from the northern 
shores of the Black Sea.” Cf. Pritchett 1991: 468.   
190 Contra Rosivach 2000: 40, n. 27.  In the speech, Demosthenes says that Androcles loaned money to the 
brother of Lacritus for a double-voyage to the Pontus (35.3, 7).  At 10-11 he reproduces the contract, which 
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outside of the Bosporus did not exceed 400,000 medinoi or else Demosthenes would 
have left himself open to easy repudiation, as these two figures would come to 800,000 
medimnoi.191  Thus, 800,000 medimnoi should represent an absolute maximum of 
imported grain from the Pontus, which amounts to 1,600 000 medimnoi of total grain 
imports.192  Recently, Whitby, adducing reliable fourth-century evidence concerning 
Philip’s seizure of the Athenian grain-fleet at Hieron in 340, estimates that the total 
number of medimnoi from the Pontus as a whole was c. 600,000.193  1,200,000 
medimnoi, then, is a reasonable m dia res between the absolute maximum and minimum 
for total grain imports.194   
                                                                                                                                      
offers the trader the choice of either sailing directly to the Bosporus or voyaging to the “left” as far as the 
river Borysthenes (τῆς ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ μέχρι Βορυσθένους) (e.g., Olbia).         
191 E.g., Jones 1957: 77-8, Isager and Hansen 1975: 18-19, and Gallo 1984.  Garnsey 1988: 97 is overly 
skeptical about Demosthenes’ presentation and rejects the figure of 800,000, arguing that this passage only 
supports “the limited point that Athens might have had to import in any particular year as much as 400,000 
medimnoi from one source.”  However, as Whitby 1998: 123 notes: “Demosthenes presents Leucon of 
Bosporus as a perpetual benefactor of Athens, and strongly implies that the level of exports was a regular 
one that would be maintained in the future [cf. Rosivach 2000: 41-3]…I share the suspicion that 
Demosthenes was overemphasising the importance of Leucon, but would note that the one possible 
deception in his argument is the suggestion that exports from the Bosporus kingdom are synonymous with
exports from the Black Sea…it is possible that imported grain from the Pontus did roughly match that from 
other sources, and that substantially more than Leucon’s annual export, whether 400,000 medimnoi or not, 
came from the Pontus as a whole” (123-4).   
192 Isager and Hansen 1975: 19 give the equation: 2 X (400,000 + x) = total grain imports (“x” 
representing imports from “the other city states along the Black Sea coast”).   
193 Whitby 1998: 124-5.  According to Didymus, who cites both Philochorus (FGrH 328 F 162) and 
Theopompus (FHG 115 F 292), Philip seized either 230 or 180 grain-ships respectively (Didymus 10.34-
11.5).  One reason that has been put forward for the discrepancy between the two historians is that 180 
represents the total number of enemy ships that Philip confiscated and sold off as booty, from which 
Theopompus says Philip received 700 talents (Bresson cited in Whitby 1998: 124, n. 39 and Sealey 1993: 
188).  The only problem with this interpretation is that Didymus emphasizes that Philip’s seizure of the 
fleet was designed to deprive the Athenians of their grain.  Hieron was the site where the Athenians met 
every autumn to convey their Pontic grain to Athens.  There is no evidence to support the idea that grin-
ships bound for other cities converged there as well.  Whitby thus takes 200 as a rough average and 
multiplies this by 3,000 medimnoi (the carrying capacity of the most common 120 ton ship: Casson 1971: 
183-4; cf. Stroud 1998: 65, who speculates that the 3,000 medimnoi “shares” articulated in Athenian Grain-
tax law of 374/3 reflects a common carrying capacity of a normal grain ship), which yields 600,000 
medimnoi.   
194 These 1,200,000 medimnoi also include grain from the cleruchies (see below).  This figure, in fact, is 
the estimate of Gomme 1933: 32-3.  Cf. the exceptionally high figure of 2 to 2 ¾ million medimnoi of 
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How much grain did the Athenians derive from domestic sources?  The first-fruits 
inventory at Eleusis for the year 329/8, the only inscription of its kind, supplies the 
historian with some figures for the domestic production of grain.195  The total production 
for Attica amounted to a marginal 339,925 medimnoi of barley and 27,062.5 medimnoi 
of wheat.196  The consensus today is that this year’s harvest was abnormally small, 
though no direct ancient evidence exists to support this conclusion.197  Comparative data 
from the modern period provide some insights, thoug these can serve only as 
approximations, and any conclusions drawn from them must be cautious.198   
The area of Attica in the fourth century seems to have been around 240,000 
hectares, of which various figures have been proposed for the percentage of cultivable 
land.199  Estimates range between 20% and 40%, but these numbers ultimately depend on 
whether the Athenians universally followed a biennial fallow regime and used all their 
                                                                                                                                      
Isager and Hansen 1975: 19 (cf. Gernet 1909: 273-93) and the more reasonable 1.5 million of Ste. Croix 
1972: 46-7.   
195IG II2 1672, 263ff.  For interpretation, see Jardé 1925: 36-60, Garnsey 1988: 98-105, Gallant 1991: 
177-8, and Sallares 1991: 79-80, 392-4.  A good summary of the methodological problems encountered in 
these works can be found in Stroud 1998: 33-7.  It must be kept in mind that “[a] continuous run of data for 
twenty or thirty years would be needed to obtain stati tically significant results for total production” (36).  
Cf. Cargill 1995: 197-8, who is much too skeptical about the use of this inscription.     
196 I have not included the meager grain output from the disputed territories of Oropos and Drymus, which 
produced 12,000 medimnoi of barley and 6,900 medimno  of wheat and 625 medimnoi of barley and 2,925 
medimnoi of wheat respectively (IG II2 1672, 271-3).  Besides, Oropos was lost to the Boeotians in 366 
(see Sealey 1993: 86-7).  Salamis, which produced a r spectable 24,525 medimnoi of barley (line 274), was 
technically speaking a cleruchy and not a part of Attica.  
197 Garnsey 1988: 99-101, Sallares 1991: 392-3, and Gallant 1991: 77; cf. Stroud 1998: 35-6, who exposes 
the weaknesses of the ancient evidence used to supprt this claim. 
198 Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 113 note well: “we are dealing with calculations that cannot be 
substantiated in the ancient sources.  Not knowing the cultivated area and unable to verify the existence of 
one and only one system of cultivation, and furthermore not knowing the yield nor the amount of sowing 
per area-unit, we must conclude that such calculations should be relegated to scholar’s desks as some kind 
of mental exercise.”  Given new evidence about the weight of ancient wheat and barley (see below), I am 
less sanguine than Isager and Skydsgaard on the ability to approximate ancient grain yields. 
199 Whitby 1998: 104. 
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arable land for grain production.200  As I am interested in reaching a maximum figure of 
grain output, I adopt 40% as a point of departure fo  my calculations.  Sallares, Gallant, 
and Whitby all stress the importance of intercropping in ancient Greek agriculture, and 
thus a number less than 40% seems certain.201  In Attica the lack of rainfall made it 
unsuitable for growing leguminous crops but perfect or olive cultivation.  Accordingly, 
Sallares proposes that around 30% of Attica was available for grain, while the remaining 
10% was devoted to olive production.202  The question of biennial fallow cannot be 
addressed fully here, but even those scholars who argue that intensive, mix farming was 
the norm in Attica acknowledge the importance of fallow and advocate a three-year 
cropping cycle where two-thirds of the arable land each year was devoted to grain 
production.203  We therefore may assume that in any given year no more than 20% of 
Attica (48,000 ha) was available for growing grain.  This number has the advantage of 
being a media res between the 10% “low” estimate of Jardé and Whitby and Garnsey’s 
“maximum” of 30%.204  
                                                
200 Jardé 1925: 52-3 (20%); Garnsey 1988: 91-3 and Whitby 1998: 104 (35-40%); Sallares 1991: 310 
(40%).  These higher figures represent the estimates based on data from the 1961 Athenian census.     
201 Sallares 1991: 303-9, Gallant 1991: 38-41, and Whitby 1998: 104. 
202 Sallares 1991: 303, 309; cf. Whitby 1998: 104. 
203 For arguments and evidence in favor of biennial fallow, see Jardé 1925: 81ff., Sallares 1991: 381-6, 
and Whitby 1998: 104-5; the most vocal critics of this school are Garnsey 1988: 93-4 and Gallant 1991: 56, 
but see Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 108-14 who express caution about Garnsey’s alternative model.  
204 Jardé 1925: 52-3 and Whitby 1998: 106; Garnsey 1998: 102.  Although Garnsey in his table on p. 102 
claims 17.5% to be the “likely” number of cultivable land, on p. 92 he argues that 20% is too low because 
that would make an Athenian hoplite (9,000 low in 322; 25,000 high in 431) have “at his disposal an 
average of at best 5.3 hectares, at worst 1.9.  We are asked to believe that the average hoplite (or knight) 
was operating below the subsistence level (in 431BC) or near subsistence level (in 322 BC), in terms of 
home-based arable land” (italics mine).  The fact that Garnsey acknowledges that many of these hoplites 
would have had estates abroad makes it difficult to put too much stock in his calculations.  Besides, as 
argued in Section 3A, most men of hoplite status were t chnically “poor” (penetes), that is, living near the 
subsistence level.    
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Jardé estimates that the productivity levels of Greece as a whole were 8-12 hl/ha 
(600-900 kg/ha) for wheat and 16-20 hl/ha (1,020-1,270 kg/ha) for barley—figures that 
more or less correspond to the averages for crop yields during a forty-year period in 
Greece from 1911 to 1950.205  Athens during this time averaged 629.1 kg of wheat and 
793.7 kg of barley per hectare.  However, to utilize this modern data responsibly, we 
have to take into account the fact that the weight of ancient of grain was lighter than 
modern varieties by about 20% for barley and 25% for wheat.206  Accounting for this 
discrepancy, the modern data suggest that ancient yi lds for Attica were around 471.8kg 
(= 15 medimnoi) of wheat and 635kg (= 24 medimnoi) of barley per hectare.  Total yields 
then for 20% cultivable area amount to 720,000 medino  of wheat or 1,152,000 
medimnoi of barley.  Unfortunately, there is no way of determining the exact ratio of 
wheat to barley grown in Attica.  In general, Athenian farmers grew much more barley 
than wheat, because Attica was well suited for growing this grain (Theophrastus, History 
of Plants 8.8.2).  Scholars once thought the Athenians ate only wheat and gave the barley 
to their livestock, but recently historians have rightly dismissed this assumption because 
                                                
205 Jardé 1925: 53; cf. Gallant 1991: 77-8. 
206 Garnsey 1985: 72 estimates average modern weights at 42.73 kg/medimnoi for wheat and 33.75 kg for 
barley (cf. Jardé’s 41.95kg/34.07kg and Foxhall and Forbes’ 40.27 kg. for wheat).  We know these 
numbers are off because the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 (Hesperia Suppl. 28 = GHI2 26) gives the equivalence 
of 5/6 medimnos of wheat per talent and 1 medimnos of barley equaling a talent (ll. 21-5).  Taking Lang’s 
(Agora X) figure of 26.46-27.72 kg/talent (cf. the 25.86kg/tal in OCD3 s.v. “Weights”), the approximate 
weight of barley was 26.46-27.72 kg and 30.86-32.34 kg for wheat (Stroud 1998: 55).  In the following 
calculations, I adopt the lower figure of 26.46 to bring it into line with the traditional 26 kg figure.  It is 
interesting to point out that during the course of the twentieth century the mean weight of barley increased 
fifteen percent (Sallares 1991: 486, n. 148).    
 183 
the evidence seems conclusive that barley was a staple of the Athenian diet.207  A 6:1 
ratio of barley to wheat is a sensible estimate.208    
To see whether these domestic yields and the amount of imported grain given by 
Demosthenes provided for Athens’ requirements, we need to consider both the 
consumption levels of the Athenians and the size of the resident Attic population in the 
fourth century.  Concerning the former, Garnsey gives a minimum of 150 kg, a likely of 
175 kg, and a maximum of 230 kg of barley per year, but Whitby demonstrates 
conclusively that these numbers are too low, since Garnsey fails to distinguish between 
unprocessed and processed barley, which looses about 30 percent of its weight after 
milling.209  According to the ancient evidence, distribution rates were much higher, one 
choenix per day of wheat or two choenikes per day of barley meal were considered 
standard rations.210  Foxhall and Forbes, whose study is the most comprehensive and 
scientific, argue that these figures are excessively high.  Employing the standards from 
the FAO for the caloric needs of those living in modern Third World countries, they 
                                                
207 Jardé 1925: 123-7 and Jones 1957: 77.  For the importance of barley, see Sallares 1991: 314-16, 366-
68 and the authors cited by Stroud 1998: 36.  
208 Jardé 1925: 36.  Garnsey 1988: 102-4 argues that the ratio of 10:1 barley to wheat calculated on the 
basis of the Eleusis inscription is too high, because 329/8 was a bad year and barley would have “done 
better than wheat, which needs more rain in the growing season.”  The 4:1 barley to wheat ratio mentioned 
in the Grain-tax law of 374/3 (GHI2 26, 8-10), which concerns Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, can be taken 
as a lower limit, because Lemnos and Imbros were bett r suited to the production of wheat than Attica.  I 
would add that the high crop failure rate for wheat in Attica (Garnsey 1988: 10-11) makes it certain that 
most Athenian peasants, who probably made up half of the Athenian population (see Section 3B above), 
planted barley predominantly, which failed roughly once in every twenty years.  According to Scott 1976: 
13-29, the economic calculus of peasants is based almost entirely on the “safety first principle: “In the 
choice of seeds and techniques of calculation, it means that the cultivator prefers to minimize the 
probability of having a disaster rather than maximiz ng his average return” (18).  10:1 seems closer to the 
truth than 4:1 (cf. Rosivach 2000: 58).      
209 Garnsey 1988: 102; Whitby 1998: 114-5.  Whitby does not consider wheat, but Foxhall and Forbes 
1982: 76 show about a 5% decrease after milling.  Given such a small difference, I have not factored this
into my calculations. 
210 Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 51-62 with Table 3. 
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estimate that a daily requirement for a “typical” Greek whose protein requirement was 
satisfied mostly by grain (75%) was .58 kg of wheat (212 kg/year) or .90 kg of whole, 
hulled barley (328kg/year).211  Again, ancient weights of barley and wheat were 20% to 
25% lighter than modern varieties, and thus Foxhall and Forbes’ calculations need to be 
adjusted to .77 kg/day (281kg/year) for wheat and 1.12 kg/day (410kg/year) for 
barley.212   
As for the population of Attica during the first half of the fourth century, it is best 
to assume an uncontroversial figure, say 200,000, which is a compromise between low 
(100,000) and high estimates (250,000 to ca. 325,000).213  An Attic population subsisting 
                                                
211 Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 71-73, 86-7 with Whitby 1998: 115-17.  They arrive at this number by taking 
the average daily caloric needs of an “active,” hypothetical family of six (1 adult made, 2 adult females, 
and three children) (15,495 ÷ 6 = 2,583 x .75 = 1937) and dividing it by the total calories of 1 kg of wheat 
(3340), which yields .58 kg/day or 212 kg/year; 1 kg of whole, hulled barley has 2158 calories (46), which 
yields (1937 ÷ 2158) .90 kg/day or 328 kg/year.    
212 Wheat: 3340 x .25 = 2505; 1937 ÷ 2505 = .77; Barley: 2158 x .20 = 1726; 1937 ÷ 1726 = 1.12.  These 
figures have the distinct advantage of differing far less from the attested ancient distribution rates than 
earlier modern estimates (1 choenix of wheat = .64 kg; 2 choenikes of whole barley = 1.1 kg = 1.4 
choenikes of barley meal = .77 kg).   
213 The high/low estimates depend on the size of the Athenian male citizen population attested at the end 
of the fourth century.  Demetrius of Phaleron (317-307) conducted a census of the population, which 
Ctesicles says accounted for 21,000 adult male citizens (FGrH 245 F1).  For the year 322/1 Plutarch 
(Phocion 28.7) also puts the population at 21,000, but Diodorus (18.18.5) records 31,000.  Both attest to 
9,000 citizens with full rights but differ in respect to the amount disenfranchised because of the Lamian 
War: 12,000 and 22,000 respectively.  Hansen 1985 and Whitby 1998: 109-14 have put forth the strongest 
cases for 31,000, whereas Ruschenbusch 1984 and Sealey 1993: 19-22 have argued spiritedly for 21,000.  
For metics, Demetrius’ survey yielded 10,000.  Ctesicl  refers to his census as an ἐξετασμός (military 
review), and thus Hansen 1985: 31-6 argues well that the 10,000 are only adult males capable of military 
service (cf. Sealey 1993: 21-2 and Whitby 1998: 111-2).  To determine the number of metic and citizen 
children and women, a multiplier of 3.5 to 4.5 is standard with 4 being the most common (Isager and 
Hansen 1975: 14 and Whitby 1998: 111).  In respect to slaves, Demetrius’ census puts their number at an 
untenable 400,000.  All but Marxist historians have rej cted this number (Isager and Hansen 1975: 15), and 
arrive at a number of arbitrary figures ranging from as few as 15,000 to 30,000 (Garnsey 1988: 90 and 
Sallares 1991: 60; cf. Sealey 1993: 22) to as many as 150,000 to 200,000 (Isager and Hansen 1975: 17); cf. 
Whitby 1998: 114 who estimates 100,000.  Strauss 1986: 81 puts the male citizen population after the 
Peloponnesian War at 14,000-16,250, which implies a total citizen population (multiplier of four) of 56,000 
to 65,000 (by the middle of the century, these numbers certainly increased as they had, for example, shortly 
after the Archidamean war; see Thucydides 6.12.1); Sealey 1993: 22 concludes that the resident population 
was more than 100,000 but less than 200,000; Garnsey 1988: 90 = 120,000 to 150,000; Sallares 1991: 60 = 
150,000 average; Whitby 1998: 114 = 250,000 to 300,000; Isager and Hansen 1975: 14-17 = 248,000 to 
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on a diet consisting solely of barley, then, would require a staggering 3,099,017 
medimnoi per year, whereas one of wheat 1,821,128 medi noi!  Clearly, the truth is 
probably somewhere between these two figures, becaus  Athenians consumed both types 
of grain.214  As calculated above, Attica on average could produce 1,152,000 medimnoi 
of barley or 720,000 of wheat.  Taking a 6:1 ratio of barley to wheat exempli gratia, 
Attica in any given year grew 102,855 medimnoi of wheat and 987,432 of barley, which 
could feed 75,022 people.  Even allowing for an extremely large margin of error in these 
calculations, there is no escaping the conclusion that he Athenians did not produce 
enough grain for their own needs.215  If we return to the 1,200,000-medimnoi figure 
estimated above for imported grain, which probably consisted mostly of wheat, an 
additional 131,787 people could be fed.216  It would seem, then, that imported grain just 
made up the difference for the domestic shortfall. 217    
                                                                                                                                      
327,000; cf. Jones 1957: 78-79 = 144,000 and Ste.Croix 1972: 46, n. 88 = ca. 250,000 (both do not proceed 
from the ancient figures given above). 
214 Another incalculable, but one that needs to be takn into consideration, is grain for livestock such as 
oxen (Jardé 1925: 125-8, Isager and Hansen 1975: 17, and Whitby 1998: 106), though Sallares 1991: 312 
downplays their role in farming; he bases his argument, in part, upon the idea that farmers of small plots 
cultivated their land with a hoe and not with a plough (but the evidence for this practice obtains mainly 
from New Comedy); cf. Plato, Laws 848c who discusses trophe for livestock.  The amount of gain needed 
for the maintenance of horses for the cavalry is another factor, but one that can be crudely calculated using 
Xenophon’s testimony (Hipparchicus 1.19) that the state paid forty talents a year for sitos payments to the 
cavalry (see Chapter 1, note 40).  The price of barley is attested at a low of two dr. to a high of 6 dr. per 
medimnoi (see Stroud 1998: 74).  Cavalry riders using this money to buy grain from the market or to 
subsidize their own losses (more likely) could amount to nearly a 100,000 medimnoi a year.        
215 This conclusion is not far off from Garnsey 1988: 105, whose population numbers are significantly 
lower than mine: “my calculations suggest that Athens never in a normal year had to find grain from 
outside Attica, narrowly defined, for more than one-half its resident population” (cf. Rosivach 2000: 38).    
216 The grain imported from the Bosporus was almost cer ainly all wheat (Sallares 1991: 331-2 and 
Rosivach 2000: 40, 59).  Rosivach 2000: 58 notes that because barley has a larger volume compared to 
wheat for the same nutritional value, it was therefor  more expensive to transport, making it less likely to 
be imported than wheat (cf. Jasny 1944: 15).       
217 Sealey 1993: 25 and Whitby 1998: 119 stress the important role that “impressions” played in the 
Athenian grain-supply.  For Sealey, the key question is not, “How far did the Athenians depend on 
imported grain?”, but “How far did the Athenians think that they depended on imported grain?  Policy is 
determined not by the economy, but by what people be ieve about their economy.”  While this conclusion 
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The key question is how the Athenians paid for this substantial import bill.  
Translated into monetary terms they needed some 1,200 talents to purchase grain from 
abroad.218  I say the “Athenians” and not the state, because the polis rarely, if ever, 
intervened in the grain trade by securing shipments from abroad and distributing it to the 
citizens, as was done, for example, in Hellenistic Samos and in Rome.219  In fact, 
governmental intervention in the foreign grain trade, at least up until the time Xenophon 
was composing the Poroi, was rather limited.220  It was not until the grain reached the 
wholesale and especially the retail market that the state supervised and controlled the 
                                                                                                                                      
may be a bit too generalizing, it has some merit fo the grain-trade, because, as Hansen 1986: 13 argues 
well, the Athenians probably did not have accurate figures for the resident population—a number that 
would have been indispensable for anyone to determin  Athens’ requirements (Xenophon’s remarks in the 
Memorabilia (3.6.13), however, take it for granted that the state man had some means to calculate 
Athenian needs).  It also must be remembered that barley has a greater laxative effect than wheat, which 
reduces its nutritional effect (Peterson cited in Whitby 1998: 115, n. 21).  Furthermore, barley meal has a 
high glycemic index rating (measures how fast 50 grams of carbohydrate raises blood glucose levels); 
wheat is slightly lower than barley on the index but still considered high.  Thus, those Athenians for whom 
grain fulfilled a bulk of their protein requirement (i.e. the poor), feelings of hunger would have result d 
quickly after meals—sensations commonly attested in the comedies of Aristophanes (e.g., Knights 777-8).  
We must imagine then one of the ten sovereign meetings of the assembly at which the grain-supply was 
discussed, consisting of many of these “hungry” Athenians, who came partly for their meal ticket, partly to 
ensure that their fellow citizens voted correctly to maintain sufficient or more than sufficient levels of grain 
and in whatever way necessary.           
218 On the basis of an average 6dr. per medimnos pricefor wheat (Pritchett 1956: 196-8 and Stroud 1998: 
76; cf. Markle 1985: 294).  The price of wheat in Athens was generally twice that of barley.   
219 Garnsey 1988: 79-86, 125.  In 445/4 Psammetichus gave 30,000 (Philochorus FGrH 328 F 90) or 
40,000 (Plutarch, Pericles 37) medimnoi of wheat to the Athenians, which was distributed in 5 medimnoi 
shares to some 14,240 citizens (cf. scholium Aristophanes, Wasps 718).  The evidence for wartime 
distributions is limited and obscure; see IG II2 1686B with Rhodes 1981: 355 and Aristophanes, Wasps 
715-21 (discussed below).  In general, the Athenians distributed money for the purchase of grain rather 
than grain itself (e.g., the diobelia (Athenaion Politeia 28.3 with Rhodes 1981: 356) 
220 The two most important roles the Athenian state played in the grain trade was guarding the grain 
convoy every autumn (Athenaion Politeia 43.4; Demosthenes 18.301-2; cf. Sealey 1993: 26, 91) and 
forging ties of friendship with grain-producing regions and states, such as with the Spartocids in the 
Bosporus (e.g., Aristotle, Rhetoric 1360a 12-18; cf. Rosivach 2000: 39-43, though he tends to 
underestimate the role the “market” played in this relationship).  The laws prohibiting any Athenian or 
metic living in Athens from exporting grain to any port but the Piraeus or contracting a loan to any 
destination but Athens (Demosthenes 35.50-51; 34.37; Lycurgus 1.32) most likely belong to the 340s (see 
below).  
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buying and selling of grain.221  By and large, the Athenians received their grain through 
private enterprise and initiative.222  Athenian and non-Athenian entrepreneurs loaned 
much of the money to merchants (comprising foreigners, metics, and Athenians) who 
purchased the grain abroad and conveyed it to Athens.  What the state did do for its 
citizens, especially the poor, was supply them with money in the form of wages to help 
them buy grain and bread in the retail market.223  Whence did most of this money come?  
In a word, from the empire.224   
That imperialism was the major solution to the problem of the food supply is 
manifest from a number of classical sources.225  Let us distinguish between three general 
methods of imperial acquisition, from which the Athenians derived their income to pay 
                                                
221 See, above all, Rosivach 2000: 44-52. 
222 There is no better indication of this than the procedures outlined in the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 
(discussed below).  The grain taxed in kind from the cleruchies of Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros is to be 
conveyed to the Piraeus and transported to the city at he expense and risk of the private merchant (10-15; 
the “buyer” of the tax is equated with the emporos at line 26) (see Stroud 1998: 26).      
223 Polanyi 1977: 163-7, Markle 1985, and Garnsey 1988: 131.  As argued above, (Section 3B), with an 
average price for a medimnos of barley around three d achmas or .375 obol for a choenix, a family of four 
needed 3.05 obols a day (186dr./year) to buy grain; with a six drachma average price for a medimnos wheat 
(.75 obol/ choenix), a family of four required 3.6 obols (219dr./year).  If we take the 1,200 talents (cost of 
grain imports) and divide it by 20,000 (approximate number of poor people living just at or below the 
subsistence level), the individual Athenian’s share of the import bill amounted to 360 dr. per annum.  
Furthermore, an unskilled laborer working 260 days  year at 1.5 dr./day had an income of 390 dr.  My 
“high” estimate for the cost of living of a family of four was 488 dr./year, whereas my “low” estimate was 
366dr./year (see note 73 above).  Thus, we can see that without assistance from the state, many “poor” 
families could not make ends meet.            
224 Xenophon, Anabasis 7.1.27 says the yearly revenue (from both indigenous and foreign sources) of the 
Athenians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War was no less than 1,000 talents.  Thucydides 2.13.3 attests o 
the figure of 600 talents from imperial revenues.  Thus, imperial revenues outpaced domestic revenues by 3 
to 2.  But it is likely that Thucydides does not include revenues obtained as a result of the empire but 
collected domestically (e.g., court deposits, poll taxes, etc.; cf. Old Oligarch, Athenaion Politeia 1.16-8 and 
below) in his calculations.  Imperial revenues were probably much higher than 600 talents. 
225 Though Garnsey 1988 minimizes the extent to which Athens was dependent upon foreign corn, he does 
countenance the importance of imperialism as a general r sponse to food crises (69-70) and notes its use 
among the Athenians in the fourth century (142-4) (cf. Finley 1999: 131-2).  Another method not discussed 
here is that of gifts of grain.  While such grants could be significant (Cyrene gifted Athens 100,000 
medimnoi between 330-6; GHI2 96, 5), they nonetheless were sporadic and thus cold not be counted upon 
as a regular source of grain.  Besides, gifts were by and large given to states who were suffering from 
shortages and famine.         
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for grain imports: 1) the regular financial exploitat on of subjects and weaker states (viz. 
tribute and taxes); 2) depredation and extortion on the high seas; and 3) the establishment 
of cleruchies and colonies.  First, according to Ps.-Aristotle, the Athenians under 
Aristides’ influence “established an abundance of tr phe for many citizens,” “for the 
combined proceeds from the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than 
twenty thousand men” (συνέβαινεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν φόρων καὶ τῶν τελῶν καὶ τῶν 
συμμάχων πλείους ἢ δισμυρίους ἄνδρας τρέφεσθαι) (Athenaion Politeia 
24.3).226  The historical merits of this passage notwithstanding, it nonetheless 
demonstrates nicely the fourth-century philosophical attitude to the Athenian empire, 
which underscores the intimate connection between imperialism and feeding the 
demos.227  First, Ps.-Aristotle mentions the importance of tribute, which during the fifth 
century was a massive source of state income.  As argued above, tribute payments in the 
fourth century (viz. syntaxeis) yielded about half of the income they had in the fifth 
(ca.195 talents), but they were not insignificant amounts of money.  These monies went 
directly to fund League operations, paying for soldiers in garrisons, officials abroad, and 
                                                
226 Schütrumpf 1982: 68 (contra Gauthier 1976: 25-6) rightly notes that the emphasis of Athenaion 
Politeia 24 is not on political pay but on trophe in the sense of ration-payment.  It must be stressed that 
Aristides convinces the demos “to leave their farms,” where they had previously secured their trophe, and 
to move to the city to live off the proceeds of empire.  Athens in the fourth century never became the 
emmisthos polis it was during the fifth (Plutarch, Pericles; cf. Demosthenes 23.209).  Hopes for perpetual 
pay from empire died with the disaster in Sicily. Thucydides claims that a vast majority of Athenians “fell
in love” with the campaign because they thought “they would get money for the moment and attain a power 
base whence they would secure endless pay” (ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι 
δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν) (6.24.3).  However, when the expedition ran into fiscal 
trouble, the request of the generals for misthos resulted in the Athenians voting to send trophe instead 
(6.93.4; see Kallet 2001: 299).  That most Athenian citizens in the fourth century were content to serve with 
the only form of remuneration being trophe seems certain, because trophe was all the state could afford 
(see, for example, Demosthenes 4.23-25, 28-29, 7.2647; 23.209; 49.11, 15; cf. Pritchett 1991: 458-9).   
227 For the historical accuracy of this passage, see Rhodes 1981: 297.   
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most importantly, rowers.228  Next, Ps.-Aristotle notes the role of taxes in feeding the 
Athenian demos.  In addition to the d kate and eikoste, which were levied periodically 
during the first half of the fourth century (see Appendix 2), the Athenians benefited from 
other taxes of imperial origin.  For example, the Grain-tax Law of 374/3 attests that the 8 
1/3% and 2% taxes collected in Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros had previously been paid 
into the treasury for the financial administration (dioikesis) of the city.229  In other words, 
revenues derived from these cleruchies prior to 374/3 financed the running of the state, of 
which funding political pay was a significant part (more below).   
The last source of alimentary support of which Ps.-Aristotle speaks is “the allies.”  
The inclusion of this generic category in his list of imperial revenues has long puzzled 
scholars, largely because tribute, which Ps.-Aristotle lists first, was imposed primarily on 
the allies.230  The confusion over “the allies” is removed, however, if we bring in the 
analysis of the Old Oligarch, who discusses at length the profits the Athenians acquired 
from the symmachoi by forcing them to come to Athens for dikai (1.16-17), a procedure 
still in practice during the fourth century.231  He claims that from the deposits at law the 
                                                
228 See, for example, GHI2 52, where the Athenians decree that the garrison on Andros “shall have its 
misthos out of the syntaxeis” (10-11), and that “Archedemus shall exact the money from the islands which 
is due for the soldiers in Andros, and hand it over to the governor in Andros so that the soldiers can h ve 
their pay” (16-21).  Cf. GHI2 51, 8-15, IG II 2 207, 12-15, Isocrates, Panathenaicus 116, and Plutarch, 
Demosthenes 17.3 (mercenaries of which some were citizens; see Pritchett 1991: 397-8, n.566).  In general, 
see Brun 1983: 89-91.  On the controversial question of whether tribute/syntaxeis was a source of dicastic 
pay, see A scholium to Wasps 684 with Kallet-Marx 1994: 246-7. 
229 Hesperia Supp. 29, ll. 55-9 = GHI2 26.  For more on this law, see below. 
230 Kaibel and Wilamowitz thought it so odd they deletd καὶ τῶν συμμάχων altogether.  Others have 
attempted a variety of emendations.  The most convincing of which is proposed by Rhodes, who, following 
the sense of Hude's emendation, wants to read: τῶν τελῶν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάχων (see Rhodes 1981: 
301). 
231 As Rhodes 1981: 301 admits, the entire twenty-fourth chapter of the Athenaion Politeia is based on 
“genuine fifth-century evidence,” some of which was colored by pamphleteers like the Old Oligarch.  For
judicial cases of allies in Athens, see GHI2 39, 45-50, 73-75; IG II2 179, 9, 12, 14; Hesperia 26 1957: 231-3 
with Cargill 1981: 136ff.   
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people received their dicastic misthos for the whole year, which is certainly an 
exaggeration, but one that does not belie the fact that the allies contributed in this way to 
the maintenance of the Athenian demos.232  Moreover, the Old Oligarch declares that the 
city profits in other ways from the allies: there are increases in revenue from the one 
percent tax in the Piraeus; the innkeepers rent out more rooms; the owners of 
transportation hire out more animals; and the heralds of the assembly “do better when the 
allies are in town.”  Ps.-Aristotle concludes this chapter as he began it, by noting that the 
Athenians will receive their trophe from all these imperial revenues: “for all these 
citizens had their maintenance from public funds” (ἅπασι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν 
κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἦν).233  
The second method of securing trophe was derived from Athens’ naval 
supremacy that she exercised throughout most of the fourth century.  Isocrates, for 
instance, laments how Athenian sea power accustoms hose “who have lost their own 
possessions” “to secure their livelihood from the possessions of others” (ἐκ δὲ τῶν 
ἀλλοτρίων πορίζεσθαι τὸν βίον).234  The Athenians seem to have followed three 
related practices.  First, when funds were low or nn-existent to pay troops in the field, 
Athenian generals forcefully exacted money from both League and non-League 
members.235  In the former case, these monies were in addition to their normal syntaxeis 
                                                
232 For the Old Oligarch’s hyperbole in this passage, see Frisch 1942: 226.  Cf. Thucydides 6.91.7, who 
also talks about revenue derived from the lawcourts (contra Gomme et al. 1970: 365-6, who do not dicuss 
the Old Oligarch).    
233 See Rhodes 1981: 309 on διοίκησις, “administration of state” = “maintenance.”   
234 Panathenaicus 116 with Momigliano 1944: 4; cf. Thucydides 1.81.4 and Hipparchicus 8.8. 
235 For example, Xenophon, Hellenica 4.8.30; 6.2.38; Lysias 28.5; Isocrates, Antidosis 111; Demosthenes 
4.29; Diodorus 15.47.7; 16.21.2; Polyaenus 3.10.9.    
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payments.236  Secondly, they often turned to piracy both to relieve food shortages at 
home and to feed rowers, soldiers, and mercenaries broad.  Sometimes they seized grain, 
but more often than not, they confiscated goods, which were then sold for money to buy 
victuals.237  The last practice was contingent upon the threat of such depredations, 
whereby Athenian generals extorted money from traders to allow them to sail the seas 
unmolested.  The case of Diopithes is notorious: 
πάντες ὅσοι πώποτ’ ἐκπεπλεύκασι παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγοί (ἢ ’γὼ 
πάσχειν ὁτιοῦν τιμῶμαι) καὶ παρὰ Χίων καὶ παρ’ Ἐρυθραίων καὶ 
παρ’ ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι δύνωνται, τούτων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν οἰκούντων 
λέγω, χρήματα λαμβάνουσιν. λαμβάνουσι δ’ οἱ μὲν ἔχοντες 
μίαν ἢ δύο ναῦς ἐλάττονα, οἱ δὲ μείζω δύναμιν πλείονα. καὶ 
διδόασιν οἱ διδόντες οὔτε τὰ μικρὰ οὔτε τὰ πολλὰ ἀντ’ οὐδενός 
(οὐ γὰρ οὕτω μαίνονται), ἀλλ’ ὠνούμενοι μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι τοὺς 
παρ’ αὑτῶν ἐκπλέοντας ἐμπόρους, μὴ συλᾶσθαι, 
παραπέμπεσθαι τὰ πλοῖα τὰ αὑτῶν, τὰ τοιαῦτα· φασὶ δ’ εὐνοίας 
διδόναι, καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομ’ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα ταῦτα. καὶ δὴ καὶ 
νῦν τῷ Διοπείθει στράτευμ’ ἔχοντι σαφῶς ἐστι τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι 
δώσουσι χρήματα πάντες οὗτοι· πόθεν γὰρ οἴεσθ’ ἄλλοθεν τὸν 
μήτε λαβόντα παρ’ ὑμῶν μηδὲν μήτ’ αὐτὸν ἔχονθ’ ὁπόθεν 
μισθοδοτήσει, στρατιώτας τρέφειν; 
 
All the generals that have ever set sail from your land—if I am wrong, I 
submit myself to any penalty—raise money from the Chians, from the 
Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean of the Greeks of Asia 
Minor.  Generals with only one or two ships raise less; those with a larger 
                                                
236 However, one should not distinguish too sharply betwe n ἀργυρολογεῖν, “to collect money” and 
χρήματα [εἰσ]πράττειν, “to exact money.”  While the former is often used for officially sanctioned 
collections of tribute and taxes and the latter for ad hoc collections of money from states who contribu ed 
willingly or not (e.g., Xenophon, Hellenica 1.3.8; Thucydides 8.3.1, 107.1, 108.2; Aristides, Encomium of 
Rome 45; Meiggs 1972: 254 calls these “emergency levies” ), the distinction is not always followed (see 
Kallet-Marx 1993: 136-7, 160-4, 202).  In the fourth century, the syntaxeis payments were also collected by 
the generals (Plutarch, Phocion 7.1; Isocrates 4.113; 8.29, 15.123; GHI 168; IG II2 207, 15-17; cf. Marshall 
1905: 39-40 and Cawkwell 1981: 51.  Brun 1983: 100, who argues that the regular, non-wartime procedure 
was probably to bring the contributions directly to Athens; however, his view is supported by an 
idiosyncratic reading of Plutarch, Phocion 7.1, which I do not endorse. 
237 Isocrates 18.61; Lysias 19.50; Demosthenes 2.28; 8.9; 13.6; 20.77; 24.11; Aeschines 2.71; Diodorus 
16.57.2; for additional references, see Pritchett 1991: 378-82, 391-98, 485-99. 
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fleet raise more. Also those who pay do not pay the sum, be it large or 
small, for nothing; they are not such madmen.  No, they purchase for the 
merchants sailing from their own harbors immunity from injury or 
robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or something of that sort.  
They say that they are granting “benevolences.”  That is the name for 
these exactions.  And so too in this case, while Diopithes has a force with 
him, it is perfectly plain that all these people will pay up.  For where else 
do you suppose that he looks for the maintenance of his troops, if he gets 
nothing from you and has no private fortune to furnish their pay? 
(Demosthenes 8.24-6; trans. Vince). 
There are two notable aspects of this passage.  First, the specter of injury (ἀδικεῖσθαι) 
or depredation (συλᾶσθαι) from the Athenians on the high seas was very real.  Those 
who did not pay the Athenians suffered seizure and the confiscation of their goods and 
money (cf. 8.9).  Second, Diopithes and the generals before him exacted these 
“benevolences” not only from allies like Chios but also from non-allies who lived in 
Asia, that is, from those who were technically subject to the Persian arche.  In other 
words, the Athenian thalassocracy allowed the Athenians to extend their power and 
influence over peoples outside the League.  What is so remarkable about Demosthenes’ 
On the Chersonese, the speech from which this passage is drawn, is that one gets the 
impression that the Athenians tacitly approved these xtortionate methods not so much 
because the state could not fund its campaigns (Demosthenes, in fact, implies that it could 
at 21-3), but because such means of securing t ophe was readily available and easy to 
perform (requiring only one or two ships).238  The sums from some of these exactions 
                                                
238 That Athenian finances in the fourth century were dismal is a commonplace in the scholarship (e.g., 
Griffith 1978: 135 and Ste. Croix 1981: 292, 607, n. 37).  This position, however, has been grossly 
overstated.  It is Demosthenes’ belief that if the Athenians only paid their war taxes or served in person, 
kept their hands off public funds, and paid out the syntaxeis to Dipithes which the League had authorized, 
such extortionate practices could be avoided.  In On the Symmories, Demosthenes boasts that “there is 
wealth in the city that is equal to that of all the other Greek cities put together” (14.25).  Even allowing for 
hyperbole, this is an amazing statement, coming as it does only one year after the Social War.  
Demosthenes’ point is that this wealth is either undeclared or hidden from the eisphora assessments (26; cf. 
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were enormous.  According to Lysias, the Athenian ge eral Diotimus, who had been 
operating in the Hellespont ca. 388 (Hellenica 5.1.25), collected at least “40 talents from 
the naukleroi and the emporoi” (19.50)!239 
The last means by which the Athenians acquired their trophe was the 
establishment of cleruchies and colonies, though the former seems to have been the more 
common form of settlement in the fourth century.240  First, many Athenians who were 
sent to settle conquered areas were from the two loest social classes, the thetes and 
zeugitai, whose new possession of land in some instances helped advance them to hoplite 
status and thus right out of poverty or maintained them comfortably at hoplite rank.241  It 
is impossible to estimate the total number of settlers in the fourth century, but Hansen 
conjectures around 5,000 for the cleruchies in Samos and the Chersonese between 365-
53.242  Whether these settlers worked the land themselves or, as in the case of Mytilene 
in 427, collected rent from locals who farmed the plots, sufficient trophe was guaranteed 
                                                                                                                                      
30).  A few years later (349/8), for example, we learn from a decree that the Athenians were able to fund
adequately a large overseas expedition with trophe under the leadership of Chares and Charidemus (IG II2 
207, fg. a-b with Pritchett 1991: 497).    
239 It is important to note that all these monies which belonged to the state could either be spent abroad to 
fund a campaign or brought home to the Athenian state treasury.  In both instances, accounts had to bekept 
and an audit was performed.  Each general and trierarch had a treasurer who kept account of monies 
received and paid out for misthos (Harpocration s.v. ταμίαι; Lysias 19.50-51; 29.3; Demosthenes 49.5-10; 
50.10; see also Pritchett 1991: 394, 489, n. 743).   
240 For cleruchies and overseas settlements in the fifth and fourth centuries, see Jones 1957: 167-77, Brunt 
1966, Meiggs 1972: 121-3, 260-2, Gauthier 1973, Hansen 1985: 70-2, Garnsey 1988: 128-31, Figueira 
1991, and Cargill 1995.  Whatever distinction there was between cleruchies and colonies (apoikiai) in the 
fifth century, disappeared in the fourth (Cargill 1995: xxi-xxiii; cf. Figueira 1991: 61).     
241 E.g., the colony at Brea (IG I3 46, 36-46); cf. Plutarch, Pericles 11.6 with Jones 1957: 168-9 and 
Meiggs 1972: 260-1.  I do not mean to suggest, however, that cleruchies and colonies were restricted to the 
lower classes, as most were open to all ranks (Cargill 1995: 196; cf. Figueira 1991: 57-62, who argues that 
colonies were open to all classes, whereas cleruchies were limited to thetes and zeugites).  That cleruchs 
retained their Athenian citizenship is generally agreed (Graham 1983: 167, Hansen 1985: 71, Figueira 
1991: 72, and Cargill 1995: xxi-xxiii).   
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to them and their families.243  Did the Athenians profit in other ways from the cl ruchies, 
and, in particular, did any grain produced in the cl ruchies find its way to Athens?  
According to Thucydides, the fall of Amphipolis in 424/3 brought great fear upon the 
Athenians, “especially because the city was profitable to them both through its 
conveyance of wood for shipbuilding and its financial revenue (χρημάτων προσόδῳ)” 
(4.108.1).  This passage is proof positive that resources and income regularly flowed 
from overseas settlements to Athens.244  Unfortunately, the evidence for such incomes is 
scant and obscure.  Figueira speculates that “[t]hese r venues would probably be derived 
from indirect taxes, and possibly from income on resources, the exploitation of which 
was retained by the Athenian government rather thanattributed to colonists.”245  These 
indirect taxes were likely harbors dues and, in places like Amphipolis, levies on 
mines.246  More certain is income (viz. rents) derived from sacred properties, as ten 
percent of a given cleruchy was dedicated to the gods.247 
                                                                                                                                      
242 Hansen 1985: 71; cf. Jones 1957: 173-4 4,000-figure fo  the fifth century.  Hansen does not consider 
the cleruchies on Lemnos, Scyros, and Imbros.  For these, Moreno 2003: 102 estimates around 540, 
because the holdings on these islands probably belong d to those of the pentakosiomedimnoi.  
243 For the settlement of Mytilene, see Thucydides 3.50.2 with Gomme 1956: 326-8 and Hornblower 
1991: 440-1.  Gomme estimates that the landholdings on Lesbos were 45 hectares, which is impossibly 
large.  The annual rent of two minai (200 dr.) corresponds to that of a hoplite, whose property was valued at 
a minimum of 2000 dr. (Jones 1957: 31 and Gauthier 1966: 64).  The average rent on land in Athens seem 
to have been on average 8% per annum, which would indicate a land value of 2500 dr. (Jones 1957: 30, 
Cooper 1978: 169, n.38, and Millet 1991: 232-5).  If we then take the 50 dr. per plethora land value 
estimate of Andreyev 1974: 15ff., the lot holding on Lesbos were exactly 50 pl. or 4.5 hectares.  As argued 
above (note 65), four hectare plot could, theoretically speaking, easily satisfy the alimentary needs of a 
family of six.     
244 See Figueira 1991: 186-93 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 99-101, 175-6. 
245 Figueira 1991: 191. 
246 Figueira 1991: 74-81, 91 citing IG I3 47 (cf. GHI2 26, 8 with Stroud 1998: 38-9); for mines, see Kallet-
Marx 1993: 175-6. 
247 Thucydides 3.50.2; IG I3 376; Aelian, Varia Historia 6.1; Walbank 1991: 154 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 
101. 
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Moreover, new evidence proves that cleruchs and colonists, in addition to paying 
eisphora, were subject to direct taxes on their land, a burden Athenians living in Attica 
did not share.248  In the recently published Grain-tax law of 374/3, we read that the 
statesman Agyrrhius proposed the law to ensure that “ ere [might] be grain for the 
demos in the public domain” (ὃπως ἂν τῶι δήμωι σῖ[το]ς ἦι ἐν τῶι κοινῶι) by 
selling the 8 1/3% tax (dodekate) and the 2% tax originating in Lemnos, Imbros, and 
Scyros “in terms of grain” (σίτο) (5-8), whereas previously these taxes had been paid in 
cash.249  Stroud is probably correct in interpreting the 2% as a levy on grain cargoes 
exported from the islands.250  The identification of the 8 1/3% is puzzling though, as this 
tax rate is seemingly unattested at Athens.251  The high level led Harris to conjecture that 
the dodekate was a “transit tax,” but this interpretation is problematic.252  Moreno has 
                                                
248 For eisphora, see IG I3 41, 38-9 with Figueira 1991: 69-70, 191-3 and Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 
1347a18-24.  Cf. IG I3 237, which Walbank 1991: 155 speculates may be decree dealing with taxes on 
leases of land, houses, and other real estate in land abroad.  Cleruchic land, technically speaking, was 
private property (Figueira 1991: 185 and Walbank 1991: 150-1) and not “public,” as argues Gauthier 1973: 
70.  But the fact that this land was directly taxed by the state demonstrates that it was in a special category 
of private property, perhaps because the state retained the “title” to the land Walbank 1991: 151).  
249 Hesperia Supplement 29 (1998): ll. 4-5 = GHI2 26 with Stroud 1998: 80, 109, Harris 1999: 269, and
Moreno 2003: 97.  The law prohibiting any Athenian or metic living in Athens from exporting grain to any 
port but the Piraeus (Demosthenes 35.50-51; 34.37; Lycurgus 1.32; cf. Demosthenes 56.10) may provide 
prima facie evidence that most of the grain exported from the three islands went to Athens, but the law does 
not cover Athenians living abroad.  Cleruchs could have shipped their surplus grain anywhere they wished.  
Besides, the law probably belongs to the early to mid 340s.  The earliest reference to it is Demosthenes 35, 
which dates to 340-38 (Gernet 1954: 179-80 and Isager nd Hansen 1975: 169-70).  The law stipulates that 
“if any man lends out money contrary to the requirements of the law, a denouncement (phasis) and an 
account of the money shall be laid before the epimeletai [of the emporion] in the same manner as is 
provided in regard to the ship and the grain” (Dem. 35 51).  In Section 5B, I argue that the decree of 
Moerocles (Demosthenes 57.10-3, 53-6), which protects traders from false denunciations, must date 
between 346 and 344.  This decree was probably enacted shortly after the law in question was in effect to 
ameliorate the legal situation of falsely accused tra ers.      
250 Stroud 1998: 38; cf. Moreno 2003: 98 and Harris 1999: 271, who identifies the 2% with the p ntekoste 
of grain mentioned in Demosthenes 59.27. 
251 Stroud 1998: 27. 
252 See Engles 2000: 114, Rosivach 2000: 39, n.24, Moreno 2003: 97-8, n.9, and Rhodes and Osborne 
2003: 123-4. 
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offered the most compelling explanation, which links the 8 1/3% with the tax of the same 
rate deduced by Boeckh of the Solonian pentakosiomedimnoi class.253  Since the law 
stipulates that the tax is to be collected in “shares” (μερίδες), each consisting of 500 
medimnoi, 100 of wheat and 400 of barley (8-10), the law was essentially a tax on the 
cleruch holdings of the pentakosiomedimnoi class.254  Using similar calculations to those 
given above for Attica, Moreno estimates 540 cleruchs for the three islands, whose tax 
burden would have amounted to 270,000 medimnoi of grain a year.255  Judging from the 
production totals of the Eleusis accounts for 329/8, this number was clearly a significant 
portion of yearly production.256  If Moreno’s interpretation is sound, it would appear that 
the Athenians profited handsomely from these cleruchies.  Before 374/3, when the tax 
was collected in kind, the Athenians probably generated in the neighborhood of 50 talents 
a year, which was earmarked for the administration of the city (59); after this date, the 
Athenians not only ensured that they would receive a regular supply of 270,000 
medimnoi of grain but also that they would potentially triple their profit, since the grain 
                                                
253 Moreno 2003: 98-99 and Boeckh 1976: 503-4.  Solon had estimated the value of a medimnus at a 
drachma (Plutarch, Solon 23).  Thus, 500 medimnoi of grain is 8 1/3% of one tal nt, which Boeckh argues 
was the total taxable capital of the p ntakosiomedimnoi class.   
254 As Moreno 2003: 99 notes well, the complete word πεντακοσιομέδιμνοι appears in a decree 
concerning Lemnos of 387/6 (Agora XIX L3, 12), which concerns land regulations. 
255 Moreno argues that there was a total of 600 kleroi, each equaling 1000 plethora and producing 650 
kg/ha per annum with biennial fallow.  This yields a total yearly production of 540,000 medimnoi.  
Moreover, he suggests that ten percent of the kleroi would have been reserved for the gods, following the 
example of Lesbos in 427 (Thucydides 3.50).  With 540 total kleroi paying 500 medimnoi in tax, we get 
270,000 for the total amount of grain that the Athenians could have purchased.  This number is 
significantly higher than Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 127, who argue that the tax would have amounted to 
around 30,000 medimnoi a year.   
256 IG II2 1672, 275-9, 288-97 reports that Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros produced 303,325 medimnoi of 
barley and 110,550 of wheat, totaling 413,875 medimnoi of grain, which is 46,887 more than the total 
production of Attica for this year.  Again, it is unknown whether these totals represent a good, average, or 
bad year, but the scholarly consensus is that, unlike Attica, it was an average to good year for these islands 
(Garnsey 1988: 100 and Stroud 1998: 35-6; cf. Moren’s calculations above; if correct, this year was 
probably well below average). 
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was sold to the public (40-44).257  It is completely understandable, then, why the 
Athenians made such a fuss about the retention of the three islands in the lead up to the 
King’s Peace: they were sources of large revenues and veritable “breadbaskets.”258  The 
metaphor is apt, for this is what Pitholaus, one of the murderers of Alexander of Pherae, 
called Sestos: “the bread-basket of the Piraeus” (Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ 
Πειραιέως).259  Indeed, all cleruchies were probably to a certain degree breadbaskets 
for the Athenians.260 
What is unknown is whether land in the cleruchies bfore 374/3 was normally 
taxed in cash or in kind.  The case of Euboea in the fifth century potentially calls into 
question the novelty of Agyrrhius’ law.  The Athenia s had established a cleruchy on 
                                                
257 Moreno’s analysis is insightful: “The law was a democratic masterstroke not only because it provided a 
public supply of grain for the Athenian demos, but also because it turned a tax on the wealthy cleruchs of 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros from a δωδεκάτη in cash (a relatively painless yearly payment of 500 
drachmas [= 45 talents total (500 dr. x 540 cleruchs)]) into a much more onerous δωδεκάτη in grain, 
equaling a yearly payment of five hundred medimnoi from each cleruch” (Moreno 2003: 100, citing Rhodes 
1981: 142-5 that by the early 5th c. the Solonian requirements had changed to  being assessed in drachmas 
instead of medimnoi, on a 1:1 basis).  Depending on the price of grain set by the assembly, this could have 
amounted to a cash equivalent of 1800 dr. per cleruh or 162 talents total  (assuming an average 4 dr.price 
for barley and 6 dr. for wheat).  These monies were then assigned to the military fund (stratiotika) (ll.53-4), 
which financed further expansionist and imperialistic projects, for which many Athenians received their 
misthos and trophe.  Thus, it was a win-win for the demos.   
258 See the provocative title of Moreno 2003; cf. Whitby 1998: 108.  Given the productivity of these 
islands, one wonders what Xenophon thought about them.  Did the fact that they “belonged” to Athens 
since 387/6 make him overlook that they were attained through war and imperialism?  Or rather, did he se  
them as illegitimate possessions?  There is no way of knowing for sure, but it is important to note tha  in 
the first chapter of the Poroi Xenophon defines Attica strictly in terms of its contiguous territory.  This land 
is παμφορωτάτη, “all-productive,” not πολύφορος, “highly-productive” (1.3; for the difference, see 
Plato, Laws 705b).  If Xenophon did believe these fertile islands to be Athenian, here would have been the 
perfect place for their inclusion in the work.   
259 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1411a13.  LSJ s.v. glosses τηλία as a “board or table with a raised edge, to prevent 
meal and pastry placed on it from falling off, corn seller’s or baker’s board.” 
260 The scholium to Aristophanes’ Knights 259-65 says the “The Thracian Chersonese is a place and polis 
subject to the Athenians and favorable for the growing of wheat; it is from this place that the Athenia s 
transport their grain”  (Χερρόνησος τῆς Θρᾴκης χωρίον καὶ πόλις, ὑποτελὴς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, 
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Carystus in 453/2 or 452/1, and after the Euboean rvolt in 446/5 they settled much of the 
island.261  Thucydides maintains that Euboea was more valuable to the Athenians than 
Attica.262  The lists of confiscated properties on the “Attic Stelai” indicate that many 
wealthy Athenians owned large estates there.263  In Aristophanes’ Wasps, Bdelycleon 
addresses Euboea’s specific role of providing the Athenians with grain.  He first attacks 
greedy politicians for holding back the proceeds of empire, which in his estimation is 
capable of providing a livelihood (βίος) for the entire demos (698ff.).  With some comic 
exaggeration, he claims there are a thousand tributa y states that could feed (βόσκειν) 
luxuriously twenty-thousand Athenians (707-9).   
ἀλλ’ ὁπόταν μὲν δείσωσ’ αὐτοί, τὴν Εὔβοιαν διδόασιν  
ὑμῖν, καὶ σῖτον ὑφίστανται κατὰ πεντήκοντα μεδίμνους 
ποριεῖν. ἔδοσαν δ’ οὐπώποτέ σοι· πλὴν πρώην πέντε μεδίμνους, 
καὶ ταῦτα μόλις ξενίας φεύγων, ἔλαβες κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν.  
ὧν εἵνεκ’ ἐγώ σ’ ἀπέκλειον ἀεὶ  
βόσκειν ἐθέλων καὶ μὴ τούτους 
ἐγχάσκειν σοι στομφάζοντας.  
 
But whenever they’re scared themselves, they promise you Euboea 
and get set to supply you with fifty-bushel rations of grain.  But 
they never give it to you, not counting yesterday when you got five 
bushels, but only after narrowly escaping a challenge to your 
citizenship, and then it was barley in one quart ins allments.  Which 
is why I kept you locked up: I wanted to feed you and I didn’t want 
these blowhards to make a chump of you (715-21; trans. 
Henderson).      
 
                                                                                                                                      
εὔφορος εἰς πυροῦ γεωργίαν. ὅθεν καὶ ἐσιταγώγουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι).  Lysias 32.15 mentions how 
“grain comes in every year from the Chersonese” for the family of Diodotus, who had an estate there.    
261 Pausanias 1.27.5 and Diodorus 11.88 with Moreno 2003: 104, n.37. 
262 Thucydides 8.96.2 and 7.28; cf. Andocides 3.9; Isocrates, Panegyricus 108. 
263 See Pritchett, Hesperia 22 (1953): 225-99, 25 (1956): 178-328, 30  (1961): 23-29; Euboean estat  can 
be found, for example, on Stele II, Col. III, l.178, 312 and Stele VI, frag. n. l.151. 
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This passage evidences the same phenomenon between Athenian political leaders and the 
demos attested at the beginning of the Poroi.  Leaders fearful of the demos felt compelled 
to fleece the cleruchies in order to provide it with trophe.  They did not follow through 
with their promises in the case of Euboea, however, and reduced distribution levels by 
90%.  As five medimnoi is ten percent of fifty, and fifty ten percent of five hundred, 
Moreno may be correct in interpreting the passage as a joke exposing the fraud of the 
politicians, who initially promised the demos a 8 1/3% tax on Euboean grain from the 
pentakosiomedimnoi.264  At whatever rate these distributions imply, it seems certain that 
this particular tax was collected in kind.  However, the main difference between 
Agyrrhius’ law and the proposal here is that the latter is envisioned as a dole and thus 
suggests a temporary measure designed to relieve shortages brought on by the war.265  
Without additional evidence to elucidate the workings of taxation in the cleruchies, we 
may assume that the normal procedure was to collect th  taxes in cash.        
The loss of cleruchies like Euboea after the Peloponnesian War was particularly 
grievous to the Athenians, and in the late 390s there is a strong desire to win them 
                                                
264 Garnsey 1988: 125 dates this episode to 424/3.  Moreno 2003: 104: “If Aristophanes is seeking in this 
passage to portray the demagogues as tight-fisted, the reader is inevitably confused to find a grain 
distribution κατὰ πέντε μεδίμνους being criticized, since this amount is more than enough to feed six 
adult males for a year.”  Here Moreno is terribly mistaken as five medimnoi a year would not have fulfilled 
the requirement for one adult male.  Foxhall and Forbes 1982: 72 estimate that a family of six (comprising 
an adult man and wife, an elderly woman, and three children—one male and two female) needed a 
maximum of about 1419 kg of wheat per year.  Again th s figure is too low because of the difference in 
weight between ancient and modern cultivars of wheat.  Taking the 281 kg/year figure (see above) and 
multiplying it by 6 yields 1685 kg/year; a number which divided by 30.86 kg (weight of 1 medimnos of 
wheat) amounts to just under 55 medimnoi a year.  Given that the original distribution of fifty medimnoi 
was to be in wheat, which is reasonably assumed from Bdelycleon expressing his frustration with 
distributions κατὰ χοίνικα κριθῶν, it seems extremely likely that 50 medimnoi represent  a reasonable 
estimate to allot to each individual citizen for himself and his family for a year.    
265 It is also entirely possible that the grain distributed was grown on public land in Euboea; see Walbank 
1991: 154.             
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back.266  The recuperation of property abroad meant real financial gains for wealthy 
Athenians in the form of rents and loans.  But for many others, the cleruchies were a 
significant source of trophe.  Andocides complains about these people, whom he sees as 
an obstacle to peace: “Thus even now some say that they don’t understand what sort of 
reconciliation it is if the city only gets walls and ships; they are not recovering their 
private property from abroad, and they cannot get th ir sustenance from walls” (ὅπου 
καὶ νῦν ἤδη τινὲς λέγουσιν οὐ γιγνώσκειν τὰς διαλλαγὰς αἵτινές εἰσι, τείχη 
καὶ νῆες εἰ γενήσονται τῇ πόλει· τὰ γὰρ ἴδια τὰ σφέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς 
ὑπερορίας οὐκ ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τειχῶν οὐκ εἶναι σφίσι τροφήν) 
(3.36).  Indeed, the recovery of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros in 387/6 and the cleruchies 
in Samos, Potideia, and the Chersonese later in the century afforded the Athenians 
significant and reliable sources of trophe.  With the build-up of their naval forces 
throughout the first half of the fourth century, the Athenians were able to secure those 
grain-producing areas and protect the grain-convoys that set out each fall from them to 
Athens; it was not until 340 when Philip captured the grain convoy did any one seriously 
oppose the Athenian thalassocracy.267   
Plato too weighed in on the debate about trophe in Book 2 of the Republic, where 
he implicitly criticizes the Athenians for succumbing to imperialistic modes of acquiring 
their trophe.  To facilitate their discussion of justice, Socrates suggests that he and his 
                                                
266 Hellenica 4.8.15; Andocides, On the Peace 15.  Harris 2000 has rightly questioned the authenticity of 
this speech, but the sentiment to recover the cleruhies is probably an accurate representation becaus the 
Hellenistic fabricator composed this speech by following authentic historical material from the period 
(500). 
267 See Garnsey 1988: 142-3, Sealey 1993: 91, 107-8, 188, and Whitby 1988: 123. 
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interlocutors examine a hypothetical city coming into being, where, he hopes, they may 
detect more easily the origins of justice and injustice.  Socrates asserts the principle that 
no person is self-sufficient; he requires “associates” and “helpers” to procure what he 
needs.  “Need” (χρεία), he explains, is the immediate cause of the polis’ existence 
(369b-c).  The first and greatest of needs is the procurement of food (ἡ τῆς τροφῆς 
παρασκευή), followed by the need for housing and clothing (369d).  Accordingly, the 
city of “utmost necessity” would consist of four orfive men: a farmer, builder, weaver, 
and cobbler (369d-e).  Socrates then elaborates upon the idea of the specialization of 
labor, which in his mind necessarily occasions further specializations according to the 
principle of “the multiplication of effects”: the farmer, for example, will not make his 
own plow or hoe, and consequently smiths and other craftsmen will be needed in the city, 
traders to procure materials for the creation of thse goods, more farmers to grow crops 
for the increased population, and so on (370c-371e).268   
“So where does justice and injustice reside in this city,” asks Adeimantus, “unless 
it is somewhere in one of these needs themselves (372a)?  Socrates responds by 
describing for his friends what Glaucon famously refe s to as “the city of pigs”—an 
idyllic city that succumbs only to satisfying its “necessary desires.”  For Socrates, people 
who reside in this city live in peace and have healt  (372d); in a word, it is a “healthy” 
(ὑγιής) city (372e).  But what Glaucon finds so offensive about this city is that it has no 
“luxuries,” that is, “to recline on couches…to dine from tables, and have relishes and 
sweetmeats such as are now in use” (ἃπερ νομίζεται· ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι 
                                                
268 Shorey 1930: xiv. 
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οἶμαι τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν, καὶ 
ὄψα ἅπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα).  The phrases ἃπερ νομίζεται and οἱ 
νῦν ἔχουσι reorient the discussion from the hypothetical city in speech to a luxurious 
city that has a real city as its model: Athens.  This city is the counterpoint to the healthy 
one because it is “feverish” (φλεγμαίνουσας), according to Socrates.  The image is 
gripping because the luxurious city, no longer confini g itself to necessities, requires an 
endless supply of refinements and concomitantly an exponential number of artisans, 
manufacturers, and artists who can produce them (373a-d).  The outcome of this process 
is that the population of the city will grow beyond what the territory can produce to feed 
it, and war becomes inevitable: “Then we shall have to cut out a cantle of our neighbor’s 
land if we are to have enough for pasture and plowing, and they in turn of ours if they 
abandon themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding the limit set by 
our necessary wants” (οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητέον, εἰ 
μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἕξειν νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὖ τῆς ἡμετέρας, 
ἐὰν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι ἀφῶσιν αὑτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες 
τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅρον) (373d; trans. Shorey).  The necessity of war leads to the 
creation of a large class of professional warriors who devote themselves to the protection 
of the city’s property and luxuries (374a).  The polis at this point devotes itself to an 
unjust militarism whose only salvation, according to Socrates, lies in a class of 
enlightened guardians who can educate the citizenry to, among other things, reject their 
unnecessary desires—the very cause of war and the polis’ injustice.   
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The therapeutic program Socrates sketches in the remainder of the Republic need 
not concern us here.  Of greater interest is Plato’s focus on trophe in determining where 
justice and injustice originate in the city.  Socrates concedes Adeimantus’ suggestion that 
justice and injustice reside in one of the three neds: trophe, housing, and clothing.  In 
their respective discussions of the city of pigs and the luxurious city, Socrates and 
Glaucon speak predominantly about food.  The apparent lack of “relish” in Socrates’ 
prescriptions elicits a quick response from Glaucon.  Socrates admits that he left out such 
savories as salt, olives, cheese, onions, etc., but these do not satisfy Glaucon, who 
demands more dainties.  He fixates on the luxurious world of the symposium; relishes 
and sweetmeats give way to myrrh, incense, prostitutes, and varieties of cakes (373a).  
For Socrates then trophe easily degenerates into ruphe, “luxury,” and it is truphe that 
precipitates an unsustainable population increase.  At this point, Socrates insists, the 
choice for the city is either poverty or war, and the luxurious city naturally chooses war 
as the means of securing its needs, both necessary and unnecessary.269  Though Plato’s 
analysis is more complex than Xenophon’s in the Poroi, both authors ultimately agree 
that “feeding” the mega, luxurious polis necessarily involves war, expansionism, and 
consequently the unjust treatment of one’s neighbors.270 
In the final analysis, the abundant historical evidnce and the testimonies of Plato 
and Xenophon illuminate clearly the motives of Athenian imperialism, compelling the 
                                                
269 Cf. Phaedo 66c.  For the connection between luxury and imperialism, see Herodotus 1.125-6; 5.49.4; 
9.82 and Thucydides 6.12.2 with Davidson 1990: 27 and Balot 2006: 158-9.  
270 The key difference is that Plato locates the underlying cause of imperialism in the desire for 
unnecessary luxuries, because satisfying these wants leads to an unsustainable increase in population.  
Trophe in Plato’s estimation is only the precipitating cause of imperialism.  Xenophon seems less 
concerned with luxury than we might expect (see, for example, Hellenica 6.2.6; Memorabilia 1.6.10; 
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interpretation that securing trophe for the demos was a significant factor in motivating 
Athenian aggression and expansionism in the fourth century.  This explanation of 
Athenian imperialism privileges the role of satisfyng basic physiological needs over 
gratifying psychological desires like fame and honor, which scholars have long assumed 
to be the underlying cause of Athenian imperialism.  It is helpful to recall Alcibiades’ 
manipulation of the ephebic oath, in which he asked the ephebes “to account wheat and 
barley, and vines and olive to be the limits of Attica.”  Alcibiades inspires his recruits 
with neither ideas nor abstractions and makes no appeal to their courage, honor, and 
fame.  Rather, he entices them with the promise of concrete material benefits gained from 
conquest.  For Alcibiades and a majority of Athenians, then, trophe and empire were 
inextricably connected.  That is not to say other economic and political factors did not 
contribute to Athenian expansionism and imperialism.  The economic benefits of empire 
went well beyond alimentary considerations, as Finley ably demonstrates.271  Moreover, 
as other commentators have emphasized, the poor were not the only ones who benefited 
from the empire.  The Athenians could never have maintained their empire in the fifth 
century nor regained it in the fourth without the consensus of a majority of Athenians.272  
                                                                                                                                      
Cyropaedia 8.3.40).  In fact, his plans for economic recovery depend on people having the ability to buy 
luxuries with Athenian silver (Poroi 4.7-9). 
271 Finley 1982: 57-60; cf. Rhodes 1981: 300-2 and Galpin 1984: 107.  Jones 1957: 5-7 (cf. Moore 1986: 
248-9 and Kallet-Marx 1994: 247-8) contests the idea that “democracy was parasitic on empire,” because 
political pay continued in the fourth century despite the loss of the empire, and “the Second Athenian 
League…was never a paying proposition, the contributions of the allies by no means covering the cost of 
military and naval operations.”  My discussion above about the reconstitution of empire in the fourth 
century speaks strongly against this argument; the Athenians received income from sources other than 
syntaxeis.  
272 This is essentially the argument of Raaflaub 1994 and 2004: 166-81; cf. Kallet-Marx 1994 and Balot 
2006: 163, 170-1.  On how the wealthy profited from e pire, see Andrewes 1978: 4-5, Davies 1981: 90, 
Ste. Croix 1981: 290, 604-5, Galpin 1984: 100, Carter 1986: 34-7, Strauss 1987: 51-3, Starr 1988: 123,
Schmitz 1988: 79-115, and Badian 1995: 81; cf. Davidson 1990: 28-9.  As demonstrated above, the 
wealthy owned substantial chunks of land in Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.   It must be stressed, however, 
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However, historians of Athenian imperialism cannot lose sight of the fact that Xenophon 
proceeds from the premise that trophe was an important if not the most important cause 
of Athenian imperialism, because he is resolute in his belief that providing the Athenians 
with sufficient trophe will eliminate in one fell swoop their need for empire.  This 
understanding of Athenian imperialism may not satisfy ome modern readers, but 
Xenophon certainly takes it for granted that his contemporaries saw the link between 
trophe and empire.  In the end, this is all that really matters.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined some of the major obstacles to my thesis that 
Xenophon composed the Poroi to wean the Athenians off empire by ameliorating the
long-standing poverty of the Athenian demos.  For many scholars, Xenophon’s intention 
to provide “sufficient trophe to all Athenians” is not a straightforward economic 
proposition but rather a political manifesto concering the remuneration of citizens for 
political activity.  I demonstrated that such a reading of the Poroi, which rests on the 
erroneous view that Xenophon used trophe and misthos interchangeably, is untenable.  
By the time he composed the Poroi, I estimated that the number of Athenian poor at or 
below the subsistence level was around 20,000, a full two thirds of the adult male 
population.  Many of these would have experienced fr quent subsistence or food crises.  
To compound the problems of the poor, the yearly grain output of Attica was insufficient 
                                                                                                                                      
that much of the grain produced in these islands wa earmarked “for the demos” after 374/3, and that te 
tax in kind was much more burdensome that it had been in the past.  According to Hobson, it is a truism 
that those who benefit the most from imperialism always pay the least when it comes to the financing of 
imperialistic policies (Hobson 1938: 94-109).  It must be remembered that strategoi and hipparchs did not 
get paid for their services, and that the wealthy, not the state, paid for most of the expenses in maintaining 
the fleet of triremes.  And as far as booty is concer ed, this technically was the possession of the stat  (see 
Pritchett 1991: 378-90) 
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to feed the total Athenian population.  Imports probably made up the deficit, but the 
funds to pay for these were not readily available from private and public domestic 
sources.  Feeling this demographic and economic pressu , the Athenians turned to 
imperialism to make up the shortfall in funds and with the monies derived from empire 
subsidized trophe-payments for the poverty-stricken demos.   
Nevertheless, I did not take it for granted, as does X nophon, that securing trophe 
for the Athenian poor necessitated empire, because the apologist interpretation of 
Athenian foreign policy has contested the very exist nce of an imperial Athens in the 
fourth century, which calls seriously into question Xenophon’s veracity as historian and 
political commentator.  I therefore devoted a signif cant portion of this chapter to 
substantiating the idea that Athens was a parasitic state in the fourth century.  If my own 
reading of Athenian foreign policy has a ring of apologia, it stems not from a desire to 
impugn the Athenians but from an aspiration to understand better this little, but 
significant text.  I now turn to an examination of Xenophon’s anti-imperialist economics. 
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Chapter 4: Xenophon’s Anti-imperialistic Economics 
[W]e are not concerned here with what belongs to the practical issues 
of political and economic policy.  It is the economic theory for which 
we claim acceptance—a theory which…dispels the delusion 




In the concluding pages of his brilliant chapter, “The Economic Taproot of 
Imperialism,” John Hobson asserts that every country whose land cannot maintain its 
population faces the same “choice of life,” in which it must decide between imperialism 
and territorial acquisition or the perspicacious improvement of “the political and 
economic management of their own land.”2  For Hobson, the latter specifically entails the 
“scientific” intensification of agriculture and industry, which “support[s] in progressive 
comfort and character a considerable population upon a strictly limited area.”3  This 
choice of life finds expression, albeit in a rudimentary way, in the ending of Herodotus’ 
History.  The historian recounts how after the Persian defeat of the Medes, one 
Artembares counseled the victors to remove themselve  from their “little rugged land” to 
the “better” Median territory.  When they presented his plan to Cyrus, the king said that 
if they so desired, “be prepared to become subjects and no longer rulers; for soft lands are 
wont to produce soft men; wondrous fruits and good warriors do not spring from the 
same land.”  When the Persians heard his reply, “they chose to be rulers living in a poor 
land rather than be slaves dwelling in a fertile plain tilling the soil for others.”  The 
passage is laden with irony because by the end of the work, the reader already knows that 
                                                
1 Hobson 1938: 91. 
2 Hobson 1938: 92. 
3 Hobson 1938: 92-3. 
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Cyrus and his successors ultimately rejected this advice.  The Persians did seek to acquire 
better lands.  For example, Herodotus claims that Xerxes initially had no desire to march 
against Greece (7.5.1), but Mardonius spurred him on by pointing out that “Europe is an 
exceedingly beautiful land that abounds in cultivated rees of every kind, is very fertile, 
and is worthy to belong to the king alone of all mortals” (7.5.3).  This information 
intrigues Xerxes: “I anticipate that we will gain glory and a land that is not lesser nor 
worse, but more fertile, than the land we now posses ” (7.8a2).4  Of course, Xerxes failed 
in achieving these objectives.  The ending of the History, then, functioned as a moral for 
the Athenians who had prevailed over the Persians: be content with the land you have; do 
not expand your territory at the expense of the defat d.5  
What Herodotus’ account lacks, however, is any positive counsel about what the 
Greeks or any people, for that matter, should do in the event they choose not to pursue 
imperialism and territorial expansion.  The choice is difficult, because, as we learn from 
Solon’s encounter with Croesus at the beginning of the History, self-sufficiency is 
unattainable for both individuals and countries: “it is impossible for a man to get at one 
time all good things together, just as no land is sufficient to produce all things for itself, 
but what one land has it lacks in another; and the land that has most things is the best.  
Indeed, not even a single human being is self-sufficient; for one thing it has it lacks in 
another” (1.32.7-9).  If no country is self-sufficient, and imperialism and expansionism 
                                                
4 Admittedly, I have simplified Herodotus’ narrative, concentrating more on the economic motives than te 
other ones the historian ascribes to Mardonius and Xerxes, namely, “revenge” (cf. 7.6.1)  But Evans 199 : 
17 argues persuasively that in Herodotus such “[a]lleged causes might serve very well as justifications, but 
they were not necessarily real causes.”  In his narrative, Herodotus challenges the pretext for taking 
revenge against the Athenians because he notes how Xerxes intends to subdue not just Athens, but all of 
Greece (7.138.1, 157.2).    
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are morally opprobrious and fraught with danger, it invites the question: what should a 
country do to provide for its citizens?   
As far as we can tell, no Greek attempted to solve this problem until Xenophon.  
In the Oeconomicus we see the first glimpse of a rejoinder to Herodotus.  Here the 
Persian king actually serves as the paradigm for the household manager of the dialogue, 
Ischomachus.6  The king provides trophe for his empire (4.6, 11) through extensive and 
intensive farming (4.8-11).  Through a system of rewards and punishments, he ensures 
that his satraps keep the lands and fields under cultivation and full of trees and crops so 
that they can feed a large population (4.8).  To those that cultivate the land well he gives 
additional territory to farm.  Similarly, Ischomachus learns from his father both methods 
of farming: “For he never allowed me to buy a well-cu tivated plot of land, but 
encouraged me to buy any that was uncultivated and unproductive because of the lack of 
diligence or the inability of its owners” (20.22).   
Socrates: Ischomachus, did your father keep all the plots of land he 
cultivated, or did he sell them if he could get a good price? 
Ischomachus: He would sell them, by Zeus, and he would buy another 
uncultivated plot immediately to replace it, because he loved working. 
Socrates: You are telling me, Ischomachus, that your father naturally 
loved farming as much as merchants love grain.  For because of their great 
love of grain, merchants sail wherever they hear the e is an abundance of 
it, so as to get it, across the Aegean, the Euxine, and the Sicilian 
Sea…(20.26-7).  
 
Ostensibly, Ischomachus’ father is like a grain-trader because he loves profit.  But 
Socrates’ comparison also serves to accentuate the xtentto which Ischomachus’ father 
will go to add land to his holdings.  The philosopher jokes with Ischomachus because he 
                                                                                                                                      
5 See How and Wells 1928: 337 and Fornara 1971. 
6 Pomeroy 1994: 240. 
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has a problem not with intensive, but with extensive cultivation, which may lead the 
entrepreneur to obtain holdings abroad.  Ischomachus’ reply (20.29) implies that such is 
not his intention, but because the chora of Attica has natural limits, his prescriptions are 
untenable without eventual territorial expansion.  Xenophon then seems to intimate what 
Hobson takes as a given centuries later: “a full simultaneous application of intensive and 
extensive cultivation is impossible.”7   
 In this chapter, I argue that the Poroi responds directly and proactively to the 
challenges of this ethico-political dilemma by advancing a viable alternative to the 
economics of imperialism and expansionism.  Remarkably, Xenophon does not begin 
where he leaves off in the Oeconomicus, exploring the potential of increasing food 
production through the intensification of agriculture.  Rather, he develops a scheme to 
expand and promote domestic industry and commerce th ough which significant amounts 
of revenue are to be created for the purchase of imported grain.  This plan to pay for 
imports with the annual proceeds generated, not from empire, but from Attica itself, 
marks a great transformation in Athens’ orientation away from a consumer-based to a 
producer-based economy.  In this chapter I do not examine the specific details of his 
proposals, a task I reserve for Chapter 5.  Rather, I investigate the ideological import of 
his views on war and peace and explain how his anti-imperialistic arguments further his 
economic and fiscal agenda.  Here I also aim to situate Xenophon’s ideas in the context 
of Athenian political and intellectual culture of the fifth and fourth centuries. 
In Section 4A, I demonstrate that Xenophon’s worldview flies in the face not only 
of Athenian imperialists but also of conservatives like Plato and Aristotle.  I frame my 
                                                
7 Hobson 1938: 92. 
 211 
discussion around the issue of self-sufficiency (autarkeia).  In that Xenophon promotes a 
policy of free and reciprocal commercial exchange as a means of acquiring trophe, the 
Poroi, I submit, occupies a conceptual and ideological sp ce between two competing 
views of autarkeia: the imperial (as practiced by the Athenians) and the Spartan (as 
idealized and promoted by fourth-century reformists, uch as Plato and Aristotle).  Here I 
also explore in particular Xenophon’s encomiastic, “ dyllic picture” of Attica, which 
exhibits many topoi of epideictic rhetoric, especially those used to characterize imperial 
Athens.  As we shall see, however, Xenophon invokes th  encomiastic rhetoric of empire 
only to call it into question, that is, he applies these topoi to his peaceful, commercial 
alternative to imperial Athens “to demonstrate that the city does not need an empire to 
survive.”8  
In Section 4B, I argue that Xenophon’s plan to encourage manufacture and silver 
mining is designed to turn Athens into a “producer ity.”  My interpretation thus calls 
into question Finley’s wholesale application of Weber’s “consumer city” model to the 
ancient world, as Xenophon aims to pay for the city’s substantial import bill not with 
revenues derived from the empire but with monies and goods produced domestically.  In 
the next section (4C), I digress to examine yet another example of Xenophon’s 
manipulation of imperial ideology: his providential argument to justify his new peaceful 
world order.  According to Xenophon, during the creation of the universe the gods 
purposefully allotted to the Athenians both native goods particular to Attica and a 
                                                
8 Dillery 1993: 2.  Dillery’s study of Xenophon’s manipulation of Athenian imperial ideology is 
indispensable to my analysis in this chapter.  However, at various points, my interpretation differs 
significantly from his, and I have examined other examples of Xenophon’s employment of the rhetoric of 
empire, which Dillery does not address.       
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geographic position suitable for exchanging these goods for needed imports.  In my 
judgment, he advances this argument to counter providential notions of Athenian 
imperialism, which ascribe Athens’ hegemonic positin to divine will.  For Xenophon, 
the ordering of the universe recommends that the Athenians should trade with the world 
and not wage war upon it.  Lastly, in Section 4D, I build a case that, unlike his Athenian 
intellectual contemporaries (especially Plato and Isocrates), Xenophon is a true-blooded 
anti-imperialist: in addition to opposing the imperial practices of his day, he objected to 
the very idea of empire.   
 
4A. Beyond Autarkeia  
The opening chapter of the Poroi is the linchpin of the work, because if 
Xenophon fails to convince his readers that the domestic resources of Attica can provide 
the Athenians with sufficient trophe, his entire anti-imperial agenda falls flat and along 
with it the possibility of a establishing a new world order based on the principles of peace 
and justice.9  Here also, perhaps more than anywhere else in his oeuvre, Xenophon offers 
his readers a unique glimpse of his Weltanschauung.  The main sections of this chapter 
(1.2-8), therefore, are worth quoting in full: 
(2) σκοποῦντι δή μοι ἃ ἐπενόησα τοῦτο μὲν εὐθὺς ἀνεφαίνετο, 
ὅτι ἡ χώρα πέφυκεν οἵα πλείστας προσόδους παρέχεσθαι. ὅπως 
δὲ γνωσθῇ ὅτι ἀληθὲς τοῦτο λέγω, πρῶτον διηγήσομαι τὴν 
φύσιν τῆς Ἀττικῆς. (3) οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τὰς ὥρας ἐνθάδε 
πρᾳοτάτας εἶναι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα μαρτυρεῖ· ἃ γοῦν 
πολλαχοῦ οὐδὲ βλαστάνειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἐνθάδε καρποφορεῖ. 
ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ γῆ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὴν χώραν θάλαττα 
                                                
9 Cartledge 1997: 227 aptly uses the phrase “a new world order” to describe Xenophon’s peace politics 
(see below, Section 4D).   
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παμφορωτάτη ἐστίν. καὶ μὴν ὅσαπερ οἱ θεοὶ ἐν ταῖς ὥραις 
ἀγαθὰ παρέχουσι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἐνταῦθα πρῳαίτατα μὲν 
ἄρχεται, ὀψιαίτατα δὲ λήγει. (4) οὐ μόνον δὲ κρατεῖ τοῖς ἐπ’ 
ἐνιαυτὸν θάλλουσί τε καὶ γηράσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀίδια ἀγαθὰ 
ἔχει ἡ χώρα. πέφυκε μὲν γὰρ λίθος ἐν αὐτῇ ἄφθονος, ἐξ οὗ 
κάλλιστοι μὲν ναοί, κάλλιστοι δὲ βωμοὶ γίγνονται, 
εὐπρεπέστατα δὲ θεοῖς ἀγάλματα· πολλοὶ δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ 
Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι προσδέονται. (5) ἔστι δὲ καὶ γῆ ἣ 
σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν, ὀρυττομένη δὲ 
πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σῖτον ἔφερε. καὶ μὴν ὑπάργυρός ἐστι 
σαφῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ· πολλῶν γοῦν πόλεων παροικουσῶν καὶ κατὰ 
γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν εἰς οὐδεμίαν τούτων οὐδὲ μικρὰ φλὲψ 
ἀργυρίτιδος διήκει. (6) οὐκ ἂν ἀλόγως δέ τις οἰηθείη τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος καὶ πάσης δὲ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀμφὶ τὰ μέσα οἰκεῖσθαι 
τὴν πόλιν. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἄν τινες πλέον ἀπέχωσιν αὐτῆς, τοσούτῳ 
χαλεπωτέροις ἢ ψύχεσιν ἢ θάλπεσιν ἐντυγχάνουσιν· ὁπόσοι τ’ 
ἂν αὖ βουληθῶσιν ἀπ’ ἐσχάτων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπ’ ἔσχατα 
ἀφικέσθαι, πάντες οὗτοι ὥσπερ κύκλου τόρνον τὰς Ἀθήνας ἢ 
παραπλέουσιν ἢ παρέρχονται. (7) καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε 
οὖσα ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται 
καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιθάλαττος γάρ ἐστι.  καὶ κατὰ 
γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπορίᾳ· ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν. (8) ἔτι δὲ ταῖς 
μὲν πλείσταις πόλεσι βάρβαροι προσοικοῦντες πράγματα 
παρέχουσιν· Ἀθήναις δὲ γειτονεύουσιν αἳ καὶ αὐταὶ πλεῖστον 
ἀπέχουσι τῶν βαρβάρων. 
 
As I was looking into the details of what I had proosed, I was 
immediately struck by the realization that the land is by nature well suited 
to provide a great amount of revenue.  In order that you may come to 
know the truth of what I am saying, I will first describe the nature of 
Attica.  First, the produce itself proves that the s asons here are the 
mildest; that is to say, the plants that cannot even sprout in other parts of 
the world bring forth their fruit in Attica.  The sea that surrounds Attica is 
just as exceedingly productive as the land.  Indeed, the very goods of the 
earth that the gods provide in their season, all of these begin here at the 
earliest possible moment and end at the latest.  Not only does the land 
excel in those things that bloom and decay on a yearly b sis but it also 
possesses imperishable goods.  For nature has implanted in the earth an 
abundant supply of stone [i.e. marble], with which people build the most 
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beautiful temples and altars and the most magnificet images of the gods; 
and both Greeks and non-Greeks are in need of it.  Furthermore, it is 
possible for our land not to bring forth its bounty when sowed, but when 
mined it feeds many times more people than if the same land produced 
grain.  Thus, it is plain to see that Attica is veined with silver because of 
divine ordering; for not even the smallest vein of silver ore extends to any 
of the states that border on Attica on both land ansea.  It would be 
completely reasonable, then, for someone to think that Athens occupies a 
position at the center of Greece or rather the entire inhabitable world, 
because the further away people live from it, the more they encounter 
rather severe weather conditions of cold and heat; and as many of those 
who wish to travel from one end of Greece to the other, all of them either 
sail or go past Athens as if it were a compass point f a circle.  
Furthermore, although Attica is not surrounded by the sea, it nonetheless 
is like an island in that the winds bring the goods that it needs and sends 
out the goods that it wants to export; for it has the sea on both sides.  And 
it receives many goods over land as well by commerce; for it is also part 
of the mainland.  Moreover, in most states non-Greeks live nearby and 
cause them problems; but those states neighboring Athens are themselves 
far away from non-Greek populations.       
 
What is so remarkable about this passage is that Xenophon believes the solution to the 
problem of feeding the Athenians lies squarely in the realm of finance, because “the land 
is by nature well suited to provide a great amount of revenue.”10  To prove this 
contention, he describes a tripartite physis of Attica, which corresponds to three revenue-
producing sectors of the Athenian economy: agriculture and fishing (1.3); quarrying and 
mining (1.4-5); and commerce (1.6-8).  Because he begins his discussion with 
agriculture, it is easy to overlook the largely fiscal orientation of the chapter.  Xenophon 
has no intention of recommending the expansion or intensification Attic agriculture to 
                                                
10 Sections 1 and 2 of the chapter follow a logical sequence; the phrase σκοποῦντι δή 
μοι…ἀνεφαίνετο hearkens back to Xenophon’s aspiration in the prologue σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ’ ἂν 
οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν.  To translate loosely: I have tried to consider whether the 
Athenian citizens could be maintained from their own domestic resources…and as I was considering this 
problem, the answer kept jumping out at me at once.  
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remedy the poverty of the Athenians, as one scholar suggests.11  Rather, he discusses 
agriculture since it is just one sector of the Athenian economy with revenue-generating 
potential.12  Von der Lieck rightly calls attention to the Oeconomica of Pseudo-Aristotle: 
“the most important revenue of a polis comes from the special products of the land, then 
revenue from markets and transit dues, and finally revenue from every-day 
transactions.”13  Interestingly, Xenophon treats each of these three sources of revenue in 
the Poroi (cf. 3.5; 4.40).  In particular, he privileges Athenian silver as a “special product 
of the land” because silver from the earth can “feed many times more people than if the 
same land produced grain” (ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σῖτον 
ἔφερε) (1.5).  Taken together, these three sectors of the Athenian economy have the 
potential of producing πλείστας προσόδους, if only the Athenians devote their 
energies to exploiting them effectively.  But what ppears “straightaway” (εὐθύς) 
obvious to Xenophon is lost on the Athenians.   
The reason for this disconnect it that Xenophon’s program is radically out of step 
with the views of his contemporaries on the question of how Athens should maintain 
                                                
11 Gernet 1909: 298. 
12 Because there was no direct tax on produce in Athens, Gauthier 1976: 54 contends that agriculture was a 
poor source of revenue, which explains why Xenophon d es not discuss it at length in the Poroi (cf. Isager 
and Skydsgaard 1992: 137-43 who question the assumption that the Athenians never levied direct taxes on 
agricultural produce).  But in Hiero 9.7-8, Xenophon explicitly states that increasing competition among 
farmers “would augment revenues” (αἱ πρόσοδοι αὔξοιντ’ ἄν).  In Cyropaedia 3.2.17-23 he notes how a 
state of peace occasions the expansion of agriculture, which, in turn, leads “to a greater increase in 
revenue” (πολὺ γὰρ ἂν αὐξάνεσθαι τὴν πρόσοδον)—a point Xenophon echoes in the Poroi about all 
kinds of revenues: “it seems clear that if the state is to receive all of its revenues (πᾶσαι αἱ πρόσοδοι), 
peace is necessary” (5.1).  Cf. Oeconomicus 20.22-6 with 11.9.  In my opinion, since Xenophon in these 
aforementioned passages is speaking prescriptively, not descriptively, Gauthier’s explanation is moot. 
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itself.  On the one hand, Xenophon’s unwillingness ven to entertain the expansion 
and/or intensification of agriculture in the Poroi must have shocked some of his readers, 
for whom agrarianism was the only kind of life worth living.14  Xenophon’s own keen 
interest in farming as evidenced in the O conomicus certainly would have added to their 
bewilderment.  Indeed, this lacuna has so puzzled scholars that some have made it the 
basis of their denial of Xenophon’s authorship.15  On the other hand, while Xenophon’s 
plan to feed the Athenians from their own public revenues would have made sense to 
many of his urban readers, nevertheless his claim that domestic revenues alone could 
sustain a population the size of Athens would have lso dumbfounded them because in 
the popular imagination only imperial revenues subsidized the civic misthoi through 
which the demos received its trophe.16  Xenophon therefore occupies a conceptual and 
ideological space between two competing views of autarkeia (self-sufficiency): the 
imperial (as practiced by the Athenians according to Pericles) and the Spartan (as 
idealized by fourth-century reformists, such as Plato and Aristotle).  
It is commonplace among classicists and ancient historians to maintain that 
autarkeia was the goal of every Greek polis, because self-sufficiency promoted freedom 
                                                                                                                                      
13 1346a 6-8: ταύτης δὲ κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γινομένη. εἶτα ἡ 
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων καὶ διαγωγῶν. εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.  Von der Lieck 1933: 26; cf. 
Gauthier 1976: 53. 
14 For example, those from rural Attica whom Thucydides mentions had a “hard time” moving into the city 
during the Peloponnesian invasion (2.14-16.2).  On the agrarian ethic in ancient Greece, see Hanson 1995. 
15 Jaeger 1938: 219, n. 14, Rostovtzeff 1941: 74, and Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979; cf. Giglioni 1970: l and 
Gauthier 1976: 1-2, 52.  Perhaps one could argue that Xenophon neglects agriculture because he wants his 
readers to consult works like the Oeconomicus for a fuller treatment on the topic.  Yet, if this were true, we 
should expect to find some kind of cue in the text itself, such as the one Xenophon offers his readers in On 
Horsemanship about the Hipparchicus (12.14).   
16 E.g., Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 24.3; Aristophanes, Wasps 698-721 with A scholium to line 684 
and Kallet-Marx 1994: 246-7.  
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and independence.17  Much of the evidence backing this claim, however, comes from the 
works of Plato and Aristotle.  To be sure, individual or oikos self-sufficiency was an ideal 
and a very old one at that, dating at least to the tim  of Homer and Hesiod, but no 
evidence exists to support the notion that the Greeks universally promoted autarkeia as a 
political principle.18  In fact, the historical sources allow us to draw the opposite 
conclusion, namely, that most Greeks thought that autarkeia was an impossible ideal.19  
The two notable exceptions to this rule were Sparta nd imperial Athens.  In order to 
understand the ideological import of Xenophon’s economic and fiscal program, let us 
examine in turn each type of autarkeia. 
Philolaconian thinkers during the fourth century promulgated the idea that the 
legislation of Lycurgus, especially his laws concerning the equal division of property, the 
common mess, and iron currency, made the Spartans “self-sufficient” (αὔταρκες) in 
both their private and public lives, by which they garnered “a lasting heritage of 
freedom” (πολυχρόνιον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν).20  Among these intellectuals are Plato and 
                                                
17 The idea is at least as old as Marx, Capital I.14.5 = Marx 1977: 487, n. 56); see also, for example, 
Rostovtzeff 1941: 249, 707, Will 1954: 19, Kitto 1951: 30, Ehrenberg 1960: 95-6, Adkins 1972: 144-6, 
Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 131-2, Polanyi 1977: 200, Loraux 1986: 87, 380, n. 46, Gauthier 1987-89: 
192-5, Runciman 1991: 352, Veyne 1990: 40-2; Rosivach 2000: 61, Scheidel and von Reden 2002: 3, and 
Raaflaub 2004: 184-7. 
18 Raaflaub 2004: 186.  For ikos self-sufficiency, see Hesiod, Works and Days 363-65, 394-400, 405-9, 
475-78, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 15-17, 41-3, 46, Tandy 1997: 216, 226-7, and Finley 1999: 34, 36, 
50, 109-10.    
19 See for example, Herodotus 1.32.7-9; Thucydides 1.120.2; Euripides, Suppliants 208-11; Old Oligarch 
2.3; Isocrates, Panegyricus 42; Aratus, Phaenomena 111-12; Agatharchides, On The Red Sea 49; Cicero, 
De Officiis 2.13; Manilius 1.87-8.  For scholars who question he ideal of self-sufficiency, see Andreades 
1933: 140, Wheeler 1955: 419, Burke 1992: 204, Hansen 2000: 18, Cohen 2000: 11-17, and Harris 2002: 
71. 
20 Polybius 6.48.3-7; Plutarch, Lycurgus 8.2, 31.1.  According to Walbank 1957: 734, Polybius draws from 
Ephorus for his praise of Spartan institutions in this chapter of his Histories, whereas his condemnation of 
Spartan foreign policy is likely to be his own.  Thus, the idea of Spartan autarkeia goes back at least to the 
fourth century. 
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Aristotle, who adumbrate a form of Spartan utarkeia in their prescriptions for the ideal 
state, as evidenced in their endorsement of such institutions as the equal division of 
property, common meals, and the limited use of money i  order to achieve this goal.21  
Because Plato and Aristotle were some of the most ntorious purveyors of the so-called 
Spartan “mirage,” it is difficult to determine the istorical reality of Sparta’s autarkeia.22  
Regardless, the Spartan ideal of self-sufficiency became a useful piece of propaganda in 
the therapeutic political programs of Plato and Aristotle.   
They both argue that no individual or household is self-sufficient, but by coming 
together to form partnerships (koinoniai) people exchange or barter the goods they need 
with those immediately around them.23  The polis is essentially a collection of such 
partnerships whose ultimate aim (telos) is to achieve autarkeia.24  The key question for 
Plato and Aristotle is what constitute the “needs” of the oikos.  Both fundamentally agree 
that “necessaries” (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα), such as food and clothes, should be the only licit 
objects for acquisition and exchange.25  These goods, the philosophers contend, should 
                                                
21 Wheeler 1955: 419-20, Popper 1962: 182, Morpeth 1982, Morrow 1993: 533-4, and Mayhew 1995.  For 
the equal partition of land, see Laws 737e; Politics 1329b36-30a25; common meals, Laws 842b; cf. 
Republic 416e, 458c; and Politics 1330a2-25; for coinage, see the references in note 29 below.  For Plato 
and Aristotle’s views on Sparta, see Morrow 1993: 40-63 and passim, Cartledge 1987: 402ff., Powell 1994, 
and Schütrumpf 1994. 
22 The term “Spartan mirage” is that of Ollier 1933; see also the articles collected in Powell and 
Hodkinson ed. 1994.  For the questionable historicity of equal land-holdings in Sparta, see Hodkinson 
1983: 378-86.  See Holladay 1977: 116 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 90 for Sparta’s abundance of 
necessities; Herodotus 7.147.2 and Thucydides 3.86.4 (cf  6.90.3); 4.53.3 mention grain imports to the
Peloponnesus but not specifically to Laconia.  The reason Sparta did not need to import grain is because 
they controlled two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, theso-called Lakonike land, which included the fertil 
Eurotas valley (Thucydides 1.10.2 with Hornblower 199 : 34; cf. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 179); much of 
this land, however, was gained through conquest.  For an excellent reassessment of Sparta’s apparent non-
usage of gold and silver, see Hodkinson 2000: Chapter 5.    
23 Republic 369b-c; Politics 1253a26-27 and 1257a1-31. 
24 Republic 369d and 373b; Politics 1253a1-2, 1280b35, and 1281a2.      
25 Republic 373b-d; Laws 704c; Politics 1256a20-56b40; 1257b12-15. 
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be obtained strictly from the territory (chora) of the polis itself, and consequently 
agriculture (both farming and animal husbandry) factors decisively in their ideal states.26  
The nature of the chora, Aristotle writes, should be “the most self-sufficing…such is that 
which necessarily is all-productive, for self-sufficiency means having at hand all things 
and lacking nothing” (αὐταρκεστάτην…τοιαύτην δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν 
παντοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες) (Politics 
1326b28-30).27  A principal factor motivating Plato and Aristotle’s promotion of self-
sufficiency is that deficiencies and surpluses necessitate trade—both long-distance 
(emporia) and retail (kapelike)—which in turn requires the existence of money to 
facilitate exchange.28  However, because money has a propensity to become an end in 
itself—and an end without a natural limit, they argue—they restrict its use in their ideal 
states and eschew the professions that employ it.29  In fact, both philosophers advocate a 
                                                
26 Laws 704d, 842c, and 847e; Politics 1258a40, 1328b6, 20; cf. 1318b7ff. (the best democracy consists of 
farmers).  
27 Mayhew 1995 argues that Aristotle’s view of self-su ficiency has more in common with Pericles’ 
imperialistic notion of autarkeia, because it includes “the ability to acquire goods from the outside.”  
However, this interpretation is entirely contingent upon Politics 1327a25-8, the only passage where 
Aristotle speaks of securing necessities from outside the polis.  The only way to resolve the contradiction 
between this passage and all the other ones quoted above is to distinguish between two kinds of self-
sufficiency: one in regard to living and the other in regard to living well (490-1; cf. Politics 1328b17; 
1326b8-9).  In fact, Aristotle criticizes Plato for not making this kind of distinction in Republic 369b-371e, 
where he describes “the city of utmost necessity.”  In Mayhew’s view, then, Aristotle deems a city that 
requires imports from abroad but promotes the “good life” self-sufficient, whereas the one that produces all 
of its necessities domestically but does not promote the good life (e.g., because it does not offer enough 
leisure time for its citizens to participate in politics) not self-sufficient; indeed, for Aristotle, such a city 
would not even constitute a polis (502).  I am inclined to accept this interpretation, but I would add that the 
overall impression one gets from reading these passages on self-sufficiency is that Aristotle is prefential 
toward the polis that does not require any imports from abroad.         
28 Republic 371c-d; Laws 679a-c, 704c-705b, 831e, and 919b; Politics 1257a30-1258a15.  See Knorringa 
1926: 102-39 and Morrow 1993: 138-48 for a fuller account of Plato and Aristotle’s attitude toward trade 
and traders.  
29 Laws 743c-e, 831c-e, 919d-20c; Republic 371c; Politics 1257a1-1258a18, 1328b6-23 (traders not 
mentioned in his list of six necessary occupations f r a city). 
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“closed society” as a political ideal, for an excessively large population would necessitate 
imports from abroad.30  Thus, they propose a variety of measures to restrict population 
growth.31 
While the Laconism of Aristotle and Plato was largely academic, there is some 
indication that their views found traction in conservative political circles.32  Fisher’s 
recent review of the evidence concerning the Athenian attitude to Sparta between Leuctra 
and the Lamian War (371-322) shows an increasing receptivity to the Spartan mirage of 
homonoia and eunomia.33  Invoking Spartan laws and institutions, especially those 
purported to be of Lycurgan invention, became a topos for conservative, reformist 
politicians who wished to “build a more disciplined, cohesive and even ‘moral’ 
Athens.”34  If Ephorus is the ultimate source behind the Polybius passage quoted above, 
where the historian praises Lycurgus for making the Spartans self-sufficient in both their 
                                                
30 Popper 1962: 86-201.  While I do not endorse Popper’s interpretation of Plato as a theorist of 
totalitarianism, he is certainly correct to see him as an enemy of the “open society,” hostile as he was to 
individuality, negative liberty, pluralism, and commerce (see Balot 2006: 203). 
31 See, for example, Republic 423a-b; Laws 740d-741a, 838e; Politics 1273a23.  The presence of an 
excessively large population (of both citizens and foreigners) was viewed as a particular characteristic of 
democracy (Politics 1320a17, 1321a1).  In general, see Popper 1962: 182, 295, n.7.  
32 It should be noted that most philosophical schools in the Socratic tradition, especially the Cynics, 
promoted the ideal of individual autarkeia for the philosopher.  For Socrates’ autarkeia, see Xenophon, 
Memorabilia 1.2.14 and Diogenes Laertius 2.24-28; cf. Plato, Philebus 60b.  The Cynic doctrine of 
autarkeia may have originated with Socrates (see Sellars 2003), but Antisthenes (Lovejoy and Boas 1935: 
119) and Diogenes (Finley 1969: 89-101) are often cr dited with its discovery (see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius 
6.78).  Many of the Cynic passages on self-sufficien y are conveniently collected in Lovejoy and Boas 
1935: 117-52.  While most Cynics seem to have promoted autarkeia as a goal for the philosopher, some 
Cynics like Crates (Diogenes Laertius 6.85) seem to have followed Plato and Aristotle’s lead in making t 
the ideal for the polis as well.  For earlier, Presocratic treatments of autarkeia, see Democritus DK B 209, 
246 and Hippias DK A 12.      
33 Fisher 1994.  Cf. Demosthenes 20.105-8 where the proponents of Leptines’ law banning exemption for 
liturgies and taxes invoke Sparta as an example of a well governed state that gets along nicely withou such 
exemptions.  
34 Fisher 1994: 382. 
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private and public lives, then it seems certain that e ideal of self-sufficiency circulated 
well beyond the philosophical schools during the middle part of the fourth century.35       
It is remarkable how much Xenophon’s program for reform contrasts with these 
Laconizing prescriptions of the day, especially given his reputation for being a 
Laconophile.  Recently, scholars have thoroughly refuted this cliché, but that is not to say 
he does not admire certain aspects of Spartan society and esteem individual Spartans like 
Agesilaus.36  The Lacadaemonion Politeia bounds with examples of Spartan laws and 
institutions of which Xenophon openly approves.  Like Plato and Aristotle, he seems to 
commend the common use of private property, the syssitia, and restrictions on the use of 
money (5.1-4; 6.3-5; 7.1-5).  Yet, when it comes to recommending reforms at Athens, 
Xenophon belies his supposed appreciation for the Spartan political-social system.  The 
conversation between Socrates and Pericles the Younger i  the Memorabilia evidences 
well Xenophon’s reticence to adopt Spartan institutions at Athens.  “What can the 
Athenians do,” asks Pericles, “to recover their forme  arete?”  Socrates suggests first to 
follow the practices of their Athenian ancestors and then, failing that, to imitate “those 
who are currently of the first rank” (τούς γε νῦν πρωτεύοντας μιμούμενοι) (i.e., the 
Spartans) and to practice their customs (3.5.14).  Pericles responds approvingly by citing 
a litany of Spartan customs, but he is incredulous as to whether the Athenians will be able 
to adopt them successfully (3.5.15-17).  Socrates’ r ply is telling because he does not 
indulge Pericles’ Laconizing interpretation of his wisdom.  For Socrates, Athens itself 
                                                
35 Cf. Ephorus apud Diodorus 7.12, where he ascribes Sparta’s loss of the hegemony to the abolishment of 
the Lycurgan laws, especially those concerning the use of money and private collection of wealth (see also, 
Xenophon, Lacadaemonion Politeia 14). 
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still affords a sufficient number of examples of virtuous conduct for imitation—examples 
not unique to the past but ones that are au courant (3.5.18-20).  The dramatic date for this 
passage, set sometime during the last years of the Peloponnesian War, explains why 
Pericles equates “those who are currently of the first rank” with the Spartans.  But the 
historical context of the dialogue is post-Mantinea, when the Spartans were anything but 
a people in the first rank.  Thus, the exchange is replete with Socratic irony, which 
Xenophon doses out masterfully to undermine the backw rd-looking, Laconizing agenda 
of Plato and his ilk.    
Though Xenophon in the Poroi does not offer his recommendations in the same 
spirit as Plato and Aristotle (viz. to offer a blueprint for an ideal society), he nonetheless 
shares the same philosophical interest in making Athens “better.”  As discussed in 
Section 2E, he is confident that the implementation of his financial schemes will restore 
not only justice to international relations but also arete to the Athenians: “Indeed, if the 
plans which I have proposed are carried out, I say th t the polis will not only be better off 
in respect to its revenues but also more obedient, disciplined, and successful in war” 
(πραχθέντων γε μὴν ὧν εἴρηκα [ξύμ]φημὶ ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον ἂν χρήμασιν 
εὐπορωτέραν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ 
εὐπολεμωτέραν γενέσθαι) (4.51).  However, to occasion this revival, Xenoph n does 
not advocate the ideal of self-sufficiency but rather economic interdependence.  Through 
a vibrant industrialism and commercialism, Athens uder his plan is to generate large 
                                                                                                                                      
36 See, e.g., Lipka 2002: 14; cf. Higgins 1977: 65-75, Tuplin 1993: 13, 31, 163 and 1994, Humble 1997, 
and Badian 2004. 
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amount of revenues to solve its social and politica problems. The phrase χρήμασιν 
εὐπορωτέραν responds directly to the claim in Chapter 1 that Attica is naturally suited 
to provide πλείστας προσόδους.  For Xenophon, trophe comes not directly from the 
land itself but from purchases from foreign producers paid for with increases in domestic 
income.  This arrangement flies squarely in the fac of the philosophical/Spartan ideal of 
autarkeia.37 
Let us flesh out Xenophon’s views on economic interdependence a bit further.  At 
1.7 he states explicitly that Athens has need for imports (πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί 
τε ὧν δεῖται), which are to be paid for with Athenian goods andcurrency: 
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις ἐν μὲν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων 
ἀντιφορτίζεσθαί τι ἀνάγκη· νομίσμασι γὰρ οὐ χρησίμοις ἔξω 
χρῶνται· ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν 
ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι, ἢν δὲ μὴ βούλωνται ἀντιφορτίζεσθαι, καὶ 
[οἱ] ἀργύριον ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐμπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν. ὅπου γὰρ 
ἂν πωλῶσιν αὐτό, πανταχοῦ πλέον τοῦ  ἀρχαίου λαμβάνουσιν.  
 
Moreover, merchants in most other cities feel compelled to ship a return 
cargo because the local currency has no value in other states.  At Athens, 
on the other hand, it is possible to export many goods that humans need, 
but if the merchants do not want to ship a return cargo, by exporting silver 
they practice good business sense; for whenever they sell it, they are 
bound to make more money on their investment anywhere else in the 
world (3.2). 
 
The many indigenous goods other people need are, presumably, those Xenophon 
mentions in 1.3-5: natural products of the land andsea, marble, and silver.  Xenophon 
privileges Athenian silver in particular as a medium of exchange, because he believes that 
                                                
37 Thiel 1922: 4, von der Lieck 1933: 26, and Gauthier 1976: 53 argue rightly (contra Herzog 1914: 477 
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silver from the earth can “feed many times more people than if the same land produced 
grain” (1.5).  
Furthermore, because Xenophon thinks that this abundant silver supply is unique 
to Attica (cf. “for not even the smallest vein of silver ore extends to any of the states that 
border on Attica on both land and sea”) and can be manufactured in great quantities (4.1), 
he is the first thinker to adumbrate the economic pr nciple of “comparative advantage,” 
the notion that a nation, state, or region has a distinct advantage over others in the 
production of a particular good.38  In order to ensure that the state gets the most fr m
their comparative advantage, he proposes to the Athnians that they not only reorganize 
and expand the mining industry but the commercial sector of the economy as well.  For 
Xenophon, mining and commerce go hand and hand.  A vigorous mining industry will 
produce a huge supply of money, guarantying every Athenian a daily triobolon, which in 
turn will attract money-hungry grain-traders to Athens.  The whole system is built upon 
the principle of supply and demand: Athens has a surplus of silver but a deficiency of 
grain; the rest of the world has a surplus of grain but a deficiency of silver (1.5; 4.8-9).  
And as long as Athens is tranquil, “what class of men will not need it?  Will not traders 
and ship-owners head the list” (5.3)?  In addition t  the growth of imports and exports, 
Xenophon also envisions rises in sales, rents, and t xes (3.5; cf. 3.13).  The net effect of 
all this is that state revenues will be “augmented” (αὔξεσθαι) (2.7; 3.6; 4.40, 49; 5.12).   
                                                                                                                                      
and Giglioni 1970: xlviii) that Xenophon does not endorse the ideal of autarkeia. 
38 The theory of comparative advantage was pioneered by Robert Torrens in his 1815 essay “On the 
External Corn Trade.”  He argued that it was to the advantage of England to trade sundry goods with 
Poland in return for grain, even though it might be th oretically possible to produce that grain more ch aply 
in England than in Poland.   
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It therefore appears that just as the function of oikonomia is “to increase the 
household by making a surplus” (περιουσίαν ποιῶν ἄυξειν τὸν οἶκον) 
(Oeconomicus 1.4), so the function of Xenophon’s political oikonomia is to increase the 
polis by making a surplus of revenue (5.2, 6.1).  Aristotle decries this very notion of 
oikonomia because he feels that the householder lives continuously “to increase his 
property with money to an unlimited amount” (αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν 
εἰς ἄπειρον).39  In fact, on the question of polis finance, Aristotle asserts that “those 
who throw their market open to the world do so for the sake of revenue” (οἱ δὲ 
παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου χάριν ταῦτα 
πράττουσιν)—a kind of financial policy that he thinks evinces “greed” (πλεονεξία).40  
Such criticism demonstrates clearly how fundamentally different Xenophon’s Athens is 
from the ideal autarkic poleis of Plato and Aristotle.  Giglioni is certainly correct to point 
out that Xenophon’s “open” Athens contrasts markedly with Plato and Aristotle’s closed 
societies.41  Whereas the two philosophers desire to limit population growth, Xenophon 
openly embraces it, for a large population contribues to Athens’ economic greatness 
(more below).42 
                                                
39 Politics 1257b38-41.  For Aristotle, increase becomes an end in itself and thus an obstacle to living the 
good life.  
40 Politics 1327a29-31.  Plato is also prejudiced to making money from custom dues (see Laws 847b and 
949e). 
41 Giglioni 1970: lv-lvi. Gauthier 1976: 52 objects to his comparison because Plato is concerned with 
nomoi, Xenophon with poroi.  Needless to say, Xenophon is also concerned with nomoi, because he states 
explicitly that his plans will be implemented by legislation (3.6).    
42 Interestingly, in the Hellenica, Xenophon represents polyanthropia as an obstacle to oligarchy (2.3.24).  
Here again, the old cliché that Xenophon was an oligarchic sympathizer is patently false. 
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Turning to the imperial notion of autarkeia, we find the earliest and clearest 
expression of it in the Funeral Oration of Pericles, who boasts that Athens is “the most 
self-sufficient” (αὐταρκεστάτη) polis (Thucydides 2.36.3).  Because Athens relied 
heavily on imported grain, Pericles’ use of the term autarkeia seems at variance with 
truth.  Yet, if we consider his remark in the context of aristocratic oikos ideology, as 
some scholars have suggested, the espousal of imperial Athens as the most self-sufficient 
city is not necessarily a contradiction in terms.43  The idea deserves scrutiny, especially 
when considered in light of the aristocratic Homeric o kos.  Indeed, the ideal of the 
Homeric oikos was self-sufficiency.  In practice, however, it was difficult to achieve, 
because most chieftains (basileis) needed precious metals and slaves, which were not 
readily available in all parts of the Greek world.44  Only two modes of acquisition were 
acceptable in the Homeric value-system: war/raiding a d gift-exchange.45  The former 
was the means by which the oikos largely satisfied its material needs, whereas the latt r 
was the primary mode of acquiring luxury goods, which served as “symbolic capital” for 
the household.  Such capital contributed to the power of the chieftain, who redistributed 
                                                
43 Loraux 1986: 87 and Kallet-Marx 1993: 19 speculate that Pericles is extending the ideal of the self-
sufficiency of the oikos to the polis but do not develop the idea; cf. Lowry 1987: 24 and Raaflaub 1994: 
110, who characterizes Athens as a “hero-city.” 
44 Finley 1978: 63-4 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 40-4, 203-4.   
45 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 42-3 and Seaford 1995: 19.  There were a variety of reasons why 
Homeric chieftains distained trade as a way to obtain these items, but procuring goods for the oikos through 
commercial transactions made the chieftain dependent on others, which therefore limited his personal 
freedom and compromised the autonomy of his household.  By contrast, obtaining goods through raiding 
and war did not diminish the freedom and autonomy of the chieftain because success in these enterprises 
depended largely on his arete as a warrior.   
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these goods to attract warriors from outside his kingdom who offered their service and 
loyalty to the king in exchange.46   
Yet what is integral to both forms of acquisition is the impulse of the chieftain, as 
head of the oikos, to appropriate goods and relationships external to the household and to 
integrate them into the oikos.47  In this respect, the Homeric economy (oikonomia) was 
essentially “anthropocentric” because it predicates man at the center of an administrative 
universe, not just any man, however, but the functio ally excellent man who improves 
the material condition of his oikos by means of his arete.48  And this form of “arete,” 
Adkins explains, “requires that one shall be willing to take risks to secure and increase 
the prosperity of the group to which one belongs.”49  Conceptually speaking, then, the 
oikos of the chieftain extended as far as his arete permitted.  For example, after Odysseus 
returns to Ithaca and kills the suitors, his first order of business, he announces to his wife, 
is to restore the economic integrity of the oikos: “look after the goods that I have left in 
my halls; as for the flocks which the insolent suitors have squandered, I myself will 
recoup many of these by making raids, the rest the Achaeans will give, until they have 
filled all of my folds.”50  Odysseus’ arete as a warrior enables him to plunder 
successfully the surrounding lands; his arete as a king guarantees that his subjects “honor 
him like a god with gifts” (Iliad 9.155, 297).  A later theorist calls this form of oikonomia 
                                                
46 For the term “symbolic capital,” see Bourdieu 1977: 183-97 and Kurke 1991: 36-8, 57-61 for its 
application in the aristocratic value system of arch i  Greece.  Cf. Seaford 1994: 21 citing Iliad 9.462-95.  
47 Finley 1978: 62, Seaford 1994: 21, and Tandy 1997: 101-6. 
48 Lowry 1987: 51ff, 268, n.14; cf. Sombart 1915: 172 who describes early “capitalists” in these very 
terms. 
49 Adkins 1972: 134. 
50 Odyssey 23.355-8.  Cf. 13.10-15 where Alcinous says that te Phaeacians will recoup the gifts they have 
given to Odysseus “by collecting them from the peopl .”   
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“kingly” ( βασιλική) precisely because its “power extends over everything” (αὕτη 
δυναμένη μὲν τὸ καθόλου) (Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 1345b20).  Viewed in this 
light, then, the Homeric oikos was self-sufficient as long as the arete of the chieftain 
remained functionally intact to appropriate the goods the household needed for both 
consumption and redistribution.51   
The Athenian empire was in some important respects analogous to the Homeric 
oikos. Indeed, the city too was at the center of an administrative universe and 
appropriated the goods of the world to satisfy its material and political needs.  Through 
the arete of their ancestors, argues Pericles, the Athenians received an empire, which the 
present generation has increased through toil.  Because of this empire, he adds, “we have 
provided the city with every resource so that it is he most self-sufficient in both peace 
and war” (καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς 
εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην) (2.36.1-3; cf. 2.41.1).  The Athenians acquired many of their 
possessions in war (2.36.4), but others “automatically” came to them as a result of their 
imperial power: “Because of our city’s greatness (τὸ μέγεθος) all the products of the 
world come to us, and we enjoy goods from abroad as though they were our own as much 
as our home products.”52  Athens’ “greatness” connotes euphemistically Athens’ 
imperial dynamis, which ensured that all the goods of the world flowed in one direction 
                                                
51 Conversely, notes Adkins 1972: 146, any curtailment of one’s self-sufficiency or freedom through a 
reduction in his property necessarily “reduced or abolished one’s arete.”  Self-sufficiency and arete, 
therefore, were inexorably linked. 
52 2.38.2: ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν 
μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἀνθρώπων.  For the translation of this passage, see Gomme 1956: 117. 
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only: to Athens.53  The Old Oligarch elaborates: “Whatever the delicacy in Sicily, Italy, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all of these things 
have been gathered together in one place on account of the Athenians’ rule of the sea 
(διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης).54   
Moreover, imperial Athens parallels the Homeric o kos in that goods from abroad 
were destined not only for consumption but also for redistribution.  In the same spirit as 
Pericles, who praises the “openness” of Athens (2.39.1), Isocrates extols the city for 
benefiting the world by establishing the Piraeus as an entrepôt:  
ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν οὐκ αὐτάρκη κεκτημένων ἑκάστων, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
μὲν ἐλλείπουσαν, τὰ δὲ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν φέρουσαν, καὶ 
πολλῆς ἀπορίας οὔσης τὰ μὲν ὅποι χρὴ διαθέσθαι, τὰ δ’ ὁπόθεν 
εἰσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ ταύταις ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἐπήμυνεν· ἐμπόριον 
γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατεσκευάσατο, 
τοσαύτην ἔχονθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὥσθ’ ἃ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἓν παρ’ 
ἑκάστων χαλεπόν ἐστιν λαβεῖν, ταῦθ’ ἅπαντα παρ’ αὑτῆς 
ῥᾴδιον εἶναι πορίσασθαι. 
 
Furthermore, because each of these states possesses land that is not self-
sufficient—one land producing a deficiency of goods, another bringing 
forth more than is needed—and because there was much confusion among 
those in these states about where they should dispose of their surplus and 
                                                
53 Loraux 1986: 86-7 argues that Pericles intentionally employs the vague term τὸ μέγεθος to disguise 
the fact that it was Athenian imperialism and not subsistence agriculture that was responsible for Athens’ 
autarkeia. 
54 Old Oligarch 2.7 (cf. 2.11-12).  See also Aristophanes, Wasps 520; Hermippus Fg. 63 (Edmonds): “O 
tell ye me know, ye Muses that dwell in Olympus exalted, what Dionysus hath shipped us from the day tht 
he took to the sea; silphium and hides from Cyrene, from the Hellespont everything salted, from Thessaly 
sides of good beef and wheatmeal as fine as can be.  And this from the land of Sitacles—a pox for the 
Spartan foe; and these from Perdiccas’ country—lies by the shipload or so.  From Syracuse swine and fine 
cheese—and Corcyra her navy abroad, because she won’t make up her mind, I consign to Thy mercies, O 
Lord!  So far so good; next, Egypt, now, sends paper nd sailcloth; Crete best cypress-wood for the shrines 
of the Gods; Syria incense sweet; Libya ivory sells us; Euboea choice apples and pears; dried fruits that 
flavor our dreams—these are the Rhodian wares; Phrygia sends us servants; Arcadia fighters for pay—
Pagasae, bondsmen branded to keep them from running away.  Paphlagonians succulent almonds send and 
chestnuts, to crown our feast, Phoenicians gay cushion  and rugs from the West, and dates and fine flour 
from the East.” 
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from where they should import, our city came to the aid in these 
unfortunate circumstances; for she established the Piraeus as an emporium 
in the middle of Greece, which has such an abundance that the goods 
which are difficult to get, one here, one there, from the rest of the world, 
all of these things are easy to procure at the Piraeus (Panegyricus 42). 
 
One tenet of Athenian imperial ideology was that Athens acquired its “friends not by 
receiving benefits, but by conferring them” (οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες 
κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους) (Thucydides 2.40.4).  Isocrates deploys this opos, arguing that 
the Athenians established the Piraeus not to remedy their own shortfalls but those of their 
friends.  Hence, according to Isocrates, it was not Athens but the rest of the world that 
had trouble achieving self-sufficiency.  The picture of imperial Athens is that of the 
Homeric oikos writ large: “final products, ready for consumption, were gathered and 
stored centrally, and from the center they were redistributed.”55  Interestingly, Finley 
calls the Homeric oikos “authoritarian,” because the chieftain was solely r sponsible for 
acquiring and distributing goods.  Indeed, by Pericl s’ own admission, Athens’ rule was 
“like a tyranny” (2.63.2). 
Returning to the Poroi, Xenophon contests this entire imperial notion of 
autarkeia, which entailed both the vigorous and even violent appropriation of resources 
from the periphery of the empire and their eventual redistribution to the margins of the 
world.  However, in “suggesting to his fellow-citizens that they should divert toward 
‘economic’ activities the spirit of enterprise and audacity which had characterized their 
political adventures,” Xenophon paints a picture of Athens that is astonishingly akin to 
that of the imperial city in the propagandistic representations of admirers like Thucydides 
                                                
55 Finley 1978: 62; cf. Polanyi 1977: 40-2, 170. 
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and Isocrates.56  Thus, we may wonder if he is ideologically closer to the world of the 
Athenian empire than he is to the ideal self-sufficient states of the philosophers.  Yet, if 
we recall Dillery’s thesis that Xenophon invokes the rhetoric of Athenian imperialism 
only to modify it and thus to call it into question, any confusion about Xenophon’s 
objectives should disappear.57  I wish to explore three prominent examples of this 
strategy.    
First, Xenophon advocates a policy of the “open” city, which makes its market 
and town available to the world.  Athens will be thronged not only with traders and 
shipowners but also with investors, artisans, sophists, philosophers, poets, and spectators 
(5.3-4).58  Xenophon’s remarks call to mind Pericles’ encomiu of Athens in the Funeral 
Oration.59  There he describes Athens famously as the “School of Hellas” to connote its 
greatness as an artistic and cultural center (2.41.1).  But as Dillery rightly notes, “the 
difference between Pericles’ vision of Athens and Xenophon’s is that for the former the 
city’s claim to be the education of Greece is based on her military power (δύναμις ΙΙ 
41.2) whereas for the latter it is an Athens at peace which will attract the world’s 
philosophers and educators.”60  Moreover, both Pericles and Xenophon “throw open the 
city to the world,” welcoming a large foreign population.  However, for Pericles, the 
imperial city serves as a “spectacle,” where subjects come to bask in the glory of the 
                                                
56 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 316. 
57 Dillery 1993: 2.  See, for example, Delebecque 1957: 475 and Cartledge 1997: 228 who mistake 
Xenophon’s rhetoric for an endorsement of imperialism.   
58 Cf. 3.11 and 4.12 on the participation of foreigners in the capital funds.    
59 Thucydides 2.38-39.1; cf. Isocrates, Panegyricus 40-50 and On the Peace 145; Plato, Protagoras 337d.  
Cognasso in Dillery 1993: 5, n.22 was the first to make this connection. 
60 Dillery 1993: 5. 
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imperial dynamis (2.39.1; cf. Isocrates, Panegyricus 41, 44-6); for Xenophon, foreigners 
come to Athens to work and make a profit (2.6; 3.2;4 49-50).  Athens’ polyanthropia has 
taken a remarkable modern turn in this thought, as Moyle appreciated well: “That 
admirable Maxim That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, consists in Numbers 
of People, well emply’d, is every where inculcated throughout the whole Course of the 
Treatise.”61  While some imperialists like Diodotus certainly recognized the value of the 
allies’ labor (Thucydides 3.46.3-4), such sentiments were overshadowed by the 
Athenians’ ability and willingness to liquidate whole populations of workers from time to 
time (e.g., Scione, Melos, Sestos).62  
Secondly, Xenophon’s characterization of Athens “as an island” (ὥσπερ νῆσος) 
is a topos of Athenian imperial ideology, expressed famously by the Old Oligarch and 
Pericles.63  But again, to quote Dillery, “Xenophon’s use of the image is subtly different; 
while Pericles and the ‘Old Oligarch’ deploy the topos in reference to Athens’ might at 
sea (N.B. Thucydides I 143.5 θαλάσσης κράτος, ‘Old Oligarch’ II 14 
                                                
61 Moyle 1697: 8-9.  The idea that wealth and population growth were interconnected underlies many 
assumptions of classical economics (e.g., labor theory of value); see above all Hume’s essay On the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations i  Haakonssen ed. 1994.   
62 Although I am not entirely convinced of the applicability of the psychoanalytic approach to ancient 
history, Sagan’s observations about genocide (viz. andrapodismos) in Greece are compelling (1991: 235-
9).  He perceptively notes that when the Greeks and especially the Athenians liquidated the adult male 
population, they forfeited serious monetary profits.  Destroying their “own property in a genocidal rage” 
constitutes a form of “moral psychosis,” the origins of which must be sought in the human psyche (239).  
Could the Athenians’ constant state of war with theworld (Isocrates 8.42 and Finley 1987: 67) have 
contributed to the retardation of their economy?       
63 Thucydides 1.143.5: “The rule of the sea is a great matter. Consider this for a moment.  Suppose that we 
were islanders.  Who could occupy a more impregnable position?  Now you must strive as closely as you 
can to this conception…” (μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν 
νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου); Old Oligarch 2.14-16 
with Gomme 1959: 461 and Dillery 1993: 4.  Cf. Hartog 1988: 202ff. who suggests that Herodotus’ 
description of Scythian nomadism evokes Pericles’ strategy to turn Athens into an island.  
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θαλασσοκράτορες), Xenophon describes Athens as an island in the context of 
merchant-trading.”64  To accentuate the difference, Xenophon says Athens’ “might” 
(κρατεῖ) (1.4) lies in its possession of indigenous goods, especially marble and silver, 
which, as we have seen, serve as mediums of exchange.  For Xenophon, then, power 
accrues to Athens from its robust commercialism not fr m its military might.  
Furthermore, the sea facilitates not only the spread of Athenian wares and silver but 
ultimately the aims of peace as well.  Just as Xenophon envisions a “universal peace” 
resulting from the implementation of his policies, so too he imagines a state of economic 
prosperity where all the peoples of the world desire Athenian goods.65  Peace and 
commerce go hand in hand in Xenophon’s thinking.  I will return to this point below.     
Lastly, Xenophon’s representation of Athens at the center of the world (τὰ μέσα, 
1.6)—“like a point of a circle” (ὥσπερ κύκλου τόρνον)—is yet another example of a 
topos borrowed from the world of the Athenian empire.  More so than any other image of 
the city, Xenophon’s understanding of Athens’ centrality poses the most direct challenge 
to Athenian imperial ideology, and therefore I would like to explore it in some detail.  In 
the passage from the Panegyricus quoted above, the orator asserts the geographic 
centrality (ἐν μέσῳ) of Athens and the commercial advantages that accrue from this 
position (42).  There Isocrates emphasizes the beneficiary role Athens plays by 
establishing the Piraeus as an e trepôt for the nations of the earth.  This seems to be a 
slight modification of the topos itself, which emphasizes how the imperial power ensure  
                                                
64 Dillery 1993: 4. 
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that the goods of the earth flow from the periphery to the center of the empire for 
consumption.  Such is the view of Pericles in the Funeral Oration and the Old Oligarch, 
but the idea seems to be older, as Herodotus was the first to deploy it to characterize the 
Persian Empire.  The historian singles out Darius specifically for siphoning off from the 
periphery the resources of the world (3.90-98).  In these sections, Herodotus describes the 
centripetal nature of his rule, calculating all theriches and luxuries Darius receives from 
his tributaries.  Elsewhere, he mentions how one of these tributaries, Babylon, supplies 
food for the empire: “All the land ruled by the great king is divided up for the 
provisioning (ἐς τροφὴν) of himself and his army, besides the tribute they owe; now the 
territory of Babylon feeds (τρέφε) him for four months of the year, while the whole rest 
of Asia for the other eight” (1.192.1).  Herodotus sardonically notes that Assyria, the 
richest grain-producing area of the world (1.193.2), does not feed the Persian people as a 
whole, but rather the king himself.  This remark serves to highlight the consumptive 
character of Darius and his empire.66    
                                                                                                                                      
65 See, for example, 1.4, 3.2, and 4.8 (quoted and discussed below).  Xenophon’s universalism is again 
expressed in the idea that Athens is not just at the center of Hellas, but of “the entire world.”     
66 Herodotus’ characterization of the Persian Empire is taken over by Plato in Critias 113bff. and 
Aristophanes in Birds, who both seem to be implicitly critiquing the Athenian empire.  In Plato, for 
example, the island of Atlantis is conceived of as a circle with the main island occupying the center.  Here 
is the seat of the kingdom, from which the royal family control the outlining islands.  “For because of their 
empire,” explains Plato, “many goods come to them from abroad” (114e).  In the Birds, Cloudcuckooland 
occupies the middle space between heaven and earth (187, 550-2; cf. 1004), where Euelpides and 
Peisthetairos set up their empire (508) to prevent the flow of goods (i.e. sacrifices) to the gods unless they 
pay them tribute (186-93) (see Konstan 1997 who reads the play as a commentary on Athens’ “will to 
power”).  For imperial ideologues like Pericles, such parasitic practices are not contemptible, as Herodotus 
intimates, but sources of pride.  Aelius Aristides, in his Roman Oration, took the topos to a new level when 
he praises Rome as the “common market of the world.”  “Cargoes from India and, if you will, even from 
Arabia the Blest,” he boasts, “one can see in such numbers as to surmise that in those lands the treeswill 
have been stripped bare and the inhabitants of those lands, if they need anything, must come here and beg 
(μεταιτήσοντας) for a share of their own” (7, 12).  In other words, the people on the periphery of the 
Roman Empire are compelled to come to Rome to plead for a share of the very goods which the Romans 
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That Xenophon conceives of empire in these very terms is evidenced in his 
treatment of the Persian Empire in the Cyropaedia.  Xenophon emphasizes how Cyrus 
the Elder occupies a position “in the center” (ἐν μέσῳ) of his empire and receives from 
the cities of the periphery “whatever fine thing they have in their land, whether it is 
grown, raised, or manufactured” (ὅ τι καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἢ φύοιτο ἢ 
τρέφοιτο ἢ τεχνῷτο) (Cyropaedia 8.6.22-3).67  However, unlike the Darius in 
Herodotus’ portrayal, Cyrus does not just consume the goods from the periphery (e.g., 
8.2.4-5), but he also redistributes them to those in need: “every private individual thought 
he would become rich if he would do something to please Cyrus; for Cyrus took from 
each those goods of which the givers had an abundance d gave in return goods that he 
perceived they lacked” (8.6.23).  Xenophon’s portrait of Cyrus’ empire as a locus of 
consumption and redistribution, then, corresponds to the idealized picture of the Athenian 
empire in the Panegyricus of Isocrates.  
Xenophon’s employment of the topos of Athens’ centrality, therefore, 
demonstrates his readiness not only to appropriate the language of Athenian imperial 
ideology, but also to subvert it in an effort to persuade his audience that empire is not 
necessary for their survival.  Rather than indulge the Athenians and foster the notion of 
Athens as a center of imperial consumption and decadence, Xenophon aims to turn the 
                                                                                                                                      
despoil from their lands.  This same dynamic was also operating in Athens during the fifth century, as 
evidenced by the Second Methone Decree (426), which re ords how subject states were required to come t 
Athens to request the right to import grain from Byzantium, which was under Athenian control and 
management (IG I3 61, 34-31 = ML 65; cf. IG I3 62 and 63; cf. Old Oligarch, Athenaion Politeia 2.11-13 
and Isocrates 8.36).66  The Athenians published the decree on an ornate stel , which depicts a seated 
Athena in a gesture of dexiosis with Artemis (the patron goddess of Methone), which speaks to the level of 
conceit they took in having subservient allies.  I intend to treat this theme in a future work.   
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city into a commercial and productive hub, which sends out merchandise and goods from 
the center of the world to the periphery.  Xenophon’s Athens is the antithesis of empire 
because it gives something back to the world, not go ds that originate in the periphery, 
and which are then redistributed from the center, but goods that are produced at the center 
and fulfill the needs of all peoples: both “Greeks and barbarians need” (προσδέονται) 
Athens’ “imperishable stone” (1.4); “people” (ἄνθρωποι) generally “have need” 
(δέωνται) of Athenian goods (3.2); and “whenever states are doing well, people have a 
strong need for silver” (ὅταν γε εὖ πράττωσιν αἱ πόλεις, ἰσχυρῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι 
ἀργυρίου δέονται) (4.8).  To gratify the people of the periphery even further, 
Xenophon guarantees the traders who exchange their goods for Athenian silver a 
substantial profit from their transactions (3.2) and opens the mining industry to foreign 
investment (3.11) and exploitation (4.12).  For Xenophon, commerce is not zero-sum—a 
view often held in Greece—but rather an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of 
friendship between states.68  In fact, under his plan for the exploitation of the mines, the 
periphery, not the center, will become the locus of luxurious consumption, because “men 
[sc. of other poleis] want to spend [Athenian] money on fine arms, good horses, and 
magnificent houses and buildings, whereas women desire xpensive clothes and gold 
jewelry” (4.8).  One of Xenophon’s greatest innovations, then, rests in his belief that “the 
                                                                                                                                      
67 Cf. Agesilaus 8.6-9.5 where Xenophon describes the unnamed Persian king in similar terms and 
contrasts him with the behavior of Agesilaus. 
68 Runciman 1990: 351.  The idea that commercial exchange was zero-sum for the Greeks is evidenced 
from the age of Homer (Tandy 1997: 137) down to Aristotle (Schofield 2000: 337) (cf. Weber 1927: 356). 
For Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations IV.3.c9 (= Smith 1981: 493), commerce creates a “bond of union and 
friendship” among individuals and nations.      
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way to prosperity lay in interdependence and in the expansion, not the contraction, of 
trade and technology.”69   
 
4B. The Rise of the Producer City 
It is important to stress how radical Xenophon’s viion of a productive Athens 
was at the time and, indeed, in antiquity.  As a basis of comparison, Dio Chrysostom’s 
discourse On Wealth is instructive.  Like Xenophon, Dio is vexed by the parasitic nature 
of empire.  But unlike the empires of past that plundered the periphery to obtain 
commodities, Dio laments that the Romans buy their luxuries from the ends of the world 
with Roman silver and gold, which precipitates an exodus of currency from Rome to the 
periphery of the empire (79.5-6).  Dio likens this movement of specie away from Rome 
as a form of “tribute” the Romans are compelled to pay because of their slavish devotion 
to foreign luxuries.70  Nevertheless, as Finley correctly points out, “[n]o economic 
analysis or economic program followed [sc. from this critique], either in the moralist 
writings or in practice, private or in public.”71  The kind of “economic” analysis of which 
Finley is thinking is the one that the English historian Winwood Reade provided in 1871: 
As London is the market of England, to which the best of all things find 
their way, so Rome was the market of the Mediterranean world; but there 
was this difference between the two, that in Rome the articles were not 
paid for.  Money, indeed, might be given, but it was money which had not 
been earned, and which therefore would come to its end at last. 
Rome lived upon its principal till ruin stared it in the face.  Industry is the 
only true source of wealth, and there was no industry in Rome.  By day the 
                                                
69 Wheeler 1955: 419 ascribes this sentiment to an anti-aristocratic, pro-commercial ideology that 
developed in the Archaic age.  This may be true, but Xenophon is the first author who actually articulates 
it. 
70 Cf. Pliny the Elder, Natural History 12.84 who claims that the luxuries from India, China, and Arabia 
alone cost the Romans 100 million sesterces a year,and Strabo 2.5.12.  
71 Finley 1999: 132. 
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Ostia road was crowded with carts and muleteers, carying to the great city 
the silks and spices of the East, the marble of Asia Minor, the timber of 
the Atlas, the grain of Africa and Egypt; and the carts brought nothing out 
but loads of dung.  That was their return cargo.  London turns dirt into 
gold.  Rome turned gold into dirt.72          
 
The image, perhaps, is a bit hyperbolic, but Reade’s analysis contributes to our 
understanding of the Poroi because it underscores nicely the fundamental difference 
between a parasitic, consumer-based economy and one based on production.  According 
to Reade, money has to be “earned,” which means it must be first invested in productive, 
economic enterprises like industry, which in turn ceates the necessary capital to pay for 
imports.  Even if huge amounts of money leave a country, the “real” wealth of the nation 
remains in the form of “fixed” capital (buildings, roads, machinery, etc.).  Writing a 
generation later, Weber and Sombart defined manufacturing centers, such as London, 
“producer” cities, because they paid for necessities with income derived from industry 
and commerce.  The ancient city, they argue, was largely a “consumer” city, because it 
paid for necessities not with money derived from urban production but with money 
derived from rents and taxes on those who worked in the hinterland, which the city 
dominated politically.  Sombart explains: “By a consumption city I mean one which pays 
for its maintenance…not with its own products, because it does not need to.  It derives its 
maintenance rather on the basis of a legal claim such as taxes or rents, without having to 
                                                
72 Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom of Man: Chapter 4 (Web Text).  I cannot help but think of h w 
Reade’s image of gold coming into the city and dung leaving is evocative of  the mass exodus of trash on 
floating barges from New York city.  Also, the literal export of trash from the U.S., especially in the form 
of hazardous electronic wastes to China, Pakistan and India, demonstrates well the lapse in the productive 
output of the U.S. economy.    
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deliver return values.”73  These exchanges of goods and services were non-reciprocal, 
whereas those between a producer city and the hinterla d were reciprocal in that both 
parties profited from the relationship.74  According to one scholar, “the reciprocity or 
non-reciprocity of economic relationships…is at theheart of the debate concerning the 
consumer vs. producer city.”75   
The notion of a “consumer” city has found favor in many scholarly treatments of 
the ancient economy, especially those of Finley and his followers.76  Consequently, the 
idea has drawn a considerable amount of controversy among modernists and formalist 
historians.77  This is not the place to address all the complexities of the debate, but one 
major shortcoming of the model is that it concentrates exclusively on the economic 
relationship between town and country and therefore fails to explain adequately 
economies like that of Athens, which obtained most f its necessities not from its 
hinterland but from imports abroad.  Recently, Erdkamp argues persuasively that the 
model of the consumer city is viable as long as it is expanded to include external 
economic relationships between cities.78  In particular, he suggests that it must 
accommodate the imperial city whose political hinterland extends beyond its territory.  
But what remains essential to the model, in any case, is the notion that the consumer city 
                                                
73 Sombart, Modern Capitalism quoted in Finley 1999: 192.  For Weber’s discussion of consumer and 
producer cities, see Economy and Society, Chapter 16.2 (= Weber 1978: 1215-7); for Sombart and Weber’s 
contribution to the study of the ancient economy, see Vidal-Naquet and Austin 1977: 5-7; Finley 1982: 11-
18 and 1985: 88-103.  
74 The reciprocity involved in these exchanges was first noted by Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations 
3.1.1 (= Smith 1981: 376). 
75 Erdkamp 2001: 343. 
76 Finley 1999: 123-49, 191-6, Hopkins 1978: 72-7, Garnsey and Saller 1987: 48-9, 55-8, 97-100, Veyne 
1990: 38-40, Hansen 2000: 156-61, Erdkamp 2001, and the citations in Andreau 2002: 42. 
77 See the works cited in Erdkamp 2001: 336, n. 8 and Morely 1996; cf. Shipton 2000: 2-5. 
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feeds itself on the basis of non-reciprocal relationships with agricultural producers.79  In 
other words, an imperial city exemplifies the consumer model if it draws resources from 
producing parts of the empire by way of taxes, levies, rents, and tribute.  Defined in these 
terms, it is indisputable that imperial Athens was a consumer city.  As discussed in the 
last chapter (Section 3D), a wide variety of sources attest to the fact that Athens paid for 
most of its grain imports with revenue derived from e pire.  No clearer example of this 
phenomenon can be offered than Ps.-Aristotle’s comment that “the combined proceeds 
from the tributes and the taxes and the allies served to feed more than twenty thousand 
men” (Athenaion Politeia 24.3).   
The key question, then, for our discussion is to which of these two competing 
models of the city does Xenophon’s Athens correspond.  Although the city of the Poroi is 
decidedly the antipode of the parasitic imperial city, it nonetheless would be a mistake to 
conclude that it must therefore conform to the producer city type without first 
establishing the precise nature of the exchanges Xenophon envisions between the city and 
agricultural producers.  In other words, does Xenophon predicate his economics upon an 
understanding of reciprocity that profits both parties in an exchange?  If one relied on the 
insights of the Poroi’s commentators, it would seem that the city’s economy is not based 
on reciprocity because it is fiscally oriented.80  For example, Schütrumpf asserts: 
“Xenophon is not concerned with the establishment of pr ductive industry so that the 
maintenance of the population is guaranteed with necessary goods or so that Athens has 
                                                                                                                                      
78 Erdkamp 2001: 342. 
79 Erdkamp 2001: 346. 
80 Von der Lieck 1933: 26, 37, Gauthier 1976: 19, 54, 238-41, and Schütrumpf 1982: 3-8. 
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something to give in exchange for its imported wares, but rather it is a question of 
revenues.  His interest is in political finance, not p litical economy, in finance, not 
economics.”81  To be sure, Xenophon aims to feed the Athenians with revenues derived 
from the metics, trade, and the mines, a plan that has led some historians to deem his city 
a “rentier” state.82  Yet, to equate this type of alimentary policy with the model of the 
consumer city is an example of missing the forest through the trees.   
As pointed out above, Xenophon guarantees that Athens will give something back 
to those living on the periphery for the grain she imports.  Some traders will choose to 
purchase Athenian wares and goods but many will depart Athens with a return cargo 
consisting only of Athenian money, because “whenever and wherever they sell it, they 
will make a profit on their investment” (3.2).  Xenophon clearly envisions that these 
exchanges will be reciprocal.  Furthermore, the money used to pay for these imports is 
not only a manufactured good but also commodity itself (cf. καὶ [οἱ] ἀργύριον 
ἐξάγοντες καλὴν ἐμπορίαν ἐξάγουσιν), no different from the other indigenous 
products suitable for export (1.3-4).  Considering the attention Xenophon devotes to the 
mining industry, one cannot but think that without the intensification and expansion of 
production his entire plan for supplying the Athenians with trophe would have been 
untenable.  Athens’ export economy under Xenophon’s plan, then, is just as important 
                                                
81 Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5; cf. Giglioni 1970: lxix. 
82 Schwahn 1931: 253, von der Lieck 1933: 13-8, 24, Bolkestein 1958: 146, and Doty 2003: 8; cf. Gauthier 
1976: 248-51 who rejects the notion of the rentier-state only in so far as it is predicated upon an economic 
reading of the Poroi, to which, as we have seen (Chapter 3, Section 3A), he objects. 
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fiscally as its import economy, which presupposes that the city has raw goods and 
manufactured wares to send abroad (1.7; 3.5).83   
Nevertheless, Finley staunchly asserts that Xenophon is thinking of “manufacture 
only for the local market.”84  This interpretation, however, contradicts his reading of 3.2, 
which he cites to demonstrate that Athens paid for its “impressive” import bill with the 
silver from Laurion.85  To deny or diminish the crucial role the mining idustry plays in 
the Poroi as a productive manufacture is to make a major inte pretive and methodological 
misstep.  Finley’s analysis typifies the scholarship on the Poroi, which for too long has 
interpreted the work simply as a mirror of Athenian economic values and practices.  Yet, 
by all accounts, the mines during the first half of the fourth century were operating far 
below their potential, and thus domestic silver production did not in any significant way 
cover the large import bill when Xenophon was composing the Poroi.86  There are many 
reasons for this, but the one that has the most explanatory power is the parasitic character 
of the Athenian imperial economy.  As long as the empire was a paying proposition, the 
Athenians did not need to exploit the mines intensively or extensively.  On the one hand, 
then, the Poroi validates the model of consumer city, but only in so far as it applies to 
imperial Athens, which is the target of Xenophon’s criticism.  On the other hand, the text 
seriously calls into question the blanket application of the consumer city model to all 
cities of the ancient world, real or imagined.   
                                                
83 In the next chapter (Section 5A), I explore furthe this sector of the Athenian economy in my 
examination of the metics.   
84 Finley 1999: 135 (emphasis mine). 
85 Finley 1999: 134.    
86 See Chapter 5, Section 5D. 
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No better proof can be offered in support of this claim than Xenophon’s 
discussion of the expansion of the mining district itself, which seriously challenges David 
Hume’s notorious dismissal of ancient manufacture: “I do not remember a passage in any 
ancient author where the growth of a city is ascribed to the establishment of a 
manufacture.”87  To the contrary, the exploitation of the mines under Xenophon’s 
program will occasion the birth of a new polis itself: 
Οὐ τοίνυν μόνον ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων ἀποφορὰ τὴν 
διατροφὴν τῇ πόλει αὔξοι ἄν, ἀλλὰ πολυανθρωπίας περὶ τὰ 
μέταλλα ἁθροιζομένης καὶ ἀπ’ ἀγορᾶς τῆς ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀπ’ οἰκιῶν 
περὶ τἀργύρεια δημοσίων καὶ ἀπὸ καμίνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων πρόσοδοι ἂν πολλαὶ γίγνοιντο. ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ 
πολυάνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο πόλις, εἰ οὕτως κατασκευασθείη· καὶ 
οἵ γε χῶροι οὐδὲν ἂν εἶεν μείονος ἄξιοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις 
ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἄστυ.  
 
The rent derived from the slaves would not only increase the alimentary 
support for the city, but if a large amount of peopl  were concentrated in 
the mining district, many revenues would also accrue from the 
marketplace there, from the public housing near the mines, from the 
furnaces, and from all other sources like these.  For an exceedingly 
populous city would come into being there, if it were managed in this way; 
and the estates there would become no less valuable to th ir owners there 
than those estates in the suburbs of Athens (4.49-50). 
 
Although some scholars may not classify this settlement as a polis, because it does not 
meet certain modern definitional requirements, it nonetheless does constitute a polis from 
Xenophon’s perspective;88 for this populous city has a fortified urban center (cf. 4.43-4) 
                                                
87 Finley quotes this passage approvingly twice in The Ancient Economy (1999: 22, 137; cf. Cartledge 
2002b: 26). 
88 Thiel 1922: 32, Lauffer 1955-6: 19, n.1, Gauthier 1976: 188-9, and Schütrumpf 1982: 171 consider this 
polis not a city-state but a town.  According to Hansen 2000: 158, “in Archaic and Classical sources th  
term polis used in the sense of town to denote a named urban center is not applied to just any urban center, 
but only to a town which was also the political centr  of a polis [viz. a state].”  The standard “minimalist” 
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with an agora and a kind of hinterland comprised of landed estates, some of which may 
have produced wine and grain for the town itself.89  In any case, without the 
intensification and expansion of the mining industry, Xenophon intimates that not only 
would this virtual polis not grow into a bustling and populous city but that it would not 
even come into being in the first place.  This is proof positive that at least one ancient 
author ascribed the growth and development of a city to the establishment of a 
manufacture. 
Xenophon’s suggestion to invest significantly in the mining industry not only 
represents a radical shift away from a consumer-based to a producer-based economy, but 
it also marks a fundamental change in the Greek attitude to money.  For Xenophon, 
Athens’ prosperity lies not within its stores of surpl s monies, though this is important 
(6.1), but in its ability to pay for what she needs with the annual produce of the country, 
which represents the true wealth of the state.  This notion, of course, is one of the central 
tenets of classical economics.  To quote Adam Smith, who famously distinguishes money 
from wealth: “It would be too ridiculous to go about to prove, that wealth does not 
consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable 
only for purchasing.  Money, no doubt, makes always  part of the national capital; but it 
                                                                                                                                      
definition of the polis qua state, which originates with Weber, is an institution endowed with sufficient and 
legitimate authority to enforce laws in a territory and over a population (see Hansen 2000: 13).  In general, 
Hansen and those associated with the Copenhagen Polis roject (as Aristotle before them) tend to 
emphasize the political dimension of the polis, to the exclusion of other considerations like territoriality and 
space (see Hölkeskamp 2004), religion, and economics (though see Hansen 2000: 168-70).  Xenophon’s 
use of the term “polis” in 4.49-50, then, undermines Hansen’s claims that the Classical sources apply the 
term only “to a town which was also the political centre of a polis.”        
89 See 4.45 with Gauthier 1976: 182-3.  For the importance of a walled urban center with a hinterland for 
the Greek polis, see Hansen 2000: 152-6.  It is notew rthy that Xenophon uses the noun πολυανθρωπία 
and the adjective πολυάνθρωπος only in regard to poleis (Hellenica 5.2.16; Anabasis 2.4.13) and, most 
notably, to Athens itself (Hellenica 2.3.24).       
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has already been shown that it generally makes but a small part, and always the most 
unprofitable part of it.”90  The idea that wealth and money are not synonymous is 
apparent throughout the Poroi.  The goal of Xenophon’s economics is not just to create a 
surplus of money to be stashed away for emergency expenditures but rather to be 
invested in labor, commerce, industry, and infrastructure.  “When start-up capital is 
sufficient,” Xenophon argues, “it would be fine and good to build for ship-owners inns 
around the harbors in addition to the current ones, and it would also be good to construct 
for emporoi places suitable for buying and selling and public inns for visitors; and if you 
were to erect houses and shops for the retailers both in the Piraeus and in the city, they 
would be an ornament to the city, and much revenue would be generated from them” 
(3.12-3).  In addition to public housing, the polis will also use surplus monies to buy 
merchant vessels and, most importantly, slaves for the mines (3.14; cf. 4.35).  By leasing 
these out, the state will generate even more income, ut of which it will reinvest part for 
the purchase of additional slaves and, presumably, more ships and buildings (4.23-4).  
Moreover, Xenophon promises that with the expansion and intensification of the mining 
industry in Laurion, those who own estates (χῶροι) in the region will also find their 
land-values increasing to the same levels as those who own land in the suburbs of Athens 
itself (4.50).  Xenophon thus envisions a rise in both public and private fortunes!  
Xenophon’s thoughts on war finance further evidences this reorientation in values 
toward money.  Again, the views of Adam Smith offer an enlightening comparandum. In 
                                                
90 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations IV.1.17 = Smith 1981: 438.  Cf. J.S. Mill, Political Economy (Vol. 1, 
Preliminary Remarks, § 9): “To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the 
highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands 
themselves.”     
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the following passage, he challenges the facile mercantilist credo that prevailing in war 
was contingent upon the accumulation and stock of gold and silver.   
It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver in order to enable 
a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in 
distant countries.  Fleets and armies are maintained, ot with gold and 
silver, but with consumable goods.  The nation which, from the annual 
produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its 
lands, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those 
consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.91 
 
That such a mercantilist notion about war prevailed in Greece, especially from the 
Peloponnesian War onward, is evident in Thucydides’ Hi tory.  The historian notes 
repeatedly the importance of money, surplus of money, and expenditure for success in 
war.92  For example, the Spartan king Archidamus asserts famously that “war is not a 
matter of men, but of expense, which allows manpower to be put to use.”93  Xenophon, 
on the contrary, holds that with a vibrant commercial and industrial economy, Athens is 
better equipped to defend itself in war, not because it will have a surplus of money, but 
rather because it will have a surplus of human capital in the form of slaves.  “For what,” 
Xenophon asks, “is a more useful possession to conduct war than men?” (τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς 
πόλεμον κτῆμα χρησιμώτερον ἀνθρώπων;) (4.42).  Given that Xenophon 
constantly reassures his readers that his program will yield a surplus of revenues, it is 
surprising that he mentions nothing about the use of these monies for war, especially 
since he recognizes the importance of money in the conduct of war elsewhere in his 
                                                
91 Wealth of Nations IV.1.20 = Smith 1981: 440-1. 
92 Thucydides 1.80.2, 83.2, 141.5, 142.1; 2.13.2; 6.22.  On this theme of money and war finance, see 
Kallet-Marx 1991: 38, 118-19 and 1994: 239-46. 
93 Thucydides 1.83.2 with Kallet-Marx 1994: 242-3, who observes that the Spartan view of war focused 
exclusively on manpower (cf. 1.81.1). 
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writings.94  It would be rash, however, to conclude that his understanding of war is naïve 
or utopian.  When Xenophon speaks of war in the Poroi he is thinking exclusively about 
“defensive” wars, in which Athens’ enemies invade Attica (4.41-48, 52; 5.13).95  Here 
manpower decides the outcome more than money.  History taught Xenophon that 
overseas, imperialistic wars imposed heavy burdens on the exchequer and consequently 
on the Athenian people (4.40; 5.11-12; 6.1).  Yet, at 5.13 Xenophon does mention the 
possibility of taking vengeance on an aggressor, which could lead to a foreign war, thus 
necessitating a ready supply of money.  Although Xenophon does not specifically address 
this scenario, it is reasonable to assume that just as, patrollers, targeteers, and those on 
garrison duty perform their tasks better when they are supplied with trophe (4.52), so too 
the rest of the citizenry could serve abroad because they will be provided with a daily 
triobolon with which to purchase victuals.  If Xenophon was thinking along these lines, 
then he clearly was moving in the direction of Smith and other modern thinkers, who 
privilege the financing of war with the annual revenu  arising out of a nation’s lands and 
industry.   
 
4C. Xenophon’s Providentialism  
One significant factor that motivates Xenophon to re rient the Athenian economy 
from consumption to production is his desire to bring Athens into line with the 
providential ordering of the universe.  Scholars have completely overlooked this aspect of 
Xenophon’s Weltanschauung and its relation to his economic vision for Athens.  When 
Xenophon says, “it is plain to see that Attica is veined with silver because of divine 
                                                
94 E.g., Hellenica 4.1.32; 6.2.1; Hiero 4.11; Cyropaedia 6.2.9; Agesilaus 2.25.   
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ordering” (καὶ μὴν ὑπάργυρός ἐστι σαφῶς θείᾳ μοίρᾳ), he is essentially arguing 
that the world is divided into distinct “shares” or “provinces,” of which Athens received 
as its portion land rich in silver, whereas its neighbors received “not even the smallest 
vein of silver ore.”  The idea that the world is divi ed into provinces is an old one, for the 
Greeks believed that during the creation of the world, the gods, either by the random 
selection process of the Moirai or by the providence of the gods themselves, divided the 
world into separate spheres, allotting to each god an goddess his/her own particular 
province.96  Here Xenophon uses the specific locution θείᾳ μοίρᾳ, “divine ordering,” 
but this seems to be virtually synonmous with his other designations for the agency 
behind the allocation elsewhere in the chapter: “nature” (1.3: φύσις, πέφυκεν; 1.4: 
πέφυκε) and “the gods” (1.3: οἱ θεοί).  What is different in the Poroi from earlier 
accounts is the notion that during creation the gods purposefully allotted to poleis 
resources or products of the earth particular to their territories.  For Athens’ share, she 
received silver ore, which arguably was not unique to Attica, but in respect to quantity 
and quality, it certainly was exceptional.97  Because the presence of silver ore in Attica is 
not the result of chance according to Xenophon, it serves a specific function.  This 
reading is recommended, because he believes that an immanent teleology exists in the 
                                                                                                                                      
95 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 214-5. 
96 See, for example, Homer, Iliad 15.187-95; Hesiod, Theogony 390-415, 881-85; Pindar, Olympian 7.54-
68; Aeschylus, Persians 762-64; Sophocles Aegeus  Fg. 24; Plato, Critias 109b-c; Politicus 271d; Varro in 
Augustine, City of God 18.9.  In general, see Cornford 1991: 15-31. 
97 The same is true of Attic marble.  The geological conditions were right for the production of marble a l 
around the Mediterranean, but most places only had t in veins or small lumps of marble: “much rarer are 
the massive beds from which can be extracted the great blocks needed for the major architectural members 
of temples and other large buildings.  In this too Attica is exceptionally favored.  More than one huge layer 
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order of world, which articulates and assigns a purpose to everything, even down to the 
specific functions of human body parts.98  Given the placement of this idea in the context 
of foreign demand for Athenian products, which Athens gives in exchange for food, we 
may reasonably assume that Xenophon thinks the gods allotted silver ore to the 
Athenians specifically so that they would exploit the mines and export silver abroad in 
exchange for needed goods.  The gods thus ordered the universe so that states would have 
to trade with each other.  Xenophon does not address explicitly the reason why the gods 
want Athens to trade, but he does assert repeatedly how commerce fosters peaceful 
relations between Athens and other states, and so it i  quite possible that Xenophon saw 
divine providence favoring trade as a means of promoting friendly bonds between 
peoples (3.4; 5.1; 6.1).  This particular notion is explicit in Libanius, who may have had 
the Poroi in mind: “God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but 
distributed his gifts over different regions, to the end that all men might cultivate a social 
relationship because one would have need of the help of another.  And so he called 
commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits 
of the earth, no matter where produced.”99   
These two related ideas, namely that providence 1) assigns special products to 
different peoples of the earth to induce them to trade with each other and 2) favors 
commerce as a way to cultivate ties of friendship between them, have an important 
                                                                                                                                      
runs through the fabric of both Pentelikon and Hymettos; and other extensive beds lie near the southern tip 
of Attica” (Wycherley 1974: 54).      
98 Memorabilia 1.4.4-19; 2.3.18-19; Symposium 5.6-7.  Xenophon probably owes his understanding of 
providence and teleology to Prodicus et al..  Xenophanes DK B 25 and Herodotus 3.108.1 express similar 
views. 
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Nachleben in the history of economic thought, as the economic historian Jacob Viner has 
demonstrated.100  Viner traces them from Libanius and the early Churc  Fathers, through 
the Middle Ages, when they were invoked largely in liturgical and scholastic contexts, to 
the early modern period as they became increasingly converted into “functional” ideas 
“to influence national economic policy.”101  Opponents of extreme mercantilism, for 
example, used the idea to support the liberalization of restrictions or even outright 
prohibitions on foreign trade.102  Viner doubts the extent to which these ideas had any 
material consequences, but he points out that theirintent to trouble the consciences of 
rulers and legislators who were advocating colonialism and other aggressive trade 
policies was effective.   
That Xenophon also promotes the idea of providential commercialism to 
challenge the hawkish policies of the Athenians is an attractive idea.  Xenophon tells us 
that during the debate about the terms of the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 369, 
Procles the Phliasian used a providential argument to persuade the Athenians to retain 
their hegemony at sea: “It has been proposed by your c ncil that you should have the 
leadership by sea and the Lacedaemonians leadership by land.  This arrangement seems 
to me to be not so much the result of some human age cy but naturally the consequence 
of providence or fortune (ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ 
θείᾳ φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι).  In the first place, you occupy a position most 
                                                                                                                                      
99 Oration 59.169.11 quoted in Viner 1972: 36-7.  Cf. Oration 5.21 for Libanius’ familiarity with 
Xenophon’s works.  
100 Viner 1972: 27-54; cf. Hirschman 1977: 59-60. 
101 Viner 1972: 40.  See, for example, Davenant, Essay on the East-India Trade (= Davenant 1771: 104). 
102 Viner 1972: 42. 
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suitable by nature for naval supremacy.  For most state  that are dependent upon the sea 
live around your city, and all these are weaker than you are.”103  Procles then goes on to 
mention twice how the god(s) granted many naval successes to the Athenians, which 
indicates to him that they should remain thalassocrats (7.1.5, 9; cf. 6.5.41).104  
Interestingly, however, this argument did not persuade the Athenians on this occasion.  
The Athenian Cephisodotus won the day by underscoring how the treaty designates that 
both parties are to be equals, suggesting that the At nians and Spartans should hold joint 
leadership on land and sea by exchanging the leadership position with each other every 
five days (7.1.14-4).  The reason Procles’ providential argument does resonate with the 
Athenians has nothing to do with the argument per se but with Procles’ application of it 
to a situation involving two equal parties.  As evident from the passage, Procles invokes 
the providential view of Athenian thalossocracy to legitimate the Athenians’ rule over 
states that are “weaker.”  For Cephisodotus, the Spartans are not the inferiors of Athens 
but equals and co-hegemons.  Cephisodotus’ riposte notwithstanding, it is unlikely that he 
or any other Athenian would have objected in principle to Procles employing the 
providential view of imperialism to justify Athens’ rule over its subjects.  Such a double 
standard was essential to the ideology of empire, as demonstrated, for example, by the 
Athenian adherence to the principle of justice applying only in cases involving two equal 
parties (Thucydides 5.89; Demosthenes 15.28).   
                                                
103 Hellenica 7.1.3.  A recent instantiation of this idea comes from the current Vice President of the United 
States, who said in a meeting of the Cato Institute in 1998: “the good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas 
where there are democratic regimes friendly to the United States” (Guardian Unlimited, 4/5/2004).  It was 
unclear at the time whether Cheney invoked the providential idea to promote peaceful trade with the 
Middle East and Eurasia or to advocate a more aggressive strategy for the acquisition of their oil.          
104 Cf. Plato, Critias 113b-e, who seems to be parodying the providential view of empire in this passage.    
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Viewed in light of this passage, Xenophon’s understanding that Attica contains 
silver because of divine providence is yet another salient example of his manipulation of 
the rhetoric of empire.  Xenophon challenges the contention that the gods allotted to the 
Athenians a geographic disposition suitable for naval empire by proposing an alternative, 
anti-imperial reading of the gods’ dispensation: they allocated a land rich in produce, 
marble, and silver, which is geographically well suited for exporting these goods abroad 
and importing necessities (1.7).  In the former view, the gods intend the Athenians to rule 
over Greeks, but in the latter, to trade with them for peaceful ends.  In the prologue, 
Xenophon asserts that maintaining the Athenians from their own resources would be the 
“most just” solution to Athenian imperialism, and now we are in the position to 
appreciate fully why this is so.  The gods ordain what is just for humans in Xenophon’s 
worldview, and justice itself is rooted in the very soil of Attica itself.  In the 
Oeconomicus, “the earth is a goddess who willingly teaches justice to those who can 
learn” (5.12; cf. Memorabilia 4.4.25).  The presence of silver in the soil is a veritable sign 
from the gods that also teaches the Athenians that the path to justice lies in the peaceful 
exploitation and trade of their indigenous goods.  Xenophon assumes the role, then, not 
only of a savvy financial advisor but also of a m ntis, “prophet,” who reveals the divine 
will to humanity.  Accordingly, he recommends sending an embassy to Dodona and 
Delphi to ask the gods “if it is fine and good for the city to execute the plan both now and 
in the future” (6.2).  Xenophon is indeed looking for their direction, but he also wants 
their blessing.105      
                                                
105 See the excellent note of Gauthier 1976: 220-1; cf. Higgins 1977: 142. 
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4D. Xenophon’s Anti-imperialism in the Context of Athenian Political Thought  
Historians have long pointed out that Xenophon’s attitude toward the Athenian 
empire in the Poroi is not novel, for Isocrates and Thucydides also demonstrate the 
“unjust” nature of Athenian imperialism.106  Moreover, Xenophon was not the only 
Athenian calling for peace around the time of the Social War; in On the Peace Isocrates 
pleas impassionedly to the Athenians to make peace with the allies and to eschew their 
heavy-handed imperial policies.  Some scholars even maintain that a “peace party” 
existed in Athens at the time, of which Eubulus was the most high-profile figure.107  
Accordingly, there has been a tendency to label Xenophon’s thinking as unoriginal and 
derivative.108  A closer scrutiny of Xenophon’s views on peace and imperialism, 
however, reveals that he was radically out of sync with his Athenian contemporaries.  In 
this last section, I argue that Xenophon was unique among Athenian intellectuals and 
philosophers as a true-blooded anti-imperialist thinker, who opposed not just the 
particular instantiations of imperialism (e.g., Athenian, Spartan, etc.) but the very idea of 
empire itself.109  
It is important to stress from the outset that in the Poroi Xenophon concerns 
himself primarily with Athens and makes no overt generalizing or philosophical 
statements about imperialism.  Nonetheless, as noted in Section 2E, Xenophon frames the 
                                                
106 E.g., von der Lieck 1933: 7-8, Jaeger 1938: 53, de Romilly 1963: 318-21, Breitenbach 1967: 1754, and 
Gauthier 1976: 42. 
107 E.g., Cawkwell 1963 and Mossé 1973 : 55. 
108 E.g., Müller 1971: 198-9, Thiel 1922: xxiv, Andreades 1933: 390, Delebecque 1957: 471, Schütrumpf 
1982: 3, and Gauthier 1976: 42-4. 
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prologue in the context of a Socratic discussion about τὸ δίκαιον, which strongly 
enjoins the interpretation that Xenophon’s analysis of Athens’ political and economic 
situation proceeds, in part, from general principles formulated through philosophical 
examination and historical inquiry.110  Such a perspective invites us to look to his other 
works composed during the period 362-355 in order to contextualize his thoughts on 
empire and imperialism.111  A salient point of departure is Xenophon’s claim that the 
“most just” (δικαιότατον) way to remedy the poverty of the Athenian multitude is that 
they “be maintained from their own territory” (διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν), or 
perhaps translated better, “from their own domestic resources” (1.1).112  Conversely, the 
most unjust solution to feeding the masses, it may be presumed, is appropriating goods 
from territories not belonging to Athens.  In the M morabilia, Socrates makes this point 
as he challenges Aristippus’ claim that life in a polis is neither necessary nor desirable:  
ἢ λανθάνουσί σε οἱ ἄλλων σπειράντων καὶ φυτευσάντων τόν τε 
σῖτον τέμνοντες καὶ δενδροκοποῦντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον 
πολιορκοῦντες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ μὴ θέλοντας θεραπεύειν, ἕως 
ἂν πείσωσιν ἑλέσθαι δουλεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν τοῖς 
κρείττοσι; καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὖ οἱ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δυνατοὶ τοὺς ἀνάνδρους 
καὶ ἀδυνάτους οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι καταδουλωσάμενοι καρποῦνται;  
                                                                                                                                      
109  That Xenophon is an anti-imperialist is a view I share with the following scholars: Giglioni 1970: xiv-
xxix, Higgins 1977: 99-127, 140, Schütrumpf 1982: 3, n.6, Dillery 1993, Tuplin 1993, and Nadon 2001: 
Chapters 3 and 5.   
110 Contra Gauthier 1976: 43. 
111 Unitarians like Higgins 1977 and non-unitarians like Delebecque 1957 and Tuplin 1993 generally 
agree that Hellenica 2-8, Hipparchicus, On Horsemanship, Agesilaus and most of the Cyropaedia and 
Memorabilia were composed post-Mantinea.   
112 Contrary to Gauthier 1976: 40 and Schütrumpf 1982: 77, I do not take the feminine pronoun in the 
phrase ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν to refer to πόλεως, which they argue is implied in the subject οἱ πολῖται, but to 
the subject of the following sentence ἡ χώρα (cf. von der Lieck 1933: 18, Marchant 1925: 193, Giglioni 
1970: 19, Waterfield 1997: 169, and Doty 2003: 19).   
 255 
 
Has it escaped your notice that there are people who reap the grain from 
others who have sown and planted it, cut down their fruit trees, and 
besiege the weaker in every way because they do not wish to serve them, 
until the belligerents prevail upon them to choose slavery instead of facing 
war with the stronger?  Indeed, in domestic affairs too don’t you know that 
brave and powerful men reap profits from the cowardly and weak by 
enslaving them? (2.1.13).113 
 
Socrates goes on to proclaim that such predatory actions of the stronger in both domestic 
and international affairs are “unjust,” employing the verb ἀδικεῖν no less than six times 
(2.1.14). 
Nevertheless, Xenophon recognizes the role played by necessity in foreign 
relations, especially when a people’s trophe is at stake: “Even on land piracy, though not 
for those who reap what they have sown, is the natural resource of men deprived of their 
sustenance.  For either men must work or they must eat he fruits of other men’s labor: 
otherwise it is no easy thing to have a livelihood an  to obtain peace (προσήκει γε μὴν 
καὶ κατὰ γῆν οὐ τοῖς καρπουμένοις τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλὰ τοῖς στερισκομένοις τῆς 
τροφῆς λῄζεσθαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐργαστέον  ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰργασμένων θρεπτέον· 
ἄλλως δ’ οὐ ῥᾴδιον οὔτε βιοτεύειν οὔτε εἰρήνης τυχεῖν) (Hipparchicus 8.8).  This 
passage from the Hipparchicus, reminiscent of the end of Herodotus’ History and 
Hobson’s “choice of life” (see Introduction above), vidences the critical choice that 
Xenophon envisages all states must make concerning their trophe: “For either men must 
work or they must eat the fruits of other men’s labor.”  This gnomic statement brings us 
directly back to the prologue of the Poroi: because the masses were deprived of sufficient 
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trophe, the Athenian political leadership felt “compelled” to treat the allies unjustly.  The 
intertext enjoins the idea that Xenophon thought the Athenians were acting like pirates, a 
sentiment about imperial states that Augustine echos centuries later: “Take away justice, 
and what are governments but brigandage on a grand scale?  And what are robber bands 
but small governments” (remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?  
Quia et latrocinia quid sunt nisi parva regna).114  Xenophon’s emphasis on maintaining 
the masses “from their own domestic resources,” therefore, is a consummate rejection of 
the politics of imperialism and expansionism and an exhortation to a new politics of 
peace based on justice.115 
Xenophon elaborates fully his peace policy in Chapter 5, where he aims to 
persuade the Athenians to reject their bellicosity and realize the financial benefits of 
peace.  To summarize: Athens cannot receive the full st measure of revenues unless 
peace exists (ἡ πόλις εἰρήνην ἄγουσα; cf. 5.3: ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως); 
consequently, a board of guardians of the peace (εἰρηνοφύλακες) should be created 
(5.1); such a board will make the city more popular (προσφιλεστέρα) and increase the 
number of visitors (ship owners, merchants trading  grain, wine, and olive oil, 
intellectuals, investors, sophists, philosophers, poets, and tourists) who will benefit the 
city both economically and culturally (5.2-4); those cities who enjoy the longest period of 
peace are the most prosperous (εὐδαιμονέσταται), and Athens is by nature of all cities 
                                                                                                                                      
113 Cf. Anabasis 5.6.32. 
114 Augustine, City of God 4.4; cf. Isocrates, On the Peace 90; Cicero, Republic 3.14.24. 
115 Breitenbach 1967: 1754; cf. Gauthier 1976: 212-3, who calls Xenophon’s policy “pacific hegemony” 
and Delebecque 1957: 475, who applies the unfortunate tag “new imperialism.” 
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the most well suited “to flourish in peace” (ἐν εἰρήνῃ αὔξεσθαι) (5.2); those who 
desire to win back the hegemony for Athens by means of war are mistaken, as Hellenic 
history demonstrates repeatedly that treating the Gr eks in a peaceful and beneficent 
manner resulted in Athens’ exercise of hegemony (5.5-7); now that the Greek world is in 
a state of confusion (ταραχή), Athens has it within her power to win back the Greeks, 
not by engaging in wars but by reconciling warring states and making peace between 
factions within states (5.8); Athens therefore should take the step to end the Sacred War 
(5.9); if people saw Athens striving to make peace in very land and on every sea, they 
would include Athens’ safety first in their prayers after their own (5.10); those who think 
war more profitable than peace once again should look t  the past, because state revenues 
have always been exhausted in times of war, especially during the recent Social War, 
whereas in times of peace revenues have increased (5.11-12); lastly, a state of peace 
(εἰρήνην ἄγειν) does not entail refraining from avenging oneself on an enemy when 
wronged; in fact, by not initiating injustice Athens will avenge itself more quickly on its 
enemies who will be bereft of allies (5.13). 
Chapter 5 is an impressive piece of Xenophon’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, which, 
as we have seen, contests the very nature of the Atnian empire by “employing topoi 
familiar from the world of the arche” and applying them to a new form of hegemony 
based in peace.116  The phrase εἰρήνην ἄγειν is fundamental to this interpretation, 
which means “to be at peace,” whereas τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν means “to observe the terms 
                                                
116 Dillery 1993: 2.    
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of a particular peace,” say, for example, the Peace of Philocrates.117  This latter usage is 
precisely what we find in Isocrates’ On the Peace (8.71), the occasion of which is 
ostensibly a meeting of the assembly concerning the peace proposals with the allies in 
355 (16).  Xenophon, by contrast, advocates not the adoption of a specific peace but the 
acceptance of a universal and lasting peace with the entire world.  He emphasizes the 
permanent nature of his peace proposal by twice employing the words διατελής, 
“lasting” or “perpetual,” and διατελεῖν, “to last in perpetuity” (5.2).  Because the 
benefits of peace are to be enjoyed by all peoples (5.1: πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις), who in toto 
(5.10: πάντας) will  express their gratitude in prayer to the Athenians for promoting 
peace throughout every land and on the sea (ἀνὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνη), 
Xenophon clearly envisions a universal peace.  The closest parallel to Xenophon’s peace 
is the so-called “common peace” (κοινὴ εἰρήνη) arranged repeatedly in the fourth 
century by the king of Persia.118  A return to the first peace of this kind, the Peace of 
Antalcidas in 387, is ultimately what Isocrates urges the Athenians to accept in 355 in 
order “to have peace” (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην) “with all of humankind” (πρὸς 
ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους) (8.16).  It is unclear, however, if by “peace forall” Xenophon 
hopes to include additional states, such as the Greeks of Italy and Sicily and the 
Carthaginians, who were not customary signatories to the common peaces.  The phrase 
ἀνὰ πᾶσαν γῆν καὶ θάλατταν εἰρήνη is unparalleled in any contemporary 
                                                
117 Seager 1969: 134; cf. Gauthier 1976: 196, who translates the phrase as “state of peace.” 
118 In general, see Ryder 1965.  
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documents and therefore suggests that Xenophon was thinking of a peace even more 
comprehensive than the ones brokered by the Persian king. 
To ensure this new state of peace Xenophon proposes creating an office of 
eirenophylakes, the very name of which evokes such Athenian imperial institutions as 
“the garrison” (οἱ φύλακες) or the “guardians of the Hellespont” 
(ἑλλησποντοφύλακες).  Instead of acting as a guardian or an outpost of empire, the 
function of this office is to promote peace.  How Xenophon expected the eirenophylakes 
to accomplish this task is debated.  Thiel submits two readings: 1) the office was either to 
settle disputes between Athens and other Greek states; or 2) to settle disputes between 
warring states and reconcile factions within states, that is, what Xenophon actually urges 
the Athenians to do at 5.8.119  The first interpretation is unsound because Xenophon 
expects many foreigners, not just those reconciled with Athens, to visit the city because 
of these magistrates’ efforts.120  Thiel’s second interpretation is supported well by the 
text itself, but Gauthier objects to this reading because such a permanent, elected board of 
magistrates devoted to diplomacy has no parallel in the international arbitration practices 
of the Greeks.121  Momigliano and Giglioni offer a different perspective, interpreting the 
eirenophylakes as “panhellenic magistrates,” elected by the Athenians, but recognized by 
the allies, to ensure a “common peace.”122  The problem with this view is that it would 
be strange to find a panhellenic board of magistrates entirely of Athenians.   
                                                
119 Thiel 1922: 33. 
120 Gauthier 1976: 196; cf. Cawkwell 1963: 56 who argues that it would be strange for Athens to be the 
arbiters of peace when the city itself is party to the peace. 
121 Gauthier 1976: 197. 
122 Momigliano cited in Gauthier 1976: 197 and Giglioni 1970: xxxi-xxxiv. 
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Cawkwell’s reading is more persuasive. Privileging Xenophon’s comments that 
immediately follow his proposal for the creation ofthe office, namely, that the 
eirenophylakes will make the city more attractive to trade, he contends that they would 
have been domestic financial officers exclusively.123  He cites Aeschines 3.159, where 
the orator claims that after Chaeronea Demosthenes returned to the city and urged the 
Athenians “to elect him guardian of the peace” (εἰρηνοφύλακα ὑμᾶς αὑτὸν ἐκέλευε 
χειροτονεῖν).  In that Demosthenes was elected to the Theoric Commission in 337/6, 
Cawkwell interprets Aeschines’ comment as a sarcastic reference to this office, “and he 
chose as a sneer the word used twenty years earlier by Xenophon in proposing a new 
office to make the most of the peace.  Here perhaps as elsewhere in the Revenues what 
Xenophon proposed, Eubulus enacted.”124  Gauthier endorses Cawkwell’s thesis and 
adds the following three points: 1) the eirenophylakes would have been Athenian 
magistrates, elected by Athenians, to take care of domestic affairs on analogy with 
Agathocles of Syracuse, who was elected “general and guardian of the peace” 
(στρατηγὸς καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης) in 317 (Diodorus 19.5.5); 2) they would have 
been charged with the task not to establish but to maintain peace; and 3) the office would 
have been the antipode of the stratiotika, which was oriented to financing war and 
imperialism.125   
Attractive as this interpretation is, I offer another solution.  While Agathocles of 
Syracuse may evidence a domestic role one “guardian of the peace” played at the end of 
                                                
123 Cawkwell 1963: 56. 
124 Cawkwell 1963: 56. 
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the fourth century, the most relevant example that e aforementioned scholars have 
failed to identify is the Persian king, whom Isocrates conspicuously deems “the guardian 
of peace” (φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης) for his part in brokering common peaces (Panegyricus 
175).  His policy was exclusively international, both maintaining and establishing peace 
throughout the Greek and non-Greek worlds.  That Xenophon is assigning such a 
diplomatic role to his eirenophylakes is supported by a later usage from the Roman 
period.  Plutarch labels the Roman priest-hood of Fetiales eirenophylakes, because “they 
settled disputes by parley, not allowing a hostile expedition until every hope for peace 
had been cut off.  For the Greeks call it peace whenev r two parties settle their quarrels 
by conference and not force.”126  The diplomatic character of these eirenophylakes 
corresponds to Xenophon’s foreign policy recommendations at 5.8-9: to reconcile 
warring states, to resolve civil strife, and to make “the Delphic shrine autonomous, as it 
was in the past, not by joining in war, but by sending embassies up and down Greece.”  
Reconciling warring states, ending civil war, and ensuring autonomy were the defining 
features of the common peaces negotiated by the Persian king.  It is quite possible, then, 
that Xenophon is proposing a permanent office of diplomats charged with these very 
same foreign policy objectives.  The key difference, of course, being that Xenophon 
substitutes Athens for Persia in the role of the guardian of peace.127  
                                                                                                                                      
125 Gauthier 1976: 198.   
126 Numa 13.3-4; cf. Camillus 18.2-3.  The word εἰρηνοφύλακες is extremely rare, occuring only in 
Xenophon, Aeschines, Philo, and here in Plutarch.  Since it is unlikely that Plutarch found the word in 
Philo he probably got it from either Xenophon or Aeschines. 
127 Consequently, one should be wary of assimilating Xenophon’s peace proposal with Eubulus’, whom 
historians (Cawkwell 1963: 52-3, Ryder 1965: 92-3, and Dillery 1993: 6-7) believe made a return to the 
King’s Peace of 387 a cornerstone of his foreign policy.         
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Whatever the precise role of the eirenophylakes, the new state of peace that they 
help establish and maintain will undoubtedly engender the goodwill of the entire world 
(5.1; 6.1) to such an extent that all peoples will inc ude the Athenians in their prayers for 
“salvation” (5.10), thus reversing the Athenians’ former imperial policies, which 
produced suspicion among the Greek world (1.1).  This practice promises to reverse the 
imperial perversion of the “dialectic of charis.”128  Athenian imperial ideology, as 
articulated by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, boasted that the Athenians were the 
benefactors of world, to whom the allies owed debts of gratitude.129  But according to 
Theopompus, after the Athenians had alienated all her former allies save the Chians, who 
alone offered military assistance in time of war, they rewarded them by offering prayers 
of “health and salvation” (FGrH 115, F104; Aristophanes, Birds 878-80 with scholium).  
To the contrary, Xenophon envisions a world where ev rybody will pray for the safety of 
Athens because she promotes a state of peace that has real economic, cultural, 
intellectual, and religious benefits.  Indeed, it is with some reason that Cartledge deems 
Xenophon’s state of peace a “new world order.”130  But is Xenophon’s attitude to war, 
peace, and empire original, as this phrase certainly implies?  Or did a competing, anti-
imperialistic ideology exist in Athens, which inspired and shaped Xenophon’s thinking?   
Some historians have identified a “quietist” ideology among the wealthy and 
oligarchic leaning Athenians, who were politically and economically opposed to the 
                                                
128 The phrase is that of Oliver 1960: 109.  
129 Thucydides, 2.38; 2.40.4-41.1 with Loraux 1986: 81-2 and Plato, Menexenus 237c; cf. Veyne 1990: 
109-10.  See also Cyropaedia 1.1.5; 5.1.1, where Xenophon notes how Cyrus arouses in his subjects a 
desire to “gratify” him because he is “thirsty” to gratify them. 
130 Cartledge 1997: 227. 
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empire, the so-called apragmones.131  Dillery argues that the phrase Xenophon uses to 
describe his peacetime hegemony, ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως, specifically evokes 
this ideology of apragmosyne.132  According to Isocrates, the Athenian leadership at the 
end of the Social War was divided between those who advocated the recovery of empire 
and those who thought it “necessary that the city observe peace” (ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν δεῖ) 
(8.6).  He also claims that the Athenians’ difficulties will not cease “until they are 
persuaded that quietude is more beneficial and profitable than meddlesomeness” (πρὶν 
ἂν πεισθῆτε τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν ὠφελιμωτέραν καὶ κερδαλεωτέραν εἶναι τῆς 
πολυπραγμοσύνης) (26).  The contrast here between external peace (hesychia) and 
meddlesomeness (polypragmosyne), Dillery points out, is similar to the one Pericles 
makes in the Funeral Oration, where he also attacks the Athenian quietist as being 
“useless” (ἀχρεῖος) for not participating in politics.  Dillery adduces numerous passages 
from Xenophon demonstrating his affinity with just such a political quietism, thus linking 
Xenophon’s views on Athenian foreign policy with his domestic philosophy of 
apragmosyne.133  A much-neglected passage from Plato’s Politicus recommends this 
interpretation:  
                                                
131 E.g., Nestle 1926, Ehrenberg 1947, Adkins 1976, and Carter 1986.  It is the contention of de Romilly 
1954 (followed by Mossé 1962: 407-9, Giglioni 1970: xix, Payrau 1971: 50ff., and many others) that there 
existed a group of “moderates” in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries who “opposed the politics of 
extreme democracy, imperialism, and war” (327).  She is concerned primarily with the fourth century, for
which she limits her discussion to Isocrates, Xenophon, and Aeschines.  In the following discussion, I 
argue that Xenophon does not espouse the values of this group.      
132 Dillery 1993: 7-9; cf. Ehrenberg 1947: 46 on the virtual synonymy of hesychia and apragmosyne. 
133 Dillery 1993 7-8 citing Memorabilia 1.6.10; 2.6.22; Cyropaedia 1.6.4; and the Oeconomicus generally. 
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οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὴ διαφερόντως ὄντες κόσμιοι τὸν ἥσυχον ἀεὶ βίον 
ἕτοιμοι ζῆν, αὐτοὶ καθ’ αὑτοὺς μόνοι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν 
πράττοντες, οἴκοι τε αὖ πρὸς ἅπαντας οὕτως ὁμιλοῦντες, καὶ 
πρὸς τὰς ἔξωθεν πόλεις ὡσαύτως ἕτοιμοι πάντα ὄντες τρόπον 
τινὰ ἄγειν εἰρήνην· καὶ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα δὴ τοῦτον ἀκαιρότερον 
ὄντα ἢ χρή, ὅταν ἃ βούλονται πράττωσιν, ἔλαθον αὐτοί τε 
ἀπολέμως ἴσχοντες καὶ τοὺς νέους ὡσαύτως διατιθέντες, ὄντες 
τε ἀεὶ τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων, ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ 
παῖδες καὶ σύμπασα ἡ πόλις ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων πολλάκις ἔλαθον 
αὑτοὺς γενόμενοι δοῦλοι. 
 
Men who are notable for moderation are always ready to support peace 
and tranquility.  They want to keep to themselves and to mind their own 
business.  They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on this 
principle and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve 
peace at any price with foreign states.  Because of their indulgence for this 
passion for peace at the wrong times, whenever they are able to carry their 
policy into effect they become unwarlike themselves without being aware 
of it and render their young men unwarlike as well.  Thus they are at the 
mercy of the chance aggressor.  He swoops down on them and the result is 
that within a very few years they and their children and all the community 
to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that 
they are reduced to slavery (307e trans. Skemp). 
 
Plato states explicitly that those who “keep to thems lves and mind their own business” 
(τὰ σφέτερα πράττειν = ἀπραγμοσύνη)134 hold the same ideological position in 
both domestic and foreign affairs.  The cornerstone f this ideology is “to preserve peace 
at any price.”  The phrase Plato employs here, ἄγειν εἰρήνην, may very well be a 
reference to and criticism of Xenophon’s peace policy in the Poroi.135  It thus seems 
reasonable to conclude that Xenophon’s esteem of the quiet life, a value he shares with 
other Athenians, informed his views on peace and war.  But does this interpretation 
                                                
134 Adkins 1976: 301. 
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explain sufficiently Xenophon’s attitude to the Athenian empire and imperialism more 
generally? 
According to Ehrenberg’s analysis of the word, apragmosyne necessarily 
“involved anti-imperialism, non-aggressive policy, quiet attitude and therefore peace.”136  
The locus classicus for the apragmon’s view of the Athenian empire is Pericles’ final 
speech in Thucydides, which may be the inspiration for the just-cited passage from the 
Politicus. 
ἧς οὐδ’ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι 
δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται· ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη 
ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ 
ἐπικίνδυνον.  τάχιστ’ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε 
πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι 
οἰκήσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ 
δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ’ 
ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν. 
 
It is no longer possible for you to give it up [sc. the empire], if somebody 
in the present circumstances who is afraid because of their quietism offers 
even this fine gesture; for you rule your empire as a tyrant, which may 
have been wrong to take, but dangerous to let go.  And such men 
persuading others of their views would quickly destroy the city, even if 
they were to live somewhere by themselves and independently; for the 
quietist is not secure unless he is protected by someone who is willing to 
act, and he brings no advantage to an imperial city, though in a subject 
state he is safe but a slave (2.63.2-3). 
 
This passage, vague as it is, seems to imply that there were politically active apragmones 
in Athens who advocated giving up the empire and tried to persuade others to do so.137  
                                                                                                                                      
135 The precise date of the Politicus is unknown but can “generally be dated to the period immediately 
following Plato’s third visit to Sicily (361); hence, before the final crisis of the Athenian empire” (Vidal-
Naquet 1978: 139, n. 57). 
136 Ehrenberg 1947: 52. 
137 Carter 1986: 39. 
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This conclusion, however, is complicated by the phrase καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι 
δεδιὼς, which suggests that it was only the immediate context (i.e. the Spartan invasion 
of Attica and the plague; cf. 2.59.1) that “might induce some to consider even this (καὶ 
τόδε), resigning the empire.”138  As Andrewes contends, “[s]ince they could cover their 
fear with a cloak of virtue, Perikles goes on to consider that virtue and its unsuitability in 
a ruling city; but nothing that he has here been given to say encourages us to ascribe to 
any group or individual a settled policy of abandoning the empire when not under 
duress.”   
Challenging this interpretation, Carter adduces Thucydides 2.64.4, which he 
claims demonstrates clearly that “there were men in Athens, and men whose opinions had 
to be reckoned with whether in politics or not, who were, and had long been, opposed to 
the creation of the Empire.”139  Yet, the passage in question says nothing about 
opposition to the creation of the empire, but rather it attests to how “the quietist would 
censure these things” (καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ’ ἄν), namely, that 
“Athens ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic states; held their own in the greatest 
wars against either the combined forces of their enemies or each individually; and 
inhabited the greatest city that had more resources than any other.”  To understand 
Pericles’ remarks better, it is helpful to view them through the lens of the rhetoric of 
praise and blame, for he attributes the apragmon’s censure not to their opposition of 
                                                
138 Andrewes 1978: 4; cf. Gomme 1956: 177. 
139 Carter 1986: 39-40. 
 267 
empire but rather to their “jealousy” (φθόνος) of not possessing the rewards of empire 
that the avid imperialists had acquired (2.64.5).140  
Adkins’ study of apragmosyne/polypragmosyne elucidates well this dynamic of 
praise and blame, which situates these concepts in the context of the workings of arete.  
For all Greeks, arete “had denoted and most highly commended those activities which 
were held to contribute most to the continued existnce of the unit [oikos or polis]…and 
it had commended ‘competitive’ excellences, since th se were held to contribute 
most.”141  Arete also denoted and commended the attributes of a particul  social class, 
whose members referred to themselves as agathoi and/or kaloi kagathoi, the “good” and 
“gentlemen” respectively.  The agathoi traditionally claimed the right to hold a monopoly 
on arete, because it was largely because of their competitiv  excellences, serving as 
hoplites and in the cavalry, for instance, that the polis was preserved.  Occasionally, these 
competitive excellences led to civil strife and conflict between poleis, because “[e]ach 
contender has a sphere of influence, oikos or polis, within which he will brook no 
interference,” but as long as the competitors are “equals,” Adkins argues, “some kind of 
equilibrium will be maintained.”142   
But suppose one of the contenders, whether individual, group in the polis, 
or polis, acquires greater power and resources than the others.  He will be 
able to exercise his power and resources to meddle in the affairs of others 
without effective opposition.  Even if such meddling causes no material 
damage, the person (or group) affected by it, if he supposes himself to 
possess arete, will resent it and regard it as placing him in a subordinate 
position, as rendering him less free (eleutheros); and he is likely to treat 
any encroachment on freedom as slavery (douleia).  Free Greeks…were 
                                                
140 See Rusten 1989: 206. 
141 Adkins 1976: 313-4; cf. Adkins 1960: 226ff. 
142 Adkins 1976: 314. 
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very sensitive to the slightest restriction upon their freedom of action.  We 
may find the attitude difficult to understand; but the emotional response of 
the Greek agathos to the idea of “being beholden to anyone” is very well 
attested, and the Greek cities responded similarly.   
 
Accordingly, those individuals or groups within the polis who felt that they possessed 
arete would employ the term polypragmosyne “to censure the activities of anyone else 
(or any other group or polis) who was acting outside his own proper sphere of influence 
(oikos, group, or polis).”  In Athens the democratic revolution of the fifth century 
engendered just such a situation, in that the demos began to acquire more political power 
than the agathoi, which significantly challenged their traditional arete-based value 
system.143   
Furthermore, because an active foreign policy, conducted and ensured by the 
navy, further increased the power (politically and economically) of the demos, it was a 
natural target of reproach for Athenian gathoi.  They deemed Athenian imperialism 
polypragmosyne, not necessarily because they were expressing their solidarity with 
fellow agathoi, though this was a part of it (cf. Ps.-Xenophon, Athenaion Politeia 1.14), 
but because the domestic power of the demos was derive  from the navy, which 
democrats like Pericles privileged strategically in war and publicly acknowledged as the 
source of Athens’ greatness and safety.144  What some agathoi seem to have condemned, 
therefore, was not empire per se but the hyper-aggressive thalassocracy that concentrated 
excessive power and resources in the hands of the demos, which is precisely what 
Pericles says brought the condemnation of the apragmon: “the greatest city that had more 
                                                
143 The fifth and fourth centuries are replete with anti-democratic diatribes expressed in such terms; see, 
for example, Adkins 1976 and Ober 1998. 
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resources than any other” (πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην).  In the 
zero-sum game of Athenian politics, many agathoi chose to retreat from politics to live 
the quiet life, pursuing a variety of activities, such as farming and contemplation, whereas 
others stuck it out to challenge the foreign policy of the democrats.145   
Now this group of agathoi, Thucydides would like us to believe, could potentially 
get caught in the moment and advocate the resignation of empire, but there is no evidence 
to lead us to believe that this was a regular featur  of their foreign policy.  In fact, two 
oft-quoted passages from Thucydides strongly suggest th  exact opposite.  In Book 8 
Thucydides attributes to Phrynichus the view that “the cities of the empire thought that 
the kaloi kagathoi would be no less oppressive than the demos in the handling of their 
affairs, since they were the ones who were the financiers and proposers of the evils done 
by the demos, from whom they derived much profit” (8.48.6).  These ideas, it must be 
remembered, Phrynichus expresses to counter the pro-oligarchic arguments of 
Alcibiades, who wished to subvert the democracy and install limited government.  Once 
this limited government of kaloi kagathoi came into power, they had no intention of 
getting rid of the empire, for when they began to fear that the demos was ready to depose 
them, they decided to make peace with Sparta according to the following set of 
preferences: “to have the oligarchy without giving up the empire; failing this to keep their 
ships and walls and be independent; while, if this also were denied them, sooner than be 
the first victims of the restored democracy, they were resolved to call in the enemy and 
                                                                                                                                      
144 Adkins 1976: 315.  Cf. the sentiments of the Old Oligarch, for example, who decries that the navy 
“imparts far more power (dynamis) to the polis than the hoplites, the high-born, and the good men” (1.2).   
145 For these alternatives to the political life, see Adkins 1976: 319 and Carter 1986: Chapters 4-7. 
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make peace, give up their walls and ships, and at all costs retain possession of the 
government, if only their lives were assured to them” (8.91.3).  If even these 
revolutionaries, the most extreme of the oligarchs, desired to retain the empire, it is 
unlikely that more moderate kaloi kagathoi would ever advocate giving it up, unless, as 
Pericles remarks suggest, dire circumstances demanded it.  What appears then to have 
been the defining foreign policy objective of Athenian kaloi kagathoi was to retain and 
rule the empire for their own political and economic benefit.  When and if that policy 
ever precipitated conflict with Sparta, however, they were “quick” (according to Plato’s 
representation) to make peace, but a peace that more or less conformed to the set of 
preferences outlined in Thucydides 8.91.3.146  
In conclusion, I see no reason to trace back Xenophon’s peace policy and his 
attitude to empire to the elite ideology of hesychia and apragmosyne.  While there may 
be some affinities, Xenophon goes much further in his condemnation of empire than any 
of his fellow Athenian kaloi kagathoi, among whom historians are wont to place him.147  
A thorough analysis of this aspect of Athenian political thought is badly needed, but my 
impression is that Xenophon stood alone in his stout opposition to expansionism and 
                                                
146 In On the Peace 51, Isocrates actually tries to dispel the stereotype that oligarchs were supporters of 
peace.  Lévy 1976: 147-69 argues that after 404, the At enians became disaffected with the essence of 
imperialism, what he calls the “ideology of power” (150).  This ideology of power continued in the fourth 
century only in the form of aggression against the non-Greek world, namely, the Persians.  This constituted 
a kind of “imperialistic revival” but one that Lévy treats as distinct from the fifth-century empire, b cause it 
was meant not to “satisfy the Athenians’ appetite for power” or their material interests, but rather to serve 
the common interests of Greece and the allies (164).  This Panhellenism he views as being distinct from 
imperialism.  Needless to say, Lévy’s exclusive focus on the concept of power ignores the other 
motivations of Athenian imperialism discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3D.    Panhellenists such as Isocrates 
veiled many of their sinister motives in the rhetoric of homonoia and Panhellenism (see Green 1996: 21-
23). 
147 E.g., de Romilly 1954, Ste. Croix 1981: 121, Anderson 1974: 40-5 and 1982: 347-8, Carter 1986: 76, 
Dillery 1993: 8, and Johnstone 1994.   
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imperialism.148  A brief examination of Plato and Isocrates’ attitudes to empire strongly 
supports this interpretation, because scholars often herald these two contemporaries of 
Xenophon as vehement anti-imperialists.149   
In the roughly twenty-five years between Panegyricus and On the Peace, 
Isocrates’ views on the Athenian empire and peace changed dramatically.  In the previous 
chapter, I have had the occasion to document Isocrates’ condemnation of Athenian 
imperialism in On the Peace.  Athens’ behavior to her allies was so criminal that 
Isocrates even advocated a return to the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (8.16), which is 
a stark about face from the cocksure Isocrates of the Panegyricus, where he says the 
King’s Peace was the “beginning of evils for Greece” (119).  There Isocrates laments the 
internecine wars of the Greeks and calls famously for a great Panhellenic crusade against 
the “barbarians” (15.173, 187).  Only by warring against the Persians and plundering 
their territory to relieve their “poverty” (ἀπορία), Isocrates promises, can the Greeks 
hope to have a secure peace (εἰρήνην βεβαίαν ἀγαγεῖν) (Panegyricus 173).  In other 
                                                
148 Originally, I intended to flesh out my investigation of anti-imperialist thought in Athens by examining 
individual authors, but Balot 2006: 138-76 has recently provided a useful survey of this subject.  With the 
exception of Aristotle, whom for chronological considerations I do not consider relevant to my argument, 
Balot’s analysis confirms my general impression that most Athenian intellectuals were not genuinely 
opposed to empire.  Thucydides was a consummate imprialist, though of a moderate type (Zimmern 1928: 
81-104,  Ehrenberg 1947: 52, Balot 2006: 171).  Aristophanes and Euripides were vehement critics of the 
Peloponnesian War and advocates of peace, but their plays present no clear anti-imperial vision.  Balot 
2006: 175-6 rightly argues that they tried to persuade the Athenians “to hit the golden mean between a tame 
pacifism and rampant imperialism (cf. Lévy 1976: 150 and Ste. Croix 1996: 45, 52 who contend that 
Aristophanes supported the double hegemony of Cimon and Andrews 1978: 4 who opposes the view that 
Aristophanes’ Babylonians was a tract against Athenian oppression of allies).  The Old-Oligarch was 
patently opposed to the Athenian empire and yet enamored of it at the same time, and it seems to me that he 
is addressing disgruntled allies abroad and not Athenian oligarchs (Frisch 1942: 88-105 and Cole 1991: 
102-3 contra Ober 1998 14-51).  On the issue of Andocides supposed “anti-imperialism,” see above.         
149 For Isocrates, see Mathieu 1925: 22-3, 118-22, de Romilly 1954: 345, Mossé 1962: 412-3, Bringmann 
1965: 21-7, 33, 109, Schütrumpf 1982: 2-3, and Davidson 1990; for Plato, see Treves 1937: 136-40, Mossé 
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words, Isocrates envisions perpetual war against the barbarians for perpetual peace in 
Greece.150  Yet, according to the orator, “this war alone is better than peace, because it is 
more like a sacred mission than a military expedition.”  “Hence the Pan-Hellenism of 
Isocrates,” one scholar explains, “required as a corollary an imperialistic war which 
would unite all Greeks against a common foe and which would depend on a common 
feeling of Greek superiority to other, non-Greek peo l s.”151  
Isocrates’ marked change in On the Peace, however, should not disguise the fact 
that an imperialistic Tendenz is present in all his writings.  The most obvious point is that 
Isocrates never gives up his dream for a Panhellenic crusade against the Persians, calling 
upon Philip to command the expedition shortly after the Peace of Philocrates (346) (5.9).  
While Isocrates does not directly mention the crusade in On the Peace—Athens being in 
no position to lead such a campaign in 355—he is still troubled by the poverty running 
rampant in Greece and offers a solution not very different from the one of the 
Panegyricus.  He urges the Athenians to appropriate land from the Thracian Chersonese 
to alleviate the poverty of the Athenians and other Greeks (24).  In 353 the Athenians 
took Isocrates’ advice, dispatching Chares to Sestos, who took the city, slew the adults, 
and enslaved the remaining inhabitants.152  Perhaps Isocrates disapproved of Chares’ 
brutal methods but he did not question the idea motivating them.  As Davidson 
convincingly argues, Isocrates never abandons the idea of empire in On the Peace but 
                                                                                                                                      
1962: 255, Barker 1960: 307-11, de Romilly 1963: 362-8, Morrow 1993: 96-100, Dusanic 1999: 15, and 
Balot 2006: 193-4.   
150 The phrase “perpetual war for perpetual peace” is that of the American historian Charles Beard. 
151 Hammond 1948: 112; cf. Fuks 1972: 28, 38 and Balot 2006: 153. 
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rather promotes a new notion of empire based on the ideals of monarchy.153  He 
criticizes Athenian imperialism not because he is against empire but because it is 
tyrannical (114-5).  Isocrates is confident, as he is in all his protreptic works addressed to 
kings and potentates, that he can reform the despotic Athenians and instruct them to 
become just rulers, who will establish a “kingly empire” for all time.  Jaeger astutely 
summarizes Isocrates’ imperialistic vision: 
It was the demos that had made Athens the mistress of Hellas; and, despite 
all the anxiety with which he gazes into the future, Isocrates still believes 
that she is destined to be the ruler, not only of the other Greeks, but of the 
whole world.  This is the last time in Athenian history that Periclean 
imperialism…raises its voice to demand, in the name of Athenian claims 
to hegemony, a reformation (μεταβάλλειν) in the political education of 
the citizen body—a reformation which will make the country and the 
people capable of successfully maintaining the historical role which they 
have inherited from their forefathers.154  
 
Xenophon and Isocrates could not be further apart in their orientation to peace and 
empire.  Whereas one proposes to alleviate the poverty of the masses through better 
financial management and increased economic productivity, the other promotes war, 
expansionism, and a racist ideology to remedy the socio-economic problems of 
Greece.155   
                                                                                                                                      
152 In Antidosis 112-3 Isocrates also approves of Timotheus’ campaign in the Chersonese, where he took 
both Sestos Crithote—an event which caused the Athenians to pay attention to their interests there, 
Isocrates boasts.    
153 Davidson 1990: 31-2, 35-6; cf. Jaeger 1944: 129.     
154 Jaeger 1944: 124.  
155 Xenophon’s attitude to the Persians is somewhat ambiguous but generally favorable (see Hirsch 1985).  
He never advocates for a Panhellenic holy crusade against Persian.  In the Anabasis 3.2.26, Xenophon the 
commander does mention as a possibility staying in Persian territory and colonizing it in order to alleviate 
the poverty of Greeks.  Some scholars take this statement as proof positive of Xenophon’s Panhellenism of 
the Isocratean sort (e.g., Mossé 1962: 444 and Dillery 1995: 76), but as Rood 2004 demonstrates, 
Xenophon’s comments must be put into the context of what needed to be said at the time: “Xenophon 
mentions the possibility of staying in Mesopotamia precisely in order to reject it, because his comrades o 
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Ambiguity also surrounds Plato’s attitudes to war and empire.  On the one hand, 
Plato developed a theory of ethics that opposed all forms of injustice and greed 
(pleonexia).  In the Republic, Plato analyzes these themes as they relate not only to the 
individual polis but also to the relationships betwen poleis.  Injustice in Socrates’ 
hypothetical city originates in the human desire to have more than necessary or deserved; 
pleonexia triggers the unlimited demand for luxuries, which in turn necessitates an 
unsustainable rise in population; unable to feed itself, the “feverish” city turns to 
conquest and expansionism to solve its food shortages (369bff).  Plato’s “healthy city,” 
built on a foundation of justice, is a counterpoint to his imperialistic city because its only 
acquisitive impulse is to satisfy necessary desires.156   At numerous points in his works, 
Plato’s theory of the origins of imperialism in the R public intersects with his analysis of 
Athenian imperialism.  In the Gorgias for instance, Socrates impugns the statesmen 
Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles for not making the Athenians “more just” (516b) but 
rather for being “caterers of their desires” (ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστάς) (518c; cf. 
517b).  “For with no regard for temperance and justice,” he bemoans, “they have stuffed 
the city with harbors, shipyards, walls, tribute, and all such nonsense” (519a).157 
                                                                                                                                      
not want to stay” (319).  For Rood, the Ten Thousand is a microcosm of Greece and “a paradigm of 
Panhellenism,” which Xenophon uses to analyze the weakness of that concept (cf. Hornblower 2004: 182). 
156 In addition to his philosophical solutions in the R public that aim to curb the pleonexia of citizens, 
Plato offers practical recommendations as well, such as delimiting the size of the citizen population t  
ensure that a city’s territory can support it (Laws 740a-e; cf. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato in Politics 
1265a12-20 and his own recommendations for population and territory sizes at 1326a6-27a40). 
157 Plato’s Menexenus is also in many ways a condemnation of Athenian imperialism, because, like all 
funeral orations of this type, it constructs “a city in speech” that aims to represent the city not as i is but as 
an idealization.  Contrary to Socrates’ “city in speech” in the Republic, which exposes the feverish city for 
what it is, an unjust expansionist behemoth, the Athens of Socrates’ funeral oration is the unquestioned 
champion of liberty, the protector of the week, and the guarantor of justice.  By glossing over its brutal 
imperialist track record, the rhetoric of the funeral oration distorts reality and is thus an easy target for 
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Plato’s obvious dislike for hawkish politicians like Pericles and Athenian 
pleonexia, however, did not give way to an outright condemnatio  of imperialism and 
empire as one might expect.  As discussed above, Plato does not approve of a foreign 
policy based in apragmosyne and hesychia, because he thinks it leads inevitably to the 
loss of freedom and to slavery (Politicus 307e).  In some respects, Plato shares 
Thucydides’ realism, since he believes in the inevitability of war, especially between 
Greek states (Laws 626a), and espouses the same classic Greek chauvinism toward the 
“barbarians,” against whom the Greeks were in a constant state of war (Republic 470c-d).  
Plato endorses a vigorous militarism for his ideal st tes which are beset by enemies on all 
sides in both the Republic and the Laws.  He patently does not share Xenophon’s 
optimism for a state of peace in the Greek world.   
Moreover, like Isocrates Plato avers in the direction that a “just empire” is 
theoretically possible.  In Book One of the R public, Socrates tries to get his interlocutor, 
Thrasymachus, to admit that every form of rule (ἀρχή) considers what is best for the 
ruled and not what is advantageous or profitable for the ruler (342e, 345d-e).  “To assert 
that rulers qua rulers always seek the good of their subjects,” Adam explains, “is in 
reality to set before us a political ideal, and Plato’s Ideal Commonwealth is intended to be 
its embodiment in a state.”158  Thrasymachus famously objects to this proposition 
because he sees reality in a different way: each kind of rule governs for its own advantage 
(338e), and this, he maintains, is why justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c).  
Stephen White argues persuasively that scholars have misunderstood Thrasymachus’ 
                                                                                                                                      
Plato’s criticism.  As one commentator notes, the Menexenus calls into question the “Thucydidean myth of 
Pericles” (Monoson 1998).  
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statement because they assume he is speaking normatively when, in fact, his initial 
explication of this thesis and his responses to Socrates’ questions suggest that “his claim 
is only descriptive, an empirical generalization of what he sees happening everywhere: 
the stronger simply do seek their own advantage.”159  Thrasymachus thinks this principle 
operates not only within cities but also between cities and he attempts to shift the 
discussion away from Socrates’ ideal world to “the brutal realities of fifth-century power 
politics” and to Athenian imperialism particularly.160  When Thrasymachus speaks of 
“the rulers in our cities, I mean the ones who truly rule” (τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν 
ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν) he is referring to both local rulers and the 
Athenian magistrates serving abroad in the interests of Athens (343b); for these are the 
ones “capable of complete injustice, being strong eough to subject to themselves cities 
and tribes of men” (348d).  Socrates eventually notices that Thrasymachus is extending 
his proposition that every form of rule (ἀρχή) governs in the interests of the ruled to 
include the ultimate ἀρχή itself, empire.  Socrates asks: 
“Would you agree that it is wrong for a city to undertake to enslave other 
cities wrongly and to subjugate them, and also to hold sway over many 
cities after enslaving them? 
“Of course I do,” he said.  “And that is exactly what the best and most 
completely unjust city will do best of all” (καὶ τοῦτο γε ἡ ἀρίστη 
μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος). 
“I understand,” I said, “that this was your claim” (351b; trans. S. White). 
 
                                                                                                                                      
158 Adam 1902: 33, note to 341a. 
159 White 1995: 321. White depicts Thrasymachus not as an immoralist sophist but a critic of Machtpolitik 
and a staunch defender of local autonomy against Athenian encroachment.   
160 White 1995: 322-3. 
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Thrasymachus’ smug response is clearly directed at imperial Athens, for all empires 
maintain as a matter of principle that they alone possess virtue (arete) and are entitled to 
the claim of “the best.”161  This aspect of Athenian imperial ideology corresponds too 
closely in Thrasymachus mind to Socrates’ paternalistic deal city, which is composed of 
only “good men” (πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν) (347d).  White rightly points out that 
Socrates’ “question and response acknowledge that Trasymachus has grounds for 
complaint,” but Socrates’ refusal to retreat from his principal thesis that rulers govern for 
the good of their subjects suggests that Plato believed a just empire was not only within 
the realm of possibility but a political ideal.  
Admittedly, Plato does not theorize about the just empire in any of his works, but 
this is exactly what Xenophon does in the Cyropaedia, which in my opinion explains the 
comment of Aulus Gellius that Xenophon wrote the Cyropaedia in response to Plato’s 
Republic.162  Indeed, Cicero remarks that the Cyropaedia gives the reader “the image of 
a just empire” (imago iusti imperii) (Epistulae ad Quintum 1.1.23).  But contrary to 
traditional interpretations of the work, I do not sub cribe to the view that Cyrus is an 
ideal ruler, whose empire is worthy of emulation.163  To be sure, like Plato’s philosopher 
                                                
161 White 1995: 323; cf. Adkins 1976: 314.  Herodotus says, “they [sc. the Persians] consider themselves 
the best of all humankind in every way and that others have virtue in proportion to their proximity so that 
those who live the farthest away from them are considered the worst” (νομίζοντες ἑωυτοὺς εἶναι 
ἀνθρώπων μακρῷ τὰ πάντα ἀρίστους, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους κατὰ λόγον τὸν λεγόμενον τῆς ἀρετῆς 
ἀντέχεσθαι) (1.134); cf. Cyropaedia 7.5.78. 
162 Aulus Gellius 14.3.3.  Tatum 1989: 39 dismisses the idea of the Cyropaedia as a “dialectical response 
to the Republic.”  My point is not that Xenophon responds philosophically to every one of Plato’s 
contentions in the Republic, but that he takes Plato’s ideal king as his point f departure for an analysis of 
the limitations of a just empire.    
163 Newell 1981 and Nadon 2001 have significantly shaped my reading of the Cyropaedia that is 
presented here.  Nadon, elaborating and advancing the ideas of Tatum 1989 and Gera 1993, has thoroughly 
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king, Cyrus rules over willing subjects because of his knowledge and virtues, but unlike 
the philosopher king, Cyrus does not aim to make his subjects virtuous but rather wealthy 
and luxurious.  The checks and balances Plato integrat s into his small republic to create 
concord between the orders of his society do not work within the context of a world 
empire.  For example, Cyrus needs a warrior class to continue his expansionist and 
imperialistic goals, but elements within this class need something more than monetary 
rewards to follow Cyrus to the ends of the earth; they require honor and respect too.  But 
Cyrus alone is entitled to virtue, because it is his virtue that holds the empire together, 
and thus anyone who tries to compete with Cyrus for virtue is a threat to his rule.  
Paradoxically, as long as he is alive, he cannot cul ivate virtue in others, which 
jeopardizes a successful imperial succession and the long-term cohesion of the empire.  
As the epilogue underscores, when Cyrus dies the empir  begins to disintegrate, leaving 
the reader with the strong impression that Cyrus’ attempt to create a just empire was a 
failure.164 
The Cyropaedia therefore nicely complements the Poroi, and had the space 
permitted I would liked to have examined this work more thoroughly.  On the one hand, 
it certainly seems to be a negative commentary not o ly on Plato’s Republic but also on 
Isocrates’ On the Peace, which too promotes the ideal of a just empire.  On the other 
hand, the Cyropaedia also appears to contest the very ideological suppositions of the elite 
that many scholars believe Xenophon himself championed.  As I argued above, the kaloi 
                                                                                                                                      
established that Xenophon presents an ambiguous and disquieting image of Cyrus and his empire.  The idea 
that Xenophon does not present Cyrus’ regime as a model was first proposed by Strauss 2000: 181. 
164 On the authenticity of the epilogue, see Delebecqu 1957: 405-10, Gera 1993: 16-22, Tatum 1989: 
220-5, and Nadon 2001: 139-46.  
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kagathoi did not oppose the empire.  What they contested was the right of the Athenian 
demos to monopolize the economic and political rewads derived from empire because 
they believed that their arete entitled them alone to possess these.  What they wanted 
above all else was to administer the empire themselve .  In many respects, the kingly sort 
of empire that Plato and Isocrates envision is the embodiment of the Athenian elite’s 
longing for imperial power.  The picture of Athenia political culture that emerges from 
this discussion is one of a public fully entrenched in their devotion to the imperial idea.  
But whereas most Athenian statesmen ultimately caved in under the pressure of the 
imperialists, becoming “caterers,” as Plato would say, of the Athenians’ desires, 
Xenophon stood up to them and offered a vision of Athens’ future that was truly an 
alternative to empire. 
 
Conclusion  
In the beginning of the Laws, Plato states that the normal attitude of the Greek 
polis to the rest of the world was one of “undeclared war” (626b).  Indeed, the Athenians 
were at war on average more than two out of every three years from the Persian Wars 
(479) to Chaeronea (338) and “never enjoyed a period of peace for as long as ten 
consecutive years.”165  Yet, even during times of formal peace, open conflict often 
prevailed.  Thucydides says as much about the Peace of Nicias to argue against those who 
did not reckon the length of the Peloponnesian War at twenty-seven years (5.26.2; cf. 
5.115.2).  One should not forget that between the conclusion of the Peace (422/1) and the 
Sicilian expedition (415), the Athenians reduced the poleis of Scione and Melos, putting 
                                                
165 Finley 1987: 67. 
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to death all the adult males and enslaving the women and children.  Moreover, the 
Athenians fought and died in wars all over Greece and the Mediterranean.  A casualty-list 
of the Erechtheid tribe attests to 180 casualties “in the war in Cyprus, Egypt, Phoenicia, 
Halieis, Aegina, and Megara in the same year (ca. 459).”166  Even in the fourth century, 
Isocrates exclaims that the Athenians “attempt to wage war on practically the whole 
world” (8.44).  According to George Norlin, the translator of the speech, “[b]etween 363-
355 B.C. Athens made war on Alexander of Thessaly, King Cotys in the Thracian 
Chersonese, Amphipolis, Euboea, Chios, Byzantium, and Potidaea—to mention only the 
chief campaigns.”167  If we include all campaigns, Sestos, Crithote, Methone, Torone, 
Pydna, Heraclea, Ceos, and Hellespontine Phrygia should be added to the list.   
The great frequency of wars and the extent to which the Athenians fought them 
had significant consequences on the Athenian way of life, contributing in no small degree 
to the political, social, economic, and cultural identity of the city, its institutions and 
values.  It is no wonder, then, that many scholars h ve deemed Athens and, indeed, every 
ancient state with such designations as “garrison state,” “warfare state,” “military 
association,” “guild of warriors,” etc.  While some nuance is needed, it is difficult not to 
draw the conclusion that war for the ancients was both “a natural condition of human 
society” and a “normal structural component of ancie t society.”168  This goes a long 
way in explaining why Aristotle does not think twice about categorizing warfare as a 
                                                
166 IG I3 1147 = ML 33.  The number is astonishing, as indicated by the heading “in the same year,” whose 
letters are much larger than the rest.  Bradeen 1964: 24 estimates conservatively that 550 Athenians died in 
this year.        
167 Norlin 1929: 35. 
168 Finley 1987: 68, 74.  In contrast, Megara in the fourth century appears to have lived in a continual state 
of peace (Isocrates 8.118). 
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“natural” form of wealth acquisition, no different from hunting and household 
management (Politics 1256b23-6).  Many modern economic historians and theorists, 
those writing both from liberal and Marxist perspectives, have followed suit, affirming 
that war was the primary mode of economic acquisition among ancient and pre-modern 
peoples.169  In the previous chapter, I adduced a rich array of evidence in support this 
thesis: the Athenians simply could not maintain thems lves without imperialism and 
expansionism. 
The Poroi, then, shows just how radically out of step Xenophon was with his 
fellow Athenians and Greeks.  He was not a pacifist, a  some maintain, but a staunch 
anti-imperialist who demonstrates that Athens does not need empire to survive.170  
Again, to quote Polanyi, the Poroi’s originality “lies in the thought that wealth, power, 
and security can be the product of peace rather than war.”171  Yet for all of Polanyi’s 
admiration for the work, he failed to underscore th istorical significance of this 
revolutionary change in economic consciousness.  Thoug  the ideas motivating the 
transition from a parasitic, imperial economy to one based on peaceful commerce and 
production may not qualify as a “great transformation”—to use Polanyi’s phrase to 
describe the advent of the modern market economy—they nonetheless anticipate some of 
the major developments in modern economic thought, which helped occasion the 
                                                
169 For example, Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations III.4 (= Smith 1981: 411-27) with Dickey 1993: 243-5, 
Marx cited in Finley 1987: 73-4, and Weber 1947: 331; cf. Hasebroek 1965: 131-36; Vidal-Naquet and 
Austin 1977: 6, and Finley 1982: 41-61 and 1999: 156-61, 169-76, 204-207. 
170 Von der Lieck 1933: 10 and Rostovtzeff 1941: 1358, n. 4. 
171 Polanyi 1977: 196; cf. Bresson 2000: 250. 
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emergence of modern free-market capitalism.172  Indeed, for Weber, who understood the 
workings of ancient capitalism better than any, saw an irreconcilable difference between 
the two forms of capitalism vis-à-vis their modes of acquisition:   
We will define a capitalistic economic action as one which rests on the 
expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that 
is on (formally) peaceful chances of profit.  Acquisition by force (formally 
and actually) follow its own particular laws, and it is not expedient, 
however little one can forbid this, to place it in the same category with 
action which is, in the last analysis, oriented to pr fits from exchange.173     
 
While Weber acknowledges that acquisition by force follows its own “laws” and even 
intimates that such a mode of acquisition can be ration lly pursued to a certain extent, 
only profit-making built upon the principle of peaceful exchange can achieve a high 
degree of economic rationality because chances for pr fit are calculable and thus 
predictable as the market begins to regulate and set prices according to observable and 
measurable laws.  Consequently, if Xenophon fully embraces the idea of such peaceful 
market-based transactions, how far would he move in the direction of a rational economic 
capitalism as a means of promoting the economic and financial recovery of Athens?  In 
the next chapter, we will attempt to answer this question.  
                                                
172 For many classic liberal thinkers, such as Hume and Smith, the growth and improvement of peaceful 
trade and manufacture mark the momentous change from the bellicose feudal age to the modern, civilized 
world (see for example, Smith, Wealth of Nations III.4 (= Smith 1981: 411-27, esp. 412) and Hume’s es ay 
Of Commerce (= Hume 1994: 93-104).  In general, see the excellent discussion of Hirschman 1977).  But 
much more than that, commerce and manufacture for these thinkers are the motor forces of economic 
development and sustained economic growth.   
173 Weber 1958: 17-8 with Love 1992: 46-9. 
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Chapter 5: The Liberalization of Athens and Economic Rationalism 
Men put an end to darkness, and search out to the 




“[The] dominant thought of [the Greeks] and their everyday aim was war.  All of 
their passions and feelings responded to the war cry, and their strongest emotion sprang 
out of love for the fatherland and hatred for the foreigner.  Go through Greece…and you 
will hear nothing but the noise of arms.”2  Though hyperbolic the judgment of Saint-
Simon is not that far from the mark, conforming essentially to Plato’s view that the 
normal attitude of the Greeks to the rest of the world was one of “undeclared war” (Laws 
626b).  It is not our place to pass moral condemnatio  on the Greeks for their bellicosity, 
but we are in a position to underscore how devastating their belligerent and somewhat 
xenophobic Weltanschauung was on the development of their economy.  Runciman 
explains: “The reason for which none of the Greek poleis, even Athens, achieved 
sustained economic growth is not the idea that it was either inconceivable or distasteful to 
them.  It was, rather, that their mode of production prevented them from seeing that 
profit…is not zero-sum: one person’s gain need not be entirely at another’s expense.”3  
Their “mode of production,” of course, being war and imperialism rather than trade and 
industry for productive ends.4  That is not to say that I endorse Runciman’s thesis that the 
                                                
1 Book of Job 28.3 
2 Saint-Simon in Iggers 1958: 17. 
3 Runciman 1991: 351. Runciman, of course, is speaking “typologically” and therefore he, like Weber, 
Hasebroek, and Finley before him, admit that there are exceptions to the rule.  His “even Athens” suggests 
that this polis was somewhat exceptional.  As my discussion below bears out, some groups in Athens, tho e 
who were a part of the “world of the emporion,” challenged this dominant ideology.      
4 Runciman 1991: 352-3. 
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Greek polis was therefore “doomed to extinction,” an “evolutionary dead-end.”  The 
Athenians in particular had the expertise (though perhaps not the gumption) to organize 
their fifth- and fourth-century empires in rational capitalistic ways to achieve sustained 
economic growth such as we find during Imperial Rome.5  Yet this growth was minimal, 
paling in comparison to even modest growth rates achieved in the modern age through 
peaceful, market capitalism.6   
As argued extensively last chapter, all this—Athens’ war economy, imperialism, 
etc.—was anathema to Xenophon, who envisions a new Athenian economy, one that is 
essentially anti-imperialistic because it challenges the basic assumption that war is a 
legitimate means of satisfying human needs and wants.  He boldly suggests that the 
Athenians reorient their economic energies away from parasitic consumption to 
production and conduct peaceful market exchanges with the rest of the world as means of 
maintaining themselves.  For Xenophon, trade is not zero-sum.  And so we must pose the 
following question: if Xenophon embraces the idea of peaceful, productive economy in 
which market-based transactions are necessary for augmenting the polis’ wealth, how far 
would this radical change in economic consciousness take him?  That is to say, by 
embracing and promoting ideas that will be rearticulated in the modern period, becoming 
some of the main tenets of free-market capitalism, can we detect any other aspects of 
Xenophon’s thought that anticipate later developments?  The answer to this question is in 
                                                
5 The notion that sustained economic growth was achieved during Imperial Rome is the provocative thesis 
of Hopkins 1980 and 2002.  Even Weber was forced to admit that Roman tax-farming was organized 
(partly) on the principles of rational capitalism (e.g., Weber 1976: 62; cf. the excellent discussion of Love 
1991: 44-55, 176-9).  Nonetheless, Weber contends that such politically oriented capitalism is inimical to 
the development of market capitalism, a claim that is very difficult to dispute.      
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the affirmative, and thus one of the goals of this chapter is to highlight those points of 
contact between Xenophon and modern thinkers on economic theory and practice.  
Overall, I submit two central claims that are historically significant.   
First, in order to promote the economic activity of metics and foreign traders 
(Sections 5A and 5B), Xenophon breaks down many barriers to trade and manufacture, 
advocating in essence a policy of economic liberalization, which results in the (partial) 
erosion of the status-divide separating citizens from non-citizen outsiders.7  Our author 
does not advocate a relaxation in citizenships laws or anything so radical as Hyperides’ 
proposal of enfranchising metics and emancipating slave , a measure, it must be 
remembered, formulated during the crisis immediately after Chaeronea.8  Rather, he 
maintains simply that outsiders whose economic activities promote the welfare of all 
Athenians should partake in many of the same honors and privileges that citizens do.  The 
great historian of status, Moses Finely, reminds us that “citizenship entailed a nexus of 
privileges and obligations in many spheres of activity, juridically defined and jealously 
protected”9  Participation in the political process was just one privilege (perhaps the most 
important) among many that the citizen claimed the right to possess and even 
                                                                                                                                      
6 So Saller 2002: 257-61 (cf. Millet 2001: 29-31, 35), who endorses Hopkins’ model but demonstrates that 
a growth rate of 25% over three centuries amounts to less than 0.1% growth per year, which compares 
(abysmally) to modern (post-1500) “modest” growth rates of 1-3%.  
7 It goes without saying that one of the tenets of mdern liberalism is the promotion of equal status among 
all members of a community; see, for example, Yushi 1998: “Under liberalism, each and every individual 
within a group enjoys the same status. No one is above or below the others…Under liberalism, each 
individual respects everyone else's freedom…Liberalism implies that there are no privileged individuals 
within a group who have the right to maintain their own freedom at the expense of that of others. Therefore, 
those who are against liberalism are in favor of privileges, whether they are motivated by the desire to 
expand their own freedom without limitation, or wish to use other people as tools to achieve their own
objectives.”  Needless to say, Xenophon’s prescriptions go only so far, as he still endorses the use of laves 
to further his objectives.  
8 Lycurgus, Against Leocrates 41; Hyperides Fg. 18; Demosthenes 26.11.  
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monopolize.10  One of these prerogatives was the ownership of land, which Finley says 
“was a universal rule.”11  Xenophon’s recommendation to grant the right of 
landownership (enktesis) to metics (3.6) would have reversed this policy, allowing them 
to share in many other privileges belonging to the citizen, such as inheritance rights 
(anchisteia), which was “effectuated exclusively through the oikos.”12  In Section 5A, I 
argue that metic industry was largely attached to the household, and thus the right of 
bequeathing real estate would have ensured the long-term integrity and survival of metic 
family businesses.  In short, Xenophon advocates a liberalization process to realize 
Athens’ full economic potential as an open society.13   
Second, and perhaps of greater significance for the history of economic thought, 
Xenophon frames his proposals for the creation of the capital fund (aphorme) (Section 
5C) and the mines (Section 5D) in accordance with “income maximizing instrumental 
rationality.”  As understood in the social sciences, “instrumental rationality” is the form 
of rationality that motivates economic actors to chose the most efficient or cost-effective 
                                                                                                                                      
9 Finley 1999: 47 (emphasis mine). 
10 For these other civic, collective activities, see Schmitt-Pantel 1991.   
11 Finley 1999: 48. 
12 Cohen 2000: 41. 
13 Cf. Giglioni 1970: lv-lvi.  The notion that Athens was an open society is the thesis of Popper 1962: I, 
169-201, though the interpretation goes back at least to late 18th-century France when liberals like 
Desmoulins and Constant promoted the idea of a “bourgeois Athens” (see Vidal-Naquet 1995: 82-140).  
Like Popper these thinkers attach great importance to the role of commerce in the development of open, 
liberal societies.  Had space permitted, I should have liked to examine further Xenophon’s contribution t  
the development of liberal thought among the Greeks (for a step in the right direction, see Newell 198).  
Havelock’s (1957) masterful study of Greek liberalism (what he calls the “liberal temper”) deserves more 
attention than it gets today.  Part of the reason for this is that Strauss’ forceful rebuttal (1968: 26-64) 
seriously called into question Havelock’s methodology.  However, it should be noted that Strauss himself 
did not deny outright the possibility of liberal thought among the Greeks and speculated that Herodotus and 
Thucydides would be the place to look (33).  To this short list Xenophon must be added, whom Strauss 
ignores.  His failure to treat the Poroi seriously in his writings is indicative of Strauss’ prejudices and 
therefore calls into question his assessment of ancient liberalism.     
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means of achieving desired ends.14  The “end” that has preoccupied economic actors in 
the modern world above all is income maximization.  An individual who therefore 
chooses the most efficient way(s) to maximize his profits is said to act rationally and is 
alone deserving of the designation homo economicus.  Yet one of the central tenets of 
substantivist historians is that homo economicus did not exist in the ancient world 
because the domination of the political life rendere  the Greeks and Romans incapable of 
expressing themselves rationally in economic matters.  Building upon Paul Christesen’s 
recent study of economic rationalism in fourth-century Athens, I call this thesis into 
question.  Xenophon’s proposals presuppose that both he and members of his audience 
not only valued income maximization as a desirable end but also tried to effect that end in 
an instrumental rational manner.15  In particular, Xenophon endeavors to mitigate risk so 
that the risk-reward balance may become acceptable to Athenian investors and 
entrepreneurs whose money and participation are indispensable for the creation of the 
capital fund and the exploitation of the mines.  After all, these are the ingredients 
contributing to the success of his entire financial program for maintaining the poor and 
increasing revenues.  
 
5A. Metics and Athenian Industry 
Of all Xenophon’s prescriptions for increasing revenu s those pertaining to the 
metics are perhaps the least appreciated and understood.  Indeed, it is precisely his 
                                                
14 For a concise introduction to economic rationalism, ee Heap 1993: 69. 
15 I do not mean to suggest that instrumental economic rat onality was pervasive throughout Athenian 
society.  As will be demonstrated below (Section 5D), only among wealthy investors and entrepreneurs, 
who made up less than five percent of the population, did economic rationality obtain.  What is significant 
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thoughts about the metics that elicited Finley’s comment: “Xenophon’s ideas, bold in 
some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits.”16  To adjudge 
whether Xenophon’s proposals touching the metics ever “broke through the conventional 
limits,” a brief discussion of the historical and ideological background of this Athenian 
institution is in order.17   
The origin of metic status is obscure.  It was probably the invention of 
Cleisthenes, but a mid fifth-century origin cannot be ruled out.18  In either case, metic 
status must be understood in the context, not just of polis ideology, but also of Athenian 
democratic ideology.19  Athenians prided themselves on being open and friendly to 
foreigners, but for those who settled in Athens for longer than a month, the state created 
institutional safeguards to keep the line between citizen and foreign immigrant clearly 
demarcated.20  First, these foreigners were required to register as metics in a deme of 
their choice, though they did not become demotai, and to take on a prostates, “guardian,” 
who served as their advocate in civic and judicial life.21  Second, adult male metics were 
required to pay the metoikion, a poll tax of 12 drachmai a year, whereas independent 
                                                                                                                                      
about the Poroi, then, is that Xenophon applies this kind of economic rationality, which had hitherto 
functioned solely in the private investment decision  f the elite, to polis finance.    
16 Finley 1999: 163; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129 who approvingly quotes this line at the end of his discussion 
on Xenophon’s contribution to metoikia in political thought. 
17 In the following paragraphs, I make extensive use of Whitehead’s masterful study (1977) on the metics.  
For recent discussions of metics, see Sinclair 1988: 2 -30, McKechnie 1989: passim, Hansen 1991: 116-20, 
Millett 1991: 224-9, Cohen 1992: 101-10 and 2000: 19-22, 50-63, 70-78, Todd 1993: 194-9, and Patterson 
2000.  
18 Whitehead 1977: 140-8 (Cleisthenic); Figueira 1991: 250 (mid-fifth century invention). 
19 Whitehead 1977: 2-4. 
20 For the openness of Athens, see, for example, Thucydides 2.39.1; Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 258-
91.  Whitehead 1977: 7 prefers the term “immigrant” to the traditional “resident alien.”  The length of the 
grace period in which a xenos was not required to register as a metic is unknown, but the consensus is a 
month (Whitehead 1977: 9 and Hansen 1991: 117).     
 289 
women metics paid 6 drachmai.22  This direct tax was not so much a financial burden as 
it was “stamp of metic-status, and a constant reminder of the citizen/metic divide.”23  
There was also the enigmatic ξενικὰ τέλη, “foreigner’s tax,” which allowed xenoi and 
perhaps metics to conduct business in the agora.24  Third, metics were debarred from 
owning real estate (enktesis) in Athens, an exclusive privilege of the citizen, though the 
Athenians occasionally awarded it to polis benefactors.25  Fourth, the metic enjoyed no 
political rights: he was not a “quasi-citizen,” as Wilamowitz once deemed him, but the 
anti-citizen, a homo apoliticus.26  Metics nonetheless did serve in the military and often 
contributed to the financial needs of the city.27  Lastly, while the Athenians granted 
metics certain judicial privileges not shared with non-resident foreigners (e.g., access to 
the polemarch), these did not amount to much in comparison to the free citizen.28  For 
example, Athenian law made no distinction between the murder of a metic and a non-
resident foreigner, and the premeditated killing of a metic by a citizen could bring the 
                                                                                                                                      
21 Whitehead 1977: 72-5, 89-92 and Gauthier 1972: 126-36. 
22 Harpocration s.v. with Boeckh 1976: 329-3 and Whitehead 1977: 73-6. 
23 Whitehead 1977: 76; cf. Clerc 1979: 15 and Finley 1999: 164, who notes how such direct taxes were 
anathema to free Athenian citizens. 
24 Demosthenes 57.31, 34 with Clerc 1979: 21-2, Andrea es 1933: 279, Hasebroek 1965: 24, n.1, and 
Whitehead 1977: 77-8. 
25 Whitehead 1977: 70-71: “The metic is always a lodger, living in rented (or leased) accommodation, and
enktesis must be recognized as a potent social division betwe n citizens and metics.” 
26 Whitehead 1977: 70. 
27 Poorer metics rowed in the fleet, whereas wealthier on s served regularly as hoplites, though they were 
excluded from riding with the cavalry (Whitehead 1977: 82-6).  Metics were required to contribute to 
eisphorai and the trierarchy and to pay civic and religious liturgies (e.g., the choregia and gymnasiarchia).  
Whitehead 1977: 81 is adamant that metics were formally debarred from the serving as trierarchs, thoug 
some metics may have been de facto commanders (e.g., Pamphilus in Demosthenes 21.163).  By the fourth 
century, when the institution was reformed, it seems that metics contributed often to trierarchic symmories 
(Sinclair 1988: 30, n. 33 and Cohen 2000: 73-4, n. 164).      
28 Whitehead 1977: 89-96; cf. Todd 1993: 194-9. 
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maximum penalty of exile, whereas the premeditated murder of a citizen could bring the 
death penalty.29 
Metics therefore were anything but “privileged” aliens.  In Athenian literature, 
they are depicted as pathetic creatures, excluded from the good life of the citizen, as 
Whitehead ably demonstrates.30  The epigraphic evidence confirms this conclusion; the 
epitaphs of metics do not refer to their metic status in Athens but rather universally 
record their ethnics or citizen status elsewhere.31  Apparently, metics had little pride in 
being “Athenian” metics.  Whatever privileges and honors the Athenians did accord them 
were undermined by barriers and prejudices that reinforced the divide between citizen 
and metic.  The sole exception to this rule obtained for wealthy metics, men such as 
Cephalus and his sons Polemarchus and Lysias, who traveled in educated circles of the 
elite citizenry (Plato, Republic 327bff.).  For these metics, their wealth helped cut across 
the status divide or what Whitehead calls the “vertical” demarcation of citizen/metic.32  
Such social connections were invaluable, as they afforded rich metics distinct advantages 
over their poorer counterparts in the Athenian legal system.  For instance, if a metic was 
suspected of not paying his/her metoikion, s/he could be dragged to the magistrate 
(apagoge) and sold into slavery if the official records did not corroborate payment.33  
                                                
29 Whitehead 1977: 93. 
30 Whitehead 1977: 34-59. 
31 For the evidence, see Whitehead 1977: 27-34. 
32 Whitehead 1977: 19: “if we call the citizen/metic division a ‘vertical’ one, other criteria too are 
‘vertical’ and tend to reinforce it [e.g., race and servile origin]…Other divisions are ‘horizontal’, cutting 
across the ‘vertical’ demarcations; notably the economic criteria…”  Cf. p. 82 on the wealthy metic’s 
participation in liturgies: “at the elite end of the status hierarchy, liturgies played their part in the ideology 
of the metic by inviting him to affirm his acceptance of the ideology of the polis itself.”  Cf. Ehrenberg 
1962: 161-3, Hansen 1991: 87, and Cohen 2000: 20-2.
33 Demosthenes 25.57 with Boeckh 1976: 330 and Whitehead 1977: 48, 77.  
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Along the same lines, if a metic was found to be without a prostates, any citizen could 
charge him/her with a graphe aprostasiou, the penalty for which, if convicted, was 
confiscation of property and slavery.34  For the vast majority of metics lacking 
meaningful and lasting social ties with Athenian citizens, justice was a rare privilege; 
most did not stand a chance against such draconian measures.35  The threat of slavery 
was very real for metics, potentially coming at thehands not of some distant, foreign 
enemy but of the Athenians themselves, who treated th m as enemies within.36   
For Whitehead, metoikia did not become what it was by accident; rather the 
Athenians constructed this status to further their own interests.  What were these 
interests?  It would be no oversimplification to say that these were largely economic and 
fiscal.  The lexigraphical tradition attests to thefiscal benefits metics offered their host 
cities.  Pollux defines the metic simply as “one who pays the metoikion” (μέτοικος ὁ τὸ 
                                                
34 Harrison 1968: 189-90 and Isager and Hansen 1975: 76. 
35 Note the conclusion of Patterson 2000: 101, who provides the most thorough analysis of the metic’s 
disadvantages in court: “the profoundly different basis of participation of the metic in the social 
organization of the polis—no tribe, no deme, and for most aliens a minimal anchisteia—would have 
significantly undermined that access and protection within a judicial system in which kin, family, deme, 
and tribe played an essential role.”     
36 Patterson 2000: 97-8.  The attempt of Cohen 2000: 49-63 to assimilate metics into the category of astoi 
(i.e., “locals” who were not xenoi) and thus potentially into the category of politai via Pericles’ citizenship 
law is not without serious problems (see Osborne 2002b).  For example, the orator Lysias was born in 
Athens in 459/8 after his father Cephalus had already been a resident in Athens for some time.  According 
to Cohen’s interpretation, Cephalus would therefore have been an astos.  Moreover, because Lysias was 
born before Pericles’ citizenship law of 451, which stipulated that both parents had to be astoi in order for 
their children “to partake in the polis” (i.e., to be politai) (Athenaion Politeia 26.3, 42.1; Scholium to 
Aeschines 1.39), the nationality of his mother would have been a moot point in determining Lysias’ statu  
(cf. Aristotle, Politics 1278a30-35).  If Cohen is correct, then, Lysias should have been a citizen (polites), 
but we know that he most certainly was not (Plutarch, Moralia 835F).  Even if we accept that metics 
belonged to the category of astoi, there is no guarantee that many of them would have become politai.  
Again the case of Lysias is cautionary.  Indeed, he was wealthy, educated, and traveled in elite circles (see 
above).  However, when it came to his marriage, no citizen dared to offer his daughter’s hand to Lysias; 
rather, he married his sister’s daughter (Demosthenes 59.22).  We hear of no children from this union, but 
assuming that children did exist, it would have marked three generations of Lysias’ family that would have 
been debarred from being enrolled as politai.  If such a rich and cultured metic family could not produce 
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μετοίκιον συντελῶν) (3.55).  Aristophanes of Byzantium deems “a metic [as] anyone 
who comes from a foreign place of origin and lives in a city, paying a tax toward certain 
assigned needs of the city” (μέτοικος δέ ἐστιν ὁπόταν τις ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν 
ἐνοικῇ τῇ πόλει, τέλος τελῶν εἰς ἀποτεταγμένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς πόλεως) 
(Fg. 38 Nauck).  In addition to the metoikion, Athenian metics contributed to eisphorai 
and numerous liturgies and tended to fill the occupations supposedly anathema to free 
citizens, that is, they were the bankers, financiers, t aders, wage earners, service 
providers, and manufacturers.37  In Whitehead’s estimation, metics were simply homines 
economici.38     
That Xenophon too looks to the metics as important sources of revenue is 
evidenced from the beginning of his analysis: “for this revenue (πρόσοδος) is one of the 
finest in my opinion because they do not receive state pay for the many benefits they 
render to cities, all the while supporting themselves, but pay the metoikion” (2.1).  Their 
“care” (ἐπιμέλεια) is a priority for Xenophon, who offers five recommendations to 
increase revenues: 1) remove (unnamed) measures which bring them atimiai (2.2); 2) 
release them from the burden of serving as hoplites (2.2-4); 3) grant them privileges, such 
as service in the cavalry (2.5); 4) allow “worthy” metics the right of enktesis (2.6); and 5) 
                                                                                                                                      
politai, one must have severe reservations about the chances of middling and poorer metics of securing 
citizenship for themselves and their offspring.      
37 Clerc 1979: 387-418, Hasebroek: 1965: passim, Amit 1965: 18, 56, Isager and Hansen 1975: 70-4, 
Whitehead 1977: 116-121, Montgomery 1986, Millett 199 : 224-9, and Cohen 1992.  To say that many or 
most metics were traders, manufacturers, etc., however, does not necessarily mean that all or most traders 
and manufacturers were metics (Whitehead 1977: 117).  For reassessments of the old Hasebroekean 
interpretation of citizens absent from the Athenian economy, see Isager and Hansen 72-3, M. Hansen 1984,
and Cohen 1992.  
38 Whitehead 1977: 59, 70. 
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establish a magistracy concerned with metic affairs (μετοικοφύλακες) on the model of 
the orphanophylakes (2.7).  He then caps his discussion, as he began it, by noting the 
fiscal potential of the metics with the phrase τὰς προσόδους ἂν αὔξοιεν, “revenues 
would increase.”39  The financial importance he attaches to the metics, therefore, is 
beyond question.  Yet scholars disagree vigorously over the reasons why the metics were 
one of the best sources of revenue.   
At first glance, Xenophon appears to be concerned only with the metoikion, as his 
recommendations are designed, in part, to increase overall metics numbers and 
consequently the amount of metoikia paid to the state.  In particular, the metoikophylakes, 
charged with the specific function of registering metics, are to be awarded prizes for 
enlisting “the most metics” (πλείστους μετοίκους).40  Because of this office, he 
promises, “it is reasonable to assume that all those who are without cities would want to 
                                                
39 It is noteworthy that he also employs the verb ὠφελεῖν, “to benefit” or “to profit,” three times in this 
chapter. 
40 It is difficult to determine the precise nature ofthis magistracy, because the office of the 
orphanophylakes, to which Xenophon likens it, is itself somewhat of a mystery.  Indeed, there is copious 
evidence for officials charged with the supervision of orphans (i.e., the Archon and his paredroi), but the 
sources do not use the term orphanophylakes, which is attested for Athens only here in the Poroi.  There 
are three possible interpretations: 1) the orphanophylakes formed a separate arche from the Archon (Thiel 
1922: 46-7); 2) the orphanophylakes formed an intermediate position (between the Archon and the 
orphan’s legal guardian) as guardians of war orphans, who made sure the orphans received their public 
maintenance (trophe) (Thiel 1922: 46-7); and 3) the term orphanophylakes was the unofficial title of the 
Archon and his paredroi (Stroud 1971: 290 and references cited therein).  The problem with the first choice 
is that it creates redundancies in the functions of the Archon and the orphanophylakes (Gauthier 1976: 70).  
The second option, as Thiel himself admits, weakens the cogency of the parallel with the metoikophylakes, 
because the office would have been concerned only with a sub-group of orphans.  Thus, the third option is 
the least offensive.  At any rate, with the exception of the second interpretation, the duties of the 
orphanophylakes under both (1) and (2) were probably the same: to protect the patrimony of the orphans 
(by serving as a check on their legal guardians) until they came of age.  Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture 
that one of the functions of the metoikophylakes was to protect metic economic interests (more below).  
Gauthier 1976: 72 suggests they would have formed a college of ten members on analogy with the 
sitophylakes.      
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come to Athens to become metics.”41  In Chapter 5, we get a better sense of how many 
different kinds of would-be metics he wants to attrac  to Athens: craftsmen, intellectuals, 
investors, sophists, philosophers, and poets (5.2-4).  How much revenue did the 
metoikion bring in?  Based on an adult male metic population of 10,000, which was the 
census number of Demetrius of Phaleron (though pre-Social War levels may have been 
much higher, perhaps 20,000), and 1000 independent adul females, Boeckh estimates 
that the metoikion produced on average 21 talents a year.42  Every increase in 500 metics 
would have yielded an additional talent of revenue.43  It is certainly possible, then, that 
by re-attracting metics to the city, who had fled in s gnificant numbers both before and 
during the Social War, Xenophon expects that the state would gain in neighborhood of 20 
talents.44 
                                                
41 Gauthier 1976: 72 interprets this sentence as proof that Xenophon wants only Greek metics to settle in 
Athens: “Men deprived of a city, which [Xenophon] hopes to draw to Athens, could have only been Greek: 
only politai were able to become apolides” (cf. Whitehead 1977: 126).  Though the comparanda he cites 
are, no doubt, apropos (e.g., Lysias 20.35), we are not compelled to interpret apolides in such a narrow, 
political sense, as Xenophon in the Poroi often uses the word polis as a territorial and spatial concept (see 
4.49-50 with Chapter 4, Section 4C).   
42 Boeckh 1976: 333; cf. Andreades 1933: 385, Gauthier 1976: 57, and Whitehead 1977: 76.  Thür (cited 
in Cohen 2000: 17) conjectures that in the early fourth century there were in the neighborhood of 100,0  
metics.  This seems exceptionally high.  Isager and Hansen 1975: 12-14 estimates more reasonably, putting 
the total metic population between 31,900 and 56,800 and Hansen 1991: 92-3 argues that 20,000 was the 
fourth century average (cf. Gomme 1933: 20: “considerably more than 10,000”). 
43 Whitehead 1977: 76. 
44 According to Isocrates in On the Peace, the Social War had made the city “devoid of metics” 
(μετοίκιων ἐρήμη) (8.21).  The orator is probably exaggerating somewhat for rhetorical effect since 
metic numbers seem to have been in the decline since the end of the Peloponnesian War.  To quote 
Whitehead 1977: 159-60: “Absolute numbers…are unattainable until Demetrius’ census; nevertheless, 
while it is fair to assume that some who left after 404 later returned, I believe that Clerc was right to claim 
that numbers never again reached the fifth-century level.  Certainly in the 350’s Isocrates was declaring, 
however melodramatically, that Athens was ‘deserted’ by emporoi, xenoi, and metoikoi…; and Xenophon’s 
object in Vect. 2 and 3 was to attract more of all three.  Either, therefore, their numbers never again reached 
the pre-432 peak or some returned only to leave again.”  The reason for this, in my opinion, was post-
Peloponnesian war Athens was a difficult place in which to do business: manufacturing slaves were hardto 
come by (see below) and long-distance trade was too of en disrupted by wars in the east.  
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Nevertheless, it is not exactly clear how some of Xenophon’s other measures 
would have occasioned similar increases in metic numbers.  With the exception of grants 
of enktesis, which he says will increase both the quantity andquality of metics seeking 
residence in Athens (2.6), the rest seem to concern only a small percentage of metics.  
For instance, opening cavalry service would have aff cted only those metics with the 
resources to buy a horse.  In the Hipparchicus, he makes the same suggestion in the 
context of keeping the cavalry corps at the full complement of 1000 riders (9.6).  Two 
hundred of these, he adds, should consist of “foreign horseman” (ἱππεῖς ξένους) (9.3).  
These are not the same as the metics though, whose numbers would probably not have 
exceeded those of this foreign contingent.  At most, then, this recommendation would 
have touched a maximum of 200 metics, yielding the polis only 2400 drachmai per year 
in metoikia.  This revenue, however, would have been consumed ten times over after 
taking into account fodder payments, and so the proposal of opening up the cavalry to 
metics makes no financial sense if Xenophon is thinking about augmenting metic 
revenues strictly by means of the metoikion.45  We must conclude, therefore, that this 
poll tax was not the only source of revenue he expects to generate from metics.46  
Whitehead argues that Xenophon is considering “metic revenues in the widest sense, 
arising from both metic-status itself (metoikion, eisphorai, liturgies) and metics’ 
economic activities (such as the x nika tele, and not least the harbour dues from a 
                                                
45 Riders received a 4-obol trophe payment per day for their horses (cf. Hipparchicus 1.19); see Kroll 
1977: 97-8, n. 36 and Rhodes 1981: 303-4.   
46 The notion that the metoikion was the only source of metic revenue has been a seriou  failure of the 
scholarship on this section of the Poroi; see, for example, von der Lieck 1933: 20, 29, Cawkwell 1963: 64, 
Hasebroek 1965: 26, Gauthier 1976: 57, Schütrumpf 1982: 4-5, and Finley 1999: 163-4.   
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revitalized Piraeus.”47 Eisphorai and liturgies notwithstanding, which were not 
technically prosodoi, Whitehead’s suggestion of income derived from theeconomic 
activities of metics, especially those working in the commercial sector, deserves further 
examination.   
At 3.5 Xenophon states that a rise in residents (εἰσοικίζοιντο) and visitors 
(ἀφικνοῖντο) will lead to a corresponding rise in imports and exports, sales, rents, and 
custom dues (ἂν πλέον καὶ εἰσάγοιτο καὶ ἐξάγοιτο καὶ ἐκπέμποιτο καὶ πωλοῖτο 
καὶ μισθοφοροῖτο καὶ τελεσφοροίη).  He does not specifically mention metics, but 
the verb εἰσοικίζοιντο, which contrasts with casual, short-term visitors implied by 
ἀφικνοῖντο, certainly signifies resident aliens.48  He insinuates the connection between 
metics, trade, and revenue more explicitly at 4.40: “with peace and the care of metics and 
traders and with the growth of imports and exports because of a larger population and the 
increases in market and harbor dues [i.e. p ntekoste]…the greatest amount of revenue 
will be created” (διὰ τὸ εἰρήνην τε εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ 
ἐμπόρους καὶ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πλείω εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι 
καὶ διὰ τὸ <τὰ> ἐλλιμένια καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς αὐξάνεσθαι…ὡς ἂν πλεῖσται <αἱ> 
πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο) (4.40).  This sentence forms a logical chain of events: peace and 
good treatment attract metics and traders to the city, who occasion increases in exports 
                                                
47 Whitehead 1977: 126; cf. Giglioni 1970: lxii who also notes the metics’ role as investors. 
48 Giglioni 1970: lxxviii-lxxxii, Gauthier 1976: 86, and Whitehead 1977: 126.  The connection between 
visitors and revenues was understood well by the Old Oligarch (Athenaion Politeia 1.16-18).   
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and imports, which in turn lead to more taxes and thus greater revenues.49  There can be 
little doubt, then, that Xenophon considers the economic activity of metics to be an 
excellent source of revenue.  Unfortunately, he does not say what that activity precisely 
is.  Should we make what appears to be the natural inference and assume that the 
metoikoi and emporoi are identical, which is to say, that metics contributed to Athenian 
revenues solely through trade and trade-related activities? 
The common assumption of historians notwithstanding, othing in the Poroi 
indicates that Xenophon considers long-distance trade to be the sole function of metics.  
In fact, the textual evidence compels us to look to their role as artisans and manufacturers 
also.  In addition to removing certain measures that t e metics think are atimiai to them, 
Xenophon suggests absolving them from hoplite servic , “for great is the risk to be away 
on campaign, and leaving their trades and workshops is also a big deal” (μέγας μὲν 
γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος ἀπόντι· μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν 
ἀπιέναι) (2.2).  Unfortunately, this is not the l ctio of the manuscripts, which read ἀπὸ 
τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν.50  The problem with this reading, however, is that τῶν 
τέκνων makes little sense in the context of Xenophon’s deire to release the metics 
“from measures that do not profit the state (viz. produce revenues)” (ὅσα μηδὲν 
ὠφελοῦντα τὴν πόλιν; cf. 2.3: ἡ πόλις γ’ ἂν ὠφεληθείη) (2.1).  The particle γάρ 
that introduces the sentence is “explanatory,” and thus the “danger” of which Xenophon 
                                                
49 Thiel 1926: 62-7 and Gauthier 1976: 173. 
50 Adopted in the OCT and other editions of the text (e.g., Waterfield 1997 and Doty 2003; cf. Herzog 
1914: 470). 
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speaks must be understood as an explication of this central idea.51  Furthermore, the 
articular infinitival phrase τὸ…ἀπιέναι is epexegetic.  As such, the idea of leaving one’s 
children hardly explains why serving as a hoplite is both dangerous to the metic and 
unprofitable to the polis.  Besides, οἰκίαι, which means both “house” and “household” 
(including all human members) in Xenophon’s works renders τέκνα otiose.52  Because 
the ancient evidence attests overwhelmingly to metic participation in the arts (technai), 
whereas very few sources actually speak to their role as long-distance traders, the 
Renaissance scholar Castalio appropriately changed τῶν τέκνων to τῶν τεχνῶν in the 
1553 Basel edition of Xenophon’s works.53  This parsimonious emendation has gained 
many converts and is adopted here.54 
To complicate the interpretation of this passage further, Dindorf’s old emendation 
of οἰκείων for οἰκιῶν has persisted, being adopted in Marchant’s Loeb, Rühl’s Teubner, 
                                                
51 Such an interpretation is supported by 4.28, where Xenophon employs similar phraseolgy to describe the 
great financial risk one takes in making “new cuttings” in the mines (κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ 
καινοτομοῦντι).   
52 E.g., Memorabilia 2.7.6: “By making bread Cyrebus feeds his whole family (oikia).” 
53 E.g., Old Oligarch, Athenaion Politeia 1.12 (“the city needs metics on account of their many different 
trades and the fleet” (nautikon ≠ commerce or navigation; see Frisch 1942: 211 and Whitehead 1977: 85); 
Plato, Laws 850a-b; Diodorus 11.43.3; Plutarch, Solon 24.2 and Lycurgus and Numa 2.3.  To my 
knowledge, the only explicit reference to metics as tr ders outside the inscriptional record is the lat gloss 
of Hesychius, who equates the ἐμπόριος with μέτοικος.  The 20.9% figure of Gerhardt (cited in Davies 
1981: 50) for metic participation in trade (compared to 48.4% in technai) is misleading because he does not 
distinguish between retail and long-distance traders.  Moreover, most of the references to emporoi in 
inscriptions (e.g., IG II2 1557, 59; 1559, 37) are, in fact, manumitted slaves (who became de facto metics; 
see Whitehead 1977: 16-7, 114-6) and thus are not representative of the metic population (Davies 1981: 
50).  Furthermore, men like Heracleides of (Cypriot) Salamis (IG II2 360), a wealthy emporos, may not 
have been a metic because there is nothing to sugget that he settled in Athens for any length of time.  The 
evidence for metic financing of trade is more abundant (e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 1347a1 and 
Demosthenes 35.51 and the other reference in the Corpus f Demosthenes cited in Isager Hansen 1975: 72, 
n. 79; though note Whitehead 1977: 49, who claims that he only “unambiguous status-designation in all 
these speeches…is Theodotus the ‘isoteles’” in 34.18, 44 and 35.14).        
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and Gauthier’s commentary.55  Dindorf justified this change by citing Cyropaedia 4.3.12, 
where Cyrus anticipates certain objections to his proposal of creating a Persian cavalry: 
“nor again are we like other men for whom farming, the arts, and other domestic labors 
leave no leisure time” (ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ μὴν ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνδράσι τοῖς μὲν 
γεωργίαι ἀσχολίαν παρέχουσι, τοῖς δὲ τέχναι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλα οἰκεῖα).  Though 
there is some similarity between this passage and the one in the Poroi, I fail to see how 
the contexts are “identical,” as Gauthier contends.56  The inclusion of farming in this 
triad, in which he mistakenly assumes metics did not engage because they did not have 
the right to own land, speaks strongly against the appropriateness of this passage to 
justify such an emendation.57  Zurborg’s defense of οἰκείων is perhaps a bit more 
persuasive: “metics could hardly have been vexed at abandoning their homes because 
they were deprived of their own domicile.”58  In other words, because renters and leasers 
have less or no attachment to their abodes than owners do, they cannot count it a “great 
thing” (μέγα) to go out on campaign.  Be that as it may, what is so perplexing about 
these scholars’ insistence on retaining Dindorf’s emendation is that the reading of the 
manuscripts nicely compliments τῶν τεχνῶν, which is the very reading each of them 
advocate in their texts, commentaries, and translations.   
                                                                                                                                      
54 Thiel 1922, Giglioni 1970, Schütrumpf 1982, and Audring 1992; cf. Moyle 1697: 47, Whitehead 1977: 
122, n. 30, and Gauthier 1976: 62.  
55 Dindorf 1866 (N.B. in the second edition of his Xenophontis opuscula, Dindorf returned to the reading 
of the mss.), Marchant 1925, Rühl 1912, and Gauthier 1976: 62-3; cf. Zurborg 1874: 23. 
56 Gauthier 1976: 62 
57 For metics in farming, see, for example, IG II2 10, 2, 5, 9 and IG II2 1553, 24-5 with Cohen 2000: 122, 
n. 104. 
58 Zurborg 1874: 23. 
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In both Xenophon’s works and the contemporary sources, οἰκίαι are often 
workplaces and centers of production, which manufact red goods for the market.59  Thiel 
notes rightly that oikia may indicate a dwelling, a family, and/or workshop (“locum 
ipsum τῆς τέχνης”  = ergasterion).60  He adduces Demosthenes’ speech Against 
Aphobus, where the orator describes the two ergasteria his father left him; one was a 
sword factory, employing 32 or 33 slaves; the other a couch factory, employing 20 slaves 
(27.9).  Here the word ergasterion signifies not only the slaves but also the dwelling 
(oikia) where they worked (11, 25, 32).61  Therefore, “the appearance of the word 
ergasterion,” explains Finley, “does not necessarily indicate th existence of a workshop 
as a distinct building.  It may mean a group of slaves employed in one place [sc. oikia] in 
the production of goods.”62  Similarly, in the speech Against Olympiodorus, the 
identification of oikia with ergasterion is discernible: “…I divided the property into two 
shares, men of the jury; one share consisted of the oikia in which Comon himself had 
lived and the slaves who were sailmakers, whereas the other share consisted of another 
oikia and the slaves who were color-grinders” (48.12).  In the Memorabilia, Socrates 
recommends to his friend Aristarchus, whose household was reduced to poverty because 
                                                
59 On the market orientation of these household ergasteria, see Harris 2002. 
60 Thiel 1922: 8; cf. Lauffer 1955-56: 83, n. 4 and Schütrumpf 1982: 122. 
61 In Athenian law, οἶκος, “property” or “estate,” was carefully distinguished from οἰκία, “dwelling-
house” (LSJ s.v. οἰκία), which Demosthenes follows in this speech (4).  In the Oeconomicus, Xenophon 
too observes this distinction (1.5; cf. Hellenica 3.1.25).  But elsewhere in the work, οἶκος denotes 
“household” or “family” with all its human members including slaves (Pomeroy 1994: 214).  In this sense, 
oikos is virtually synonymous with oikia.        
62 Finley 1952: 67.  Finley perhaps underestimates th number of ergasteria separate from oikiai, basing 
his claims largely on the documentary evidence from the horoi inscriptions: “Eight [sic. “ten”; Lalonde 
1991: 46 = Agora XIX, H112 and SEG 21, 655] out of a total of 154 [horoi mentioning ergasteria] is a 
small proportion and the ratio sinks even further when the mining and quarrying operations are eliminated” 
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of the Peloponnesian War, that he turn his oikia into a center of production on the model 
of five named Athenians who produce enough not onlyto feed their families but also to 
live luxuriously and to pay for liturgies (2.7.3-6).  Aristarchus reminds Socrates that these 
entrepreneurs employ “artisan slaves” (τεχνίται), not “free” Athenians whom he retains 
in his household and are above such work (2.7.4, 6)  While this passage evidences the 
prejudice of Athenian elites toward banausic occupations, it also attests well to the 
existence of Athenian oikiai as ergasteria.  A household that employ craftsmen is later 
described specifically as “a house bringing in revenue” (οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα) 
(3.11.4).  If such was the case for Athenian citizens, then a fortiori the same for metics.  
For example, Demosthenes calls the oikia of Neaera, an Athenian metic and courtesan, an 
ergasterion (59.67).  Hyperides describes the metic perfumer Athenogenes’ place of 
work an ergasterion, which the orator intimates was his oikia, employing three slaves.63  
According to Aeschines, whenever one person rents ad occupies a dwelling, the 
Athenians called it an oikia (naturally all metics belong to this category); when he plies a 
trade and occupies one of the ergasteria on the streets, the dwelling takes the name of the 
person’s trade (e.g., where a “smith” (χαλκεύς) works is called a “smithy” (χαλκεῖον)) 
                                                                                                                                      
(66).  For example, Lysias’ oikia clearly included a separate ergasterion (12.8-12); cf. IG II2 2496, 9-11 
and Plutarch, Pelopidas 12.1.      
63 Hyperides, Against Athenogenes 6, 10 with Finley 1952: 68-9. 
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(1.123-4).64  In these specific contexts, then, oikia may refer specifically to ergasterion: 
oikia and place of business were practically indistinguishable.65   
In sum, reading μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι in 
2.2 makes perfect philological sense.  With the lectio on firmer ground, we are now in a 
better position to understand Xenophon’s proposals for the metics.  The reason he 
advocates removing the burden of serving in the infantry is that campaigning was 
particularly risky to the metic’s livelihood, because the metic’s oikia was his business.  
Time away from his oikia, even for a couple of weeks, would have seriously jeopardized 
his business operations.  Moreover, because metics were disqualified from serving in the 
cavalry, Xenophon may be thinking in particular about the deleterious effects of hoplite 
service on rich metics who were indiscriminately conscripted together with their less 
well-off counterparts.  These metics, perhaps representing ten percent of the total adult 
male metic population (ca. 1-2,000), would have operated large oikiai/ergasteria 
(employing ten or more slaves).66  Time away would have necessitated retaining slave 
epitropoi, “foremen,” to oversee the work of the other slaves and to continue business 
                                                
64 Aeschines’ testimony substantiates the documentary evidence, which indicates that the vast majority of 
metics settled in the city: 3 of 5 lived in urban/suburban demes; 1 of 5 in Piraeus; and rest were scattered 
throughout Attica (Whitehead 1986: 82-5 and Sinclair 1988: 29-30).  Most metics were thus occupied in 
urban trades (cf. Harris 2002: 70). 
65 Harris 2002: 81-3.  That the oikos was the locus of production elsewhere in the Greek world seems 
certain (see Cahill 2002: Chapter 6). 
66 From the epigraphical record, Gerhardt (cited in Davies 1981: 50) estimates that 8.5% of metics were 
“industrial entrepreneurs.”  For the size of the metic population, see above n. 42.  On the issue of slave , the 
Athenian peasant probably owned on average at least three slaves; wealthy proprietors owned around ten 
domestic slaves (Garlan 1988: 61-2).  Numbers for the industrial sector range from lows around a dozen 
(e.g., Aeschines 1.97) to 20-30 in the middle range (e.g., Demosthenes 27.9-11) and to 60-100 on the high 
end (e.g., Demosthenes 36.11; Lysias 12.8, 19) (see Davies 1981: 41-44 for additional references).  The 
numbers Xenophon gives for slaves who worked the mines (Nicias: 1000; Hipponicus: 600; Philemonides: 
300) were abnormally large (4.14-5).  
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operations.67  However, even epitropoi needed constant supervision (Oeconomicus 
12.19; 13.1), and unlike the Athenian citizen who was in much the same position, the 
metic lacked the social and kinship network on which he could otherwise rely during his 
absence.  Furthermore, because metics could not own real property, financial losses that 
mounted while on campaign would have been compounded by the necessity of having to 
continue with rental payments for their oikiai/ergasteria.68  If these problems were 
serious for wealthy metics, then they were even more so for small-time metic 
entrepreneurs of the hoplite census, men like Simias of Alopece who worked alongside 
his five slaves.69  The greater number of metic hoplites probably consisted of these 
working entrepreneurs, and we can crudely estimate their numbers to be in the range of 2-
3,000.70  Because not all of these worked in their oikiai (some would have practiced their 
                                                
67 E.g., Oeconomicus 12-13; Aeschines 1.97.  See the additional references in Cohen 1992: 93.  Many of 
these slaves paid their masters a fixed rate of the profits made from their businesses. 
68 The inscriptional evidence provides us with some numbers.  For oikia, IG II2 1590 shows rents ranging 
between 126 and 175 dr. per annum.  Finley 1952: 255, n. 73 suggests that these rents were high but they 
may represent the median.  According to IG II2 2496, 9-28, a workshop and adjoining house in the Piraeus 
(τὸ ἐργαστήριον τὸ ἐν Πειραεῖ καὶ τὴν οἴκησιν τὴν προσοῦσαν αὐτῶι) was leased out in 
perpetuity for 54 dr. per annum.  It also gives the valuation (τὸ τίμημα) of the property at seven mnai (28).  
This number is significant because it demonstrates that the rent was based on 7 5/7% of the total valuation.  
This percentage is close to the 8% average capitaliza ion rate for land (Jones 1957: 30, Cooper 1978: 169,
n.38, and Millet 1991: 232-5) and thus shows that dwellings fetched about the same rate.  Accordingly, if 
we take the loan amounts given in the horoi for ergasteria, which could represent as much as half the value 
of the property (Harris 1988: 263 and 2002: 81), and multiply them by 8%, we get the following (absolute 
minimum) rental amounts: horoi nos. 87 and 88 = 480 dr.; horos no. 90a = 136 dr.; horos no. 86 = 64 dr.; 
horos no. 7 = 60 dr.; horos no. 90 = 56 dr.;  horoi nos. 92a and b = 40 dr. 
69 IG I3 476, 87-93 with Randall 1953: 199-200, 202 (Table 2).  Of course, there is no way of knowing if 
Simias ever served as a hoplite, but the fact that he owned five male slaves suggests that he was at least of 
the zeugite census and thus eligible to be called up if necessary (Garlan 1988: 61).  For the practice of 
Athenians buying slaves as “helpers” in industry and manufacture, see Memorabilia 2.3.3 with Jones 1957: 
15-6.     
70 According to Thucydides 2.31.1-2, in 431 metic hoplites were “at least three thousand strong.”  Gomme 
1933: 5 and Jones 1957: 164-5 argue that this number does not take into account reservists (e.g., those over 
50 years).  Gomme puts the total at 5,000-5,500 (but see Whitehead 1977: 98).  Subtract the 1-2,000 
wealthy metic hoplites deduced above from 5,000 (Gomme) and 3,000 (Thucydides) and we get the range 
of 2-3,000.  Theoretically, these metic hoplites would have been compensated with misthoi or trophe.  
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trades in the agora or outdoors in places like the mines and quarries), we can now 
appreciate the appropriateness of the phrase μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ 
τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι.71  Whereas the term oikiai pertains only to those metics who used 
their homes as centers of production, technai would cover all metics in manufacture, 
whether they worked at home or elsewhere. 
Some scholars have detected what they see as a contradiction in Xenophon’s 
proposal to remove the metics from hoplite service while at the same time opening up the 
cavalry (2.5).72  Given my interpretation above, the paradox seems real and raises the 
question: why does cavalry service not bring “danger” to wealthy metics’ business 
operations?  For starters, we must respect the syntax of the passage and recognize that the 
grant of this privilege is precisely that, a “privilege” (καλόν).  This right is categorically 
different from the other atimiai he recommends “removing” (i.e., hoplite service).  
Consequently, we are not compelled to identify potential metic hippeis with those 
occupied in technai.  These metics probably leased land in the c ora, possessed many 
                                                                                                                                      
However, unlike in the fifth century, and especially before 413, when pay could have amounted to 2 dr.per 
day (Thucydides 3.17.4), hoplite pay in the fourth century probably averaged around 3 obols per day, but 2 
obols were also common (for the whole question, see Pritchett 1971: 14-21 and passim).  In 351 
Demosthenes, for example, suggests that the Athenians p y their hoplites 2 obols a day and intimates that 
they make up the rest of their pay from booty raids (4.28-9).  These low payments contrasts sharply with
the 1.5 to 2 dr. a day a skilled metic could have made in the labor market. 
71 For the high concentration of workshops in and around the agora, see Lysias 24.20, IG II2 1013, 9, and 
Camp 1986: 135-47.  While Demosthenes mentions some te porary stalls in the agora made of wicker 
(18.169), some workshops and stores were made of stone and other durable materials (Harris 2002: 75; cf. 
Wycherley 1978: 98-100).  Xenophon remarks how Agesilau  once turned the whole city of Ephesus into 
an “arms factory” (πολέμου ἐργαστήριον), where the market was full of horses and weapons f r ale, 
copper-workers, carpenters, smiths, leather-cutters, and painters (Hellenica 3.4.16-7; cf. Agesilaus 1.26).  
For workshops in the Piraeus, see Garland 1987: 68-9.   
72 Gauthier 1976: 65 and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 366; cf. Whitehead 1977: 127-8. 
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slaves that worked the soil, and owned a number of horses.73  Their life would have been 
not much different from that of Ischomachus, as depict d in the Oeconomicus (11.14-18).  
Furthermore, the number of metics eligible for cavalry service could not have numbered 
more than 200, as argued above.  We are dealing the primarily with a small number of 
elite metics “with whom Xenophon himself might readily mix, socially and 
intellectually.”74  Supposing the proposal attracted some wealthy metic en repreneurs and 
financiers (which seems likely), service in cavalry need not have been a detriment to their 
businesses.75  Though the cavalry was taking a more prominent role in offensive 
campaigns, especially after Mantinea, it was nonethel ss a largely defensive corps 
charged with the protection of the Attic chora.76  Lastly, it is important to note how this 
particular measure, though touching only a small number of metics, would have had 
trickle-down effects by endearing Athens to all metics, thus helping to increase overall 
numbers (εὐνουστέρους ἂν ποιεῖσθαι; cf. 2.7: καὶ τοῦτο εὐνουστέρους ἂν τοὺς 
μετοίκους ποιοίη).  For example, the cavalry served important religious functions and 
was a vehicle for displaying wealth and status (Hipparchicus 3.1-14).  Seeing their fellow 
                                                
73 About one of five metics lived in non-urban regions of Attica (Whitehead 1986: 82-5 and Sinclair 1988: 
29-30), dwelling in more than forty separate demes (many of them rural) (Whitehead 1986: 83-4) and even 
non-deme areas  good for farming (e.g., Oropos) (Cohen 2000: 122-3, n. 106).  The long lease periods an  
the high rents attested  for these lands (see Walbank 1991: 152-65) made them available to only the richest 
metics.   
74 Whitehead 1977: 128.      
75 Besides, it is important to note that Xenophon proposes to “share” this privilege with the metics, not to 
make cavalry service mandatory for them.  Perhaps, the wealthy metics, whom this honor would have 
attracted to Athens, would have been more interested in it for their sons than themselves. 
76 See Poroi 4.47 and Hipparchicus 7.2-7 with Spence 1993: 16-17. 
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metics honored by the state during religious ceremonies would have given many the hope 
of increased social mobility.77 
Xenophon’s proposal for granting the right of enktesis is similarly targeted at a 
minority of metics because the state must first deem them “worthy” (οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι 
ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι)—a stipulation that probably refers to a vote by the demos in the 
assembly.78  “[T]he beneficiaries,” Whitehead contends, “would be individuals who ask 
for it and are adjudged worthy (axioi) to receive it—not the ‘the metic population’ but a 
veritable ‘metic aristocracy’.”79  Indeed, Xenophon does say that the right of enktesis 
will cause “more better metics to desire to live in Athens” (διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ 
βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως).80  But what kind of metics does 
βελτίους connote?  Let us take a closer look at the proposal: “Then again, since there 
many vacant sites and building plots within the walls, if the city were to grant to those 
applicants who are deemed worthy the right to buy these plots and build houses on 
                                                
77 Just because Xenophon suggests removing the duty of hoplite service, he gives no indication that metics 
were to be debarred entirely from service.  Metics willing to serve presumably still had that right. 
78 Gauthier 1976: 68. 
79 Whitehead 1977: 127, invoking Clerc 1979: 440. 
80 Contrary to all the commentators and translators, I interpret the phrase πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους as 
hendiadys. Gauthier 1976: 63-4, 72-3 and Whitehead 1977: 126 both take βελτίους to mean that 
Xenophon wished to attract only Greek metics, because there were too many barbaroi metics living in 
Athens (cf. 2.3: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἡ πόλις γ’ ἂν ὠφεληθείη, εἰ οἱ πολῖται μετ’ ἀλλήλων 
στρατεύοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ συντάττοιντο αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ νῦν, Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ 
ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι).  What they fail to explain, however, is if Xenophon is playing the racial 
card with his audience, why would he then turn around and advocate opening up the cavalry to metics, 
among whom certainly numbered the same Lydians, Phrygians, and Syrians?  In the Hipparchicus, 
Xenophon advocates establishing a foreign contingent of 200 riders (7.3-4).  Here xenoi could refer to just 
Greek hippeis, but he goes on to say that the fame of the Spartan cavalry dates to the inception of foreign 
riders, which Bugh 1988: 156 argues refers to Agesilau ’ use of barbaroi (including Phrygians!) riders in 
395 during his campaign in Asia (Hellenica 3.4.15; 4.1.3, 21; Agesilaus 1.23-4; cf. Anabasis 1.8.5).   
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them…” (εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ 
οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι 
ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι).81  As the commentators correctly point out, Xenophon is 
specifically advocating the grant of οἰκίας ἔγκτησις (the right of owning a house) not 
γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις (the right of owning both (agricultural) land and house), 
which is presumed to be greater privilege.82  This grant in and of itself was nothing new, 
as the polis periodically granted nktesis of both varieties to benefactors of the polis well 
before Xenophon wrote the Poroi.83   
Xenophon says nothing about the metics’ qualification for enktesis other than that 
they be deemed axioi, which, I suggest, refers not to their status as benefactors or 
potential benefactors, but rather to their revenue-generating potential.  In other words, 
under Xenophon’s plan all a metic would have to do is convince the assembly, perhaps 
with help of the metoikophylakes, that he was a homo economicus capable of contributing 
to augmentation of the polis’ revenues.84  Pecirka astutely observes that this proposal is 
“a very serious—and I should say very enlightened—attempt to change, though very 
partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real economic role 
                                                
81 There is a dispute about the punctuation of this sentence, as some want to place a comma after τῶν 
τειχῶν (Thiel 1922, Marchant 1925, Gauthier 1976: 67, and Au ring 1992).  As this does not affect my 
interpretation, I have followed the text of the OCT.  
82 Thiel 1922:10, Gauthier 1976: 68, and Whitehead 1977: 127.  For enktesis in general, see Pecirka 1966 
and Henry 1983: Chapter 7. 
83 See the chronological table in Pecirka 1966: 152-6. 
84 Whitehead 1977: 129 argues that “[t]hose considered ‘worthy’ would be men who had performed 
substantial euergesia.”  This interpretation cannot stand, because it completely ignores the fact that the 
sentence is an unreal condition and thus indicates that Xenophon is introducing something new.  Under his 
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in Athens.”85  Whitehead and others, however, have strongly objected to the notion that 
this measure was both progressive and economically oriented.86  Because Xenophon does 
not propose to grant γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις to the metics, he is guilty of maintaining 
the legal and economic divide between metics and citizens.  Only landed property 
constitutes real estate, it is believed, and the metic’s separation from the land was a major 
“economic disability.”87  This interpretation of Xenophon’s proposal is an example of 
missing the forest through the trees.  It behooves all those wishing to understand the 
significance behind the grant of enktesis oikias to explain first what the measure would 
have done for metics before describing what it would not have done. 
The fact of the matter is that Xenophon provides sufficient information for 
determining the true intention of his proposal.  The phrase πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν 
ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα takes us back to the thought expressed in 2.2: μέγα 
δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι.  As argued above, metic 
hoplites count it a “great thing to leave their trades and homes” because their oikiai were 
loci of production and manufacture and thus the bases of their livelihoods.  Xenophon’s 
measure to grant the right to construct houses and/or buildings on vacant plots within the 
city walls is directed at these metic industrial entr preneurs.  “Inside the walls” (ἐντὸς 
τῶν τειχῶν) is also a dead giveaway, since it denotes the urban sector of Athens, where 
                                                                                                                                      
plan, for the first time, a whole status group would have become eligible for enktesis, not just a small class 
of benefactors.            
85 Pecirka 1967: 24-5. 
86 Whitehead 1977: 127, Finley 1952: 77-8 and 1999: 163-4, Gauthier 1976: 68, and Schütrumpf 1982: 4-
5. 
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there was the highest concentration of workshops.  Xenophon is probably thinking 
particularly of the asty, which, less populated than the Piraeus, seems to have had more 
vacent sites than the rest of the city.88  This is significant because the statistics from the 
epigraphical record place three out of every five mtics in the asty.89  Consequently, 
Xenophon’s proposal to grant enktesis oikias, like the one for removing hoplite service, is 
“economic” because it aims to promote metic household businesses.  Increasing polis 
revenues for Xenophon, then, is contingent upon the economic activity of individuals. 
Moreover, the privilege of enktesis oikias, contrary to Finley and Whitehead, 
would have bridged the legal and economic divide betwe n metics and citizens in one 
very significant way: those possessing the right of anchisteia could have bequeathed their 
oikiai and concomitantly their businesses to their sons, thus ensuring the long-term 
continuance of both.  Without this entitlement, metics came and went, staying in Athens 
only very rarely past the first generation.90  The grant of enktesis oikias, therefore, would 
have lent a greater permanency to the status of resident aliens.  Xenophon is not 
concerned with measures that bring short-term gain but with ones that guarantee long-
term economic success and growth (see below Section 5D).  A more permanent and 
productive resident alien population is essential to realizing this goal.   
Before moving on, we must briefly examine one more way enktesis oikias would 
have benefited Athenian economy and society.  Xenophon wants to attract not only 
productive metics but also metic philosophers, sophists, and poets (5.4).  Leiwo and 
                                                                                                                                      
87 Finley 1952: 77, 264 n.17; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129and Cartledge 1997: 222. 
88 Thiel 1922: 9 citing Aeschines 1.81-4; cf. Gauthier 1976: 67-8 and Cartledge 1997: 222. 
89 See above, note 72. 
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Remes’ recent analysis of the will of Epicurus demonstrates well that metic intellectuals 
who wished to establish permanent schools or Athenian philosophers who aspired to 
bequeath school to metics (as was the case with Epicurus) were severely handicapped by 
the law forbidding metics from owning property.91  A convoluted solution to this 
problem was discovered, citizen go-betweens, but there was always the danger that these 
de jure custodians of the school would not carry out the stipulations of the will, which 
might lead to the dissolution of the institution altogether.  Xenophon’s plan would have 
prevented such a “brain-drain” from taking place.  Consequently, the retention of 
intellectual capital would have also had a palpable impact on the Athenian economy, 
helping to sustain economic growth.92 
Let us now summarize and clarify exactly how Xenophon expects his proposals to 
increase Athens’ revenues.  The creation of the office of metoikophylakes, whose 
members vie with each other to register the greatest number of metics, is directed at 
increasing the numbers of metics paying the metoikion.  All those “without a city” (e.g., 
political exiles, refugees, etc.) are welcome in Athens under his plan.  Our author also 
speaks of removing certain atimiai, about which he is frustratingly silent.  Perhaps not
wishing to introduce too much controversy into his work, Xenophon wisely leaves it up 
to his readers to decide what timiai to remove.  Scholars have speculated endlessly 
                                                                                                                                      
90 See the excellent analysis of Patterson: 2000: 98-102. 
91 Leiwo and Remes 1999. 
92 Such is the postulate of contemporary developmental conomists who stress the importance of education 
and training in sustaining economic growth (see Saller 2002: 261-2). 
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about what these atimiai could have been, but no consensus has been reached.93  The 
most plausible suggestion is that he is referring to the prostates obligation because the 
metoikophylakes would have assumed many of their prerogatives.94  Whatever these 
atimiai were, they certainly concerned all metics (ὅσα…ἀτιμίας δοκεῖ τοῖς μετοίκοις 
παρέχειν), and so their elimination probably indicates a desire on Xenophon’s part to 
boost overall metic numbers.95   
The three remaining recommendations (removal of hoplite duty, the privilege of 
cavalry service, and enktesis oikias), which concern only a minority of metics, aim at 
augmenting revenues by promoting economic activity n technai and oikia/ergasteria.  In 
the two passages discussed above (3.5; 4.40), Xenopho  enumerates three potential 
sources of metic revenue under the general of rubric of imports and exports (3.5: 
εἰσάγοιτο καὶ ἐκπέμποιτο; 4.40: εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι): harbor dues (τὰ 
ἐλλιμένια/τελεσφοροίη) (i.e. the pentekoste on imports and exports), rents 
(μισθοφοροῖτο), and taxes in the agora (τὰς ἀγορὰς) (including those from sales; cf. 
πωλοῖτο).  In respect to the latter two types, it is easy to see how metic production in the 
technai would have occasioned increases in these sources of revenue.  More goods 
                                                
93 For the possibilities, see Thiel 1922: 45-6 (exclusion from religious life: sacrifices, festivals, etc.), 
Giglioni1970: lxiv (judicial inferiority at the hands of the polemarch), Gauthier 1976: 57-9 (apagoge and 
exclusion from certain gymnasiums and festivals); cf. Whitehead 1977: 126-7.    
94 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 366 and Whitehead 1977: 127. 
95 A majority of these metics would have been wage earners (misthotai), poor, and thus rowers in the 
Athenian fleet (Amit 1965: 30-49).  Because Xenophon is rather silent about them, Gauthier 1976: 62 takes 
this as a sign of his disinterest in naval affairs: “For a man of his time and education, the only soldier was a 
hoplite.”  This cannot be right because he does show some interest in the navy at 4.42, where he advocates 
putting the mining slaves on the ships as rowers.  Moreover, these poorer metics, while, no doubt, valuable 
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produced for sale means more goods that can be taxed in the agora.96  If the ξενικὰ 
τέλη, “foreigner’s tax,” which allowed foreigners to conduct business in the agora, also 
applied to metics, then this was another source of revenue.97  Furthermore, because a 
majority of metics would not be “worthy” of enktesis oikias, many would still need to 
rent out houses and other dwellings.  Some of these would be state owned (3.12-3); 
others privately owned; but both kinds of rental property would have been taxed.98 
The last source of revenue, harbor dues, while, no doubt, pertaining to foreign 
traders, also concerns the metics in two fundamental ways.  First, metics in the technai 
often needed imported goods to manufacture their products.  For example, shield makers 
and cobblers required hides from regions around the Pontus and Cyrene.99  A mass 
amount of wood was also needed to make charcoal, without which the mining, ceramic, 
and metal working industries could not have functioned.100  Consequently, increased 
imports from the expansion of metic industry would have led to greater harbor traffic and 
thus more income.101   The second way the metics would have played a part in 
augmenting harbor dues is through the export of domestic products and manufactured 
                                                                                                                                      
to the Athenian economy, for revenue purposes were important only for the metoikia they paid.  Athens 
received this income from them whether they went on campaign or not. 
96 On the sales tax, see Boeckh 1976: 329-3 and Andreades 1933: 144-5. 
97 Demosthenes 57.31, 34 (see above). These two taxes would have applied also to traders, especially to 
those who personally brought their goods to the market for sale.   
98 For the “tax on rents” (τέλος ἐνοικίων), see Andreades 1933: 151-3.  
99 We learn from Demosthenes 34.10 that in addition to many other goods, one ship was carrying 1000 
hides from the Pontus to Athens before it capsized.  Cf. Hermippus Fg. 63 (Edmonds): hides from Cyrene. 
100 See Isager and Hansen 1975: 29-30, Meiggs 1982: 188-2 7, esp. 203-5, and Olson 1991(though he 
diminishes the extent to which the Athenians had to import wood for charcoal). 
101 Cf. Plato, Republic 370e-71b with Harris 2002: 77 who asserts that a ci y should be established in a 
region where it can acquire imports, and he says this in the context of raw materials needed for domestic 
manufacture. 
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goods.  That Xenophon is looking to exploit this source of revenue is certain.  First, 
Xenophon explicitly mentions “exports” no less than te  times in the Poroi (1.7; 3.2 (4x); 
3.5 (2x); 4.21 (2x); 4.40; cf 1.3-5).  In addition to silver, he claims that “Athens has a 
great amount of goods for export that humans need” (ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα 
μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι) (3.2).  Unfortunately, Xenophon 
does not adumbrate for us here the goods that πλεῖστα denotes, but at 1.3-4 he does 
mention agricultural produce and marble.102  Judging from the epigraphic record, not a 
few metics worked in the quarrying industry as stonecutters.103  Moreover, while metics 
undoubtedly produced an abundance of manufactured goo s for local consumption, they 
also made wares for the export market (e.g., ceramics), though some historians have 
denied vehemently that the Athenians ever exported th ir manufactured goods in great 
quantities.104  However, the point is not whether the Athenians actu lly exported 
manufactured goods in vast quantities; rather, it is a question of what Xenophon 
prescribes to stimulate metic manufacturing so thate Athenians may significantly 
increase the number of domestically produced goods f r export and consequently collect 
greater revenues.  
To further the claim that Xenophon is thinking of products for foreign markets, 
we can bring in a passage from the Cyropaedia, which has escaped the attention of those 
                                                
102 There is much evidence to support Xenophon’s claim that Attic marble was exported (viz. in demand) 
throughout the Mediterranean.  For example, temple builders at Epidaurus paid 100 mnai for Pentelic 
marble for several buildings (Burford 1969: 173-4) and Pentelic marble has been found in the temple of 
Zeus at Olympia, the tholos at Delphi, a frieze of the Mausoleum in Halicarnassus, and two sarcophagi in 
Sidon (Ober 1985: 30, n. 30 citing an unpublished paper by H.A. Thompson).   
103 See, for example, the references in the table of Clerc 1979: 450-6. 
104 See Chapter 4, Section 4B. 
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scholars who deny that goods were ever manufactured fo  external markets in the ancient 
world.  After Cyrus captures Sardis, the king seeks Croesus’ advice about whether to 
pillage the city, which is teeming with luxury goods.  Croesus recommends sparing the 
city because “whatever fine possession that a man or woman has here will come to you; 
and next year you will find the city once again full of many fine things as it is now; but if 
you plunder it completely, even the industrial arts (αἱ τέχναι), which they say are the 
fountains of all fine things (ἃς πηγὰς φασι τῶν καλῶν εἶναι), will be utterly 
destroyed” (7.2.12-3).  Cyrus wisely decides to spare the city, because, as we later find 
out, he needs these goods to distribute to his friends in Babylonia and Persepolis.  
Consequently, cities like Sardis began to produce goods for external markets: “they 
would send [sc. to Cyrus] whatever fine thing they have in their land, whether it was 
grown, raised, or manufactured” (πέμψειεν ὅ τι καλὸν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἢ φύοιτο 
ἢ τρέφοιτο ἢ τεχνῷτο) (8.6.22-3).  This passage is significant for our analysis of the 
Poroi because it demonstrates well not only Xenophon’s interest in goods manufactured 
for external markets but also his awareness of the connection between war and the demise 
of technai.105  War, as we have seen, brings a sharp decline in revenues (5.12).  Croesus’ 
advice to Cyrus, then, parallels nicely Xenophon’s counsel to the Athenians.  Both 
                                                
105 Because the Cyropaedia was written before the Social War, it is likely tha  Xenophon’s understanding 
of the effects of war on industry is due to his personal experience with the disastrous effects the 
Peloponnesian War had on Attic industries.  According to Macdonald 1981, the Attic pottery industry 
drastically declined during the war because of a waning labor market (especially slaves), which resulted in 
the massive emigration of potters and other craftsmen from Athens, especially after 413 with the 
occupation of Decelea (see Section 5D).  A vast majority of these, Macdonald argues, were metics (166-7).  
After the war, though the labor market improved, many skilled potters and painters did not return, leading 
to the production of cheaper, massed produced pots. Because these were not in high demand, overall 
production never matched fifth-century levels.  Again, Xenophon’s desire to attract “better” metics reflects 
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advisors exhort imperialists to turn away from war and the practice of depredatory 
economics to the cultivation of the t chnai, which are the bedrock of the state’s long-term 
economic and fiscal sustainability. 
In sum, Xenophon’s proposals for the metics are not prescriptions for social and 
political change, but rather for financial and economic growth.  It is a mistake to criticize 
him for not going far enough in dismantling the political and legal barrier between 
citizens and metics.  Xenophon could have offered more, no doubt, particularly the 
privilege of enktesis ges.  But when we look at the specifics of his program for financial 
recovery, such a grant would have contributed little, because, as demonstrated last 
chapter, agriculture from an economic and fiscal point of view was not lucrative.  
Besides, it is unlikely that many metics would have turned to farming had they the 
opportunity to own land, because those wishing to farm probably did so as tenants, and 
the percentage of these was very small.106  Moreover, scholars like Finley also take 
Xenophon to task for not offering more incentives to the metics to promote trade and 
industry.  In particular, Xenophon should have given tax breaks, such as the removal of 
the metoikion and export duties.107  This is a red herring because it ignores many other 
types of incentives that Xenophon does suggest to promote trade and industry.108  In 
addition to the benefits noted above, the right of enktesis oikias for those in manufacture 
would have also allowed them to use their homes as ecurity, thus putting them on an 
                                                                                                                                      
this need to encourage skilled workers to return to Athens.  Many of them who returned during the middle 
part of the fourth century probably left during the Social War (cf. Isocrates 8.21).    
106 8.5% according to Gerhardt cited in Davies 1981: 50.  
107 Finley 1982: 53-4 and 1999: 164; cf. Hasebroek 1965: 2 -7, 100-103. 
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equal footing with Athenian citizens.109  Such loans would have been indispensable for 
maintaining and growing a business.110  And if we add to this the elimination of hoplite 
service, a good number of metic entrepreneurs would have had a distinct advantage over 
their citizen counterparts.  For instance, as Ehrenberg reminds us, the citizen who had to 
close his shop occasionally to fulfill his political (and military) duties would have lost 
“customers to the man whose shop was always open.”111  Had the Athenians carried out 
Xenophon’s proposals for the metics (there is no evidence to support the notion they did), 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that many of them would have prospered 
immensely.112  Accordingly, increased wealth would have eroded further the status-
                                                                                                                                      
108 The metoikion was a meager sum, especially for those metics who ere industrial entrepreneurs, and 
though the evidence is not rich, the p ntekoste was either the going rate or below average for the larger 
Greek world.  There is no indication that such low taxation levels inhibited trade or manufacture.       
109 For oikia as security, see Finley 1952: 55-6, 60-5.     
110 For a refutation of the old orthodoxy on the supposed non-productivity of Athenian loans (e.g., Finley 
1999: 141, 208 and Millet 1983: 42-7), see Cohen 1992: 30-6.  For instance, loans are attested for 
providing funds for the continued operation of a perfumery (Lysias, Fg. 38.1); for the purchase of mining 
concessions and processing mills (Demosthenes 37 and 40.52); for establishing a cloth-making business 
(Memorabilia 2.7.12); and for the financing of the import of wood (Demosthenes 49.35-6).    
111 Ehrenberg 1962: 163.  Perhaps this was not so much of an issue for entrepreneurs with larger 
establishments that required capable foremen.      
112 Cawkwell 1963: 64 (cf. Giglioni 1970: lvii-lviii, Burke 1992: 209, and Engen 1996: 376-8) argues that 
the Athenians (through the initiative of Eubulus) adopted Xenophon’s proposal of enktesis: “whereas 
before the Social War the conferment of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις appears to have been very rare, after 
that war it is conferred, to judge by our epigraphic evidence, very freely indeed.  This of course affcted 
only privileged individuals, but suggests that Eubul s had taken Xenophon’s advice, in part, about howto 
attract metics.”  Whitehead 1977: 128-9 draws attention to many problems with this interpretation: “There 
are indeed numerous enktesis grants from the second half of the fourth century, but: (a) there are also 
substantial grants before ca. 350; (b) there is no demonstrable cluster after 354 [cf. Pecirka 1966: 152-9]; 
(c) the status of the honorands, as always, is problematical; and (d) most of these grants (as ever) ar  of ges 
kai oikias enktesis.”  Cf. Gauthier 1976: 223-5 who argues much the same.  However, just because the 
specifics of his program were not carried out, we should not underestimate the broader influence Xenophon 
exercised on his contemporaries concerning metics.  The metic population, if there is any truth to Isocrates 
8.21, had been in decline for some time.  But by the end of the century, the adult male metic population was 
at least 10,000 strong.  Cawkwell and Burke 1984: 11 - 5 attribute this sharp rise to the efforts of Eubulus, 
whose indebtedness to Xenophon, though often overdrawn, is undeniable.  Moreover, what is absent from 
the discussions about grants of enktesis is that only after ca. 350 do we find individuals receiving this 
privilege for economic activity, which is precisely the kind of pursuit Xenophon intends to honor in the
Poroi (IG II2 342+, 337, 351+624, 360b, 343; Hesperia (43) 1974: no. 3).  As Engen 1996: 375 stresses: “It 
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divide between metic and citizen, a phenomenon to which the Old Oligarch attests as 
early as the late fifth century (1.12).113  Though it cannot be ascertained for sure from the 
text whether Xenophon intended to contribute to the erosion of the boundaries separating 
metic and citizen (though see next section), judging from his other works where the 
divisions between slave/free, man/women, and Greek/barbarian are often blurred, it is a 
likely prospect.114  Although he may not have revolutionized metic/citizen relations to 
the liking of modern historians, much of what he recommended to the Athenians did, in 
fact, “[break] through the conventional limits.”115  
 
5Β. Commerce and the Liberalization of Trade Relations 
Xenophon begins his section on commerce by explaining why “the city is the 
most agreeable and profitable for those engaged in trade” (ὥς γε μὴν καὶ 
                                                                                                                                      
is apparent that Athens adapted its practice of granting ἔγκτησις for political and military services to meet 
specific needs involving trade and the acquisition of revenue as they arose” (more below).        
113 On this “new social structure based on economic wealth and not bound to status” see Pecirka 1976: 28; 
cf. Mossé 1962: 24-8; Humphreys 1978: 72, and Cohen 1992: 88, n. 134. 
114 For Xenophon’s rather “enlightened” attitude of the barbarians, see Hirsch 1985.  For Xenophon’s 
rejection of a natural hierarchy among human beings, especially his views against natural slavery, see th  
excellent analysis of Pomeroy 1994: 65-7.  For Xenophon, what seems to have counted the most is 
efficiency and results.  In other words, he was a consummate believer in a meritocracy, which he treats 
theoretically in Books 3 and 4 of the Cyropaedia (Newell 1981: 121-50 and Nadon 2001: 71-4).        
115 Once again, Xenophon’s ideas clash strongly with Plato’s in the Laws.  While Plato apparently got rid 
of the prostates obligation and the metoikion and, like Xenophon, absolved metics from serving in the 
infantry, he had no intention of even attracting metics to Magnesia in the first place by these “privileges” 
(see Morrow 1939: 102-3 and Whitehead 1977: 131, 133).  In fact, metics were required to leave after 
twenty years (Laws 850b).  This time limit contrasts with Xenophon’s plan to foster long-term settlement 
under the grant of enktesis oikias.  As in Athens, only citizens can own real estate in Magnesia (737e; 738d; 
740b-741a).  But Plato’s legislation goes one step further by outlawing the alienation of land, which as
Morrow 1939: 101 correctly points out, would have rendered special grants of enktesis by the assembly 
impossible.  Citizenship itself could not even be secured by euergesia! (Whitehead 1977: 139, n. 64).  In 
short, the judicious remarks of Whitehead 1977: 135are worth quoting: “Plato saw to it that, in his place, 
the Magnesian metic would enjoy a freedom from burdens, financial and military, and (above all) a degre  
of legal protection for which his Athenian counterpart might well have envied him.  But rights and duties 
alike seem to add up to more social prejudice, lesssecurity, and less integration than was the case in 
Attica.”  
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ἐμπορεύεσθαι ἡδίστη τε καὶ κερδαλεωτάτη ἡ πόλις) (3.1).  He then expands on 
this statement with two salient examples: Athens has t e finest and safest places to moor, 
especially during bad weather; and, unlike other poleis, she possesses both a great variety 
of goods people need and a valuable silver currency, which allow traders the choice of 
returning to other ports with either; and those who choose to return with silver are 
guaranteed a profit on their investment (3.1-2).  What is so remarkable about these 
straightforward yet often misinterpreted propositions is that Athens is a pleasant and 
profitable place for non-Athenians to conduct commerce.116  Indeed, Athens gains from 
increased commercial activity, but she does so onlyby benefiting others in the process.  
As discussed in the last chapter (Sections 4A-B), Xenophon’s program to transform the 
Athenian economy away from consumption to production is predicated upon reciprocity 
and the notion that profit derived from trade is not zero-sum.  Thematically, then, these 
illustrations are akin to the other “natural” advantages Attica enjoys, which Xenophon 
adumbrates in the opening sections of the work: the land has the potential to produce 
“great revenues” by satisfying other peoples’ needs for produce, manufactured goods, 
and viable currency (1.2, 4, 7; cf. 3.2).  
Xenophon proposes three measures, which have as their aim the increase in the 
number of traders visiting the Piraeus and concomitantly the augmentation of sales, rents, 
and custom dues (3.5).  The first of these suggestions is the establishment of rewards for 
the magistrates of the emporium to speed up the adjudication of disputes among 
merchants: “If prizes were offered to the magistrates of the emporium who settled 
                                                
116 Take, for example, the translation of Waterfield: “I shall now explain why maritime trade is a 
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disputes in the most just and quickest manner so that the merchant who wished to sail 
would not be hindered, the result would be that a far greater number of merchants would 
trade with us and with much more satisfaction” (εἰ δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ 
ἆθλα προτιθείη τις ὅστις δικαιότατα καὶ τάχιστα διαιροίη τὰ ἀμφίλογα, ὡς 
μὴ ἀποκωλύεσθαι ἀποπλεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον, πολὺ ἂν καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους 
τε καὶ ἥδιον ἐμπορεύοιντο) (3.3).  The proposal itself is unambiguous, paralleling the 
one calling for creation of the metoikophylakes who receive rewards for increasing the 
numbers of metics (2.7).  It is well acknowledged that maritime cases (dikai emporikai) 
could be painfully drawn out.117  For example, Lysias mentions one defendant who had 
been disputing a maritime case for three years (17.8)!  A system of rewards, as elsewhere 
in Xenophon’s works, is designed to increase competition (philoneikia/philotimia) among 
groups of individuals (e.g., in the army) so that greater efficiency is achieved.118  In the 
Hiero, Xenophon even professes that rewards engender the excellent performance of 
public affairs (9.4-7).  Though such rewards may seem counterproductive to Xenophon’s 
wish to increase revenues, since it would cost the s ate money to dispense prizes to these 
various officials, it is likely that he is thinking only of “small prizes.”119  For Xenophon, 
                                                                                                                                      
particularly agreeable and profitable pursuit for Athens” (emphasis mine).   
117 See Cohen 1973: 10-12. 
118 See the citations in Gauthier 1976: 83 and Cyropaedia 1.6.18; Oeconomicus 12.6. 
119 Cf. Hiero 9.11: “In case you fear, Hiero, that the cost of offering prizes for many subjects may prove 
heavy, you should reflect that no commodities are ch aper than those that are bought for a prize.  Think of 
the large sums that men are induced to spend on horse-races, gymnastic and choral competitions, and the 
long course of training and practice they undergo for the sake of a paltry prize (μικρὰ ἆθλα)” (trans. 
Marchant).  Gauthier 1976: 83 also adduces IG II2 1629a, 190-204, which mentions prizes of gold crowns 
of 500, 300, and 200 drachmas for trierarchs.  If Xenophon is thinking of a few prizes around these 
amounts, then the net gains would clearly outweigh the costs.   
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then, offering rewards to the magistrates of the emporium to speed up the legal process is 
a simple cost-effective remedy. 
One interpretative challenge remains: to which magistracy is Xenophon referring?  
His terminology (τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ) regrettably does not match up with any 
known contemporary office.  Scholars have offered two solutions.  The majority identify 
τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ with the enigmatic ναυτοδίκαι, “maritime judges.”120  Very 
little is known about them, however, and what is mentioned in the historical sources, 
especially in the lexicographers, is contradictory.121  Cohen, who has devoted the most 
attention to the nautodikai, argues that they were the dicasts that judged mariti e cases 
(dikai emporikai).122  Yet if the nautodikai were dicasts, then Xenophon’s τῇ τοῦ 
ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ cannot possibly refer to them, because dicasts, technically speaking, 
                                                
120 Moyle 1697: 41, Herzog 1914: 479, von der Lieck 1933: 39-41, Gernet 1955: 180, Giglioni 1970: 
lxxix-lxxx, and Cohen 1973: 184.   
121 For example, Hesychius refers to them as δικασταί, whereas Harpocration calls them an ἀρχή and 
Pollux speaks of them as magistrates οἱ εἰσάγοντες.  For the ancient sources of the nautodikai, see Cohen 
1973: 162, n.11.  It is notable that Lysias 17.5-6, 8 is the only classical forensic text that attests to this 
magistracy.  IG I3 41, 90-2 is a worthless source, as it is based entirely on reconstructions:  
[……16……ἐσαγόντον τὲν δίκε]ν τοῖ αὐτοῖ μενὶ hοι ναυτοδ[ί] 
[και …….……24…………καὶ τ]ὸ δικαστέριον παρεχόντον πλ- 
122 Cohen 1973: 163-86, esp. 164-5, n.14.  The contradic ory testimony in the sources, I believe, stems 
from the ambiguous use of the verb δικάζειν in these legal contexts.  The verb can be used both of a jury 
adjudicating a case (e.g., ἐξεδίκασαν of Lysias 17.6) and the magistrates introducing and presiding over 
the case (e.g., Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 52.3: οὗτοι [sc. εἰσαγωγεῖς] μὲν οὖν ταύτας 
δικάζουσιν ἐμμήνους εἰσάγ[ον]τες); here δικάζειν has the sense of “to preside” (Rhodes 1981: 586-
7).  Such usages in the speeches of the Attic orators to which the lexicographers had access probably led to 
some confusion, the solution of which was the conflation of the presiding magistrates and the dicasts nd 
thus the identification of the magistrates οἱ εἰσάγοντες with the nautodikai. 
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were not magistrates.123  Following the lead of Thiel, Gauthier takes τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου 
ἀρχῇ as a reference to the ἐπιμεληταί τοῦ ἐμπορίου, “the superintendents of the 
emporium.”124  This interpretation is certainly correct.  First, Xenophon’s τῇ τοῦ 
ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ, as a circumlocution, corresponds nicely to ἐπιμεληταί τοῦ 
ἐμπορίου, who conducted their activities in the port at the Piraeus.  Secondly, unlike the 
nautodikai, the epimeletai tou emporiou formed a magistracy (ἡ ἀρχή), which matches 
up well with Xenophon’s τῇ ἀρχῇ.125   
This identification is significant because it demonstrates that Xenophon’s desire 
to speed up disputes among traders anticipated the judicial reform involving dikai 
emporikai that took place shortly after he composed the Poroi.126  Sometime after 355, 
the Athenians turned ikai emporikai into “monthly cases” (δίκαι ἔμμηνοι), which, as 
Cohen convincingly demonstrates, means that maritime cases were accepted every month 
during the winter in the hopes that they would be completed before the summer sailing 
season.127  Until the discovery of the Athenian law on silver coinage of 375/4, the 
                                                
123 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 82.  Moreover, rewarding dicasts with speedy judgments does not 
make any sense, because once a case came before a jury, decisions were often reached very quickly.  
Besides, prizes for dicasts would have been seen as a form of bribery. 
124 Thiel 1922: 47-8 and Gauthier 1976: 80-3; cf. Cartledge 1977: 223.  The sources for these magistrates 
are Hesperia (43) 1974: 158, lines 21-22; Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 51.4; Demosthenes 35.51; 58.8-
9; Dinarchus 2.10; Harpocration s.v.; Lexica Segueriana s.v. 
125 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 51.4 with Gauthier 1976: 80-1 and Rhodes 1981: 579.
126 Boeckh 1976: 604, Herzog 1914: 479, Andreades 1933: 385-6, von der Lieck 1933: 40-1, Cawkwell 
1963: 64, Giglioni 1970: lxxx, Cohen 1973: 22, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 367, Whitehead 1977: 128, 
Mossé 1983: 53, Burke 1984: 115 and 1992: 210, and Cartledge 1997: 223. 
127 Cohen 1973: Chapter 1, esp. 23-59. 
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judicial functions of the epimeletai tou emporiou were not well understood.128  The law 
has been rightly considered a “legal tender act,” which makes it an actionable offense for 
an Athenian not to accept genuine Athenian currency.129  The part of the law that 
articulates the judicial procedures for those who break the law is insightful: “Let 
denunciations for offences (phaseis)…in the emporium and in the Piraeus be laid before 
the epimeletai tou emporiou…For [all those] denunciations which are up to ten drachmai 
the magistrates [are to be] competent to give a verdict; for those over ten drachmai let 
them bring them into the law court (ἐσαγόντων ἐς τὸ δικαστήριον) and let the 
Thesmothetai assist them by allotting a court whenever they request one…” (23-28, trans. 
Stroud).  The procedures outlined here (phasis and the right of introducing cases to court) 
dovetail with those attested in the forensic speechs concerning the role of the epimeletai 
emporiou in dikai emporikai.  An injured party to a maritime contract (symbola) 
registered a denunciation (phasis) and a deposition (apographe) with the secretary of the 
epimeletai emporiou, who was responsible for keeping such contracts (Demosthenes 
35.51; 59.8 with Aristotle, Politics 1321b 13-15, 34-6).  The secretary then publicly 
displayed the denunciation until it was investigated by the epimeletai emporiou 
(Demosthenes 59.8-9). These magistrates ultimately decided whether to hold a 
preliminary hearing (anakrisis) or not (Demosthenes 59.8; cf. Lysias 17.8).  If there was 
                                                
128 GHI2 25 (cf. the editio princeps in Hesperia (43) 1974: 158-9).  Though Gauthier 1976: 80-4, 225-6 
was aware of this inscription, he ignores the most valuable information it provides for understanding 
Xenophon’s proposal.  In particular, he argues thate epimeletai had limited judicial functions, being 
restricted to the phasis process.  From this, he argues that Xenophon’s advice to grant rewards to the 
epimeletai has nothing to do with dikai and thus should not be connected with the subsequent j dicial 
reform of the dikai emmenoi.  But as the inscription bears out, these officials did have the right of 
introducing dikai into court.   
129 Buttrey 1979: 44. 
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sufficient evidence to initiate a case, they convened a court of special jurors (perhaps 
with the help of the Thesmothetai), who then adjudicated the case.130  Viewed in light of 
this judicial procedure, we can now better appreciat  Xenophon’s intentions.  By granting 
rewards to the epimeletai, he hoped they would initiate legal proceedings more quickly, 
that is, they would speed up their investigation of the publicly displayed denunciations 
and introduce cases into court in a timely fashion.  Because the Thesmothetai eventually 
took over this prerogative of introducing dikai emporikai from the epimeletai, it is 
tempting to speculate that the epimeletai did not expedite maritime cases to the liking of 
the Athenians and foreign traders.131  In this case, had the Athenians taken Xenophon’s 
advice, perhaps such a transfer would have been unnecessary in the first place. 
The second piece of advice Xenophon offers to increase revenues from trade is to 
“reward merchants and shipowners with honorific seats in the theater and to occasionally 
invite them to partake in public hospitality, whenever they benefit the state because of the 
high quality of their ships and merchandise.  For when they are honored with these 
things, they would be eager to make us friends not o ly for the sake of profit but also for 
honor” (προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ’ ἔστιν 
ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν 
ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς 
                                                
130 Lysias 17.5-6, 8 makes it certain that these magistrates were distinct from the nautodikai, who were 
probably the dicasts of the dikai emporikai (see above). 
131 Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 59.5 with Cohen 1973: 195-8.  Cohen dates this transfer to 330-26 
during the notorious grain shortages, because the Thesmothetai were seen as “special-crisis officials” (198).  
This is a plausible suggestion, and I would add that judicial speed and efficiency probably played a role in 
their ability to solve such commercial crises.  
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τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν) (3.4).132  The comments of Austin 
and Vidal-Naquet are a useful point of departure fo the analysis of this passage: 
These proposals are…deeply subversive: honorific seats in the theatre 
were normally reserved for magistrates and for the highest priests.  
Xenophon is in fact suggesting that one should invite traders to the 
prytaneum—an exceptional honour—simply in relation t  the importance 
of their cargo.  A quarter of a century after the publication of Xenophon’s 
pamphlet Athens passed a fourfold decree in honour of Heracleides, a 
merchant from Salamis in Cyprus, who in difficult circumstances during 
the famine of 330-331, had provided Athens with cheap corn.  This 
inscription…grants a series of honours to this man (a crown, presentation 
to the people, etc.), but not explicitly hospitality in the prytaneum.  
Xenophon’s proposal goes further as it is based on strictly commercial 
criteria.133 
 
Engen’s recent study of the honors and privileges btowed on individuals for trade-
related services between 415-307 B.C. substantiates his interpretation.  His survey yields 
36 examples of individuals to whom the Athenians granted honors (e.g., gold crowns, 
bronze statues, tax exemption, proxeny, etc.) for their commercial activities.134  Ten 
instances predate the Poroi, and of these for which we can determine the motivation 
behind the privileges, there are a total of five.135  But the trade-related services provided 
in these particular cases are traditional in nature (e.g., gifts of grain and timber) and thus 
                                                
132 The fact that Xenophon is recommending xenia proves that the traders involved are x noi; foreign 
honorands awarded citizenship received d ipnon, which was a greater honor because only citizens attended 
this kind of meal (see Henry 1983: 262-75).    
133 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 367 (the decree in ho or of Heracleides = GHI2 95).  Cf. Miller 1978: 
4, who notes: “to invite someone into the prytaneio f r entertainment at the expense of the city was of the 
highest honors paid by a Greek city to an individual.”  See also the excellent comments of Engen 1996: “In 
providing many of the same honors and privileges for whose who had performed trade-related services as 
for those who had performed political and military ones, Athens was elevating trade, certain forms of 
which had been traditionally socially and morally unesteemed, to a level formerly occupied only by 
political and military matters.  Moreover, the foreigners who performed trade-related services now had 
access to the τιμή formerly reserved for citizens or foreign benefactors who had performed political or 
military services.”   
134 The evidence is conveniently tabulated in Engen 1996: 43-6. 
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not apropos to Xenophon’s recommendations, which are aimed at honoring traders and 
shipowners not for their euergetism, but rather for “the high quality of their merchandise 
and ships.”  For such cases, in which the Athenians granted privileges to traders for the 
simple importation of goods (and for whom “profit” was probably the main consideration 
for trading with Athens), we have six examples, all occurring after 350.136  Interestingly, 
one of these honorary decrees actually grants both xenia and a seat in the theater (θέα) to 
a Sicilian trader sometime between 331-24 for importing grain to Athens.137  Because 
other examples for such xenia grants to traders exist after ca. 350, we are on firmer 
ground to declare that the Athenians in all likelihood followed Xenophon’s advice.138   
Nevertheless, as far was we can tell, the Athenians never granted προεδρία for 
trade-related services.139  The grant of θέα differed from προεδρία in that the latter was 
a permanent seat in the front row, whereas the former was only a guarantee of a seat in 
the theater for one festival only.  Though this honor was not as prestigious asπροεδρία, 
                                                                                                                                      
135 IG I3 182 (a), 117; IG II2 212 (cf. Isocrates 17.57; Demosthenes 20.29-41) (Satyrus and Leucon); IG II2 
207. 
136 IG II2 342+, 409, 407; Hesperia (43) 1974: no. 3; Hesperia (9) 1940: no. 39; Athenaeus 3.119f-120a.  
Engen 1996: 178 notes that “[t]he honorands were professional traders who personally transported their 
goods to Athens and sold them at the market price.”  These seem to be the emporoi whom Xenophon says 
will trade with Athens “not only for the sake of profit but also for honor” (οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ 
καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν).     
137 Hesperia (43) 1974: no. 3, ll. 9-12, 24-9.  This decree was published after the first French edition 
(1973) of Austin and Vidal Naquet and thus was not taken into consideration in their analysis.  Cf. Miller 
1978: 146-61 who collects some 102 instances of xenia and deipnon.  Of these only about half reveal 
anything about the motivation for such invitations, and the vast majority of these are for political and 
military services.        
138 IG II2 81, 212.  However, I am not convinced IG II2 81, which dates between 390-378/7, qualifies as a 
grant of xenia for trade-related services. Engen 1996: 89-90 argues that the reference to asulia on the goods 
of the honorand (6-7) indicates that he was a trader, and thus the honors he is given must be for trade-
related services.  Yet on p. 312 he is forced to admit that there is only “one example of an Athenian 
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it nonetheless was in the spirit of Xenophon’s proposal and radical in its own right.  
Engen explains: “by granting a seat for the Dionysia at state expense, Athens was at least 
providing the non-citizen honorand with a unique opp rtunity to receive [sc. the 
equivalent of] the θεωρικόν, a state subsidy originally intended to cover the cost of 
theater tickets, which otherwise was an exclusive privilege of Athenian citizens…In order 
to ensure trade-related services from foreigners, Athens was willing to chip away, even if 
only for a little, at the barriers between citizens and non-citizens to include a foreign 
trader in some of the citizens’ former exclusive rights.”140  
We can push the “subversive” reading of Xenophon’s proposals further by 
considering them in the context of the dynamics of ritualized friendship (xenia): “for 
when they [sc. xenoi] are honored with these privileges, they would be eager to treat us as 
friends (ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν).”  What has escaped the attention of 
commentators is that with this thought, Xenophon hopes to bring those who conduct 
short-term, market exchanges into the orbit of tradi ional long-term xenia relationships.  
According to Herman, exchanges of goods within the context of ritualized friendship are 
diametrically opposed to market exchange: 
[I]n trading relationships, the exchange is a short-term, self-liquidating 
transaction.  Once the benefits are obtained, the social relationship is 
terminated.  The transaction does not create moral involvement.  By 
contrast, within the framework of amiable relations (kinship, friendship, 
ritualized friendship), exchanges have a long-term xpectancy.  Gifts beg 
counter gifts, and fulfill at one and the same time a number of purposes: 
                                                                                                                                      
invitation for ξενία or δεῖπνον in the Prytaneion before the end of the fourth century hat we can be 
certain was motivated solely by trading interests, namely Camp (1974) no. 3 [=Hesperia (43) 1974: no. 3].”  
139 Engen 1996: 318.   
140 Engen 1996: 319. 
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they repay past services, incur new obligations, and ct as continuous 
reminders of the validity of the bond.141 
 
Throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, examples abound of xenia relationships 
between Athens and foreign traders and grain producers.142  The most notorious, 
perhaps, is that between Athens and the Spartocids f the Bosporus, who traded with the 
city not only in commodities but also in gifts: the Athenians received the “gifts” 
(δωρειαί) of tax-exemption, grain, and priority in loading grain, whereas the Spartocids 
were bestowed with the “gifts” of statues, gold crowns, honorary citizenship, and tax-
exemption in Athens.143  “Apparently, there was no limit to what a xenos could do for 
another,” Herman contends.  “Yet one type of human activity is conspicuously absent 
from the list: low-class activities most immediately concerned with getting a livelihood.  
To be sure, xenoi did provide each other with grain and some other necessities of life.  
But they were not dependent for their survival on such provisions.  Ritualized friendship 
was concerned with extracting spoils for people situated high above the subsistence 
level.”144  But when it came to grain the Athenians, collectively speaking, were well 
below the subsistence level, as three quarters of their grain came from abroad, and much 
of this was transported to Athens via foreign trades and shipowners whose motives were 
largely governed by profit.  The problem with these transactions, as Herman rightly 
notes, is they do not “create moral involvement,” which could lead to potentially 
                                                
141 Herman 1987: 80.  Cf. Bloch and Parry 1989 on the diff rence between the long-term and short-term 
transactional orders. 
142 E.g., IG I3 117, 23; IG II2 360b, 363; Hesperia (9) 1940: no. 42; Athenaeus 586d, 596b. 
143 Demosthenes 20.29-40; Dinarchus 1.43; GHI2 64.  Demosthenes 20.33 and GHI2 64, 20-3 specifically 
use the language of gift-exchange.  For a good analysis of Athens’ relationship with the Spartocids in terms 
of ritualized friendship, see Rosivach 2000: 40-3.  
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disastrous consequences, especially for a city like Ath ns which was not self-sufficient in 
grain.  For instance, when market prices fluctuated b cause of droughts or manipulation, 
merchants sometimes disposed of their cargos in coutries where prices were the highest, 
even though this meant breaking their legal contracts with the Athenians.145 
Moreover, according to Aristotle, in “market trade” (ἡ πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ 
χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα), which he considers a type of philia (in particular, one based on τὸ 
χρήσιμον, “utility”), disputes (ἐγκληματικαὶ) often arise: “for because the two parties 
associate with each other for profit they always want more, and they think that they are 
getting less than their due; and they find fault because they do not get as much as they 
need or feel they deserve; and they who perform services can never satisfy all the needs 
of the ones who receive them.”146  Consequently, these relationships often dissolve 
quickly because they are not based on equality and proportion (1162b24-8).  
Interestingly, in the companion piece in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle recommends that 
one way to restore equality and proportion in these r lationships is “honor” (τιμή): “the 
profit must be made equal to the honor” (δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν 
τιμήν) (1242b18-20).  Now profit and honor are precisely what Xenophon wishes to 
                                                                                                                                      
144 Herman 1987: 128. 
145 Such is the case of Demosthenes’ speech against Dionysodorus, which recounts the tale of the 
eponymous merchant who sold his shipment of grain at Rhodes when he heard prices in Athens had 
dropped, even though he contracted a loan on the conditi n that he return to Athens with the grain (56.3, 8-
10).  Cf. Oeconomicus 20:28: “Whenever merchants need money, they do not u l ad their cargos of grain 
anywhere they happen to be, but wherever they hear t at the price of grain is the highest and the people 
value it the most, to these places they deliver thei shipments.”   
146 Nichomachean Ethics 1162b17-27. Usually translated as “friendship,” the meaning of the word philia 
in Aristotle has a semantic range that extends beyond intimate familial relationships and includes civi  and 
business relations like the ones described by Xenophon in the Poroi (see Cooper 1980: 301-2).   
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grant foreign traders.  The former entices traders to come to Athens; the latter keeps them 
coming back.  In other words, by guaranteeing not only profits, but honors as well, 
Xenophon hopes to obligate traders to repay these honors in the future, which may entail 
nothing more than forming a strong and lasting trading partnership with the city.  Thus, in 
order to protect the Athenians from the vagaries of the market, on which the Athenians 
had to rely to a much greater extent after the Social War, Xenophon, I submit, 
“moralizes” commercial transactions by introducing traditional, long-term friendship 
categories into short-term, market-based relationships.  With the bestowal of privileges 
like xenia and prohedria, which in the realm of ritualized friendship are tantamount to 
“gifts,” Xenophon hopes to engender enduring relations with foreign traders that do not 
dissolve after each self-liquidating transaction.  What is so subversive about this advice is 
not so much that Xenophon insinuates a connection between two transactional orders that 
the Greeks thought of as functionally and ideological separate, but rather that he 
envisions a kind of amiable relationship between Athenians and foreign traders that was 
analogous to the one existing between citizens.  For Aristotle, and probably for most 
Athenians, the quintessential type of philia based on utility and equality was “political 
friendship” (φιλία ἡ πολιτική) (1242b22).147  Xenophon is in a sense “politicizing” 
trading relations.  
                                                
147 The comments of Cooper 1977: 646 are insightful: “In a community animated by civic friendship, each 
citizen assumes that all the others, even those hardly not known at all to him, are willing supporters of their 
common institutions and willing contributors to the common social product, from which he, together with 
all the citizens, benefits.  So they will approach one another for business or other purposes in a spirit of 
mutual goodwill and with willingness to sacrifice their own immediate interests to those of another, as 
friendship demands.”  It is worth noting that Xenoph n envisions a good amount of association between 
citizens and xenoi, as he also recommends that xenoi subscribe to the capital fund along with citizens (3.11) 
and commends the city’s policy of opening up the mining industry to xenoi on the same terms as granted to 
citizens (4.12).  I do not think that Xenophon expects all xenoi to subordinate their individualistic drive for 
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Before turning to the last of Xenophon’s recommendations for promoting trade, it 
is necessary to consider briefly the motivations behind his specific choice of grating 
xenia and prohedria to traders and shipowners, because a whole host of other monetary 
and non-monetary privileges was available to our author.148  While it is undeniable that 
Xenophon foresaw and even intended the social consequences of granting xenia and 
prohedria to foreign traders, financial considerations must have been the prime 
motivating factor.  In the turbulent years in which he was composing the Poroi, a “fiscal 
anxiety” consumed the Athenians.149  In 356 they passed two decrees and one law in the 
hopes of increasing revenues.150  They authorized Androtion to collect arrears of 
eisphorai, which promised to bring in fourteen talents but yielded only seven 
(Demosthenes 22.44, 48-9, 63); Aristophon moved a decree appointing a commission of 
inquiry to receive information about sacred or public monies in private hands 
(Demosthenes 24.11); and Leptines, an associate of Aristophon, proposed a law that “no 
one, whether citizen, alien with fiscal equality, or f reigner, shall be exempt [sc. from 
liturgical obligations]…except the descendents of Harmodius and Aristogeiton…nor shall 
                                                                                                                                      
profit to the common good of the city to the same extent as Athenian citizens.  Yet I also do not consider 
such individualistic values and those concerning the common weal to be mutually exclusive.  Such was the 
view of the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylonia (Cicero, De officiis 3.50-3), whose views about 
disclosure in commercial transactions invoked the ire of Antipater and Cicero.  Xenophon’s view is no 
different in this respect from Aristotle’s, who argues that in the moral (ἡ ἠθική) philia, “one gives  a gift, 
or does whatever it does, as to a friend (ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται); but one expects to receive as much or more, 
as having not given but lent (Nichomachean Ethics 1162b31-32).  In other words, just because a transaction 
entails a moral commitment does not mean that it has to be unprofitable.  The foreign traders whom 
Xenophon is trying to entice may occasionally have to reduce their profit margins in order to remain fr ends 
with the Athenians, but they still will profit from the relationship. 
148 Monetary: gold crowns, bronze statues, inscribed st lai, ateleia, isoteleia, and hyperesiai (i.e. slaves); 
non-monetary: proxeny, euergesia, enktesis, and citizenship.  
149 Sealey 1993: 113. 
150 On the dating of these three pieces of legislation, see Sealey 1955: 78.  The order of legislation 
presented here does not reflect a chronological sequence. 
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any such exemption be granted in the future” (μηδένα μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν 
ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων εἶναι ἀτελῆ…πλὴν τῶν ἀφ’ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ 
Ἀριστογείτονος…μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι δοῦναι) (20.29, 160).  The intent of this 
law was ostensibly to increase state revenues becaus  the treasury was nearly bankrupt—
a statement Xenophon himself corroborates (24-5; cf. Poroi 5.12).151  In the midst of this 
fiscal crisis we must imagine Xenophon contemplating his proposals for traders.  Because 
Leptines’ law was probably still in effect, he was not in a legal position to advocate 
ateleia, and given the hysteria over the decline in public revenues, he wisely avoided 
proposing grants of costly monetary privileges and honors, such as gold crowns and 
bronze statues.  Instead, he chose the two most cost-effective measures available.  Seats 
in the theater ran about two obols in the fourth century, but those granted prohedria 
probably paid nothing.152  As far as xenia, we cannot calculate its costs, but such one-
time dining events could not have been expensive; rathe , what was pricey were the 
“social costs”: “[t]he foreigner who had performed trade-related services would be put on 
                                                
151 Demosthenes, who spoke against the legality of the law in the following year (355/4), argues that 
expenditure on agonistic liturgies had nothing to do with public revenues or surpluses, because the festivals 
were not the concern of the city, but of smaller associations within it, namely, the demes and phylai (25); 
and besides, exemption from the financial obligations that were a public concern, eisphora and the 
trierarchy, simply did not exist for anyone (not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton) (18, 
26, 28, 129).  Because Demosthenes believes passiontely that the monetary privileges and honors that t e 
state grants to foreigners provide far more fiscal benefits than the potential loss in revenues, he is willing to 
bend the truth a bit in stating his case, and some scholars have gullibly followed him (e.g., Sealey 1993: 
113, 126).  We know for a fact that Athens awarded exemption from eisphora to foreign traders, and 
though much of the funding for festivals came from private funds, the state did finance them partly with 
public monies.  The rider of the decree for Strato, king of Sidon  (ca. 378-6 = GHI2 or 364/3 = Mosey 1976) 
makes it certain that he and all the citizens of Sidon received ateleia from Athens and in particular 
exemption from eisphora (IG II2 141, 29-36 = GHI2).  On the question of public finance of festivals, see IG 
I3 82 (421/0); Demosthenes 24.27 (ca. 355); Agora I, 7495 (355/4) (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3A);
and Agora XIX, L 7 (ca. 338/7). 
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par with foreign ambassadors and benefactors who had performed more traditional 
political or military services for Athens.”153 
Unlike the previous two recommendations, which Xenophon says can be 
implemented with the help of “benevolent legislation and attention” (ψηφίσματά τε 
φιλάνθρωπα καὶ ἐπιμελείας), the last two proposals require “start-up capital” 
(ἀφορμή) (3.6).  In Section 5C below, I discuss the inner workings of the capital fund, 
but suffice it to say Xenophon conceives of this scheme as an investment program, which 
bears little similarity to eisphora and other forced contributions.  Even though start-up 
costs are involved, the monies in the fund will form a new source of revenue apart from 
existing ones, and so Xenophon does not need to be as sensitive here to the fiscal 
concerns of the likes of Aristophon and Leptines.  The first of these suggestions is to 
build 1) public hotels for shipowners near the ports (in addition to the ones that already 
exist) and hotels for other visitors (i.e., tourists); 2) convenient places of exchange for 
traders; and 3) dwellings and shops for retailers in the Piraeus and in the city.154  As 
stated previously, Xenophon intends to lease these hot ls, dwellings, and shops to 
individuals (3.5), which explains why “large amounts of revenue would accrue from 
                                                                                                                                      
152 For price of seats, see Demosthenes 18.28 with Ulpian on Demosthenes, Olynthiacs 1.1 and Csapo and 
Slater 1994: 288.  The lease of the deme of the Piraeus for the theater there (ca. 324/3), stipulates that those 
with prohedria are to be exempt from paying the entrance fee (Agora XIX, L13, 10-11).  
153 Engen 1996: 311, 315.   
154 καλὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ναυκλήροις οἰκοδομεῖν καταγώγια περὶ λιμένας πρὸς τοῖς 
ὑπάρχουσι, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἐμπόροις [ἐπὶ] προσήκοντας τόπους <ἐπ’> ὠνῇ τε καὶ πράσει, καὶ 
τοῖς εἰσαφικνουμένοις δὲ δημόσια καταγώγια. εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀγοραίοις οἰκήσεις τε καὶ 
πωλητήρια κατασκευασθείη καὶ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστει.  Gauthier 1976: 105 is certainly right 
to interpret  δημόσια in the penultimate line as referring to all the indivi ual parts of the passage: the state 
will own all these buildings and lease them out. 
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them” (πολλαὶ ἂν ἀπὸ τούτων πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο) (3.13).  Moreover, with 
permanent places of trade in the agora and the Piraeus, it is reasonable to assume a 
further augmentation in the volume of trade and consequently increases in sales from 
which the state would derive even more revenue.  Did the Athenians ever follow these 
suggestions?  Though the evidence is not particularly decisive, it seems that they did, but 
not to the extent that Xenophon envisions here.155 
The last of Xenophon’s proposals, the creation of amerchant marine (ὁλκάδας 
δημοσίας), which the state would lease out to private individuals, we know the 
Athenians never implemented (3.14).156 Some historians have chalked this failure up to 
Xenophon’s naiveté.157  The maintenance of such a fleet alone, it is argued, would have 
cost the state dearly.  Gauthier rightly challenges thi  baseless assumption by drawing 
attention to the phrase ὥσπερ τριήρεις δημοσίας, “just as they do with public 
triremes.”  Xenophon intends to lease out these public trading ships to private individuals 
                                                
155 Cawkwell 1963: 64 (cf. Giglioni1970: lxxxii, Burke 1984: 115 and Garland 1987: 43) claims that 
Eubulus “provided the trading facilities and hostel that Xenophon had demanded,” citing Dinarchus 1.96 
and SIG3 1216 = IG II2 2496.  However, the former source mentions nothing specifically about 
καταγώγια or πωλητήρια or even trading in general, whereas the latter is a record of leases for the 
deme of the Piraeus (mid-fourth century), which mentions οἰκήσεις, but nothing about Eubulus’ initiative 
(rightly noted by Lewis 1990: 251).  The evidence for Lycurgus’ role in promoting commerce is better 
attested, as his epitaph mentions specifically “theconstruction of harbors” (Hyperides, Fg. 118); he was 
also the mover of the decrees honoring the traders Heracleides of Salamis (GHI2 95) and Sopatros 
(Hesperia (43) 1974: no. 3).  We can infer from Plutarch 841d that among “the many projects that were 
half-finished (πολλὰ δ’ ἡμίεργα),” which Lycurgus completed, were publicly owned housing.  That the 
state owned dwellings which they rented out is assured (see IG II2 1183 28-9 (after 340) and 2496, 10).  Cf. 
Demosthenes 18.309, who makes ἐμπορίου κατασκευήν a key function of the useful statesmen (he 
implies that he has improved commerce, whereas Aeschines has not).      
156 ἀγαθὸν δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι πειραθῆναι, εἰ καὶ ὥσπερ τριήρεις δημοσίας ἡ πόλις κέκτηται, 
οὕτω καὶ ὁλκάδας δημοσίας δυνατὸν ἂν γένοιτο κτήσασθαι καὶ ταύτας ἐκμισθοῦν ἐπ’ 
ἐγγυητῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα δημόσια.  εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο οἷόν τε ὂν φανείη, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ 
ἀπὸ τούτων πρόσοδος γίγνοιτο.  Cf. Gauthier 1976: 107-8 and Cartledge 1997: 224. 
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in a manner analogous to state-owned triremes, which the individual trierarch was 
responsible for maintaining while it was in his care.158  Cartledge suggests that the 
Athenians did not follow Xenophon’s advice because it “offended against the Athenians’ 
entrenched notions of what it was proper for the state o do economically, and what 
should be left to private enterprise.”159  However, he is forced to admit that the state did 
lease out immovable property (e.g., sacred and public lands, dwellings, and theaters) and 
farmed certain taxes themselves (cf. Athenaion Politeia 47).  Whatever the reason(s) for 
which the Athenians decided against Xenophon’s plan, we should not ignore the 
important implications it has for the study of the ancient economy: the proposal is aimed 
primarily at Athenian citizens.   
The key phrase is καὶ ταύτας ἐκμισθοῦν ἐπ’ ἐγγυητῶν ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα 
δημόσια, “to lease the ships out under guarantors just like our other public property.”  
As far as we can tell, only Athenian citizens and metics could lease out public property, 
and judging from the leases themselves, only Athenian citizens could be guarantors.160  
One guarantor was needed for leases involving rents les  than 600 drachmai, two 
guarantors for those between 600 and 1200, and so on.161  Considering that the property 
in this case would have been both movable and probably very expensive, more than two 
guarantors would have been required who had the where ithal to pay the state back in 
                                                                                                                                      
157 Boeckh 1976: 605, Andreades 1933: 386, and Cawkwell 1963: 64. 
158 Gauthier 1976: 107.  For the responsibilities of the rierarch for the maintenance and upkeep of his 
ship, see Amit 1965: 112-3 and Gabrielsen 1994: 126-145.  
159 Cartledge 1997: 224. 
160 Walbank 1991: 163, 165.  
161 Walbank 1991: 163. 
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the event of a default (e.g., because of a lost or damaged ship).162  While this leasing 
system in theory would have been open to the metics, in practice very few would have 
had the social networks from which they could garner guarantors (see above Section 5A).  
In short, we have yet another example of potential citizen involvement in trade and 
commerce, which should be added to the growing list of evidence contradicting the old 
Hasebroekean thesis that Athenian citizens abstained from trade.163 
In conclusion, Xenophon’s recommendations for increasing revenues from trade 
were radical in some respects but not altogether out of the mainstream of Athenian values 
and fiscal practice.  With the exception of the merchant marine, the Athenians enacted in 
one form or another all of Xenophon’s proposals.164  Of course, we cannot ascribe these 
changes in commercial policy entirely to his direction and initiative: rewarding 
magistrates, granting xenia and prohedria to benefactors, and leasing public property 
were all traditional practices.  The “world of the emporion,” with all its values, 
                                                
162 The ὁλκάδες Xenophon intends to lease were probably the large 120-ton ships, which could carry up 
to 3,000 medimnoi of grain (Casson 1971: 183-4).  Demosthenes mentions a merchant ship (neos) selling 
for 40 mnai, which was smaller than a ὁλκάς.  As a basis of comparison, the hull of a trireme probably 
cost a talent (Athenaion Politeia 22.7) but completely outfited (i.e. with bronze ram, sails, etc.), probably 
two talents (Casson 1995: 242).     
163 Hasebroek 1965: 22-43.  For recent restatements of Hasebroek, see Hopper 1979: 109, Millet 1983, 
Morris 1994, and Finley 1999: 60, 144-5.  Polanyi 1977: 198 took this thesis and applied it wholesale to the 
Poroi: “Nowhere in this discussion is there as much as ahint that the Athenians themselves are involved in 
trade” (cf. von der Lieck 1933: 43).  For the evidenc  of the Athenian citizens engaged in trade, see Isager 
and Hansen 1975: 72, Thompson 1982, M.V. Hansen 1984, Montgomery 1986, and Cohen 1992: passim 
(though see pp. 27-30 on the perils of drawing conclusions from cliometric analysis).  Indeed, though 
Xenophon is talking prescriptively here, his proposal to lease merchant ships to citizens would make no 
sense if they were not actively involved in trade.  
164 It should be noted that the polis of Olbia in the lat  third century had a fleet of ta ploia ta demosia used 
for the transport of blocks of stone (SIG3 495, 146-51).  Gauthier 1976: 108 erroneously thinks that these 
ships are warships (see Lewis 1990: 254).  While we cannot insist on a genetic connection between 
Xenophon’s suggestion and this particular episode, it does support the conclusion that Xenophon’s 
proposal was practicable.   
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ideologies, and business practices, existed well before Xenophon composed the Poroi.165  
Traditionally, this space was both physically and ideologically separate from the city 
(asty), which was the center of political deliberation ad action; even the world of the 
agora, a business center in its own right, was considered separate from the emporion.166   
However, as Gernet argues, with the emergence of dikai emporikai, and especially when 
they became “monthly” suits sometime after 350, commercial law, for the first time, 
entered into the law of the city.167  The key historiographical question that has occupied 
the attention of scholars is the extent to which this entrance of commercial law into the 
law of the city concomitantly brought the larger world of the emporion into the political 
and social life of the city.  In particular, did the “market mentality” of the emporion 
penetrate into the consciousnesses of Athenian citizens and transform their values in the 
process?  For Gernet and many others, the dikai emporikai represent nothing other than 
the city’s desire to ensure its own food supply andto raise revenues.  They reveal the 
existence of a “professional circle” but nothing of a “merchant class which played an 
                                                
165 The phrase “world of the mporion” is that of Gernet 1955: 185, n.5.  As Cohen 1992: 39, n.38 
explains, the term “has become scholarly shorthand for the physical, financial, and ideological sphere 
encompassing businessmen involved in maritime trade an  finance” (cf. Vélissaropoulos 1977: 61-85).  
166 Cohen 1992: 48, n.25 citing the Athenian law on silver coinage of 375/4 (GHI2 25), which stipulates 
“parallel but separate provisions for the emporion at the Piraeus and the agora in the city…Special 
provision is made even for the placement of the inscr bed text of the decree separately at the two centers;” 
and Poroi 3.13: καὶ πωλητήρια κατασκευασθείη καὶ ἐν Πειραιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄστει.  To be sure, the 
boundaries between the asty and the Piraeus were transgressed on a number of occasi ns for political 
reasons.  The council, assembly, and courts occasion lly met in the Piraeus (for the evidence, see Garland 
1987: 81-2), but topics of discussion were strictly political and military in nature (e.g., dockyard business). 
167 Gernet 1955: 185-6.  Gernet’s thesis that dikai emporikai were introduced only after ca. 350 is 
probably wrong (see Cohen 1973: 158-83).  By “commercial law” Gernet is referring to the supranational 
character of dikai emporikai, which afforded to foreigners who entered into contracts providing for the 
Athenian market the right to bring suits without symbola arrangements (bilateral treaties).  While symbola 
sometimes touched upon commercial cases (e.g., Phaselis (IG I3 16) and Selymbria (IG I3 118); see 
Gauthier 1972: 158-63, 198-205), these were by and l rge political agreements, following civil legal 
procedures, not “separate” commercial procedures.  According to Cohen 1973: 59-70, Athens’ “open” 
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active role in the affairs of the state or even which exerted influence over legislation.”168  
Mossé even goes so far as to contend that “the world of the emporion remained marginal 
in relation to the city during [the] second half of the fourth century…because ‘trade and 
politics’ belonged to two mutually impenetrable domains.”169 
To be sure, Xenophon’s interest in the world of the emporion centers largely on 
its revenue-generating potential, but we cannot ignore the evidence in the Poroi, which 
also demonstrates his desire to promote the interests of traders and commerce more 
generally.  Xenophon wants to reward traders with honors, which, it must be 
remembered, required the approval of the assembly, not for their euergetism of 
provisioning Athens with free grain, but rather for the “high quality of their 
merchandise.”  The fact that all six examples of the Athenians granting such honors and 
privileges to traders for simple market transactions ccurred in the decades following the 
publication of the Poroi suggests strongly that the world of the emporion was making 
significant inroads into the political world of the Athenians.  Another example can be 
adduced.  Sometime between 346 and 344/3, the Athenians passed a comprehensive 
decree, proposed by the politician Moerocles, protecting traders from false denunciations 
(phaseis) and creating a police force, comprised of Athenians nd allies, to guard traders 
from piracy.170  As Burke notes well, “[t]he decree was no mere window-dressing, for 
                                                                                                                                      
commercial policy was not unique and probably was a later development, following the normal procedure 
in most Greek states where citizens of foreign state  could litigate freely in local commercial courts. 
168 Gernet 1955: 186 (quoted from the English translation of Mossé 1983: 53).  Of course, Gernet’s 
analysis bears the stamp of Hasebroek 1965; see also, Humphreys 1978: 71-2, Finley 1982: 53-4 and 1999: 
162, Mossé 1983, and Garnsey 1988: 139-42. 
169 Mossé 1983: 63. 
170 Demosthenes 57.10-3, 53-6.  The terminus ante quem is the date of this speech 344/3 (Burke 1984: 
115, n.24).  Demosthenes 12.2 provides a terminus post quem of 346, the date of the Peace of Philocrates, 
 338 
we learn subsequently, according to its terms, the island of Melos was to be fined ten 
talents for harboring pirates.”171  The scope of the decree militates against the view that 
this was passed strictly to ensure revenues or to secure the food-supply.  In protecting 
traders to such an extent, the Athenians were true to the spirit of Xenophon, who aimed to 
keep the city “the most agreeable and profitable for th se in trade.” 
 
5C. Eisphora and Aphorme  
In order to execute the aforementioned proposals (the construction of hotels, 
places of exchange, merchant marine, etc.) and to purchase the requisite number of slaves 
for reconstituting and expanding the mining industry (see next section), the polis, 
Xenophon assures his readers, will require aphorme (3.6).  Often translated as “capital” 
(e.g., Marchant and Giglioni), aphorme in its most basic sense denotes “something to 
start with,” and hence “the initial monies needed for a business,” but “in practice the 
word came to denote the funding necessary for continui g operations, in Athenian terms 
a ‘provision for functioning’ or ‘for earning a living,’ akin to Anglo-American ‘working 
capital’.”172  Because Xenophon considers these monies to be not only start-up capital 
but also working capital to cover future expenditures (e.g., for the purchase of more 
hotels, ships, slaves, etc.), aphorme is best rendered simply as “capital fund.”173  The 
                                                                                                                                      
which included a stipulation about the suppression of piracy; it is doubtful that the Athenians passed the 
law before this time, or else Philip would have surely  mentioned it in his letter when he accuses the 
Athenians of looking the other way when pirates sought refuge in Thasos.  As 57.10 makes clear, the law 
went further than existing legislation, since the person found guilty of making a false denunciation was 
liable not only to pay a 1000 drachma fine (for not securing a conviction), but also to arrest and 
imprisonment.  
171 Burke 1984: 115 citing Demosthenes 58.6.  
172 Cohen 1992: 184. 
173 Marchant 1922 translating aphorme at 3.9, followed by Waterfield 1997: “state capital fund.”  
Gauthier’s mise de fond, “capital outlay” does not quite capture the full range of the word (1976: 89). 
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suggestion is undoubtedly a risky one, for it comes right on the heals of the losses 
suffered in the Social War, which was financially devastating for both the state and 
private citizens who contributed much to the war effort (cf. 4.40; 5.11-2).  But such 
expenditure is not a cause of concern for Xenophon; rather it is a source of hope that the 
Athenians will contribute freely and generously to his proposed capital fund: 
οὐ μέντοι δύσελπίς εἰμι τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ προθύμως ἂν τοὺς πολίτας 
εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰσφέρειν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὡς πολλὰ μὲν 
εἰσήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ὅτε Ἀρκάσιν ἐβοήθει ἐπὶ Λυσιστράτου 
ἡγουμένου, πολλὰ δὲ (8) ἐπὶ Ἡγησίλεω. ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ 
τριήρεις πολλάκις ἐκπεμπομένας σὺν πολλῇ δαπάνῃ, καὶ 
†ταύτας γενομένας†, τούτου μὲν ἀδήλου ὄντος εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε 
κάκιον ἔσται, ἐκείνου δὲ δήλου ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἀπολήψονται ἃ ἂν 
εἰσενέγκωσιν οὐδὲ (9) μεθέξουσιν ὧν ἂν †εἰσενέγκωσι†. κτῆσιν 
δὲ ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλὴν κτήσαιντο ὥσπερ ἀφ’ οὗ ἂν 
προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμήν·   
 
However, I am hopeful that our citizens will contribute eagerly to fund 
such things [sc. revenue-producing projects], when I recall how much 
money the polis gave when we came to the aid of the Arcadians under the 
command of Lysistratus [364/3], and again when it provided much for 
Hegesileos’ campaign [363/2].  I know also that triremes are often sent out 
with much expense [to individuals], and when they do this, it is unclear 
whether the mission will be for the better or for the worse, but what is 
certain is that those who participate will not recover the money they 
contributed nor share in the profits from the war they helped fund.174  Yet, 
they would receive no finer return on their money than the one they would 
get by investing in the capital fund. 
 
What differentiates Xenophon’s aphorme from funds established for the maintenance of 
war is   contributors will receive a “return” (κτῆσις) on their money.  While the proceeds 
of war (viz. booty) were often distributed among the participants of campaigns, no 
                                                
174 On the translation of the phrase οὐδὲ μεθέξουσιν…, see Gauthier 1976: 91 citing Herzog 1914: 472-
3. 
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system was in place to guarantee those funding expeditions (through eisphorai, 
trierarchies, epidoseis, etc.) a share of the profits, though occasionally financiers and 
commanders were one and the same.  Under his scheme, profits are all but “certain” 
(δῆλος) for every subscriber.  
More specifically, Xenophon proposes a three-tiered investment system in which 
every subscriber to the fund receives a daily triobol n (180 dr. per year) no matter the 
amount given: subscribers of ten minai (1,000 dr.) will receive “almost 20%” on their 
investment (18% to be exact), which Xenophon likens to the rate of return from “nautical 
loans;” subscribers of 5 minai (500 dr.) will get “more than a third” of their money back 
(i.e., 37%); but subscribers of one mina (100 dr.), “a majority,” he asserts, “will get more 
money in a year than they put in because a payment of one mina will yield a return of 
nearly two” (i.e., 183%) (3.9-10).175  “And what is more these returns are guaranteed by 
the polis, which is the most secure and enduring of human institutions” (καὶ ταῦτα ἐν 
πόλει, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον 
εἶναι).176  With this gnome Xenophon underscores the major difference between his 
polis-administered capital fund and other investment opportunities.  Unlike the placement 
of monies in private banks, which were ephemeral by nature, or loans contracted to 
finance risk-laden activities like long-distance commerce, monies advanced to the state 
                                                
175 ᾧ μὲν γὰρ ἂν δέκα μναῖ εἰσφορὰ γένηται, ὥσπερ ναυτικόν, σχεδὸν ἐπίπεμπτον αὐτῷ 
γίγνεται, τριώβολον τῆς ἡμέρας λαμβάνοντι· ᾧ δέ γ’ ἂν πέντε μναῖ, πλέον ἢ ἐπίτριτον. οἱ δέ 
γε πλεῖστοι Ἀθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν. οἱ γὰρ μνᾶν 
προτελέσαντες ἐγγὺς δυοῖν μναῖν πρόσοδον ἕξουσι. 
176 For the translation of this phrase, I follow Marchant 1922, endorsed by Gauthier 1976: 95-6; cf. 
Waterfield 1997.  
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have a much greater likelihood of “returning” to their donors according to Xenophon.  In 
the next section, we will see how the polis is able to mitigate risks more efficiently and 
successfully than private investors, but for now it is important to stress the vital role the 
state plays as a guarantor of private investment.  By stressing the durability and 
permanence of the polis, Xenophon hopes to assuage the fear of potential subscribers 
who may have anxiety about the long-term commitment to the capital fund, in which it 
might take decades to see any return on their investment.  Interestingly, for this reason 
Xenophon also recommends that foreign poleis and potentates, such as kings, tyrants, and 
even Persian satraps, be permitted to invest in the fund, as they would be encouraged by 
the prospect of “being enrolled as benefactors for all time” (ἀναγραφήσεσθαι 
εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον) (3.11).177   
A number of interpretive challenges present themselve  in regard to the creation 
and implementation of the aphorme.  First, it is unclear how Xenophon intends to finance 
the capital fund.  Beyond the idea that individual Athenians who contribute (εἰσφέρειν) 
money in amounts of either 100, 500, or 1,000 drachmai will receive a constant rate of 
return on their investment in the form of a daily triobolon payment, Xenophon says 
nothing of the inner workings of the system, which has inevitably led scholars to read 
between the lines of his presentation.  A number of c mmentators, transfixed by 
Xenophon’s comparison of the “nearly twenty percent” rate of return for ten-minai 
subscribers to the interest rate on nautical loans, construe Xenophon’s eisphora as a kind 
                                                
177 It is unclear if foreigners under Xenophon’s scheme would be entitled to receive the triobolon; see 
Gauthier 1976: 100-1.  My own feeling is that they would not.     
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of “forced loan granted by the citizens to the state.”178  There are nonetheless a number 
of problems with this interpretation, least of which is the fact that subscribers never get 
back their “principle” in the end.179  The comparison is strictly notional, serving the 
purpose of putting a new and unfamiliar investment opportunity into terms familiar to 
wealthy Athenians. 
For Gauthier, the repetitive employment of the noun εἰσφορά (once) and the 
verb εἰσφέρειν (six times) in the context of the military expeditions of the 360s suggests 
that Xenophon is indeed thinking of some kind of forced payment, but one that is 
analogically similar to an extraordinary wartime tax, which the Athenians levied directly 
on citizens to finance military operations.180  In particular, Gauthier contends that 
Xenophon envisions his eisphora as an obligatory contribution, which a majority of 
citizens pay, but in amounts proportionate to their fortune: the “rich citizen” will pay ten 
minai; the “well-to-do” five minai; and the “less fortunate” one mina.181  Gauthier is 
careful though not to push the analogy too far, as he notes three key differences between 
                                                
178 Giglioni 1970: lxxxiv; cf. Thiel 1922: 48-50: “mutatio publica”, Pöhlmann 1984: 243: “Anleihe,” von 
der Lieck 1933: 41, “Schaffung von Staatsrenten durch eine Anleihe,” Andreades 1933: 389: “a sort of loan 
on a lifetime annuity.” 
179 Gauthier 1976: 95, 103-4.  For Greek notions of lending and interest, see Millett 1991: 24-52, 91-108 
and Cohen 1992: 41-60.  The loan interpretation of Giglioni 1970: lxxxiv-xc leads her to hold some very 
peculiar ideas about the triobolon, namely, that the proposal at 3.9-10 has nothing to do with the one at 
4.17, which aims to create three slaves for every Athenian and consequently three obols per day in 
apophora.  Giglioni sees the latter as realizable only in the distant future, whereas the former is to be 
collected immediately by subscribers of the capital fund.  As Gauthier 1976: 103-4 and Schütrumpf 1982: 
72-4 ably demonstrate, such a view is untenable, since Xenophon is quite clear that the monies in the 
capital fund are to be available for the purchase of slaves and not to be distributed prematurely to those who 
contribute to the fund (4.34-6).  Moreover, it is “absurd” to imagine that Xenophon would advocate in a
work devoted to alleviating the poverty of the masses the distribution of monies to wealthy individuals, 
who have no pressing need for the triobolon.    
180 Gauthier 1976: 88-97, 90-1.  For similar interpretations of the campaigns of Lysistratus and 
Hegesileos, see Thomsen 1964: 228-9, Brun 1984: 43,  Migeotte 1992: 16, n.17, and Cartledge 1997: 223.
181 Gauthier 1976: 89-90, 93-4. 
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Xenophon’s eisphora and the Athenian wartime tax: 1) the inclusion of f reign 
contributors; 2) the disbursement of a daily, fixed r nt; and 3) the ideological affiliation 
with peace.182  Yet even with these caveats Gauthier’s interpretation of an obligatory tax 
runs into some major obstacles upon further consideration.  
First, the contributions to Lysistratus and Hegesileos’ campaigns of the late 360s 
need not refer exclusively to war taxes, since the terms εἰσφορά and εἰσφέρειν are 
often employed in relation to voluntary public subscriptions known as epidoseis.183  
Accordingly, some historians take these references to isphorai as examples of voluntary, 
not compulsory contributions.184  Second, Xenophon’s three-tiered contribution rates do 
not correspond to those of the eisphora-tax system.  While our understanding of the 
eisphora is frustratingly incomplete—“a lake of crocodiles” according to one noted 
scholar—it is generally agreed that eisphorai were levied directly on the capital (both 
moveable and immovable) of individual citizens according to the value (τίμημα) of their 
property.185  Consequently, the financial burden on individual t xpayers varied 
                                                
182 Gauthier 1976: 97; “an eisphora of peace” (99, 101, and 107). 
183 Kuenzi 1923: 16, n.1 and Wyse 1904: 460 citing Isaeu  5.37; Lysias 30.26, 31.15; Demosthenes 45.69.  
Gauthier 1976: 98 objects to this interpretation, arguing that whenever the substantive (εἰσφορά) and verb 
(εἰσφέρειν) are used together, “it is always a question of eisphora-tax.”  The examples he cites in favor of 
this interpretation are inconclusive, and he even acknowledges that Isaeus 5.37 does not support his thesis.  
Besides, even if he were correct, we simply do not find εἰσφορά and εἰσφέρειν being used together in 
3.7-8.  Xenophon employs εἰσφορά once (3.9) but this is in reference to his system, not to the war 
financing during the campaigns of Lysistratus and Hegesileos, which is really what is at issue here.  
184 Ste Croix 1953: 52 and Pritchett 1991: 474-5.  Forthe epidosis, see Andreades 1933: 349, Veyne 1990: 
90-100, Pritchett 1991: 473-85, and above all Migeotte 1992.  Hommel in Pritchett 1991: 473-4 offers a 
succinct definition of the pidosis: “A collection of voluntary contributions, which are ordered by a decree 
of the assembly, in which an individual who lives in Athens, whether a citizen or foreigner, is invited, if he 
is willing and able, to contribute a sum of money for the purpose determined by the people, which is either 
an amount as big as the contributor pleases or varying in amount within fixed limits.”  The procedure is 
nicely summarized by Pritchett 1991: 475. 
185 Pritchett 1991: 474, n. 707.  On the τίμημα, see Ste. Croix 1953 and Thomsen 1964. 
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significantly, and thus there was no uniformity in the contribution rates such as we find in 
Xenophon’s scheme.186  A uniformity of payment rates, however, is well attested in 
epidoseis.  When the assembly invited the citizenry to make subscriptions, they often set 
minimum and maximum amounts.187  Xenophon modifies this practice slightly by also 
including a median amount (500 dr.) alongside the 100 dr. minimum and 1,000 dr. 
maximum.  Overall, these figures appear to be generic, resembling epidosis-amounts 
attested both in Athens and elsewhere in the Greek world.188  What is more, the total 
amount of money needed for the capital fund can be estimated somewhere between 30 
and 40 talents.189  As far as the evidence permits us to conclude, the At enians did not 
levy eisphorai for less than 1% of the total valuation of Attica, that is, 60 talents.190  Yet 
                                                
186 Gauthier 1976: 98 argues against this objection: “in order not to get lost in a diversity of sums, which 
each person would have to pay, [Xenophon] was compelled to calculate in round numbers.”  But this 
argument is a red herring because if Xenophon is truly hinking of an eisphora-tax, then all he had to do 
was simply state the percentage (1%, 2%, etc.) of the assessment, as was common practice (e.g., 
Demosthenes 14.27).  
187 See Migeotte 1992: 316-19.  For example, an epidosis of 247/6 sets the minimum at 50 dr. and the 
maximum at 200 dr., whereas the only other amount attested is 100 dr. (IG II2 791, 19-20, 33-81).  With the 
exception of 50 dr., all other numbers are in whole-minai denominations.   
188 For 100 dr., see IG II2 791, 49-50, 74, etc.; for 500 dr., SIG3 976; for 1,000 dr., Isaeus 5.37.   
189 At 4.23 Xenophon suggests starting with 1,200 slaves, which, as we will see below, he estimates to 
cost between 158 and 195 dr. apiece.  For the latter mount we get 32 talents; for the former, 38 talents.  He 
then recommends implementing his proposals for the mines, merchant marine, and rental projects 
piecemeal: “but if some were proceeded with and others delayed, the income realized would help in 
establishing what remains to be done” (4.36-38).  If we read this passage in conjunction with 4.24, where 
Xenophon suggests using 40 of the 60 talents made from the leasing of 6,000 slaves “for what ever purpose 
that is necessary” (εἰς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ), it would seem that he intends to fund the construction of the 
merchant marine, markets, and rental properties with the revenue generated from the leasing of the slave .  
Thus, we may conclude that the total amount needed for the aphorme is equivalent to the cost of purchasing 
the initial 1,200 slaves.  For a different interpretation, see Gauthier 1976: 156, who takes the phrase εἰς 
ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ as referring to the distribution of the triobolon.  I do not think this reading is supported 
by Xenophon’s egalitarian view of the triobolon at 4.33, where “all Athenians” are to receive “sufficient 
trophe.”  Besides, 40 talents would have guaranteed a triobolon payment for only 1,300 people.  Such a 
premature distribution hardly seems to be worth it.   
190 Ste. Croix 1953: 50, Brun 1984: 62, and Osborne 2002a: 125 speculate that a ½ percent isphora was 
within the realm of possibility, but such a diakosioste is unattested. The rate of taxation was set by the 
assembly, varying between one and two percent of the total valuation of taxable capital in Attica, whic  
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Xenophon’s 30 to 40-talent eisphora is commensurate with known amounts for epidoseis, 
which generally range between 6 and 50 talents.191   
Furthermore, two of the three distinctive aspects of Xenophon’s eisphora to 
which Gauthier calls attention, the inclusion of foreigners and the ideological orientation 
to peace, are precisely the distinctive features of epidoseis.  In fact, Migeotte, the author 
of the definitive study on the pidosis, considers public subscriptions to be “a sign of 
peace and prosperity.”192  While Athens certainly employed epidoseis to finance war far 
more frequently than other poleis, generally speaking, public subscriptions were the most 
common means for financing peacetime, civic projects during the late classical and 
Hellenistic periods, most notably for our purposes, to set up public funds to buy grain for 
public distribution or reduced sale.193  Concerning the inclusion of foreigners, it should 
be emphasized that subscribing to an epidosis brought great honor to the donor.194  Those 
who promised to contribute had their names and pledges written on tablets, which were 
placed in front of the statues of the Eponymous Heroes.  Sometimes we even find the 
names and pledge amounts of subscribers inscribed on ornate stelai.195  Contributions to 
eisphorai-taxes, on the other hand, brought no such distinctio —a point well underscored 
                                                                                                                                      
was estimated to be 6,000 talents in the fourth century (see Demosthenes 14.19; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 
46; Polybius 2.62.7).   
191 For amounts, see Migeotte 1992: 349-50.  For example, at Cos we find an epidosis yielding as little as 
17 talents (Paton-Hicks, I. of Cos 10); but for higher figures, see Plutarch, Moralia 849F (Migeotte 5) = 40 
talents (with Pritchett 1991: 478, 484), and Migeotte 86 = 52-55 talents.  Migeotte estimates that about 80% 
of the total attested epidoseis were of a rather limited amount, that is, in the 20-30 talent range (350).   
192 Migeotte 1992: 348.   
193 On Athens’ use of the pidosis to finance war, see Migeotte 1992: 376; cf. Pritche t 1991: 480 and 
Harris 1994: 106; for the use of the epidosis to finance civic projects, see Migeotte 1992: 327-7, 341-56.  
For the connection between the Poroi and the development of grain-funds, most notably at Samos in the 
late 3rd c. BC, see Bresson 2000: 249-53. 
194 For foreign participation, see Garland 1988: 67 and Migeotte 1992: 358-63. 
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by Croiset: “The sacrifice…of the citizen who contributed to the eisphora brought no 
immediate results and carried with it no honors; his very name, in fact, probably 
remained unknown to the many.”196  Thus, Xenophon’s suggestion to open the 
subscription up to foreigners so that they may become inscribed as “euergetai for all 
time” accords well with the ideology of the epidosis.  In short, while none of these 
objections by themselves speaks against Gauthier’s interpretation, taken together they 
seriously call into question the idea of Xenophon’s ei phora being an obligatory 
eisphora-tax.  Rather, for all the reasons underscored above, the kind of contribution 
Xenophon has in mind bears a striking similarity to the epidosis, and so it must be 
concluded that participation in the capital fund was not compulsory.197 
Having established the voluntary nature of Xenophon’s eisphora, I now turn to 
the question of who would have contributed to the capital fund.  The issue is important 
because it is often assumed that Xenophon’s proposals had as their aim the amelioration 
of the financial condition of the wealthy (plousioi).198  Given the close relationship 
between Xenophon’s eisphora and the epidosis, which was theoretically open to any 
citizen, one might reasonably conclude that all butthe poorest citizens would have 
                                                                                                                                      
195 Most notably, see IG II2 791 with Meritt, Hesperia 11 (1941): 287-92, which includes over 130 names; 
cf. also plates I-V in Migeotte 1992. 
196 Croiset quoted in Andreades 1933: 341-2.  On direct taxation being anathema to rich citizens, see 
Andreades 1933: 126-30, Finley 1985: 95 and 230, n.1. and Christ 1990: 152-60 who also treats liturgical 
oblligations. 
197 In fact, the only thing that differentiates Xenophn’s eisphora from the epidosis is the expectation of a 
monetary return in the form of a daily triobolon.  But even in this respect we are not too far from the 
ideology of the epidosis.  A public subscription was perceived as a kind of gift to the state, which 
demanded a return favor, usually in the form of public honor and praise bestowed on the contributor by the 
rest of citizenry.  While this transaction cannot nbe considered economic in its strictest, modern s nse, it 
nonetheless conforms to the reciprocal principles of a gift economy, in which one gift, favor, etc. obligates 
a return from another.   
198 E.g., Schütrumpf 1982: 32, 51-2, 65, Vannier 1988: 186-9, and Veyne 1990: 98. 
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participated.  This seems to be the view of Gauthier, who argues that under Xenophon’s 
plan the “rich citizen” will pay ten minai; the “well-to-do” five minai; and the “less 
fortunate” one mina.  Unfortunately, Gauthier’s terminology is not very descriptive, 
failing to correspond to existing Athenian socio-economic categories.  If we assume that 
the group of “less fortunate” is not a subcategory of the “rich” (plousioi), it would appear 
that he assumes that those of the middle rank, that is, of the hoplite census, would have 
subscribed to the capital fund.  This interpretation s not surprising given Gauthier’s 
understanding of Xenophon’s eisphora as a compulsory eisphora-tax.  Some historians, 
most notably Thompsen in his study of the eisphora, contend that the minimum 
requirement for the eisphora was 2,500 drachmai, which was the cutoff mark for the
value of an Athenian hoplite’s estate, whose numbers in the fourth century were 
somewhere between 6,000 and 9,000.199  However, other scholars, especially those of the 
opinion that the eisphora symmories after 378/7 were identical to those for the trierarchy, 
have contested this view, arguing that only the wealthy (those owning perhaps a 
minimum of 8000 dr.), representing some 1,200 citizens after the reforms of Periander in 
358/7, paid eisphorai and state liturgies.200  Based on this evaluation of Athenian tax 
                                                
199 Thomsen 1964: 194-203, esp. 200-2; cf. Ste. Croix 1953: 45, Jones 1957: 28, Brun 1984: 21-2, Markle 
1985: 295-7, and Gabrielsen 1994: 189-90.  That the hoplite census was reckoned at a minimum of 2,500 
dr. is the thesis of Jones 1957: 9-10, which is endorsed by Ste. Croix 1953: 33, Markle 1985: 292, 295-7, 
and many others.  For hoplite numbers in the fourth century, see Chapter 3, Section 3B.   
200 Ruschenbusch 1978 and 1987, Davies 1981: 34-5, and M cDowell 1986: 438-41 contra Rhodes 1982: 
5-11, Brun 1984: 20-1, 30, and Gabrielsen 1994: 182-90, who argue that the symmories established by the 
trierarchic reform of 358/7 were organized differently from the eisphora-symmories of 378/7.  A variety of 
figures have been proposed for the minimum property value of the liturgical class, but those of Davies 
1971: xx-xxiv and 1981: 9-37 are generally accepted: “during the fourth century men whose property was 
worth less than 3 tal. were free from liturgical obligations, while men whose property was worth over 4 tal. 
were very unlikely to escape such obligations” (xxiv).  He estimates their numbers at 300 to 400 but notes 
(1981: 19-20) that between 357 and 340 (the year of Demosthenes’ reforms) the liturgical class would have 
also included those of the “leisure class” (those whose estates were valued at a minimum of one talent; s e 
pp. 29, 34-5) and numbered between 1,200 and 2,000 (cf. Casson 1976: 30, Ruschenbusch 1978: 279, n.17,
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obligations, only the 1,200 richest citizens would have subscribed to Xenophon’s 
eisphora.  There are three compelling reasons why the latter view is preferable. 
First, like liturgies, epidoseis were largely, if not exclusively, the concern of the 
wealthy and were frequently utilized to supplement trierarchic contributions.201  Our 
author is probably alluding to this practice when h mentions that “triremes are often sent 
out with much expense…” (3.8).  Again, after 357 only the 1,200 richest citizens were 
liable to the trierarchy, and as far as the evidence permits, only those on the trierarchic 
register made voluntary contributions when the assembly called for subscriptions to 
finance naval expeditions.  Second, the inclusion of Athenians of moderate means creates 
an impossible situation in which thousands of Athenians would have been encouraged to 
pay sums well beyond their financial means.  For insta ce, the income generated from a 
hoplite estate valued at 2,500 drachmai at the customary rate of 8% was 200 drachmai.  
Considering that a family of four needed somewhere between 366 and 488 drachmai per 
year to maintain itself, even a 100-drachma contribu ion would have broken the backs of 
most Athenian hoplites.202  On the other hand, the income generated from an estate of a 
“poorer” rich person (i.e., one possessing an estat v lued at a minimum of 8,000 dr.), 
would have yielded just enough to make such a minimum contribution.  Third, 
commentators have failed to take notice of Xenophon’s call to implement his slave-
buying program with 1,200 slaves (4.23).  This number, which is the same as the 
                                                                                                                                      
Rhodes 1982: 8, MacDowell 1986: 444, Ober 1989: 128-9, Christ 1990: 149, and Gabrielsen 1994: 45-53 
who argues convincingly that 8,000 dr. is a more lik ly figure for the minimum property value of liturgical 
class at this time).    
201 Pritchett 1991: 474, 478-9, 485, Migeotte 1992: 338-9, 377-8, and Gabrielsen 1994: 199-206. 
202 On these numbers, Chapter 3, Section 3B.  For a similar argument, see Ober 1989: 128-9, n. 59.  
Demosthenes 42.44 is often cited in this regard to emonstrate that some Athenians considered an estate 
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trierarchic register, cannot be a coincidence.  Xenophon, I submit, chose this figure 
because it introduces a simple calculation in the minds of his wealthy readers vis-à-vis 
the financial burden they are expected to bear.  Whatever happened to be the current 
market price for a mining slave would have represented the average rate of contribution 
per individual subscriber.  As we will see below, Xenophon himself estimates that each 
mining slave will cost somewhere between 158 to 195dr.  Considering that individual 
expenditure for the trierarchy, and even for the syntrierarchy, usually amounted to 
thousands of drachmai, the average payment of less than 200 drachmai per contributor 
would have appeared quite reasonable to the wealthy Athenian.203   
Despite what appears to be nominal contribution amounts, the timing of his 
proposals, coming as they do a few years after the burdensome eisphorai of the Social 
War, causes Xenophon to fear that many Athenian elites will be financially incapable of 
subscribing to the capital fund (4.40).  To remedy this situation, he proposes the 
following measure:  
ὑμεῖς δὴ ὅσα μὲν πρὸ τῆς εἰρήνης χρήματα ηὕρισκε τὰ τέλη, ἀπὸ 
τοσούτων καὶ τὸ ἐπιὸν ἔτος διοικεῖτε τὴν πόλιν, ὅσα δ’ ἂν 
ἐφευρίσκῃ διὰ τὸ εἰρήνην τε εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι 
μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους καὶ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πλείω 
εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὸ  τὰ ἐλλιμένια καὶ τὰς 
ἀγορὰς αὐξάνεσθαι, ταῦτα λαμβάνοντες κατασκευάζεσθε ὡς 
ἂν πλεῖσται <αἱ> πρόσοδοι γίγνοιντο. 
 
Keep the cost of city administration for the coming year to the amount that 
the taxes brought in before the peace; then take any surplus monies that 
will accrue to you because of the peace, because of your concern for the 
                                                                                                                                      
valued at 4,500 dr. insufficient to live on as a renti r (e.g., Jones 1957: 135, n. 1, Davies 1981: 28-9, and 
Gabrielsen 1994: 51-2).  
203 For some figures, see Gabrielsen 1994: 49-50 and pssim. 
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metics and traders, because of the growth of imports and exports due to a 
growing population, and because of the augmentation in market and 
harbor dues, and invest it [in the capital fund] so that the greatest amount 
of revenue will be created.204   
 
With these remarks, does Xenophon mean that the Athenians should postpone the 
eisphora and for the present simply use the surplus revenues as aphorme?  Does he 
intend therefore to give the wealthy a temporary reprieve from their financial burdens?  
To answer these questions it is imperative that we read the above passage in conjunction 
with Xenophon’s recommendations at 4.36-8: “for if all these schemes were put into 
effect at the same time, it would be necessary for ou to furnish all of the money at once” 
(ἔτι δὲ πάντων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡμᾶς ἂν ἅπαντα δέοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι).  In other 
words, a gradual implementation of his projects would avoid the necessity of demanding 
an excessively high eisphora at the start.205  The point of 4.40, then, is not that the 
employment of surplus revenues will make the eisphora unnecessary to execute from the 
beginning, but rather that with the use of the surplus revenues the total amount of money 
that the wealthy will have to contribute will be reduced.206  Thus, in the event that the 
                                                
204 The commentary of Gauthier 1976: 172 is excellent: “I  order to comprehend [Xenophon’s] proposal it 
is necessary to remember that taxes were farmed out at the beginning of each year (summer) for 
predetermined sums which the t lonai had to settle at fixed dates (at the beginning of certain prytanies).  
Essentially the revenues of the city were not able to grow in the course of a year but only from one year to 
another.  Writing during the winter of 355/4, [Xenophon] foresaw that with the return of peace the taxes 
farmed out in summer of 354 would yield sums much hig er than the preceding year.  His reasoning then is 
as follows.  At present (355/4), it is “the sums produced by the taxes” farmed out in the summer of 355 that 
the Athenians will use to “administer their city.”  The total of these sums is undoubtedly mediocre.  The 
next year, after better auctions, the total of sums to be collected will be higher.  [Xenophon] recommends 
that the Athenians use for the administration of the city in 354/3 only a sum as large as the one employed in 
the previous year, and then use the difference as aphorme for the realization of his projects.” 
205 Gauthier 1976: 169. 
206 Contra Vannier 1988: 188.  Naturally, it is impossible to determine the exact amount of surplus 
revenues that would have offset the cost of the eisphora.  But if we take Demosthenes’ claim that city 
revenues increased from 130 talents at the end of the Social War to 400 talents by 341 (10.37), we can 
exempli gratia estimate a maximum 20-talent increase from 355/4 to 354/3.  Considering that the purchase 
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wealthy are unable to contribute as generously as they had during the Social War, 
Xenophon suggests using public monies to offset the initial cost of the eisphora. 
In sum, Xenophon’s eisphora, through which will be realized an aphorme 
sufficient to implement his proposals for the financi l recovery of Athens and the 
maintenance of all Athenians, is a kind of contribution that is functionally and 
ideologically related to the public subscription (epidosis).  For this reason, we must 
conclude that participation would have been strictly voluntary and that only the wealthy, 
practically speaking, would have contributed to the funding of the aphorme.  Xenophon’s 
major innovation vis-à-vis this quasi epidosis is the promise that every subscriber will 
receive a return on their contribution in the form of a daily triobolon.  To be sure, under 
his plan every Athenian will receive the same triobolon regardless of whether they 
contribute to the capital fund or not.  Yet the fact that he concentrates on the wealthy, 
framing his discussion in terms of the rates of return each of them will receive on the 
money they contribute (i.e., ὥσπερ ναυτικόν, σχεδὸν ἐπίπεμπτον, ἐπίτριτον, etc.), 
suggests strongly that Xenophon views each contributor not as a political animal who 
willingly sacrifices his resources for the benefit of the state, but rather as an investor who 
when confronted with a number of investment opportunities chooses the one that brings 
him the greatest return.  It is often denied that tere was any kind of economic rationality 
                                                                                                                                      
of 1,200 slaves would have cost between 30 and 40 talents (see above), the use of these surplus monies 
could have potentially reduced the cost of the eisphora by half to two-thirds.  In the following table, I 
propose a hypothetical payment schedule for the eisphora based on Xenophon’s contribution rates: 
10 minai subscribers (100): property valued 4+ talents (100) = 16 2/3 T 
5 minai subscribers (200): property valued at 3-4 talents = 16 2/3 T 
1 mina subscribers (900): property valued at 1 1/3-3 talents = 15 T 
      Total subscribers: 1,200 = 48 1/3 T + metic and foreign contributions of 11 2/3 T = 60 T 
Thus, with the use of the surplus revenues, only about a third of the 1,200 richest Athenian citizens would 
have had to participate in the eisphora to finance the capital fund.           
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in terms of profit maximization in classical Athens, but as my discussion of the Laurion 
mines in the next section bears out, Xenophon’s proposals presuppose that not only did 
such homines economici exist but that Xenophon himself was one of them. 
 
5D. Mining and Economic Rationalism 
“Xenophon’s project concerning the mines is more important than all his others 
and by far the most audacious.”207  So begins Gauthier’s analysis of the Poroi’s longest 
and most complex chapter, and it is difficult not t agree with his appraisal.  Here we 
quickly learn the details of what Xenophon promises at the start: “the earth…when mined 
feeds many times more people than if the same land pro uced grain” (1.5).  In particular, 
Xenophon intends to provide the Athenians with sufficient trophe by leasing out a cadre 
of publicly owned slaves at an obol a day to those exploiting the mines until there are 
three for every citizen, which is to say, until every Athenian collects a daily triobolon 
(4.13, 17, 33, 48).  This is Xenophon’s bold, long-term goal, one which may take two to 
three decades to realize (see below).  But the exploitation of the mines also contributes to 
the realization of his short-term goals: achieving fiscal solvency so that the Athenians 
can, among other things, celebrate their festivals more magnificently, restore temples and 
                                                
207 Gauthier 1976: 110; cf. Cartledge 1997: 167. The most comprehensive studies on the Laurion mines 
are Conophagos 1980 and Kalcyk 1982, which have replac d Boeckh 1976: 613-76 and Ardaillon 1897, 
though the latter is still useful.  For concise general introductions, see Hopper 1961 and 1979: 170-89, 
Cunningham 1967, Ellis-Jones 1982, Isager and Hansen 1975: 42-50, and Osborne 1985: 111-26.  For 
discussions on the technical side of silver mining a d production, see Conophagos 1980: 125-372, Rihll 
2001, and Christesen 2003: 39-46.  For the texts of the mine leases, see Langdon 1991: 70-143, which 
supercedes the earlier work of Crosby 1950 and 1957.  For analysis of the mining leases, see Crosby 1950 
and 1957, Hopper 1953 and 1968, Conophagos 1980: 42-39, Rhodes 1981: 552-5, Langdon 1991: 57-62, 
Vanhove 1996, Aperghis 1998, and  Shipton 1998 and 2000.  Lauffer 1955-6 is still the best study for 
slavery and the mines, though see Morris 2001 for arecent discussion of archaeological evidence. 
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repair the walls and naval yards, and restore the ancient privileges to the priests, council, 
magistrates, and cavalry (6.1).208   
To be more clear, in addition to the revenue that will accrue from the leasing of 
slaves, other revenues will be generated from the mines as a result of the intensification 
and expansion of the mining industry: “As for the silver mines, if they were organized 
properly I think that a great amount of money would come from them apart from any 
other revenues they may produce” (τά γε μὴν ἀργύρεια εἰ κατασκευασθείη ὡς δεῖ, 
πάμπολλα ἂν νομίζω χρήματα ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων 
προσιέναι) (4.1).209  He does not elaborate the point, taking for granted that his 
audience knows what these other sources of revenue are.  Historians have speculated that 
he is referring to the monies the state received from the mining leases, but the use of the 
plural τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων indicates that Xenophon is not thinking of these 
exclusively.210  At 4.49 he provides some insights when he says that the leasing of slaves 
will cause a large populous city to grow in Laurion: “much revenue would be generated 
from the market there, from the publicly owned houses, from the furnaces (ἀπὸ 
καμίνων), and all the other sources (τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων).”  The kaminoi of which 
he speaks are probably the publicly owned furnaces, which the state leased out to 
                                                
208 To restate a point from an earlier chapter, I do not think Xenophon intends to stop the payment of civic 
misthoi once all citizens begin collecting their daily three obols (cf. Thiel 1922: 55, Wilhelm 1932: 43-4, 
and Andreades 1933: 389, n.7).        
209 Based on their translations, it seems that Giglioni1970 and Marchant 1925 construe that phrase καὶ 
ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων προσόδων προσιέναι as refering to non-mining revenues.  This is certainly not 
correct, as 4.49 demostrates that there were, in fact, other sources of revenue from the mines.  See Thi l 
1922: 16 and Gauthier 1976: 112-5, 187-8 with the better translations of Schütrumpf 1982 and Waterfield 
1997.    
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concessionaires for the smelting of silver ore.211  Yet the phrase τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων 
suggests that the polis derives even more revenues from the mines in addition to those 
from the furnaces.  Some evidence for these revenues exists outside the Poroi, but a 
number of interpretive obstacles stand in the way.212  Due to the complexity of the 
subject, we must refrain from speculating on the nature of these mining revenues for now.  
But whatever their precise nature, it is quite certain that the mines had great fiscal 
“potential” (δύναμις) (4.1)—a remark that harkens back to Aeschylus’ contention that 
Laurion’s “font of silver” (ἀργύρου πηγή) is “treasure trove of the earth” (θησαυρὸς 
χθονός; Persians 238).  
In order to appreciate fully Xenophon’s proposals vi -à-vis the mines, it is 
necessary to examine first the history of the Laurion mining industry in the fifth and 
                                                                                                                                      
210 E.g., Thiel 1922: 16 and Gauthier 1976: 112-3 contra Crosby 1950: 203-4. 
211 Gauthier 1976: 187-8. 
212 For instance, there is the enigmatic “five-drachma tax” (see Crosby 1950: 203, n.44, Hopper 1953: 
216, n. 114, and Shipton 1998: 58-9) and a 1/24th mentioned in Suda ἀγράφου μετάλλου δίκη  s.v.: 
“Whenever those who worked the mines wished to open a new mine they made a declaration to those put in 
charge of such matters by the people and registered it for taxation purposes (the people having decided that 
each new mine should pay a 1/24th).  Thus, if someone was caught secretly working a mine, it was open to 
any interested party to initiate a suit and bring forth evidence against him who did register his mine” (οἱ τὰ 
ἀργύρεια μέταλλα ἐργαζόμενοι ὅπου βούλοιντο καινοῦ ἔργου ἄρξασθαι, φανερὸν ἐποιοῦντο 
τοῖς ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις τεταγμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο τοῦ τελεῖν ἕνεκα τῷ δήμῳ 
εἰκοστὴν τετάρτην τοῦ καινοῦ μετάλλου. εἴ τις οὖν ἐδόκει λάθρα ἐργάζεσθαι μέταλλον, τὸν 
μὴ ἀπογραψάμενον ἐξῆν τῷ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν).  Momigliano 1932: 258 (cf. 
Crosby 1950: 203, n. 44) argues that this 1/24th was a tax on the ore produced but one that was in existence 
only in Roman imperial times (cf. Codex Justinian 11.7.2).  Other scholars, e.g., Ardaillon 1898: 199-91, 
Hopper 1979: 184, 186, and Aperghis 1998: 17, consider this tax to be of a fourth-century origin.  I see no 
good reason to doubt the relevance of Suda’s testimony for fourth-century mining practices, as it is 
doubtful the Athenians would have imposed a 1/24th tax on new mines at a time when, by all accounts, 
mining activity was virtually non-existent (Conophagos 1980: 121-24).  The 1/24th may have been a tax on 
the total ore produced, collected by treasurers of the mines (e.g., IG I3 444, 249; 445, 294; 465, 126) at the 
furnaces (Poroi 4.49), or it may represent a minting fee.                
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fourth centuries.213  Let us begin with the period immediately following the infamous 
“lucky strike” of the 480s when Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to use a surplus of 
mining revenues to build a fleet of triremes.214  Though the literary and epigraphic 
sources touching the exploitation of the mines from ca. 479 to 424 is not particularly rich, 
the numismatic record supports overwhelmingly the conclusion that silver was produced 
at a high level between 479 and ca. 450.215  For the period down to the Peloponnesian 
war, we have the building accounts for the Propylaia and the Parthenon for the years 439-
7 and 434/3, which attest to monies “from the treasurers of the mine Hephaistikon in 
Laurion” ([παρὰ ταμ]ιῶν hεφα[ισ]τικοῦ ἀπὸ Λαυρε[ίου]).216  The fact that one 
mine and, perhaps, more had treasurers assigned to them suggests that revenues from 
                                                
213 For discussions of Bronze Age mining in the Laurion region, most notably at Thorikos, see Hopper 
1968: 293-4, Mussche et al. 1975, Conophagos 1980: 5 -65, and Ellis Jones 1982: 170 with references to 
the archaeological reports.  Much of the evidence for the exploitation of the mines in the archaic period 
comes from the numismatic record (see the summary in Kroll and Waggoner 1984).  Xenophon knew well 
that the mines had been exploited for some time (palaia) but was unable to fix a point in time for their 
discovery (4.2). 
214 Herodotus 7.144; Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 22.7; Plutarch, Themistocles 4.1; Polyaenus 1.30.6.  
Herodotus’ contention that Themistocles’ proposal ws geared to the war with Aegina (cf. Thucydides 
1.14.3), which he dates to shortly before 490, seem unlikely.  A date after 487, that is, after Marathon, 
accords better with what we know about Athenian history at this time (see How and Wells 1928: 49).  Ps-
Aristotle dates this event specifically to 483/2 and places the discovery at Maronea; he also gives a specific 
figure of 100 talents.  That Laurion silver was used in Athenian and even Corinthian coins as early as ca. 
500 belies the notion of a “lucky strike” in a single year (Howgego 1995: 25).  Hopper 1961: 141 and 
Kraay 1976: 62 speculate that the loss of the Thracian mines to the Persians in 512 necessitated the 
exploitation of Laurion; Picard 2001 dates the discovery of the silver-laden “third vein/contact” to ca. 515.   
The 100 talents, therefore, probably represents the accumulation of mining revenues in the state treasury 
over a two-decade period.  For the difficulties in accessing the historicity of Ps.-Aristotle and Herodotus’ 
claims, see Hopper 1961: 140-4, 1968: 302-4, and especially 1979: 172-3 and Rhodes 1981: 279. 
215 The literary and epigraphic sources, to my knowledge, are limited to Plutarch, Pericles 12.6; Aristides 
5.8; Nepos, Cimon 1.3; Aristophanes, Knights 362; Pherecrates Fg. 108-11 (Kock); IG I3 90, 11; 444, 249; 
445, 294; 465, 126; and Thucydides 2.55.1.  The numismatic evidence is summarized in Figueira 1998: 
180-97. 
216 IG I3 444, 249; 445, 294; 465, 126; cf. Plutarch, Pericles 12.6.  The exact figure for this contribution is 
missing, but the mysterious fraction of “five-sixths” (τῶν πέντε μερῶν) is preserved.  Fornara 1977: 129 
speculates that the five-sixths represents the percentage of silver from the mines, but this seems 
unreasonable, for very little would be left over fothe concessionaire.  Perhaps, it is simply five-sixth  of 
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Laurion regularly flowed into the state’s coffers at this time.  Furthermore, during the 
first invasion of Attica in the summer of 430, Thucydides says the Spartans proceeded 
“as far as Laurion, where the Athenians have their silver mines” (2.55.1).  Ostensibly, the 
purpose of venturing so far south was to disrupt mining operations by encouraging the 
slaves in the mines to defect.217  Lastly, we have good evidence indicating that two 
prominent Athenians, Callias of Alopeke and Nicias, made huge amounts of money from 
the mines at this time.218  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Athnians derived 
a significant amount of revenue during the p ntecontaetia from this vigorous mining 
activity. 
From the loss of Amphipolis to the occupation of Decel a (424/3-413/2), the 
mines seem to have been exploited to their full potential.  In the Knights (424), 
Aristophanes has the Sausage-Seller declare that he will “purchase mines,” implying that 
he will become a rich man like Callias or Nicias.219  A decade later, the Chorus of the 
Birds ask Pisthetairos, who is trying to convince them to build Cloudcuckooland as a 
rival city to Olympus, why humans would choose to wrship them instead of the gods.  
To which he responds:  
Pisthetairos: All good things (ἀγάθ’ πάντα) will be laid at their feet. 
                                                                                                                                      
“payments” from the rents, which the Athenians decre d be paid directly to these two projects, as opposed 
to some other use.     
217 On this occasion, however, the Spartan invasion did little to upset the mining industry (Lauffer 1955-6: 
220).  See Hornblower 1991: 328 who notes the difficulty in destroying mining infrastructure; cf. Gomme 
1956: 162 and Ober 1985: 30.  Xenophon’s thoughts about fortifying the mining district support this 
interpretation (Poroi 4.43-8).  He says nothing of invading armies destroying props, ergasteria, etc.  
Rather, they would hypothetically seize grain, wine, and cattle but nothing else.  Hornblower 1991: 328
also speculates that the reference to Laurion may be a scholiast’s gloss.          
218 For Callias and Nicias’ mining activity, see Plutarch, Nicias 4 and the Comparison of Nicias and 
Crassus 1; Memorabilia 2.5.2, Poroi 4.14; Nepos, Cimon 1.3 (for the meaning of Callias’ nickname of 
Lakkoploutos, “rich in mining pits,” see Hopper 1961: 142); and Davies 1971: nos. 7826 and 10808. 
219 Knights 362 with Sommerstein 1981: 163.   
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Leader of Chorus: Tell me about one of these “good things.” 
Pisthetairos: Well, first of all, locusts will not devour their vines.  One 
levy of owls or hawks will utterly destroy them.  Nor will there be any 
ants or gall-bugs wasting their figs.  One flock of thrushes will pick all of 
them up clean.   
Leader of Chorus: But from what sources shall we give them wealth 
(πλουτεῖν)?  For this is what they particularly want. 
Pisthetairos: The birds will give them oracles to those who seek 
divinations about the mines (τὰ μέταλλ’ αὐτοῖς μαντευομένοις οὗτοι 
δώσουσι τὰ χρηστά) (586-93). 
 
Remarkably, “all good things” defined in terms of agricultural success has little value in 
the Chorus’ estimation.  What matters to them and the Athenians is wealth, which comes, 
not from traditional economic pursuits like farming, but from mining silver.  The 
equivalence of τὰ μέταλλα with πλουτεῖν suggests that the mines were still very 
lucrative by 414.  Later in the play, the Chorus again promises ἀγάθα to humans, 
declaring that “the little owls from Laurion will never stop flowing. They’ll dwell inside 
your house, build nests inside your wallets, and leave little owls behind.  Then you will 
live in your houses as if they were temples” (γλαῦκες ὑμᾶς οὔποτ’ ἐπιλείψουσι 
Λαυριωτικαί / ἀλλ’ ἐνοικήσουσιν ἔνδον, ἔν τε τοῖς βαλλαντίοις 
/ ἐννεοττεύσουσι κἀκλέψουσι μικρὰ κέρματα. / εἶτα πρὸς τούτοισιν ὥσπερ ἐν 
ἱεροῖς οἰκήσετε (1106-9).  It is noteworthy that the Chorus vows not to usher in a new 
era of prosperity but to ensure that current levels are maintained and augmented.  These 
lines undoubtedly reference “the importance to the Athenian economy and money supply 
of the Laureion silver and of confidence in the continuity of that supply.”220 
                                                
220 Rankin 1988: 196. 
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Furthermore, in 415/4 Alcibiades counsels the Spartans to occupy Decelea, 
“because the Athenians will be deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at 
Laurion and from the land and law courts that presently profit them so much, and 
especially from the revenue of their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they will 
consider it no great matter when they see war being fou ht with much vigor in the 
Athenians’ own territory” (6.91.7).221  When the Spartans invaded Attica the following 
summer, Thucydides asserts that “more than 20,000 slaves defected, of which the greater 
part were craftsmen (πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων τὸ πολὺ 
μέρος χειροτέχναι) (7.27.5).222  Traditionally, χειροτέχναι has been taken to mean 
slaves working in the mines, but a number of historans have resisted this 
identification.223  Most notably, Lauffer argues that these χειροτέχναι were both 
workshop slaves from the agricultural settlements ad skilled craftsmen from the mining 
                                                
221 It is truly perplexing that Westermann 1940: 465 and Lauffer 1955-6: 141 think that Alcibiades’ advice 
to deprive the Athenians of their revenues from the mines has no connection to the Spartans’ occupation of 
Decelea.  
222 I follow the OCT and most commentators who read τὸ πολὺ μέρος with manuscript B against the 
πολὺ μέρος reading of the other manuscripts (cf. Budé and Jameson 1976: 136-7).  Moreover, it must be 
noted that some historians (e.g., Westermann 1955: 8, Gomme et al. 1970: 403, and Finley 1999: 24, 72) 
round down the number Thucydides gives and write “20,000,” forgetting that he states πλέον ἢ δύο 
μυριάδες.  On the veracity of Thucydides’ figure here and elsewhere in the History, see Hanson 1992.  I 
would also add that the number Thucydides supplies h re was probably calculated (albeit crudely) 
according to the same method used by Xenophon at Poroi 4.24-5, that is, by employing taxation figures 
(see below).  We know that the Spartans collected a dek te for Apollo on all property (including slaves) 
seized during the Decelean occupation (Hellenica 3.5.5, Justin 5.10.12, and Plutarch, Lysander 27.2 with 
Pritchett 1991: 373-4).  The Thebans, in particular, made a killing buying Athenian slaves on the cheap 
(Oxyrhynchus Historian 17.3-5).  All Thucydides would have needed, then, to estimate the number of 
slaves that defected was the total figure brought in by the dekate (easily attained from temple records) and 
the approximate, average price the Thebans paid for the slaves (tithe ÷ .10 = total profit from sale of b oty  
÷ average slave price = total number of slaves sold).  Perhaps, the records of sale also included designations 
of slave occupation, such as οἰκέτης or χειροτέχνης.         
 359 
operations (qualifizierte Werkstättenarbeiter aus den Bergbaubetreiben).224  Lauffer 
astutely distinguishes between those working in the s afts and those slaves employed in 
the ergasteria (i.e., in dressing, smelting, and cupellation of the ore).225  Nonetheless, he 
contends that the fortifications at Thorikos, Sunion, and Anaphlystos prevented these 
slaves from escaping to Decelea, whereas their counterparts working in the open chora 
easily escaped.226  Lauffer believes that the Athenians did, in fact, lose a significant 
number of mining slaves, but this happened not because of defection but as a result of 
slave casualties suffered at Arginusae and the massemancipations carried out afterwards 
(406).227  The major problem with this interpretation, however, is that the Athenians did 
                                                                                                                                      
223 For those who interpret χειροτέχναι as mine-workers, see, for example, Ardaillon 1897: 5, 
Andreades 1933: 270, Hopper 1953: 248, n. 345, Ehrenberg 1962: 185-6, Gomme et al. 1970: 403, Isager 
and Hansen 1975: 43, Jameson 1976: 136-7, Wood 1983: , Strauss 1986: 46, and Sallares 1991: 428-9. 
224 Lauffer 1955-6: 141-2. 
225 This point is lost on Ste. Croix 1981: 506 and Hanson 1992.  Both interpret χειροτέχναι to mean 
agricultural specialists (e.g., vine dressers) because, as Ste Croix believes, “they would have [had] better 
chances for running away than e.g. mine slaves.”  Hanson, in particular, claims that the mining slaves 
worked in chain gangs (219), whereas agricultural sl ves were not (sic. Menander, Dyskolos 412-16 
mentions chains on agricultural workers).  The evidnce for this claim (which he incidentally does notcite) 
is meager.  Iron fetters have been found in the galleries (Ehrenberg 1962: 186), but this tells us nothing 
about the extent to which these were used or at whaperiod of exploitation they belong (they may, in fact, 
be from the Hellenistic era).  Plutarch says that some of Nicias’ slaves “were bound” (ἐνίων δεδεμένων) 
(Comparison of Nicias and Crassus 1), which demonstrates, at least, that not all slaves were fettered (see 
Ardaillon 1897: 94-5 who argues that the accounts of poor mining conditions (e.g., Diodorus 3.13; 5. 38) 
are stereotypical exaggerations and not applicable to classical Laurion).  Moreover, while homes excavated 
at Thorikos exhibit increased security measures, these steps were taken not to keep the slaves in but the 
silver from walking out (Jones 1975: 121-2).  Even assuming that the slaves working in the pits were 
chained, they represented only about 40% of the total number of slaves working the mines; at least an equal 
percentage of slaves were skilled (Conophagos 1980: 348; cf. Hopper 1961: 151 who considers even the 
diggers skilled workers).  These were free to move about and thus could easily escape in the event of an 
opportunity like the occupation of Decelea.     
226 Lauffer 1955-6: 220-24.  For the evidence of these fortifications in the fifth century, see Ober 1985: 
192-4. 
227 Lauffer 1955-6: 224-6.  For slave participation in this battle and emancipations, see H llenica 1.6.24; 
Aristophanes, Frogs 33-4, 190, 693 with scholium (= Hellenicus FGrH 4 F 171); Justin 5.6.5; and Garlan 
1988: 164-67 and Hunt 1998: 87-95, who argues that the slaves were also given Athenian citizenship (see
93, n. 57 for others with this view).  According to Lauffer, because Xenophon says the Athenians “put on 
board all those of military age whether free or slave,” then these must have included slaves working in the 
mines.  While it is reasonable to believe that the Athenians followed through on their promises, it is hard to 
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not fortify the mining district until 409 (Hellenica 1.2.2), and thus a considerable number 
of mining slaves could have defected between 413/2 and 410/09 if not entirely in the 
former year.228  
In regard to numbers, it is unclear how many slaves th  phrase πλέον ἢ δύο 
μυριάδες denotes, the answer to which inevitably influences our reading of τὸ πολὺ 
μέρος.  Naturally, πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες cannot signify a number greater than 30,000 
(or else Thucydides would have written πλέον ἢ τρεῖς μυριάδες), and we are probably 
on safe ground to assume no more than 25,000.229  Accordingly, the expression τὸ πολὺ 
μέρος, “the greater part,” recommends a figure of at least 12,000 but probably not 
greater than 15,000.230  It is important to stress that whatever the number of mining 
slaves that deserted to Decelea this figure need not correspond to the total number of 
slaves working in the mines, since not all would have defected.  Accordingly, historians’ 
estimates of total slave numbers in the mines vary widely, reaching as high as 54,000 
total slaves before the occupation of Decelea.231  Fortunately, Xenophon provides a 
check on modern estimates.  After introducing the id a that within ten years the 
                                                                                                                                      
imagine that all slaves were emancipated (Garlan 1988: 165).  For what it is worth, the scholium on 
Aristophanes, Clouds 6 preserves or confuses a tradition that only those who tried to recover the bodies 
after the battle were granted their freedom.  If IG II2 1951is really an honorary inscription for those who 
fought at Aegospotami, then it is certain that mass emancipations were not carried out, as the inscription 
attests to hundreds of slaves rowing with their masters in 405. 
228 Strauss 1986: 26.  The view of Westermann 1940: 465 (followed by Hanson 1992: 210-1, n. 1) that the 
pluperfect ηὐτομολήκεσαν must refer to whole Decelean War 413-404 is unconvincing (see Ehrenberg 
1962: 185, n. 8).   
229 Ste Croix 1981: 506. 
230 Lauffer 1955-6: 142-3; cf. Gomme 1933: 20. 
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Athenians may attain a total of 10,000 slaves, he promises “the mines would receive 
many more times this number (ὅτι δὲ δέξεται πολλαπλάσια τούτων), as anyone who 
is old enough to remember will testify to the amount the slave tax brought in before 
Decelea.  And further proof comes from the fact tharoughout the history of the mines 
countless numbers of men have worked them, and yet there is no difference between the 
mines today and in the past, as our ancestors remember them” (4.25).232  While 
πολλαπλάσια is not precise, it suggests a figure much higher tan 10,000.  Lauffer’s 
figure of 25,000 is perhaps the most reasonable estimate for the total number of slaves 
working in the mines before 413.233  
With the loss, then, of more than half of the mining workforce (and maybe even 
more if Lauffer’s thesis about mass emancipations after Arginusae is correct) and the 
continued occupation of Decelea throughout the remainder of the war, silver production 
went into a serious decline if it did not come to a halt altogether.  Consequently, revenues 
from the mines plummeted.234  We also learn of dramatic losses in personal fortunes of 
                                                                                                                                      
231 E.g., Conophagos 1980: 347-9 = 11,000; Ardaillon 1897: 92-3 = “more than 20,000” (in time of 
Pericles); Lauffer 1955-6: 144-5 = 20,000-30,000 (cf. Osborne 1995: 31); Isager and Hansen 1975: 43 = 
“more than thirty thousand”; Gomme 1933: 40-50,000; Kalcyk 1982: 110-4 = 54,100.  
232 Reading τὰ ἀργύρεια, not τὸ δημόσιον, as the implied subject with Thiel 1922: 24 followed by 
Lauffer 1955-6: 144 and Gauthier 1976: 156.  There are three possibilities on the identity of the tax o 
which Xenophon refers: 1)  a head tax, paid annually by the master of the slave (for the scant evidence, see 
Andreades 1933: 283-4): 2) a two percent tax paid on the entry and departure from the Piraeus (e.g., Ps.-
Aristotle, Oeconomica 1349b17-8 with Gauthier 1976: 157); or 3) a sales tax (Andreades 1933: 154, 281-2 
and Lauffer 1955-6: 72 and 144).  The first can be rul d out because no known slave head tax is attested in 
Greece proper.  While the other two taxes are better videnced, a sales tax seems to have been more 
common elsewhere in Greece. 
233 Lauffer 1955-6: 162 (Table 11); cf. Gauthier 1976: 156.              
234 Memorabilia 3.6.12 is often cited in support of this claim.  Here Socrates asks in vain if Glaucon 
knows “why the revenue from the mines is less than it was before.”  The dramatic date of the conversation 
is post-Decelea.   Some scholars have interpreted this passage as evidence for a general decline in mining 
activity during the first half of the fourth century as well (e.g., Hopper 1979: 179 and Ober 1985: 29-9). 
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Athenians occupied in mining.  The defection of 12,000 slaves represents a cost of 300 to 
400 talents in real capital and countless talents in opportunity costs.235  The drop in silver 
production was so precipitous that the Athenians resort d to minting gold coinage in 
407/6, made from the dedications to Nike on the Acropolis, and even introduced silver-
plated bronze coinage a year later.236  Both issues were meant to replace or supplement 
Athenian silver owls, but the former was used primaly as a foreign exchange currency, 
whereas the latter circulated domestically, freeing up silver coins for use abroad.237  
These silver-plated coins were probably discontinued shortly after the end of the war, but 
the Athenians did not strike a new issue of silver tet adrachms until the late 390s.238  
Laurion may have been the source of silver for these coins, but the Athenians most likely 
obtained their silver from Conon’s personal expenditures, Persian subsidies, the eikoste 
and dekate imposed by Thrasybulus on the Greek poleis of Asia ca. 391-87, and their 
own harbor dues.239  Nonetheless, the total amount of silver put back into circulation was 
modest, as Lysias still speaks of a “shortage of money” in 389 (19.11).240   
                                                
235 This figure is based on a 150-200 dr. average for mining slaves (see Lauffer 1955-6: 65; cf. Gauthier 
1976: 155-6).  Cf. Strauss 1986: 53 who rightly stre ses the negative consequences the defection of slaves 
had on the Athenian economy in terms of opportunity costs. 
236 Aristophanes, Frogs 718-25 with scholium; Hellenicus FGrH 323a F 26; Philochorus, FGrH 328 F 
141.  See Kroll 1996 who argues conclusively that te πονηρὰ χαλκία in line 725 are silver-plated 
bronze coins and not simply coppers, as sometimes believed.  
237 Thompson 1966: 342-3 
238 Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 815-22 with Kroll 1976: 338-41 and 1883: 8.  I follow Sommerstein 1998: 
1-8 for a 391 production date (cf. Seager 1967: 107, n. 110) against the traditional 393 date of Rogers 1919 
and Ussher 1973. 
239 Isager and Hansen 1975: 43 assume the silver came fro  Laurion, whereas Kraay 1968: 7, Hopper 
1979: 179, and Kroll 1993: 8 speculate it was obtained from Persia through Conon (e.g., Nepos, Conon 4 
mentions 50 talents).  It must be noted that Conon also spent his own personal fortune on rebuilding the 
long walls, which must have put a lot of silver back into circulation (Isocrates 5.64; Demosthenes 20.7 -4; 
Diodorus 16.85.3).  For the dekate and eikoste in the early fourth century, see Appendix 2.   
240 Stroud 1974: 171, n.45 and Kroll 1993: 8 also point ut that the small number of dies used during the 
first half of the fourth century indicates a sharp decline in silver production.   
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The Athenians undoubtedly recognized the need to jump-start the mining 
industry, but without slaves to work the mines, any discussion or proposal for improving 
them must have been viewed as moot.241  The examples of Nicias and the younger 
Callias were cautionary.  As Xenophon tells us, Nicias and Hipponicus, the father of 
Callias, made huge sums of money by hiring out slaves to concessionaires of mines (i.e., 
those who leased mines from the state and mined the ore) and to proprietors of ergasteria 
(i.e., those who owned workshops that dressed, smelted, and refined the ore) (4.14-5).242  
This practice of leasing out mining slaves (apophora) was lucrative, as the slave-owner 
collected one obol a day net from the lessee, who contracted to pay such a rate for 360 
days, provide trophe and lodging, and assume all risks (e.g., losses incurred from 
sickness, injury, death, etc.).243  Nicias owned a whopping 1000 slaves and Hipponicus 
600, which yielded them yearly revenue of ten and six talents respectively.  It is quite 
reasonable to assume, then, that the defections resulting from the occupation of Decelea 
caused the sharp declines in the value of their estates and of men like them (Xenophon 
                                                
241 See Poroi 4.5 with Andreades 1933: 270 who recognizes well that he decline in productivity in the 
first half of the fourth century was the direct result of the lack of slaves. 
242 Gauthier 1976: 113, 134, 151, following Hopper 1968: 320 (cf. Osborne 1985: 117-8), argues that 
Xenophon’s distinction between kataskeuazomenoi and ergazomenoi (cf. 4.11, 22, 28) reflects a general 
division in the mining industry between concessionares who worked the mines (ergazomenoi) and 
proprietors of the land (kataskeuazomenoi), who built and owned washeries, ergasteria, furnaces, etc. on 
their land for processing the ore.  This bipartite organization of the mining industry is, no doubt, correct, 
but it is not necessarily accurate to say that the proprietors of the land built or even owned all theergasteria 
on their property.  The operations of Pheidippos of Pithos are instructive, as he was an owner of lands 
(edaphe), a frequent registrant in the leases, and owner of gasteria (see Ito 1986 and Aperghis 1998: 16-
7).  For instance, one of his ergasteria was located on the land of Lysitheides (P28, 4-8), whereas his other 
was situated on land that he may have owned but where h  certainly was a registrant in the mine (P27, 70-
2).  This latter example should caution against maintaining a strict division of labor between proprietors 
and concessionaires.  Ito argues reasonably that the evidence permits the interpretation that Pheidippos 
began his career in the mining industry as a concessionaire, who then took the profits earned therein to 
purchase land on which he built his ergasteria. 
243 For the inner workings of this system, see Gauthier 1976: 138-43.   
 364 
intimates there were others).244  Consequently, finding the private capital to replace these 
slaves was the main obstacle to the recovery of the mining industry in the fourth century.  
Strauss’ thoughts are insightful: “When peace came, the slaves were not replaced quickly.  
Not that there was any shortage of candidates: warsin A ia Minor and Sicily would soon 
provide a market.  But Athenian capital was in short supply, and investors probably 
preferred to put their capital in maritime loans.  Not only were these loans generally more 
lucrative than the mines, but they were easier to hide from the tax collector—no small 
consideration after 405, when there was no longer any imperial tribute to protect the 
affluent from eisphora.”245     
When did the Athenians decide to make a concerted effort to exploit the mines 
again?  According to Strauss, it was not until Sparta’s land power was broken at Leuctra 
(371) that mining began to appear less risky to Athenian investors.  This dating has two 
advantages.  First, the threat of Spartan invasion was so acute during the 370s that the 
Athenians had to guard constantly their territory, which is one of the main reasons they 
sued for peace in 375/4 (Hellenica 6.2.1).  Secondly, 370/9 probably marks the year in 
which the Athenians first began to inscribe the mining leases sold by the poletai.246  
                                                
244 For instance, Nicias’ estate, once valued around 100 talents, was worth some 14 talents when his son 
Niceratus died; the younger Callias, whose grandfather’s property was rated at 200 talents, had an estate 
valued at a meager two talents (see Lysias 19.47-8 with Rankin 1988: 198-9). 
245 Strauss 1986: 46. 
246 Since the first, and only complete, stele of the poletai, which dates to 367/6, speaks of an earlier stele 
(P5, line 50), scholars have argued rightly that the publication of the mining leases predates 367/6 (e.g., 
Crosby 1950: 190 and Hopper 1953: 250-4).  Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 47.2 mentions two distinct 
lease periods (three for e gasima and [ten] years for sunkechoromena).  Unfortunately, the papyrus reading 
for sunkechoromena is uncertain.  Editors have read both ‘Γ’ (three years) and ‘Ι’ (ten years).  If gamma is 
the correct reading, then a scribal error is most certain because the repetition of the phrase τὰ εἰς τρία ἔτη 
would be otiose.  Crosby, preferring neither three nor ten years, proposed seven, a number she reaches 
through an idiosyncratic interpretation of the leasing procedure (Crosby 1950: 199-200).  Hopper and 
others have followed suit (Hopper 1953: 237, Rhodes 1981: 554, and Langdon 1991: 60), but Hopper does 
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While the publication of the leases probably does not i dicate a change in mining 
procedures from fifth century practices, it nonetheless represents a desire to streamline 
the administration of the mines in the anticipation f increased mining activity.247  
Indeed, at this time there is evidence to support the notion that wealthy Athenians began 
to invest in the mines again: the first and only complete stele of the poletai (367/8) 
contains seventeen leases, of which seven were contra ted by elites.248  This number is 
significant because it is more than double the average attested for elite participation in 
mining activities for the fourth century.249  In other words, after Leuctra wealthy 
investors seem to have been reasonably confident that he mines would give them a good 
return on their investments.  
We must be cautious, however, and not push this interpretation too far.  While 
mining activity seems to have been on the rise during this period in comparison to 
                                                                                                                                      
not dismiss outright the possibility of ten years.  Some more recent studies have argued persuasively that 
ten years is the most likely reading (Conophagos 1980: 432, Aperghis 1998: 13, and Shipton 1998: 60-1).  
Accordingly, three dates are possible 377/6, 374/3, or 370/69.  Aperghis 1998: 13 (cf. Gauthier 1976: 1 1) 
opts for 377/6, which corresponds to the foundation of the Athenian Sea League and the reorganization of 
finances—“a time when ‘openness’ of Athenian finances was an issue.”  As the League was a response to 
Spartan aggression, I strongly doubt the Athenians would have made a significant move to exploit the 
mines in this year when invasion was possible.  A date of 374/3, coming soon after peace with Sparta, has 
prima facie plausibility, but this was an uneasy peace.  Moreover, the arguments for a seven-year lease 
period, as just stated, are weak.  This leaves 370/69 as the most plausible date for the inception of 
inscribing the mining leases.          
247 Langdon 1991: 60-1 and Crosby 1950: 191, n.5 (citing Aristophanes, Knights 362) argue contra 
Hopper 1953: 253 that the poletai were responsible for leasing out the mines during the fifth century and 
according to the same procedures attested in the fourth.  Langdon speculates that the leases from the fif  
century would have been written on wood tablets (see Sickinger 1999).  He offers two explanations as to 
why the Athenians decided to publish the leases on t e: 1) to achieve transparency and administrative 
efficiency; and 2) to assist the scrutiny of public officials during their euthynai.  These are not mutually 
exclusive, but I prefer the latter interpretation, because it dovetails with the changes in public finance 
attested at this time (see Rhodes 1980: 309-11).  
248 P5, 40-83 = Hesperia 10 (1941): 14-17.  Shipton defines “elites” as those who were liturgists (agonistic 
and trierarchic) or descendants of liturgists. 
249 See Shipton 2000: 133-3 with Table 8.1 and 2001: 31-37 with Appendix 1 p. 97 (cf. Crosby 1941: 26-
27 for a précis of the prosopography).   The average percentage of elites in mining for the fourth century is 
19%.   The percentage of elites in P5 is just over 40%.     
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previous decades, historically speaking, the activity attested for 367/6 was abysmal.250  
With the defeat of Sparta in 371 Athens only exchanged one potential threat to their 
mining interests for another.  The Thebans, it must be remembered, were responsible for 
most of the miseries suffered during the Decelean occupation and profited handsomely 
from the cheap prices of deserted slaves.251  Not only did they successfully invade the 
Peloponnesus on three occasions during the 360s but they also succeeded in detaching the 
border area of Oropos from the Athenians in 366.252  Even after their resounding defeat 
at Mantinea, the Thebans were still considered a threa  to Athenian territory throughout 
the 350s.253  It is likely, then, that the Athenians did not run back to Laurion in any 
significant numbers or with any zeal until after 362.  This date makes the most sense of 
Xenophon’s comment that “only recently have the Athenians begun to exploit [the mines] 
again” (νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται) (4.28).254  While mining operations 
certainly started up again shortly after 371, it is probable that only a few concessionaries 
ventured back to the mines, and thus silver production remained low throughout the 360s. 
In the Poroi, Xenophon corroborates this dismal picture of the mining industry in 
the first half of the fourth century and diagnoses the two main, interrelated reasons for its 
                                                
250 For instance, in the poletai records for 342/1, we find 61 recorded leases, but the stele is damaged, and 
may have originally contained ca. 141 (Crosby 1950: 203, n. 46, 245, 289-90. 
251 Oxyrhynchus Historian 17.3-5; Demosthenes 18.96; Isocrates 14.31.   
252 Hellenica 7.4.1; Diodorus 15.76.1. 
253 In the Hipparchicus, which was composed after Mantinea but before 357 (see Chapter 1, note 40), 
Xenophon claims that the Athenians have on their borders hostile cavalry as numerous as their own (7.2), 
which he later identifies as the Boeotians (7.3).  In the sections of Poroi in which Xenophon discusses 
defensive strategies for the chora (4.43-8), he underscores the relatively close distance between Laurion 
and Thebes.     
254 Xenophon employs the adverb νεωστὶ six times in his works, and when specific times are indicated 
(e.g., Hellenica 4.7.5; Cyropaedia 3.3.36), it indicates a time not m re than a few years prior to that of the 
reference point.  The contention of Gauthier 1976: 161 that νεωστὶ harkens back to the 370s is unlikely.  
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poor state: a lack of capital investment and a deficiency of labor.  Slaves were being hired 
out on the apophora system in the 350s, for Xenophon says “many men in the mines 
today are leased out in this way” (καὶ γὰρ νῦν πολλοί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀργυρείοις 
ἄνθρωποι οὕτως ἐκδεδομένοι) (4.16).  However, it is imprudent to read too much 
into πολλοί and assume that it represents any kind of return to the slave levels of the 
fifth century.255  The point of this sentence is to remind his readers that the old apophora 
system was still in practice.  If any of Xenophon’s contemporaries had owned and leased 
out slaves in numbers approximating those of Nicias and Hipponicus, he surely would 
have mentioned them.256  In fact, Xenophon asserts that “all those involved in the mining 
industry today say that they are in need of workers” (4.5).  That Athenian citizens 
themselves worked in the mines further substantiates th  claim that there was a shortage 
of slave labor during this time.  Xenophon alludes to them when he claims that “many of 
                                                
255 As does Lauffer 1955-6: 153-61, who estimates 5,000 slaves for 367/6 and some 20,000-30,000 
between 360 and 350.  His methodology is faulty, since he bases his calculations on a number of 
groundless assumptions.  For instance, he assumes that the “typical” mine employed 50 slaves and that 
ergasteria ordinarily employed 30-35 slaves (cf. Ardaillon 1897: 97).  As Hopper 1979: 180 correctly 
points out, “there is no such thing as “an average mine’.”  Furthermore, he also presumes that 2/3 of the 
total number of slaves in the mines worked in the actu l production of silver (160).  Even if we play this 
numbers game, we must base our calculations on more“sci ntific” data.  Conophagos’ study is the only 
one that comes close to achieving this criterion.  While his calculations substantiate the 30-35 slaves p r 
ergasterion figure of Lauffer, they also seriously call into question the idea that 50 slaves were normally 
employed in the extraction of ore, as each mine (1,000 total during maximum production) require only four 
slaves to achieve their potential (see 343-8).  He never explains how he reaches the figure of 1,000 mines, 
and I think the number is better put at 500-600 for the highest level of exploitation in the fourth century 
(see Aperghis 1998: 18-19).  Given this adjustment, we are probably talking of no more than ten slaves per 
mine on average.  If we assume, then, that 51 mines were in operation in 367/6 (Lauffer 1955-6: 158), then 
we reach a total of 510 slaves working in the mines proper.  For slave numbers in the production of silver, 
Conophagos estimates about 90% of the total of slave  working in the extraction of ore.  Thus, employing 
Conophagos’ adjusted figures we reach around 970 slave .  This figure must be considered a maximum 
though, as it is doubtful that concessionaires in 367/6 put the optimal number of slaves in the mines so oon 
after they opened.   
256 It must be emphasized that the large slave holdings of these men were abnormal, and that the vast 
majority of slaves were leased out by individuals who owned no more than a few slaves.  We know of one 
Diocleides who actually let out a single slave to work in the mines ca. 415 (Andocides 1.38). 
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those who are now in the mines are getting old” (πολλοὶ δ’ εἰσὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν 
τοῖς ἔργοις γηράσκοντες) (4.22).257  Because the Greeks reckoned “old age” (τὸ
γῆρας) at sixty years, these miners were probably working in the galleries since the early 
390s, when the mines were first reopened after the Peloponnesian War.258   
In respect to the capital situation of the concessionaires, Xenophon offers a 
nuanced appraisal.  In the following passage, he anticipates an objection to his idea that 
unexplored regions of Laurion may contain more silver than in areas currently under 
exploitation.  
τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ 
καινοτομοῦσιν; ὅτι πενέστεροι μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα· 
νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται· κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ 
καινοτομοῦντι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὑρὼν ἀγαθὴν ἐργασίαν πλούσιος 
γίγνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εὑρὼν πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν ὅσα ἂν δαπανήσῃ. εἰς 
τοῦτον οὖν τὸν κίνδυνον οὐ μάλα πως ἐθέλουσιν οἱ νῦν ἰέναι. 
 
Why then, one may ask, are there not as many new cuttings being made 
now as in the past?  The reason is simply because thos  currently working 
                                                
257 Most commentators interpret πολλοὶ…γηράσκοντες as referring to Athenian citizens and not slaves 
(e.g., Ardaillon 1897: 90, Thiel 1922: 23-4, Lauffer 1955-6: 10-13, and Gauthier 1976: 152-3 contra 
Giglioni1970: cxiv-cxv).  Lauffer 1955-6: 12, citing Memorabilia 2.8 (Socrates’ conversation with 
Eutherus on the nobility of supervisory work), argues that they were specifically “wage-earners” 
(Lohnarbeiter).  Gauthier 1976: 153-5, however, has vigorously challenged this interpretation, arguing that 
these old miners were small, self-employed concessionaires.  The similarity between the two passages is 
striking though (see the list of scholars Lauffer cites on p. 12, n. 1 who also agree), and Gauthier’s attempt 
to severe the connection between the two is feeble.  Essentially, he argues that because the passage from 
the Poroi says nothing explicitly about misthos, it is not relevant to Eutherus’ situation.  But what seems to 
me to speak decisively against Gauthier’s interpretation is that it makes nonsense of Xenophon’s reasoning 
in 4.22.  Here Xenophon is answering the imagined objection of those who think that not enough employers 
will be found to lease the public slaves.  He answer  first by claiming that there will be many 
concessionaires with sufficient funds to lease them, because, as I argue below, they will have extra capital 
from the triobolon.  Why would he then introduce a separate, sub-category of concessionaires, whose 
small-time operations make them unlikely to lease large quantities of slaves?  On the other hand, 
highlighting the fact that a large percentage of the labor force is soon to retire and in need of replacement 
makes much better sense. 
258 Perhaps these gerontes were the sons of those freed and enfranchised (so Hunt 1998: 92-5) after 
Arginusae.   
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in the mines are poorer.  For only recently have the Athenians begun to 
exploit [the mines] again, and for him who makes a new cutting it is a very 
risky enterprise.  For if he discovers a good gallery he becomes rich, but if 
he discovers nothing, he loses everything that he has spent.  Therefore, I 
suppose that people today are quite reluctant to take such a risk (4.28-9). 
 
First, it is important to stress that the phrase πενέστεροι μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ 
μέταλλα refers to the whole class of mining concessionaires.  These men are not “poor” 
per se but have fewer financial resources than their counterparts had in the past, that is, 
during the period of exploitation before Decelea.  This financial handicap prevents them 
not from exploiting existing mines but from making “new cuttings” (kainotomiai).  
Modern research has substantiated Xenophon’s claim of the risk involved in making 
kainotomiai.  Conophagos estimates that it would have taken at leas  six slaves (working 
around the clock and in twelve hour shifts) digging with a hammer and chisel to burrow 
nine meters a month (mine depths in Laurium range from 30 to 119 meters and average 
around 50).259  For a six-person crew, maintenance expenses amounted to 110 drachmas 
per month.260  The digging of a single 50-meter mining shaft, then, would have cost just 
over 600 drachmas.  But this does not take into consideration the need for gallery 
explorations and ventilation shafts, and so “it is unlikely that more than a few mines 
could have been brought into operation in under a year and most would have required one 
or two years and sometimes even three.”261  Thus, the financial commitment to undertake 
kainotomiai was enormous, and as Xenophon notes well, there was still no guarantee of 
                                                
259 Conophagos 1980: 199-200, 343-4. 
260 Conophagos 1980: 351 puts the annual expense for asingle slave at 219 drachmas (61 dr. for 
apophora; 122 dr. for trophe; 24 dr. for clothing, shoes, and other such expenses; and 12 dr. for 
depreciation costs).   
261 Aperghis 1998: 6. 
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success.  Consequently, most concessionaires during this time were exploiting existing 
mines, which, though less risky, were probably not very productive.262  In brief, the 
example of kainotomiai underscores well the major financial problems confronting the 
mining industry in the first half of the fourth century.  
Xenophon’s program for reconstituting and expanding the mining industry 
addresses directly and innovatively the labor shortages and financial woes plaguing the 
Athenians vis-à-vis the mines.  In essence, he makes three suggestions to expand and 
intensify silver production.263  The first measure he proposes is the creation of a large 
pool of publicly owned slaves, which the state will lease out to concessionaries and to 
owners of ergasteria on the apophora system (4.17, 49).  Xenophon asserts that the only 
“novelty” of his plan is that “just as private individuals have furnished themselves with a 
permanent income by owning slaves, so too the polis wi l own public slaves until there 
                                                
262 According to the most recent and best-to-date reconstruction of the leasing procedure (Aperghis 1998: 
6-8, 13), a kainotomia (new-cutting) was leased for 1-3 years, at which tme, if silver was discovered, the 
mine was reclassified as an ergasimon (a workable mine) and leased for 3 years; after this period the mine 
was reclassified yet again, becoming an anasaximon (a mine that can be equipped again) with a 10-year 
lease period and perhaps with a renewal option for an ther 10-year term; if the mine was abandoned or left 
idle for more than a year and then brought back into operation, it was classified as palaion anasaximon (a 
mine that once had been an asaximon) with a ten 10-year lease period (cf. Crosby 1953: 198 and Hopper 
1953: 236).  Because most palaia anasaxima mines were leased for 20 drachmas (see Shipton 1998: 60, 
Table 2), it is reasonable to assume that they wereg n rally not very productive (though some like P27, 96 
and P19, 26 were certainly very profitable).  The pr ponderance of 20 drachma leases (52% of total prices; 
see Shipton 1998: 58, though note she does not include P19, 26) “suggests that in the period between 367/6 
and c300 BC a considerably greater number of old mines was opened up compared to new ones” (Aperghis 
1998: 8).  Interestingly, the stele for 367/6 (P5) records 17 leases, of which 12 are priced at 20 drachm s.  If 
these represent palaia anasaxima (though we have no way of knowing for sure; see Crosby 1941: 24), it 
would seem that the vast majority of mines reopened after ca. 370 were once anasaxima.  According to 
Conophagos 1980: 196 galleries were typically 0.6 m2, which would have allowed only one worker to dig 
on its face.  Thus, compared to making new cuttings, reworking an old mine would have been much less 
expensive to operate. 
263 As is clear from his discussion, Xenophon aims to put “the greatest amount of slaves” not only in 
existing mines (4.11), but also in new mines (kainotomiai) (4.28-32), since areas rich in silver “always 
extend beyond” those that are exploited (4.3).  This point is somehow lost on Samuel 1983: 29, who 
maintains that Xenophon’s proposals are based on what he calls “lateral expansion” (increase in overall 
activity) rather than “any intensification of production or revenue yield” (cf. Lowry 1987: 63-4). 
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are three for every Athenian citizen” (4.17).  Indee , the Athenians leased out sacred 
plots and houses (4.19), and as we have seen, Xenopho  recommends the public 
ownership of hotels, places of exchange, and a merchant marine (3.12-4).  The Athenians 
also possessed a considerable number of public slaves.264  Technically speaking, then, 
Xenophon is correct, but what must also be considered an innovation, though he is 
reticent to admit it, is the scale of the proposal.265  To be sure, he advises implementing 
the plan gradually (4.23-4, 36), but “three for every Athenian citizen” suggests slaves 
numbers somewhere between 60,000 and 90,000.266  These totals represent a capital 
investment of at least 1500 talents but perhaps as much as 3000, which is half the total 
valuation (timema) on taxable capital in Attica!267  If Lewis is correct in his estimation 
that the scale of public property in Athens was somewhere between five and ten percent, 
Xenophon’s suggestion must have been seen as revolutionary.268 
The inventive and revolutionary aspects of Xenophon’s proposal go a long way in 
explaining why the section on the mines is so much longer than the rest.  To convince his 
readers that his plan to “channel the largest amount f men into the mines” (4.11) is both 
practical and expedient, he employs many different kinds of arguments.  These generally 
fall under two distinct categories: the historical and the theoretical.  In respect to the 
                                                
264 In general, see Jacob 1928 and Lewis 1990: 254-8, who conservatively estimates their numbers at 
“several hundred,” but suggests that “there would be nothing particularly surprising if the total ran into four 
figures” (257) 
265 Rightly noted by Gauthier 1976: 144. 
266 Fourth-century population numbers probably vacillated between 20,000 and 30,000 (see Section 3D).   
267 Based on a price of a 150 dr. per slave, we get 1500-2250 talents; for 200 dr. per slave, 2000-3000 
talents.  It should be noted that Xenophon’s presentation in 4.23-24 implies an average price of a slave t 
158 dr. or 195 dr. (depending on whether the Athenians implement the increase of 1200 to 6000 slaves in 
five or six years).  For the calculations, see Thiel 1922: 52-3 and Lauffer 1955-6: 67-8.  For Attica’s 
timema in 378/7, see Demosthenes 14.19; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 46; Polybius 2.62.7.    
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former, Xenophon repeatedly invokes examples from the past, especially from the period 
of lucrative exploitation before the occupation of Decelea (4.3, 13-17, 25, 28, 43-8).  If 
ca. 25,000 represents a fair estimate of their numbers, it appears that Xenophon envisions 
at least a two-fold increase in the size of the slave bor force.  Since it would take at least 
a decade to reach 10,000 slaves (4.23-4) and probably another to attain 20-25,000, 
Xenophon’s invocation of the past is a persuasive rationale for the realization of the 
short-term goals of his proposal.269  
To support the implementation of his long-term goal f three slaves for every 
citizen, however, Xenophon employs a theoretical argument, for which he has suffered 
endless abuse at the hands of modern scholars.270  After introducing the quasi-empirical 
observation that the silver at Laurion will never run out (4.2-3, 11), he boldly contends 
that silver will never lose its value, thus suggesting hat the mines can admit a work-force 
of the magnitude he is proposing without causing a devaluation of silver.271   
(6) καὶ γὰρ οὐδ’ ὥσπερ ὅταν πολλοὶ χαλκοτύποι γένωνται, 
ἀξίων γενομένων τῶν χαλκευτικῶν ἔργων, καταλύονται οἱ 
χαλκοτύποι, καὶ οἱ σιδηρεῖς γε ὡσαύτως· καὶ ὅταν γε πολὺς 
                                                                                                                                      
268 Lewis 1990: 259.   
269 To be precise, based on his calculations at 4.23-4 an initial investment of 1,200 slaves in ten years 
would have yielded 10,327.  If the Athenians continued to reinvest a third of their earnings into the 
purchase of additional slaves, as Xenophon suggests, 29,555 slaves would have been realized in 20 years 
and 87,358 in 30 years.  The idea that it would have t ken “a hundred years” for the benefits of the program 
to accrue to the Athenians is thus untenable (Michell 1940: 97, n. 2; cf. Andreades 1933: 389-90).   
270 Bresson 2000: 294-5 and 2005: 53 calls attention to the “theoretical” turn of Xenophon in these 
sections. 
271 Xenophon has been criticized for being “foolish” and “naïve” in holding the view that the silver in 
Laurion was inexhaustible (e.g., Boeckh 1976: 608, Andreades 1933: 387, and Gauthier 1976: 116).  But as 
Giglioni 1970: xcix rightly notes, Xenophon is not thinking of an inexhaustible source of silver for all time 
but rather for the foreseeable future.  Lauffer 1975: 174-6 supports this interpretation by citing evidence for 
the continued exploitation of the mines throughout the Hellenistic era, and we may also point to the modern 
exploitation of the mines by the Greek Metal Works Company of Lavrio (1873-1917) and la Compagnie 
Française des Mines du Laurium (1875-1982).  
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σῖτος καὶ οἶνος γένηται, ἀξίων ὄντων τῶν καρπῶν, ἀλυσιτελεῖς 
αἱ γεωργίαι γίγνονται, ὥστε πολλοὶ ἀφέμενοι τοῦ τὴν γῆν 
ἐργάζεσθαι ἐπ’ ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας καὶ τοκισμοὺς 
τρέπονται· ἀργυρῖτις δὲ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείων φαίνηται καὶ ἀργύριον 
πλέον γίγνηται, (7) τοσούτῳ πλείονες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο 
ἔρχονται. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἔπιπλα μέν, ἐπειδὰν ἱκανά τις κτήσηται τῇ 
οἰκίᾳ, οὐ μάλα ἔτι προσωνοῦνται· ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδείς πω οὕτω 
πολὺ ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μηκέτι προσδεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἤν τισι γένηται 
παμπληθές, τὸ περιττεῦον κατορύττοντες οὐδὲν ἧττον ἥδονται 
ἢ χρώμενοι αὐτῷ.      
 
For indeed [mining] is not like bronze-working, in which whenever there 
is a large number of smiths, the price of bronze products drops, and they 
are forced to quit their businesses; and the same thing happens also with 
iron-workers.  Likewise, whenever there is a surplus of grain and wine, 
and the prices of these crops fall, farming becomes unprofitable, so that 
many farmers abandon working the land and turn to trade, retailing, and 
money lending.  However, with silver ore the more of it that is discovered 
and the greater supply there is of money, the more people pursue this kind 
of work.  For instance, with furnishings, whenever people acquire a 
sufficient amount in their house, they do not buy any more; but with 
money no one has ever yet acquired so much that he no longer has the 
need for more.  But if they were to acquire a great quantity of it, they 
would be no less satisfied in burying the surplus as they would in 
employing it (4.6-7). 
 
Traditionally, this passage has been quoted to demonstrate not only Xenophon’s naiveté, 
but also the absence of any kind of economic mentality mong the ancient Greeks.272  
Yet it must be emphasized that Xenophon does, in fact, observe the law of supply and 
demand operating in other metallurgical industries and in agriculture.273  Indeed, he goes 
on to assert that “gold is no less useful than silver,” but “when gold is plentiful it loses its 
                                                
272 Jones 1957: 95 and Gauthier 1976: 120.  For other similar views on Xenophon’s naiveté, see, for 
example, Thiel 1922: 19, Pöhlmann 1984: 245, Andreaes 1933: 387, n. 7, Hopper 1961: 139 and 1979: 
188, Cawkwell 1963: 64, Breitenbach 1967: 1757, andConophagos 1980: 114.  Some authors from the 
Roman period (e.g., Polybius 34.10.10; Suetonius, Divine Julius Caesar 54.2; Divine Augustus 41.2; 
Cassius Dio 51.21.5; Josephus, Jewish War 6.6.1) seem to establish a direct link between prices and the 
money supply (Bresson 2005: 51-2). 
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values, whereas silver gains in value” (χρυσίον μηδὲν ἧττον χρήσιμον εἶναι ἢ 
ἀργύριον, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω, ἐκεῖνο μέντοι οἶδα, ὅτι καὶ χρυσίον ὅταν 
πολὺ παραφανῇ, αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον τιμιώτερον 
ποιεῖ) (4.10).274  What Xenophon seems to be arguing in these two passages, then, is 
that silver, unlike other metals and products, is uniq e because it does not depreciate with 
increases in supply.   
A handful of historians have given Xenophon the benefit of the doubt, trying to 
make sense of his remarks in the context of Athenian economic practices and monetary 
circulation during the fourth century.275  Most notably, Bresson draws attention to the 
fact that the word ἀργύριον in 4.6-7 can mean both silver and money, and thus 
Xenophon’s point, he argues, is not that silver always retains its value but that silver 
money exhibits a peculiar nature in which its value is relatively stable.276  The reason for 
this phenomenon, Xenophon explains, is that money has an almost infinite demand: “with 
money no one has ever yet acquired so much that he no longer had need for more.”  
Moreover, “whenever states are prosperous people hav a strong need for money” to 
purchase luxury goods, and “when states are in crises…they have even a greater need for 
                                                                                                                                      
273 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: 318-9. 
274 Cf. 4.36.  Research has now corroborated Xenophon’s claims about the relative value of gold to silver 
(see Lauffer 1975: 176-7, Gauthier 1976: 133-4 and the references therein, and Figueira 1998: 511-7, 521-
7).  Historically, the gold to silver ratio has remained fairly constant, but during periods of increas s in the 
gold supply (e.g., ca. 420-400), the value of gold depreciated and silver appreciated.   
275 Von der Lieck 1933: 47, Giglioni 1970: lxxvii-lxxvii, and Bresson 2005: 52-6. 
276 Bresson 2005: 52.  
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coined currency” to purchase food and to pay for natio l defense.277  Xenophon was not 
the only Greek to note this unique quality of money, as Aristotle also recognized its 
relative stability in value.278  But Xenophon, unlike Aristotle, explains why money is 
different, expressing, albeit in a rudimentary form, the modern theory of marginal utility: 
The argument is thus that demand for ordinary goods is limited by the 
satisfaction of the needs of the individual, the marginal utility for those 
goods decreasing toward zero...In contrast with ordina y commodities, for 
the individual the marginal utility of money does not decrease toward 
zero, because money can provide for future consumption and security.  
Money is a commodity, but a commodity that has characteristics that make 
it quite different from all other goods…Xenophon’s observation is 
sensible and perfectly right.  The contrast he makes between money and 
other commodities might be seen as an opposition between a commodity 
and inelastic demand.279    
 
Even though money behaves in this way, the law of diminishing returns stipulates that it 
cannot retain its value ad infinitum.  As supplies continue to increase apace, money will 
                                                
277 4.8-9: καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε εὖ πράττωσιν αἱ πόλεις, ἰσχυρῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀργυρίου δέονται. οἱ 
μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ ὅπλα τε καλὰ καὶ ἵππους ἀγαθοὺς [τε] καὶ οἰκίας καὶ κατασκευὰς 
μεγαλοπρεπεῖς βούλονται δαπανᾶν, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες εἰς ἐσθῆτα πολυτελῆ καὶ χρυσοῦν 
κόσμον τρέπονται. ὅταν τε αὖ νοσήσωσιν <αἱ> πόλεις ἢ ἀφορίαις καρπῶν ἢ πολέμῳ, ἔτι καὶ 
πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἀργοῦ τῆς γῆς γιγνομένης, καὶ εἰς ἐπιτήδεια καὶ εἰς ἐπικούρους νομίσματος 
δέονται. 
278 Nichomachean Ethics 1133b with Bresson 2005: 54-6; cf. Gauthier 1976: 67 who also cites this 
passage in relation to Poroi 4.6-7 but fails to draw the necessary theoretical conclusion.   
279 Bresson 2005: 53.  Cf. Lauffer 1975: 192, n.10 and Doty 2003: 11-12 who both cite the observations of 
John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (= Keynes 1936: 130).  
There the economist notes that gold does not suffer from the disadvantage of marginal utility.  In fact, the 
principle of marginal utility was recognized much earlier.  Most notably, John Baptise Say, A Treatise on 
Political Economy II.4.15 (1803), who discuses the notion in relation t  Poroi: “The general use of silver 
amongst all the civilized nations of the world, coupled with its great facility of transport, makes it a 
commodity of such extensive demand, that none but a very large influx of fresh supply can sensibly affect 
its value. Thus, when Xenophon, in his essay on the rev nues of Athens, urges his countrymen to give more 
assiduous attention to the working of the mines of Attica, by the suggestion, that silver does not, like other 
commodities, decline in value with the increase in quantity, he must be understood to say, that it does not 
perceptibly decline. Indeed, the mines of Attica were too inconsiderable in their product, to influenc the 
value of the stock of that metal then existing in the numerous and flourishing states upon the borders of the 
Mediterranean Sea, and in Persia and India; between all which and Greece the commercial intercourse was
sufficiently active, to keep the value of silver stationary in the Grecian market. The driblet of silver, 
furnished by Attician metallurgy, was a mere rivulet trickling into an ocean of existing supply.” 
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eventually exhibit a decline in its marginal utility and thus depreciate.  His long-term goal 
of increasing the slave supply to three for every Athenian, therefore, is still problematic 
because this augmentation quite possibly could haveled to a situation in which the supply 
of silver would have outstripped demand.280  Xenophon accounts for this paradox by 
introducing the phenomenon of hording: “if they were to acquire a great quantity of 
money, they would be no less satisfied in burying the surplus than they would in 
employing it.” 281  According to Bresson, hoarding was the mechanism in the ancient 
world for absorbing the overproduction of currency, and this interpretation is 
undoubtedly correct, a fortiori, because Xenophon’s trading peace would have ensurd 
that hoarding became a universal phenomenon by promoting the even wider circulation 
of Athenian money outside Attica.282  In other words, widespread hoarding would have 
                                                
280 Bresson 2005: 53 speculates that silver production w uld have had to be increased between twenty and 
fifty times to render Xenophon’s statements false.  These numbers must be viewed as strictly notional, as 
there is no way of calculating accurately the demand for Athenian silver at this time. 
281 The modern analogy to hoarding is the stockpile of foreign currency reserves.  Currently, the US dollar 
is the world’s largest reserve currency (65.7% according to the IMF).  As long as nations, especially those 
in Asia, continue to stockpile dollars and hold them back from the market, the Federal Reserve can 
continue to print the dollar at unprecedented and somewhat alarming (to this observer anyway) levels, 
without it plummeting in value.   
282 As argued in Chapter 4, Section 4A, people living o  the periphery of the Athenian world in particular 
have a strong demand for Athenian money, which theyobtain through the trading of necessary foodstuffs 
with the Athenians (cf. 3.2).  Thus, we must appreciat  Xenophon’s notion of the stability of silver 
currency in the context of a Mediterranean-wide economy, in which money circulates freely and swiftly 
from center to periphery, where a portion of it is eventually taken out of circulation through the practice of 
hoarding (contra Gauthier 1976: 132-3).  This is more r less the argument of Giglioni, who contends that a 
large amount of the silver produced at Laurion would have circulated outside of Attica as monetary 
payments for imports (Giglioni 1970: lxxvii-lxxvii; cf. von der Lieck 1933: 47).  Based on my calculations 
(Section 3D), grain imports would have cost the city somewhere between 800 and 1,200 talents a year.  
During the fifth century, some 600 talents circulated back to Athens in the form of tribute and other 
imperial revenues (Thucydides 2.13.3; some states paid tribute in non-Attic coinage, but a majority of
payments were made with Athenian owls; see Figueira 1998: 265-85).  In the fourth century, many of these 
imperial revenues still existed but in much smaller quantities, and syntaxeis often went directly to pay for 
combat operations in the field, which kept this money from being repatriated (there is no evidence to my 
knowledge to support the idea that allies paid their syntaxeis with Athenian currency).  Moreover, the need 
for grain-producing states to balance their own payments would have further increased the demand for 
Athenian currency, as Xenophon suggests in 4.7-8.  Indeed, many Athenian coins have been found in 
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guaranteed that the supply of Attic currency never exceeded demand.  Consequently, 
Xenophon’s proposal to “channel the largest amount f men into the mines” is predicated 
not upon naiveté but rather upon rational economic analysis.283     
The second recommendation vis-à-vis the mines has yet to be identified by 
commentators but suggests itself upon careful consideration of Xenophon’s remarks at 
4.22.  There Xenophon answers the imagined objection of those worried that an 
insufficient number of employers will be found to lease the public slaves: “If anyone is 
pondering such a thing as this…let him take heart by considering the fact that many of 
those who exploit the mines will lease the public slaves, since they will have a sufficient 
amount of capital” (εἰ δ’ αὖ τις τοῦτ’ ἐνθυμεῖται…ἐκεῖνο κατανοήσας θαρρείτω, 
ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν κατεσκευασμένων προσμισθώσονται τοὺς δημοσίους, 
πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα).  A majority of translators interpret the phrase 
πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα as a reference to the financial resources of the 
concessionaires and proprietors of ergasteria.284  Gauthier objects strongly to this 
reading because he believes it contradicts 4.28, where t ose working the mines are said to 
                                                                                                                                      
hoards in parts of the world under Persian control (e.g., southern Anatolia and Syria) or where no local 
currency existed (e.g., Egypt) (for reviews of the evidence, see Schönert-Geiss 1973 and 1974, Isager and 
Hansen 1975: 42-9, Kraay 1976: 72-77, Howgego 1995: 5-8, Figueira 1998: 21-48, and van Alfen 2000 
and 2002; some Athenian silver has even been discovered in Egypt in bullion form; see Kroll 2001; cf. 
Howgego 1995: 89-90).  For instance, Greek cities subject to Persia needed money to make tribute 
payments, whereas Egypt also required money to pay for mercenaries and to facilitate trade (Figueira 1998: 
231-6, 260-5, 529, 535, Kroll 2001: 14, Bresson 2005: 49-50, and Engen 2005).  As long as states needed 
money to conduct trade, to pay tribute and other imperial taxes, and to disburse money to cover the costs of 
political administration, the transference of specie from Attica to these silver-starved areas of the 
Mediterranean was all but guaranteed. 
283 That Xenophon moves beyond mere “observation” to “economic analysis” in these sections is rightly 
underscored by Samuel 1983: 22-5, though I find his conclusions much too tentative. 
284 E.g., Marchant 1925, Chambry 1958, Giglioni 1970, Schütrumpf 1982, Waterfield 1997, and Doty 
2003. 
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be πενέστεροι.  He proposes construing τὰ ὑπάρχοντα alternatively not as “resources 
in money,” but rather “resources in ore available” for exploitation.285  While this 
interpretation has some prima facie plausibility, it distorts what Xenophon actually says.   
As argued above, πενέστεροι indicates that concessionaires are not poor but 
“poorer” in comparison to those of the past.  The situation envisioned at 4.22, on the 
other hand, is in the distant future “when the labor force becomes abundant” (ἐπειδὰν 
πολλοὶ ἐργάται γένωνται), that is, whenever there are three slaves for evey citizen 
(4.17).  It is important to note that once slave numbers reach this level, Xenophon 
promises that all Athenian citizens will be drawing the triobolon.  This goes a long way 
in explaining the reason why those working in the mines will have “a sufficient amount 
of capital” to lease the public slaves.286  While most Athenians will use this money for 
food purchases, those above the subsistence level (but not the rich exclusively), 
Xenophon intimates, will elect to invest their tr obolon in the mines.  For concessionaires 
                                                
285 Gauthier 1976: 152; cf. Moyle 1697: 28, Thiel 1922: 3, and Lauffer 1955-6: 11 who translate τὰ 
ὑπάρχοντα similarly.  Be it noted that Gauthier contradicts himself here because in his commentary of 
4.28 he does not read πενέστεροι as referring to the financial condition of concessionaires at all; rather he 
interprets it as a statement about the productivity of the mines themselves.  He concludes from this reading 
that “in reality, it seems [Xenophon] does not even consider the necessary start up costs of private 
individuals; for him, the assurance of rapid gains (except in the case of kainotomiai; cf. 4.28) renders the 
problem of initial financial resources a secondary concern ([Xenophon’s] attitude, which is the fruit of 
excessive optimism, is one of the main weaknesses of his program).”  Indeed, Xenophon is not too 
concerned with the “initial financial resources” of the concessionaires because he intends to begin the 
program with a meager 1,200 slaves (4.23).  For the short term, those working the mines must have had t e 
necessary capital to lease these slaves because Xenophon claims that what entrepreneurs required most of 
all was workers, not an abundance of capital (4.5).  The latter was required largely for kainotomiai.       
286 It must be remembered that Xenophon introduces thee sections about the mines to elucidate his 
discussion about trophe.  In fact, the whole discussion between 4.13 and 4.32 is nominally about trophe (cf. 
ἳνα δὲ καὶ σαφέστερον περὶ τῆς τροφῆς εἴπω (4.13) with (4.33): καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ εἴρηται ὡς ἂν 
ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθείσης τῆς πόλεως ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ 
γενέσθαι).    
 379 
with a limited amount of capital, 180 drachmas would have contributed handsomely to 
the reduction of labor costs.  For instance, in a six-slave mining outfit, a concessionaire 
would have saved about 15% per annum—a significant amount even by modern 
standards.287  For other concessionaires wishing to expand their operations in the event 
of owning a productive mine, the addition of a single slave to his outfit may have yielded 
a return of well over 50% on his investment.288  It is noteworthy that Xenophon 
recommends that the state also embrace the same entrepr eurial ethic by reinvesting the 
profits from the apophora system into the purchase of additional laborers (4.23- ).  As 
                                                
287 For the costs involved, see above, note 260.  While t ere was not such thing as a “typical” mining 
outfit, Conophagos’ figures (1980: 199-200, 343-9) offer the best approximation of ancient employment 
numbers in the various modes of silver production.  He estimates a maximum of three slaves (working 12-
hour days) for making the initial cutting.  Once ore was discovered, no more than one slave would have
been able to work in a gallery at a time due to their small size (cf. Rihll 2001: 116).  At this point, perhaps 
the other slaves began the initial dressing of the ore (Conophagos suggests that three slaves were sufficient 
to process a ton of ore).  As far as the remainder of the silver production process (i.e. the grinding, washing, 
smelting, and cupellation of the ore) it is uncertain whether concessionaires leased ergasteria to process the 
ore themselves with their own slaves or paid owners of ergasteria (maybe a certain percentage (ca. 20%?) 
of the finished product) to process their ore for them.  The latter scenario is much more likely though (see 
Michell 1957: 105 and Ito 1986: 460), since the production of silver ore required a much higher degree of 
technical expertise than the average miner possessed.  Some concessionaires, such as Pheidippos of Pithos 
(see above), owned their own ergasteria and thus processed their own ore themselves.  But he was very 
wealthy, and it is unknown how typical his case was.        
288 Based on Conophagos’ figures (see table on p. 343), a single slave working a 12-hour day for 350 days 
a year could have extracted 18.5 tons of ore or 5 kg of silver (after possessing), which works out to 1092 dr. 
of coined money.  After subtracting labor costs (243dr.), processing costs (estimating two payments of 20 
percent of total silver production—one for dressing and washing the ore in the ergasterion, the other for 
smelting and refining at the furnace; see previous note), state taxes (1/24th of total silver production), and a 
small amount to cover leasing fees (variable, but averaging just under 450dr., though Aperghis 1998: 17 
notes that this figure is a bit distorted, as there are a few leases with extremely high rents), which I take as a 
per annum payment, we get about 350dr. left in profit (naturally, for those concessionaires who owned their 
own ergasteria, the profit margin would have been much higher).  Cf. Aperghis 1998: 18-9 for a similar 
calculation of mining profits, but one that is lower than mine because he assumes wrongly that the state 
mining tax was not 1/24th of production, but rather 1/10th (see above, note 212); Conophagos’ estimate of 
592 dr. seems rather high; cf. the 400dr suggestion of Osborne 1995: 34.  Recently, Christesen 2003: 52-3
has assessed the evidence for investment opportunities in fourth-century Athens and places the annual 
return from silver mining above all other forms of investment, including maritime lending, which brought 
an average per annum return of 25-50%.    
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we shall argue below, the impulse to reinvest income into productive labor is one of the 
hallmarks of modern capitalist enterprise.289   
Nevertheless, even with this additional capital avail ble to invest in the mines, 
kainotomiai would have remained a risky venture, and so Xenophon proposes a measure 
to “make new cuttings as risk free as possible” (ὡς ἂν ἀσφαλέστατα καινοτομοῖτο) 
(4.30).  This is Xenophon’s third major proposal.  His idea is to create mining syndicates 
of the ten Attic tribes, in which each tribe receives an equal number of public slaves from 
the state, so that they may share the risks and the profits of exploitation: “if one tribe 
discovers silver, all of them would receive a share of the profits, and if two, three, four, or 
half the tribes find silver, then it is certain that the mining works would become much 
more profitable.”  Xenophon then suggests that private individuals should organize their 
mining operations in the same way (4.32).  Yet about the inner workings of this system 
he says nothing—a silence that scholars have rightly found regrettable.290  While the 
operations of tax-farming syndicates and trierarchic symmories afford some parallels, 
they contribute very little to our understanding of the mining system Xenophon envisions 
here.  Even in the case of private mining partnerships, which seem to have come into 
existence after the Poroi and thus whose origins can quite reasonably be attributed to 
Xenophon’s suggestion, our knowledge is quite limited, and what is known about them 
                                                
289 Wealth of Nations II.3.13-32 = Smith 1981: 337-49 with Dickey 1993: 217.             
290 Thiel 1922: 26, von der Lieck 1933: 53, and Gauthier 1976: 163.  However, because we are not in a 
position to assess the workings of this system, I do not think we can draw any firm conclusions about it as 
does von der Lieck: “The author appears to me to proceed in an illogical manner, and if the charge of 
utopianism can be leveled at any point it is here in his proposal for tribal associations.”    
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does not seem applicable to public mining associations.291  The best comparandum to 
this proposal is the division of the territory of Oropos among the ten tribes sometime after 
338, but the evidence for the financial exploitation f this region is frustratingly 
fragmentary and ambiguous.292  Despite the shortcomings of his presentation, we must 
not overlook the significance of the main idea motivating the creation of such a 
cooperative system in the first place.   
It is imperative to underscore that Xenophon sees a direct relationship between 
employment and income: “for whenever a few dig and look for silver, I think little wealth 
is discovered; but whenever the labor force is large, many more times the amount of 
silver ore is brought into existence” (4.4; cf. 4.32).  While he makes this observation at 
the “microeconomic” level of analysis, Xenophon sees the big picture as well, often 
couching his discussion of the mines in the larger, macroeconomic context of the polis 
economy.  For instance, our author contends that the “concentration of a large population 
                                                
291 For such private partnerships, see Demosthenes 37.38; 42.3; and Hyperides, On Behalf of Euxenippus 
35.  Herzog 1914: 480 (cf. Breitenbach 1967: 1760 and Gauthier 1976: 163) intimates a direct connection 
between Xenophon’s proposal and later fourth century practices.     
292 Hyperides, On Behalf of Euxenippus 16-17; Hesperia 56 (1987): 47-58 = L8.  One insight into the 
Poroi the former text provides involves the nature of the initial disbursement of slaves to the ten tribes.  
When Oropos was returned to the Athenians in 338, “the tribes formed into groups of two and parceled out 
the mountains in Oropos amongst themselves [= the entire territory of Oropus, according to Langdon 1987: 
55], after the state had granted this to them” (αἱ φυλαὶ σύνδυο γενόμεναι τὰ ὄρη τὰ ἐν Ὠρωπῶι 
διείλοντο, τοῦ δήμου αὐταῖς δόντος) (16).  Xenophon speaks of the grant of slaves in similar terms (εἰ 
δ’ ἡ πόλις δοίη ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν).  Thiel 1922: 26 and Gauthier 1976: 163 interpret th  verb δίδοναι as 
indicating that this dispersal is not a “gracious gift.”  I do not think this is correct.  If Xenophon envisioned 
leasing the slaves out to the tribes, surely he would have used the verb μισθοῦν, as he does at 4.19, 20, 21, 
22.  Secondly, I cannot think of any good reason why this would not have been a “free” grant.  For the
system to have worked, the participation of private financiers was necessary (Thiel 1922: 26 and von der 
Lieck 1933: 53).  By giving the tribes free use of the slaves, the state would have encouraged investors to 
participate, for they would have saved about 30% on labor costs.  The only expense really involved here 
would have been the maintenance of the slaves.  Gauthier 1976: 162 tries to get around the economics of 
the proposal by assuming that the state would have “forced” the tribes to participate.  Since Xenophon 
recommends forming private syndicates along the same principles as public ones, are we to imagine that 
the state compelled private citizens to invest in kainotomiai as well?       
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in the mining district” will lead to additional revnues from other sectors of the economy 
and increases in real estate values in the region (4.49-50).  The importance of this point is 
not lost on Doty, who insightfully draws the parallel to Keynes’ formulation in The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money: “The outline of our theory can be 
expressed as follows.  When employment increases, aggregate real income is 
increased.”293  For Keynes, the father of macroeconomics, “aggregate income” is the 
total amount of income received by all factors of production in an economy.  To 
maximize the aggregate income of society, then, requi s full employment, and to 
achieve full employment, he famously argues, requires the active participation of the 
government in the economy, not only as an employer, but also as a promoter of the 
economic welfare of private investors, whose capital is instrumental in augmenting the 
labor force.294  Entrepreneurs, however, incur serious “risks and hazards” when 
investing, and so “throughout human history…the propensity to save [has been] stronger 
than the inducement to invest.”295  Thus, “whatever can be done to make profit more 
certain, or investment less risky, will have the effect of stimulating investment, and, 
hence, employment and revenue.”296  We will return to this point below. 
                                                
293 Doty 2003: 10 citing Keynes 1936: 27.       
294 Doty 2003: 11 summarizes Keynes’ theory as follows: “ hen the income of a community is increased, 
consumption increases also.  Moreover, an increase in consumption will cause a proportionate increase in 
demand as consumed goods are taken out of circulation.  If the demand increases faster than the supply of 
goods, prices will rise, providing a reward for those who invest in producing more goods.  To produce more 
goods will require additional labor, causing an additional increase in the aggregate income, more 
consumption, and a further increase in the demand for goods.” 
295 Keynes 1936: 347.  As discussed above, at 4.7 Xenophon makes a similar observation.  But he also 
notes that the propensity to save (i.e. hoard) is not necessarily stronger than the inducement to invest 
(χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ; cf. Oeconomicus 11.13) but about the same.   
296 Doty 2003: 10.  For instance, Keynes 1936: 351 recommends that the state regulate and even cap 
interest rates to reduce the risk to investors, who, unlike entrepreneurs who front their own money, incur 
the additional cost of making interest payments (cf. 144-5).  
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To be sure, Xenophon’s discussion in the Poroi does not even begin to 
approximate the level of analytic sophistication and complexity of Keynes’ general 
theory.  Our author concerns himself almost exclusively with the particular, the Athenian 
economy, and consequently has no interest in generalizing the economic principles he 
observes around him.  Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the important points at which the 
economic thought of these two authors converge.  Xenophon too proceeds from a general 
theory, namely, the idea that silver never loses its value.  His discovery of the concept of 
marginal utility contributes significantly to the development of his proposals for 
reinvigorating the Athenian economy.  With virtually an infinite demand for money, the 
Athenians may safely invest their money into a scheme that aims to increase employment 
in the mines to the maximum extent.  Yet for the program to be fully successful new 
cuttings had to be made, which were extremely risky ventures.  To encourage the private 
investment of capital into kainotomiai, Xenophon recommends that the state take a 
leading role by facilitating the creation of public and private mining syndicates, whose 
sole purpose is to create additional outlets for the labor supply so that “these mines 
become more profitable,” not just to investors, but to he entire state as well.  Therefore, 
like Keynes, Xenophon insists that to maximize the total income of society requires not 
only the greatest amount of workers, but also the synergy of both public and private 
domains.297  Indeed, Moyle’s observation from centuries ago is not far from the mark: 
“That admirable Maxim That the true Wealth and Greatness of a Nation, consists in 
                                                
297 Rightly noted by Schütrumpf 1982: 12-3 contra Breitenbach 1967: 1759.  
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Numbers of People, well emply’d, is every where inculcated throughout the whole 
Course of the Treatise.”298 
To sum up what has been a rather complicated and technical discussion thus far.  
From 413 to ca. 362 the mines of Laurion were in serious decline.  The Decelean 
occupation had a deleterious and lasting impact on mining operations there; not only did 
a large percentage of mining slaves desert, but the fortunes of many Athenian 
entrepreneurs working in the mining industry were ruined.  As long as Sparta (until 371) 
and Thebes (until 362) remained a threat to Attica’s security, the capital necessary for 
reconstituting the mines, especially for the purchase of slaves, probably flowed into 
other, less risky investment outlets.  By the time Xenophon began to compose the Poroi, 
mining activity was on the rise, but historically speaking at very low levels of production, 
especially because those working the mines were poorer than they had been in the past, 
and consequently very few new cuttings were being made.  To remedy this situation, 
Xenophon makes three separate but related measures: 1) the public ownership of slaves 
to be hired out on the apophora system to concessionaires and proprietors of ergasteria at 
an obol a day; 2) the creation of public and private mining syndicates to share the risks 
and profits of exploitation in kainotomiai; and 3) the employment of the triobolon to 
increase investment in the mines.  The ultimate goal of these proposals is to increase 
employment to its greatest possible extent so that the greatest amount of revenue can be 
generated from the mines, occasioning an era of prosperity enjoyed by all Athenians.   
                                                
298 Moyle 1697: 7-8.  To be sure, Moyle is also thinking of Xenophon’s proposals for expanding Attic 
industry and commerce, sectors of the Athenian economy in which the number of workers is expected to 
increase (cf. 3.6, 12-3).   
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At the outset we quoted Gauthier’s contention that Xenophon’s proposals vis-à-
vis the mines are the “most audacious” of the work, and now we are in a better position to 
assess the validity of this claim.  Indeed, many of his recommendations for the mines, 
like those for the metics and commerce, are rooted in contemporary practices: the 
Athenians owned hundreds of public slaves; private investors hired out slaves on the 
apophora system; and private investors formed syndicates to pread the risk of such 
capitalist enterprises as tax farming.  Yet what makes these proposals so bold is the extent 
to which Xenophon adopts these commonplace practices and transforms them into 
something entirely new.  Our author is certainly aware of this when he asserts, somewhat 
understatedly, that “the only innovation” in adopting the apophora system is that the state 
will follow the example of private entrepreneurs (4.17).  In classical Athens, there were 
certain things the state just did not do economically.  To be sure, the polis leased out 
public and sacred property, farmed out taxes, and spent money on the improvement of 
infrastructure, especially in the commercial sector of the Piraeus.  However, there is no 
parallel to the state behaving as an investor, appropriating the means of production in a 
major industrial enterprise and employing these means, not only to generate massive 
amounts of income for the public sphere, but also to invigorate that industry for the 
financial improvement of private investors as well.  In the previous section, we observed 
that Xenophon embraces the “world of the emporion,” as we find him advocating on 
behalf of traders and promoting the reciprocal benefits gained from trade.  Here we see 
him going a step further.  Under his direction, the polis is to imitate private 
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entrepreneurial practices and become in the process an integral economic actor in the life 
of the city.299   
The most important consequence of this “economization” of the political order is 
that Xenophon introduces a high degree of rationality into his political economy.300  
Scholars, especially those in Weberian tradition, have long assumed that the Greeks were 
incapable of economic rationality, because without a “functionally segregated and 
independently instituted” economy “with its own profit maximizing, want-satisfying 
logic and rationality,” rational decision-making based upon calculation is impossible.301  
A number of recent studies have thoroughly called into question this substantivist 
supposition, supporting the conclusion that a differentiated market economy did exist in 
fourth-century Athens.302  While it was certainly not as developed or complex as the 
modern, free-market economy, it nonetheless achieved a high degree of functional 
autonomy with some price-regulating mechanisms.  Theoretically speaking, then, nothing 
                                                
299 Long ago Pöhlmann interpreted these measures as an ttempt to establish state socialism in Athens, but 
such a view does not hold up to scrutiny (Pöhlmann 1984: 240-50; cf. Marchant 1925: xxvii; for criticism 
of Pöhlmann’s thesis, see von der Lieck 1933: 51-4, Oertel in Pöhlmann 1984: 566-7, Giglioni 1970: cxxx, 
and Schütrumpf 1982: 12, n.50).  Xenophon does not advocate that the state direct the economy as a whole, 
but rather that it control the means of production in a single branch of an industry (Schütrumpf 1982: 11-2).  
It is important to note that the state will not have complete control over the means of production, as private 
entrepreneurs will still hire out their own slaves 4.19 and the processing plants will remain in private hands, 
though, as noted above, some furnaces were owned by the state (4.39 with Gauthier 1976: 187-8).  
Nonetheless, the synergy between public and private spheres in the Poroi is salient, and so if we must 
assign a term to Xenophon’s imagined economy, perhas “mixed economy” is the most appropriate, 
especially as it is commonly employed today to mean an economy that incorporates elements of privately- 
and publicly-owned enterprises with some centralized economic planning.   
300 To my knowledge, only Giglioni 1970: cxx, cxxx and Cartledge 1997: 166 have advocated this idea, 
though they both do not elucidate the point in any detail.  Cf. Lowry 1987: 15-26, 45-81, who places 
Xenophon in the tradition of “administrative rationality” and discusses the Poroi passim.  As will become 
clear below, my analysis of Xenophon’s economic rationality bears little resemblance to Lowry’s.       
301 Cartledge 2002b: 15.  For recent discussions of ecnomic rationality among the Greeks, see Davies 
2001: 124, Morris 2002, and Christesen 2003: 32-6.  
302 See, above all, Burke 1992, Cohen 1992, Engen 1996, Loomis 1998, and Shipton 2000. 
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seriously hindered Athenians like Xenophon from thinking in rational ways about their 
economy (though I anticipate some possible objections below).   
Christesen’s recent study on economic rationalism in fourth-century Athens 
contributes significantly to our understanding of this concept and provides a helpful 
framework for assessing Xenophon’s political economy.  Like previous works on the 
subject, Christesen argues that income maximization was “instrumental” in the 
investment decisions of Greek entrepreneurs and investors.303  As explained earlier, 
“instrumental rationality” is the form of rationality that motivates economic actors to 
choose the most efficient or cost-effective means of achieving desired ends.  However, he 
advances the discussion by emphasizing the importance of choice and calculability in the 
development of economic rationality, as decision-makers must “possess a well-defined 
set of preferences, which are consistently employed in selecting the best use of limited 
resources.”304  One such factor is the demand that profitability be commensurate with 
risk.305  But to weigh the risk-reward balance, some form of calculation or accounting 
(preferably quantitative) is necessary.306   
                                                
303 See the works, for example, cited in his précis on pp. 34-9.  For these Athenian investors and 
entrepreneurs, see also Thompson 1978 and 1982.  While C ristensen is concerned largely with 
instrumental rationality, he also stresses the importance of “expressive rationality” in classical Athens (32-
4, 54-6).  Whereas instrumental rationality is concer ed simply with the “hows” of an action, expressive 
rationality focuses on the “whys.”  Simply put, expressive rationality assumes that economic agents are 
“self-consciously reflective about their preferences and that they are sensitive to societal norms” that define 
and govern behavior (32).  Consequently, an expressive rational agent will not always choose the most 
cost-effective means of achieving an end if it conflicts with the value system of his/her society.      
304 Christesen 2003: 32-6.      
305 Christesen 2003: 32, 46; cf. Cohen 1992: 53-4, 140-4. 
306 The idea that rational calculation is achievable only with the advent of modern, capital accounting 
techniques, such as double-entry bookkeeping (e.g., Weber 1958: 21-2 with Love 1991: 247-8, Ste. Croix 
1956, and Finley 1999: 110-1, 116-7, 181) has been challenged by Macve 1985. 
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Christesen’s point of departure is the Attic mining industry.  Building upon 
Conophagos’ calculations, he underscores the economic significance of the beneficiation 
stage of production, whereby extraneous minerals were r moved (through grinding and 
washing at the rgasterion) from ore with lead contents between ca. 7% and 30% prior to 
smelting.307  The process eliminated about 60 percent of the ore’s weight and in effect 
concentrated the lead in the ore to about 50%.  From a metallurgical perspective, the 
stage was unnecessary, as it was possible to smelt ore of all lead-bearing ratios without 
prior enrichment.308 Yet because concentrated ore weighed about 80% less than 
unprocessed ore, beneficiation greatly decreased the amount of smelting and cupellation 
necessary to produce finished silver and thus helped reduce charcoal costs, which was a 
rather expensive and scarce resource in Attica.  Consequently, if mine operators had 
skipped this stage, production costs would have increased dramatically, diminishing 
profits by as much as 70%!309  The profitability of beneficiation goes a long way, then, 
in explaining why many Athenians built processing plants despite the risk involved in 
fronting significant amounts of capital.310  Christesen draws the following conclusion: 
Athenian mine operators were very much aware of the costs of different 
ways of processing ore.  This is because the workshps in which the ore 
was enriched could only result from a careful cost analysis…Simply put, 
the numerous workshops in the Laurium region…are without a doubt the 
                                                
307 Christesen 2003: 39-46.  For a concise description of the beneficiation stage (also known as 
enrichment, concentration, or dressing), see Rihll 2001: 118.   
308 Christesen 2003: 41   
309 Christesen 2003: 43-4.  Conophagos 1980: 341-59 puts the gross profits of silver mining at about 70 
dr. per ton of ore.  Expenses for production (with beneficiation) totaled 38 dr. per ton, leaving a profit of 32 
dr. per ton; without beneficiation, production costs amounted to 61 dr. per ton, leaving 9 dr. profit per ton.   
310 Christesen 2003: 41-2, with note 25: “These sources [SEG 32, 236; Demosthenes 37.4, 12-3; and Ellis-
Jones and Lambert 1999] indicate that beneficiation workshops were valued well in excess of 6,000 
drachmai.”  There are approximately 30 preserved beneficiation workshops in the mining region and some 
83 mentioned in the leases. 
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product of rational analysis employed in the pursuit of income 
maximization.  Their presence indicates that Athenians weighed different 
approaches to conducting the mining of silver and were willing to invest 
time, energy, and money and to utilize relatively advanced technology in 
order to achieve higher rates of return on their investment.  Stronger 
evidence for the operation of rational decision-making in the pursuit of 
income maximization would be difficult to imagine.311  
 
Having established that Athenian investors acted ration lly by carefully evaluating the 
risk-reward balance within the mining industry, Christesen then demonstrates that such 
rationality motivated the decisions of individuals when confronted with a number of 
investment options.  For him the presence of a strong correlation between risk and return 
among all investment opportunities points decidedly in favor of a well-developed 
economic rationality operating within a society.  Though the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence does not permit an accurate quantitative comparison of risk and return, a 
qualitative assessment is possible making use of approximate rates of return gleaned from 
epigraphic and literary sources.312  The following hierarchy of returns on known 
investment options emerges: 
Risk  Form of Investment    Return313 
Low  Real Property …………………………… 8% 
Loans, Land/Domestic Commerce   .……… 10-18% 
Medium Ownership of Slaves …………………… 15-25% 
Maritime Lending …………………… 25-50% 
High  Silver Mining …………………………… +50%314 
                                                
311 Christesen 2003: 44-5. 
312 As Christesen 2003: 46-7 notes well, risk is very difficult to quantify, and without reliable economic 
data and statistical and probabilistic methods, quantitative risk assessment is impossible.  Needless to say, 
the Greeks did not have such information and mathematical sophistication to quantify risk.  Yet even today 
many firms use qualitative risk assessment, which relies on the subjective opinions of experts to evaluate 
the probability and likelihood of certain outcomes. 
313 These are only approximate annual rates of return. 
314 This table is a slight modification of Christesen 2003: 52 (cf. Casson 1976: 33-47, Thompson 1978 and 
1983, Millet 1991: 103-5, 232-5, and Cohen 1992: 53-4 for discussions of these figures), who under silver 
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Again, Christesen summarizes the significance of these findings: 
This pattern could only come into being as the result of a widespread 
pattern of economic decision-making in which investor  assessed the 
relative merits of various alternatives open to them and demanded a return 
commensurate with the anticipated risks.  The ‘widespr ad’ aspect of this 
conclusion requires particular emphasis.  The correlation discussed above 
could not have arisen from the actions of a few scattered individuals.  It 
could only have come into being in an economic enviro ment populated 
by investors employing instrumental rationality with income maximization 
as a dominant preference.315 
 
If Christesen is correct in his conclusion about the pervasiveness of economic rationality 
in fourth-century Athens, we have an invaluable framework with which we can evaluate 
Xenophon’s proposals for the mines.   
First, it goes without saying that Xenophon is, above all, concerned with income 
maximization (1.2; 2.7; 3.2, 5, 6, 13, 14; 5.1, 12;6.1), and his proposals for the mines are 
intended to contribute significantly to achieving this goal (4.1, 17, 31, 38, 40, 49-50).  
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that Xenophon recommends investing in the 
mining industry, because the average annual rate of return from the mines was much 
higher than that of any other investment opportunity.  Remarkably, he demonstrates 
throughout the work his awareness not only of other investment options, but also of just 
how profitable they are in relation to one another.316  For example, in his discussion of 
the capital fund, he compares the “nearly” 20% rateof return subscribers of ten minai 
                                                                                                                                      
mining states “too variable to state a meaningful aver ge.”  Above, I suggest that 50% represents a 
conservative estimate for the average annual rate of return.    
315 Christesen 2003: 53. 
316 The catalog of these investment opportunities is impressive: agriculture and fishing (1.3-4; 4.5-6); 
quarrying (1.4); mining (1.5; 4.1-50); manufacture (2.3; 4.6); maritime loans (3.10); capital funds (3.7-11); 
leasing lands, houses, apartments, etc. (3.12-4; 4.19); tax farming (4.19, 20); long-distance trade and 
retailing (4.6); and hiring out slaves (4.14-8, 20-21, 23-4).     
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will receive to the return generated on maritime loans (3.9).  Xenophon’s calculations at 
4.23-24, as Thiel demonstrates, indicate that he exp cted the annual rate of return on the 
leasing of slaves to be between 30% and 38%.317  More significant still, our author 
understands the relative risks involved.  According to Christesen’s hierarchy, investing in 
slaves and the mines were two of the riskiest investm nt ventures, and Xenophon’s 
discussion does not betray his awareness of the hazards involved in both.  In fact, both his 
responses to imagined objections and his specific proposals that aim to mitigate risk 
presuppose that he and his audience were well aware of the risk-reward balance among 
these investment opportunities.  More than that, Xenophon even expects his readers to 
corroborate his investment choices by means of calculation, to “run the numbers,” so to 
speak (4.18, 34).  While the quantitative analyses of the Greeks may seem rather 
primitive by today’s standards, we must emphasize that hey calculated nonetheless.  
“Every owner of cultivable land,” Xenophon assures us, “can state exactly how many 
oxen or laborers are sufficient for the land; but if someone [i.e., a bailiff] puts more to 
work than the right number, they calculate it as a loss” (4.5).318  The same holds true for 
those working the mines, he goes on to say, and the only thing preventing Xenophon 
himself from calculating the requisite number of laborers for the mines (beyond the 
generic, “three for every citizen”) is that his perspicacious understanding of the marginal 
utility of money makes such a calculation unnecessary in the first place.319 
                                                
317 Thiel 1922: 52-3; cf. Lauffer 1955-6: 67-8. 
318 For such accounting in estate management, see Pomeroy 1994: 55-7 with references to earlier studies.  
319 Xenophon’s quantitative turn thoroughly impressed Moyle 1697: 8: “I believe Xenophon was the first 
Author that ever argu’d by Political Arithmetick, or the Art of Reasoning upon things by Figures.”  
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Xenophon’s coupling of the apophora system with his plan to reinvigorate the 
mining industry needs further elucidation, for it would have also been sensible under his 
scheme to expand manufacturing (see Section 5A above) t  lease out slaves to metic 
entrepreneurs and/or to employ them in a variety of other industries and enterprises (e.g., 
agriculture, fishing, quarrying, etc.).  Xenophon, be it noted, does entertain such 
eventualities, being fully aware of the benefits and risks involved in each.  The main 
issue is labor, particularly which industry can readily admit a labor force of the 
magnitude that he proposes.  Unlike in other industries, employers in the mines keep 
adding laborers, for “of all the industries I know only in mining does the expansion of 
business not lead to jealousy among the entrepreneus” (4.3-4).  By this statement, 
Xenophon does not mean to imply that competition is a bad thing, but rather that 
competition in the mines does not lead to animosity among competitors.  The reason for 
this resentment, he explains, stems from the inevitable superfluity of labor that 
competition brings, which leads to price reductions a d consequently to financial losses 
(4.6-7).  While Xenophon mentions this phenomenon operating specifically in agriculture 
and in the manufacture of iron, copper, and furnitue, he cites these merely exempli 
gratia, for his entire discussion presupposes the notion that every business enterprise that 
increases production indiscriminately will sooner or later experience a downturn because 
of the effects of diminishing marginal utility.  However, as we have seen, Xenophon 
rightly notes the exception the mining industry poses to this rule, as money does not 
experience the same reduction in its marginal utility as other goods when supply is 
increased.  For this reason, the mines can admit the largest possible labor force without 
causing a diminution in the value of money.  He is thus fully conscious not only of the 
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risk-reward balance of competing investment opportunities but also of the factors that 
make each risky and profitable in the first place.  “Economic agents” do not simply 
“maximize,” explain the authors of a leading textbook on economics, “[they also] make 
optimal decisions [which] means they use all available information in reaching decisions 
and that those decisions are the best possible in the circumstances in which they find 
themselves.”320  What makes the Poroi a unique document in the history of economic 
thought, then, is not so much the wealth of information it provides about the fourth-
century Athenian economy, but rather the rare glimpse it offers of homo economicus at 
work, reasoning, calculating, and choosing the most rational means of maximizing 
Athens’ income.   
Perhaps one may object that our interpretation of Xenophon’s economic 
rationality is a house of cards because it fails to take into account the classic liberal 
critique of slave-based economies, which maintains that slave labor is inimical to real 
economic growth and thus to economic rationality, because homines economici desire to 
maximize profits not just in the short term, but in the long term as well.321  Though 
economic historians and theorists have raised a number of criticisms, four in particular 
seem to be relevant to the slave economy that Xenophon proposes.  First, slaves are 
                                                
320 Dornbusch and Fischer cited in Davies 1998: 231. 
321 This idea is best encapsulated in Weber’s proclamation in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: “Capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of 
continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise.  Forit must be so: in a wholly capitalistic order or sciety, an 
individual capitalistic enterprise which did not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would 
be doomed to extinction” (1958: 17).  By “classic liberal”, I am of course referring to the school of thought 
pioneered by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill.  In the following 
discussion, however, I focus almost exclusively on Weber’s contribution to the study of slavery and 
economic rationality (see Love 1991: 39-40, 246-76), which has been extremely influential on 
contemporary historians, especially those working o Antebellum slavery in the American South (e.g., 
Genovese 1965).   
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considered less productive than their free-labor counterparts: output can be increased 
only through the irrational measures of corporal punishment and/or the fear of such 
punishment.322  Second, because slave prices tend to fluctuate erratically in slave 
societies, costs for a given enterprise are very difficult if not impossible to compute, and 
thus predictability of future profit or loss—a pillar of homo economicus’ rationality—is 
severely hampered.323  Third, because slave labor is a form of fixed capital, representing 
a constant, inflexible element of production, no different from tools, land, or factories, it 
often leads to “overcapitalization” (i.e., an excess of capital necessary for the needs of a 
business).324  As market conditions change, especially for the worse, the inflexibility of 
slave labor becomes stark.  Whereas modern capitalists, who purchase labor power rather 
than the laborers themselves, can quickly lay off workers during downswings in the 
market, slave-owners must sell their “redundant” slaves or else suffer the financial loss of 
having to maintain an idle work force until market conditions change.325  Yet if too many 
slaves are sold off at once, prices will drop, resulting in further financial losses for the 
slave-owners.  Accordingly, many slave-owners elect to retain their slaves, eating the 
losses in the hopes that market conditions will improve, a strategy which in the event of a 
quick turnaround may actually save money because the repurchase of slaves (at likely 
higher prices) would be circumvented.  But such a pr ctice is highly speculative and 
risky, and if market conditions do not improve fast enough, a slave-owner could bankrupt 
himself through maintaining his slaves.  Consequently, and this is the last major criticism 
                                                
322 E.g., Smith 1981: 387-89, 684-5 and Mill 1904: vol. 1, 233-7. 
323 Weber 1927: 128 and 1947: 276 with Love 1991: 39. 
324 Weber 1927: 128, Philips in Conrad and Meyer 1964: 74, and Post 2003: 311.  
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of slave economies, the heavy costs incurred from capitalized labor severely restricts the 
ability of slave-owners to invest in laborsaving technologies.  In fact, slavery itself, it is 
believed, deters the development of technology in the first place, without which real 
economic growth is impossible.326  
Let us address each of these concerns in sequential order.  While it is prima facie 
plausible that slaves in classical Greece were less productive than free laborers, without 
quantitative data to support this conclusion it cannot be stated simply as fact.  
Comparative data from the Antebellum South suggests caution.  Some studies of the 
period, especially the cliometric analysis of Fogel and Engerman, demonstrate that slaves 
were not only hard working and efficient but that they outstripped the productivity of 
their free-counterparts in the North by some thirty-five percent.327  This thesis is not 
uncontroversial, and many have contested not only their conclusions but also their 
methodology and data sets, yet what has remained virtually unchallenged is their central 
idea that slavery was a profitable enterprise.328  While profitability is not quite the same 
thing as productivity, the presence of the former is usually an indicator of the latter, and 
there can be little doubt that slavery was profitable for the Athenians just as it was for 
proprietors of plantations in the Antebellum South.329  Again, we cannot accurately 
compare the profitability of slavery with free labor verall, but as Osborne reminds us, 
                                                                                                                                      
325 Post 2003: 311-2. 
326 Genovese 1965: 48-51, Post 2003: 312-3, and the references in Finley 1999: 227, n. 64. 
327 See, above all, Conrad and Meyer 1964 and Fogel and Engerman 1974 (cf. Cartledge 2002b). 
328 For criticism of the authors cited in the previous note, see, for example, Genovese 1965 and David et 
al. 1976; for a recent discussion of the profitability of slavery, see Smith 1998: Chapters 5 and 6 (cf. Dowd 
in Conrad and Meyer 1964 : 93-7).  
329 Casson 1976: 35-40, Osborne 1995: 34, Finley 1999: 83-4, and Cartledge 2002b.  
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Athenian citizens had political, religious, and military obligations that would have kept 
them from working for perhaps over 25% of the year.330  Even metics had military duties 
and frequently attended religious festivals.  But slaves could work all year round, which 
means that in theory they were likely to be more productive than free laborers.  As far as 
punitive measures are concerned, they certainly existed in classical Athens, but 
Xenophon’s advice to employ the mining slaves as rowe s in the fleet and infantrymen 
(4.42)—duties that were almost exclusively the prerogatives of citizens—suggests that 
the Athenians, for the most part, treated them humanely.  
Concerning the non-calculability of slave labor resulting from erratically 
fluctuating slave prices, Xenophon’s own calculations at 4.23-4 confirm the notion that 
slave prices were not stable in classical Athens.  He expects to pay between 158 and 195 
drachmai for each mining slave over the course of five to six years.  It is important to 
note, however, that Xenophon contemplates a range of prices, and if we calculate the 
average of these two figures, we get 176.5 dr. per slave, which is comparable to the 174 
dr. average in the Attic Stelai for 414.331  Thus, despite some fluctuation it is reasonable 
to assume that prices for mining slaves did not extend much above or below this price 
band (ca. 150-200 dr.).  Xenophon and most Athenians for that matter probably had a 
good notion of what a “fair” price was for a mining slave, above which they were willing 
to pay only a certain amount.  It is sometimes stated that market forces did not determine 
prices, but Xenophon’s testimony suggests otherwise: “if we seek a huge amount of 
                                                
330 Osborne 1995: 34-5; cf. Markle 1985: 296-7 and Sincla r 1988: 225-7 who estimate that the free 
workers labored only 260 days a year.   
331 Pritchett 1956: 276-8; cf. Ste. Croix 1981: 585-7 with full bibliography of slave prices in antiquity.  
For a recent discussion of slave prices in antiquity, see Scheidel 2005.  
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slaves at once, we will be forced to buy them both in an inferior condition and at a high 
price” (4.36).332  “Indeed, in this respect it will be more profitable to proceed piecemeal 
than to implement everything at once,” he recommends.  Accordingly, if supply and 
demand influenced the movement of prices within the range given by Xenophon, then 
predictability becomes possible.   
The overcapitalization of labor charge is a more serious obstacle to the rationality 
of Xenophon’s scheme but one that is not insurmountable.  Though he and his fellow 
Greeks do not conceptualize labor in the same ways as modern economists, they do 
consider slaves to be a form of fixed capital, speaking of them as “living tools” (e.g., 
Aristotle, Politics 1253b23-54a9).  Consequently, they were fully aware of the adverse 
economic consequences brought on by the overcapitalization of slave labor.  Again to 
quote from the Poroi: “Every owner of cultivable land can state exactly how many oxen 
or laborers are sufficient for the land; but if someone puts more to work than the right 
number, they calculate it as a loss (ζημίαν λογίζονται)” (4.5).  If Athenian farmers had 
employed free labor, they could have “expelled” redun ancies rather easily.  But the fact 
that they (and presumably all employers of slaves) consider excess labor “a loss” 
demonstrates that they generally retained redundant sl ves and ate the losses when prices 
dropped, a practice which eventually forced many to quit the profession in pursuance of 
other opportunities, such as trading and money-lending (4.6).  Xenophon thus attests well 
to the “inflexibility” of slave labor, which left Athenian slave-owners little to no cost-
saving options during downturns in the market.  But s ch drastic changes in market 
                                                
332 Giglioni 1970: cxxvi-vii (cf. Gauthier 1976: 169) contra Wiedemann 1981: 6 who argues that supply 
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conditions is precisely what Xenophon promises will not occur in the silver mining 
industry, rendering the overcapitalization problem moot.333  As long as silver money 
retains its value, which Xenophon claims is both historically and theoretically all but 
certain, overcapitalization is an unlikely prospect, provided that the Athenians do not 
acquire more slaves than is necessary for any given year.334  From the perspective of the 
individual mining concessionaire or proprietor of an ergasterion, the state ownership of 
the slaves would have completely sheltered them fro the risk of overcapitalization.335  
In fact, by contracting slaves from the state on the conditions of a one-obol a day 
payment and providing for their maintenance (trophe), mining entrepreneurs would have 
actually been purchasing labor power in a manner not u like that of a modern-day 
capitalist.  Had the Athenians adopted Xenophon’s plan, the mining industry would have 
undoubtedly achieved a higher degree of rationality than it already possessed because 
investors could have calculated labor costs more accur tely and consequently predicted 
future profit and loss with greater precision. 
                                                                                                                                      
and demand did not determine prices. 
333 For a similar argument against overcapitalization in the Antebellum South, see Conrad and Meyer 
1964: 74-6.  
334 At 4.39 Xenophon says that the “greatest fear” people may have about his proposals is that if the polis 
acquires too many slaves, “the mines may become overcrowded.”  To prevent such an eventuality, 
Xenophon suggests that they “put no more men in the min s than is required each year” (εἰ μὴ πλείονας 
ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὅσους αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα προσαιτοίη κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐμβάλοιμεν).  Cartledge 1997: 226 
interprets this “fear” as anxiety about “servile insurrection.”  The problem with this interpretation is that we 
hear of no slave revolts in Attica until the second century B.C. (Diodorus 34.2.19; Athenaeus 272e-f).  The 
similarity with 4.5 is striking (cf. ἢν δ’ ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἱκανῶν ἐμβάλλῃ τις), strongly suggesting that 
the “greatest fear” in the minds of the Athenians is overcapitalization.   
335 In the event that the Athenians overestimated their labor needs in a given year (see previous note), th y 
could have hired out the mining slaves to anyone that was in need of labor.  Given that the state is to 
purchase slaves directly from the Athenians themselve  (4.18-9), the amount of privately owned slaves 
would have declined and raised demand.  If there was still an excess of labor, perhaps they could have 
followed Xenophon’s lead and used the slaves in defensive operations around Attica (4.42; cf. 4.52).      
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Finally, we come to the issue of slavery as a deterr nt to technological 
development.  First, it is important to note that this notion is often stated but rarely 
proven.  Finley, who is perhaps the most sympathetic to the view that there was little to 
no technological and economic growth in antiquity, understands well how 
unsubstantiated this contention is, considering it a “pseudo-issue” and “a subject 
bedeviled by dogma.”336  He calls the whole thesis into question, when he points out that 
where technological progress did exist to some degree in the ancient world, in the mines, 
slaves were employed to the greatest extent.  Althoug  Xenophon does not seem too 
concerned with the technological side of the mining industry, he is not ignorant of it, as 
Gauthier has shown.337  Besides, today it is by no means a given that central planning is 
an appropriate or even efficacious way to foster technology.338  Xenophon perhaps 
wisely leaves the issue to the private sector.  Second, the apotheosis of technological 
development in models of economic growth is a relatively recent phenomenon, becoming 
vogue only in the last fifty years.339  Prior to this, economists from Smith to Keynes 
underscored capital accumulation and investment in productive labor as determinants of 
growth.  For Smith the two went hand and hand: “The annual produce of the land and 
labour of any nation can be increased in its value by no other means, but by increasing 
either the number of its productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers 
                                                
336 Finley 1999: 83; in general see 1999: Chapter 3 and 198-204 and 1982: 176-95. 
337 Gauthier 1976: 166-7. 
338 See Rosenberg 1994: 87-108, who argues persuasively that decentralized, free market capitalism 
historically has been the greatest inducement to technological development in the West. 
339 See Millet 2001: 31-2 for a concise review of the literature. 
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[i.e. through technology] who had before been employed.”340  Though Smith recognizes 
the importance of technology, his famous discussion of capital accumulation in Book II, 
Chapter 3 leaves little doubt that he privileges the role of productive labor in the 
augmentation of national wealth.  In particular, Smith lauds the “frugal man” who creates 
capital by saving money and then (re)invests it in productive labor.  Such behavior has a 
cumulative effect on society, contributing to the stock of “public capital” and thus being 
the motor force of sustained economic growth.341  Xenophon’s recommendations in the 
Poroi bear a striking similarity to Smith’s ideas of capit l accumulation.  By suggesting 
that the Athenians reinvest a third of their revenues produced from the apophora back 
into the purchase of additional labor (4.23-4), Xenophon outlines a model of economic 
growth, whereby the Athenians will acquire 10,000 slaves within a decade and then three 
slaves for every citizen in the distant future.  But more importantly, his plan presupposes 
that the individual entrepreneurs who hire these slaves will also add to their existing 
stocks by reinvesting some of their profits and/or their revenue from the capital fund.  
Because the focus of Xenophon’s discussion is on public revenues, it is easy to overlook 
the concomitant growth that his proposals would have occasioned in the private sector 
had the Athenians implemented them.342  
                                                
340 Wealth of Nations II.3.32 = Smith 1981: 343; cf. 676. By “productive labor,” Smith means labor that 
brings in more income to the entrepreneur than he spends on the maintenance of his workers (i.e. wages).  
While Smith himself consider slavery to be unproductive (387-89, 684-5), his argument rests on the 
stereotypical and racist idea prevailing at the time that slaves were lazy, who brought in little income above 
what the master paid for their maintenance.  Our discussion above seriously calls into question this 
interpretation. 
341 Wealth of Nations II.3.13-32 = Smith 1981: 337-49 with Dickey 1993: 213-9.              
342 For two excellent, recent discussions on the debate about economic growth in antiquity, see Millet 
2001 and Saller 2002.   Both follow Hopkins 1980 in distinguishing between per capita growth in 
production and aggregate growth and privilege the former as a better indicator of “sustained” economic 
growth.  While it is impossible to calculate the potential effects of Xenophon’s proposals on sustaining 
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In short, none of these possible objections to our thesis about the rationality of 
Xenophon’s proposals for the mines holds up under scrutiny.  While some readers may 
find his level of economic rationality paltry by today’s standards, our discussion above 
nonetheless demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that Xenophon’s analysis of and 
proposals for the mines meet the requirements of instrumental rationality, which still 
factors significantly in contemporary debates about homo economicus.  Perhaps, a more 
potent objection to our interpretation would concentrate on the issue of the extent to 
which this economic rationality pervaded Athenian society.  That is to say, if Xenophon’s 
proposals were rational, and the Athenian “economic environment [was] populated by 
investors employing instrumental rationality with income maximization as a dominant 
preference,” as Christesen maintains, then why did the Athenians not implement his 
schemes?  I have two answers to this objection.   
First, we must emphasize that instrumental rationalty was a factor solely in the 
decision making of Athenian investors and entrepreneurs, that is, the elite, who 
comprised less than five percent of adult male population. A majority of Athenians were 
peasants (see Section 3B), “and they, like peasants anywhere at any time,” Cartledge 
explains, “pursued minimum-risk strategies in a process that has been labeled ‘risk 
buffering’.  Rather than profit-maximization, the overall goal of most peasants was one of 
                                                                                                                                      
growth, had they been implemented, we can at least point to five likely outcomes, which developmental 
economists maintain are necessary for sustained economic growth (see Saller 2002: 261-2): 1) trade; 2) 
intensification of capital investment; 3) technological development; 4) investment in human capital 
(education); and 5) demographic transition (i.e., transition from high birth rates and death rates to low birth 
and death rates) occasioning a move away from a production to a service economy.  As our discussion 
above makes clear, Xenophon calls for increased trade and capital investment (criteria 1 and 2).  Because of 
the trading peace, he promises, an intellectual boom will take place (5.3-4) (criterion 4), perhaps increasing 
the likelihood of technological development, though Xenophon does not explicitly state this outcome 
(criterion 3).  In respect to criterion 5, it is certainly possible that Athens, after decades or even centuries of 
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‘satisficing’: enough was good as a feast, and a lot safer in the circumstances than going 
for (literally) broke.”343  We must imagine, then, when the Athenians debated fiscal 
proposals of a seemingly risky nature in the council chamber or the assembly, there 
would have always been a large contingent of voters inherently resistant to them from the 
start.  That said we must also believe that the numerous strategies Xenophon recommends 
to mitigate risk were intended to allay the fears of these very individuals.  Accordingly, 
and this is the second point, while the Athenians never implemented Xenophon’s 
proposals for the mines across-the-board, there is some indication that they did at least 
contemplate it.  For Aristotle mentions the attempt of one Diophantus, a likely “coeval” 
of Eubulus, to establish the public ownership of slaves at Athens 355-50.344  The exact 
nature of the proposal is obscure, but the Poroi is the most likely source of inspiration.345  
Moreover, in Hellenistic Egypt, where economic rationality reached very high levels, the 
Ptolemaic kings seem to have followed Xenophon’s advice vis-à-vis the leasing of 
publicly owned capital on the apophora system.346  Keeping these points in mind, we 
should be cautious and not succumb to the often-drawn conclusion that the Athenians’ 
lack of follow through represents some kind of failure on Xenophon’s part, especially 
                                                                                                                                      
being a producer economy, would have transitioned ito a service economy not unlike Roman Corinth (see
Engles 1990) because of demographic changes.        
343 Cartledge 2002b: 160; cf. Tandy 1997: 87.  For the satisficing methods of peasants, see Scott 1976 and 
Gallant 1991, esp. 34-59. 
344 Aristotle, Politics 1267b15 with Gauthier 1976: 228-9 and Lewis 1990: 257-8: “And it is clear from 
Phaleas’ legislation that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans 
(τεχνῖται) are to be publically owned slaves and are to contribute to the complement of the state.  But if it 
is proper to have public slaves, it is the labourers mployed upon public works (τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ 
ἐργαζομένους) who ought to be of that status (as it is the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried 
to establish at Athens). 
345 So Gauthier 1976: 228-9. 
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because his recommendations are too “impossible,” “will o’ the wisp” or “utopian.”347  
Rather, they are simply rational, and considering democracies, both ancient and modern, 
do not always act in the most rational ways, should it really come as a surprise that the 




At the outset of this chapter, we posed the question: h w far would Xenophon’s 
change in economic consciousness, characterized by a radical departure from traditional 
militaristic and imperialistic modes of production to ones based on productive industry 
and peaceful exchange, take him in the direction of m dern economic thought and 
practice?  Throughout our analysis of Xenophon’s financial proposals, we underscored 
two historically significant developments: 1) the liberalization of economic relations 
between Athenians and foreigners, resulting in a partial breakdown of the status divide 
separating citizen from non-citizen; and 2) the advancement of income maximizing 
instrumental rationality.  In respect to the latter development, our interpretation of 
Xenophon as a serious economic thinker has the mostpurchase.  A (and perhaps the) 
foundational tenet of the modern economic science is that it starts from the premise that 
every human being is a homo economicus.  While some have contested this conception of 
                                                                                                                                      
346 See Préaux 1966, who discusses the Poroi in connection with the leasing of the so-called “immortal 
flocks.”  For economic rationalism in Hellenistic Egypt, see Rathbone 1991 and 2002.  
347 E.g., Boeckh 1976: 607-10, Pöhlmann 1984: 245, Schwahn 1931: 253, von der Lieck 1933: 53, 
Andreades 1933: 388-90, Breitenbach 1967: 1760, Giglion  1970: cxxxiv, and Gauthier 1976: 165. 
348 For instance, at the time of writing this section, the Comptroller General for the United States, David 
Walker, announced on the TV news magazine “60 Minutes” that the 2003 law enacting the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Benefit Program was “probably the most fiscally irresponsible piece of legislation si ce 
the 1960s” because “we’d have to have eight trillion dollars today, invested in treasury rates, to deliver on 
that promise,” he explains.  Asked how much the US actually has, Walker replies, “Zip” (aired CBS, 
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“man,” homo economicus nonetheless has been and will continue to remain an important 
theoretical basis of economics, even if more economists come around to embrace other 
notions of rationality, such as “bounded” and “expressive” rationality, and countenance 
sociological conceptions of man that stress humans’ predilection for collective action.349   
Indeed, in the Poroi, Xenophon too proceeds from the premise that his audience is 
comprised of homines economici, but this is not the only assumption he makes.  He
understands well that the Athenians are also politica , social, and religious men who want 
their money to serve communal and civic ends, that is, o feed the poor, to celebrate 
festivals magnificently, to improve infrastructure, etc.  Therefore, in this one important 
respect, Finley’s notion that “Xenophon’s ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke 
through the conventional limits” has some merit.  Xenophon is a reformer, not a 
revolutionary, since homo politicus is alive and well in the Poroi.  This explains in part 
why he does not always see his progressive ideas to their logical conclusion.  Most 
notably, though he outlines a theory and practice for achieving substantial economic 
growth, he stops short of making this the ultimate end to which the Athenians should 
strive: three slaves and thus three obols for every Athenian is sufficient.  He does not 
state why they should be satisfied with this amount, but we can speculate that for 
Xenophon there are social and political limits to gr wth.  Though he does not see eye to 
eye with Aristotle on all points of what it means to live the “good life,” he is in 
agreement with the philosopher in acknowledging that life is more than making money.  
Nevertheless, we should not let this fool us into thinking that Xenophon embraces the 
                                                                                                                                      
3/4/2007).  In fact, the National Taxpayers Union estimates that the program will eventually cost 37% 
percent of United States’ GDP! 
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backward-looking values of Aristotle.  Whereas Aristotle does not think that homo 
economicus is even worthy to live in the same polis, Xenophon assigns him a prominent 
and indispensable role in his Athens. 
                                                                                                                                      
349 See, for example, the works cited in Christesen 2003: 32-3. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: The Relationship Between Xenophon’s Poroi and the Oeconomica of 
Ps.-Aristotle and Aeneas Tacticus’ Procurement. 
 
In Chapter 2, Section 2D, I argued that the Poroi is a unique document of ancient 
political economy.  The only works that potentially call this thesis into question are the 
second book of the Oeconomica of Pseudo-Aristotle and the lost Procurement of Aeneas 
Tacticus mentioned in Siegecraft 14.2.  While the former author wrote his treatise a 
generation after the Poroi, the latter may have written Procurement within a few years of 
the Poroi.  In this Appendix, I examine each of these works and state the reasons why 
they are fundamentally different from the Poroi.     
 In the theoretical first chapter of Oeconomica II, Ps.-Aristotle considers four 
types of “financial administrations” (οἰκονομίαι): the kingdom (βασιλική), province 
(σατραπική), polis (πολιτική), and private household (ἰδιωτική) (1345b12-14).  
Unfortunately, he devotes less than five lines to the political economy of the polis, listing 
only its four primary sources of revenue: special products of the land, markets, tolls, and 
every-day transactions (1346a6-9).  Later in the chapter, he does mention one additional 
aspect of polis finance—the importance of a balanced budget—but this element is not 
unique to this type of administration since keeping expenditure within the limits of 
revenue is the prerogative of the other three oikonomiai as well (1346a14-7).  Ps.-
Aristotle then concludes his preliminary analysis with a short discussion that suggests 
that the goal of all four types of oikonomiai is the management of revenues and 
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expenditures (1346a14-24).1  With this consideration, he segues into the second part of 
his discussion (II.2), which is a collection of anecdotes of cunning stratagems whereby 
statesmen, generals, governors, and autocrats increased the revenues of their states during 
financial crises.   
Aristotle’s suggestion in the Politics about just such a compilation seems to be the 
source inspiration: “A collection ought to be made of the scattered accounts of methods 
according to which some people have had success in making money…and statesmen too 
should find it useful to be acquainted with these financial schemes, for many states are in 
need of money-making and such ways and means of increasing revenues (τοιούτων 
πόρων).”2  Gauthier provocatively argues that this anecdotal m terial is in essence a 
collection of poroi.3  However, we must recall that Gauthier distinguishes between two 
types of poroi: 1) poroi as ways and means of creating or augmenting existing prosodoi, 
which the polis applies to its regular expenses, such as infrastructure, festivals, and 
defense; and 2) poroi as ways and means of getting money (πόροι χρημάτων) to pay 
for unexpected or emergency expenditures.4  Though Ps.-Aristotle occasionally mentions 
a scheme for augmenting existing revenues (e.g., 1350a16), he recounts mostly 
emergency financial measures, which explains why he employs the phrase πόρος 
                                                
1 So Bresson 2000: 247-53. 
2 1259a5, 33-35: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, δι’ ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι 
χρηματιζόμενοι, δεῖ συλλέγειν…χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. πολλαῖς 
γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων.   
3 Gauthier 1976: 13.  However, I find his suggestion that had Oeconomica II.2 appeared separately from 
ΙΙ.1, “poroi would have undoubtedly factored into the title of the work.”  Van Groningen 1933: 44-47, 56-
57 has argued convincingly for the coherence of both chapters of Book 2.   
4 Gauthier 1976: 8-18. 
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χρημάτων to describe his collection.5  This concentration on emergency poroi is at odds 
with his analysis in Chapter 1, which promises to treat systematically the regular 
revenues of the four types of ikonomiai.   
In the Poroi, by contrast, Xenophon makes proposals only for augmenting 
existing revenues and creating new ones on a permannt basis so that the polis can meet 
its regular expenses and execute public services.  Even his eisphora, which in the Greek 
world was an extraordinary wartime tax, is destined to become a new and permanent 
source of revenue.6  Whereas Ps.-Aristotle recommends reducing expenditures as a way 
to increase revenues—a tactic common to all periods of fiscal crisis—Xenophon makes 
no such proposal.7  Thus, while we can reasonably classify Oeconomica II.2 and the 
Poroi together because of their affiliation to the same genus of finance (viz. poroi), the 
orientation of the former to extraordinary and emergency financial situations marks it out 
as fundamentally different from the latter.  Moreovr, as argued above (Section 2D), the 
Poroi is best categorized as a deliberative discourse of the private or bouleutic variety.  
The measures Xenophon proposes thus speaks to the imm diate fiscal circumstances 
Athens found itself at the end of the Social War; the anecdotal schemes of Oeconomica 
II.2, on the other hand, are “capable of being applied from time to time by others to the 
                                                
5 Gauthier 1976: 13.  Ps.-Aristotle writes: “We have collected material that we have found noteworthy of 
the men in the past who have discovered new ways of obtaining money or have administered their states 
skillfully.  For we accept that this historical material is useful in that it is capable of being applied from 
time to time by others to the circumstances they find themselves” (ὅσα δέ τινες τῶν πρότερον 
πεπράγασιν εἰς πόρον χρημάτων, εἴ <τε> τεχνικῶς τι διῴκησαν, ἃ ὑπελαμβάνομεν ἀξιόλογα 
αὐτῶν εἶναι, συναγηόχαμεν. oὐδὲ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀχρεῖον ὑπολαμβάνομεν εἶναι. 
ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε τούτων ἐφαρμόσει τι οἷς ἂν αὐτὸς πραγματεύῃ) (1346a26-31). 
6 Gauthier 1976: 14.  In Section 5C, I argued that Xenophon’s eisphora resembles an epidosis (voluntary 
subscription) more than an extraordinary, wartime tax.  Nonetheless, the epidosis too was an extraordinary 
way to raise cash to pay for emergency expenditures.       
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circumstances they find themselves” (1346a29-30).  The general applicability of Ps.-
Aristotle’s collection goes a long way in explaining its popularity in the Hellenistic era.  
The Poroi, however, with its focus on polis finance and Athenian political economy in 
particular had no such universal appeal.   
Let is now turn to Aeneas Tacticus’ lost Procurement (ἡ Ποριστικὴ βίβλος), 
apparently the only work written on finance contemporaneous to the Poroi. 8  Aeneas 
mentions this book in a chapter from Siegecraft on how to promote unanimity among the 
citizens of a besieged city.  The following passage contains our only information about 
the work: 
τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν τέως μάλιστα χρὴ 
προάγειν, ἄλλοις τε ὑπαγόμενον αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς χρεωφειλέτας 
κουφίζοντα τόκων βραχύτητι ἢ ὅλως ἀφαιροῦντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς 
λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις καὶ τῶν ὀφειλημάτων τι μέρος, καὶ πάντα 
ὅταν δέῃ, ὡς πολύ γε φοβερώτατοι ἔφεδροί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοίδε 
ἄνθρωποι, τούς τε ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ὄντας τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰς εὐπορίαν 
καθιστάναι.  καὶ ὅπως ἴσως καὶ ἀλύπως τοῖς πλουσίοις ταῦτ’ ἂν 
γιγνόμενα πράττοιτο καὶ ἐξ οἵων πόρων πορίζοιτο, καὶ περὶ 
τούτων ἐν τῇ Ποριστικῇ βίβλῳ δηλωτικῶς γέγραπται. 
 
As for the mass of the citizens, it is of the utmost importance in the 
meantime to foster unanimity, wining them over with such means as 
lessening the burdens on debtors by reducing or completely canceling 
interest-payments.  At times in extreme danger, even th  capital sums 
owed may be partially or, if necessary, wholly canceled as well; there is 
nothing more alarming than to be constantly under th  eye of men in debt.  
Provide the basic amenities of life for the needy, too.  How this could be 
                                                                                                                                      
7 1346a24; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1359b23; Memorabilia 3.6.4-13.   
8 I depart from the Loeb translation ofΠοριστικὴ as “Finance” because, though finance is an important 
part of providing supplies for an army, it is not the only consideration; hence LSJ cites this title under the 
entry for ποριστικός, translating it as “treatise on supply.”  I thus follow Whitehead 1990: 139 who refers 
to ἡ Ποριστικὴ βίβλος as “my book Procurement.”  Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1366a 37 and Memorabilia 
3.1.6. 
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done fairly and without pains to the rich, and where the money might 
come from, are amongst the matters clearly explained in my book 
Procurement (14.1-2; trans. Whitehead). 
 
Needless to say, economic and social historians of the fourth century have suffered the 
loss of this work, especially those interested in class conflict in the ancient world.  For 
students of the Poroi, the tantalizing reference marks the loss of what would prove to be 
an insightful comparandum had the work survived.  Not only does the title Ποριστική 
call to mind the Poroi but Aeneas’ interest in ways and means is made explicit by the 
phrase καὶ ἐξ οἵων πόρων πορίζοιτο.9  Furthermore, Aeneas’ advice to “provide the 
basic amenities of life for the needy” corresponds to Xenophon’s primary objective to 
relive the poverty of the demos by providing them with trophe.10  The key question, then, 
is whether Procurement dealt with financial schemes for generating revenue only during 
a siege situation or included material that appertained to wartime more generally and 
even to peacetime conditions.   
According to Whitehead, Procurement probably would have encompassed all 
aspects of wartime finance.  For instance, Siegecraft, while ostensibly about defensive 
operations, frequently comments on offensive tactics, as Aeneas considers them useful in 
the defense of a city.11  On analogy with such a broad-minded understanding of siege 
warfare, it is reasonable to think that Procurement included some general advice about 
wartime finance.  In the passage just cited about a city with a large debtor population, the 
antithesis between “up to” (τέως) and during “times of extreme danger” (ἐν δὲ τοῖς 
                                                
9 Whitehead 1990: 138.  
10 See, for example, 1.1, 4.51, 6.1. 
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λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις) certainly recommends this interpretation.  However, I do not think 
this passage supports the notion that Aeneas considered his counsel for debt relief to be 
applicable to times of peace.12  The phrase ἐν δὲ τοῖς λίαν ἐπικινδύνοις implies that 
the city in question, before it falls into “extreme danger,” is nonetheless still in danger 
“up to” (τέως) this point.  In other words, the contrast is between two varying degrees of 
danger in wartime, not peace and war.  Hunter and Handford’s assessment is therefore 
correct: Xenophon’s ways and means rested “on a broder basis” than Aeneas’ because 
they are predicated on peacetime conditions and aim at fostering a lasting peace.13  In 
this important repsect, Procurement probably shared the preoccupation of Oeconomica 
II.2 with emergency fiscal measures.  In fact, Van Groningen contends that Procurement 
resembled the anecdotal parts of the Oeconomica for this reason.14    
Nevertheless, the case can be made that Procurement was “a work more like 
Xenophon’s Poroi than like the second book of [Aristotle’s] Economics.”15  Again, if we 
assume that Procurement resembled Siegecraft in its method, Aeneas’ use of 
παραδείγματα drawn from history would have factored less in his work than in Ps.-
Aristotle’s: indeed, only a third of Siegecraft includes anecdotal material, whereas the 
                                                                                                                                      
11 Whitehead 1990: 17-25 and passim. 
12 Whitehead 1990: 138 seems to intimate as much in his commentary on this passage. 
13 Hunter and Handford 1927: xiii. 
14 Van Groningen 1933: 35, n. 1.  Aeneas says he wrote Procurement δηλωτικῶς, which is a rare word 
but seems to be synonymous with παραδειγματικῶς, “by means of examples” (see the passages cited in 
LSJ s.v. 4 with Dionysius Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition 16.2, where he uses the adjective 
δηλωτικά in the sense of “illustrative”).   
15 Whitehead 1990: 29, n. 84.     
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rest contains his own prescriptions.16  Moreover, numerous affinities between Siegecraft 
and the rest of Xenophon’s oeuvre suggest that Procurement too would have resembled 
parts of the Poroi.  Both authors generally agree that military sciene entails much more 
than tactics.  In Siegecraft Aeneas refers not only to Procurement but also to works on 
Preparations (ἡ Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος) and Encampment (ἡ Στρατοπεδευτικὴ 
βίβλος).17  This broad interest in military affairs is paralleled in Memorabilia III, where 
Socrates sports with one of his companions who wished to learn about generalship from 
Dionysodorus of Chios but learned nothing except tactics.18  Socrates argues that tactics 
is only a small part of generalship, saying that “a general must be skilled in preparing the 
equipment for war and in procuring supplies for his troops” (καὶ γὰρ 
παρασκευαστικὸν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρή, καὶ 
ποριστικὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις) (3.1.6).  Furthermore, there are 
similarities in both approach and emphasis between A eas’ Siegecraft and the 
Hipparchicus.19  More significantly, Siegecraft includes recommendations analogous to 
advice given in the Poroi.   Both authors, for instance, propose granting incentives to 
merchants as a way to increase trade and paying attention to the role of chora 
                                                
16 Whitehead 1990: 38, 138. 
17 Aeneas, Siegecraft 7.4, 8.5, 21.1-2, 40.8; cf. Aelian, Tactics 1.2: Aeneas who “composed a considerable 
number of military books” (Αἰνείας τε διὰ πλειόνων ὁ καὶ στρατηγικὰ βιβλία ἱκανὰ 
συνταξάμενος). 
18  Memorabilia 3.1.1-11 with Delebecque 1957: 430; cf. Cyropaedia 1.614-15; Plato, Euthydemus 273c. 
19 Whitehead 1990: 35-6 and Delebecque 1957: 418, 430.  For example, cf. Siegecraft 6.3 with 
Hipparchicus 7.15, 16.7 with 4.13, 16.12 with 7.12, 16.19 with 4.6, 16.20 with 4.11 and 8.3, and 40.6-7 
with 5.2. 
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fortifications in the defense of the city.20  It is reasonable to conclude therefore that 
Procurement would have overlapped with the Poroi in some respects.  What remains 
unclear is whether we should ascribe to one the status of innovator and to the other that of 
imitator or consider the influence as bidirectional. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to know when Aeneas composed Procurement, 
especially because the date of Siegecraft is far from certain.  Whitehead dates the treatise 
“close to 355” or “in the later 350s,” but the work’s terminus post quem is debated, and 
some place the work in the early 340s.21  Accordingly, Aeneas may have written 
Procurement under the influence of the Poroi, which as argued above (Section 2C), is 
securely dated to 355/4.  While agnosticism on the issue may be best, generally speaking, 
there is much to be said for the idea that Xenophon influenced Aeneas rather than the 
other way around.  First, Aeneas alludes to a specific stratagem from the Anabasis on 
how to quell a panic in the army.22  Second, and more importantly, Xenophon 
demonstrates consistently an interest in military procurement and finance throughout his 
oeuvre.  In Memorabilia II, for instance, which Delebecque dates to 381, Xenophon 
                                                
20 On incentives, cf. Siegecraft 10.12 with Poroi 3.4; fortresses, cf. 16.16-19 with 4.43-48 (the polis 
Xenophon is interested in protecting is not Athens per se but the one that would spring up in the mining 
district (4.49-50) if his plans were implemented ).  
21 See the discussion in Whitehead 1990: 8-9, 128-9.  For example, Bosworth 1980: 178 dates the betrayal 
of Chios (Siegecraft 11.3) to ca. 346 by linking it with Demosthenes 5.25, where the orator laments the 
capture of Chios by Idrieus, the satrap of Caria (351/0-344).  Whitehead 1990: 129 admits to the “intrinsic 
attractions” of this identification, but he is unwilling to lower the treatise’s terminus post quem by such “an 
uncomfortable margin” because the next latest secured date for an episode is ca. 359-5.  Yet Aeneas 
mentions that Chios was “at peace” before its betrayal, a fact which is difficult to fit into the events of 364-
355 (see Ruzicka 1998).  That the event took place before 364 is belied by the vividness of Aeneas’ 
account, which historians generally take as an indication that the betrayal was fresh in the minds of both 
Aeneas and his readers (see the references in Whitehead 1990: 128).  Furthermore, though our knowledge 
of Chian history is lacunose, Demosthenes 5.25 is our only reference to a betrayal of the city to a foreign 
army.  The island therefore could have been taken anytime between 351 and 346.   
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pokes fun at Aristippus for not wanting to become a ruler because he must “supply his 
fellow citizens with the necessities of life” (τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὧν δέονται 
πορίζειν) (2.1.8).23  A decade later in the Cyropaedia, he stresses the important role of 
the military commander to procure supplies for his troops and even to have it as “a part of 
his character the ability to contrive some means of revenue” (καὶ ἤθους ἓνεκα 
μηχανᾶσθαι προσόδου πόρον) (1.6.10).24  Xenophon even assumes this role in the 
Anabasis; from his very first speech to the Ten Thousand to the final days of the march, 
he demonstrates to his readers that he can provide for his men.25  Lastly, the rhetorical 
and philosophical rigor of these works betrays an Athenian intellectual provenance.  
Whitehead explains: “Xenophon was by far the more accomplished writer of the 
two…and if it is correct to see both Xenophon and Aineias as seeking to inject a human 
and pragmatic element into sophistic military expositi n, it was probably the Athenian 
who had come face to face with more of what he was re cting against, and certainly he 
who appropriated more of its rhetorical skills for creating the requisite fusion of empirical 
military experience with the general lessons and axioms to which it gave rise.”26   
                                                                                                                                      
22 Aeneas Tacticus 27.12; Xenophon, Anabasis 2.2.20.  Polyaenus (3.9.4) says Iphicrates employed th  
same technique, but Whitehead 1990: 176-7 argues convincingly that Aeneas’ reference is to Xenophon 
and not Iphicrates, who was often identified (wrongly) as the originator of many cunning stratagems. 
23 Delebecque 1957: 221-3.  In the next section, Aristippus reiterates this point again: “states think it 
necessary that their rulers provide them with the as m ny good things as possible” (αἵ τε πόλεις οἴονται 
χρῆναι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἑαυταῖς μὲν ὡς πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πορίζειν).   
24 In fact, the entire discussion in 1.6.7-18 is about provisioning; cf. 8.1.13; Memorabilia 2.1.8; Agesilaus 
2.25; and Hellenica 5.1.14-17.  For the date of the Cyropaedia, see Delebecque 1957.   
25 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.2.21; 5.5.13; 5.6.32; 6.4.9, 12; 6.5.20; 7.6.29-31; 7.7.33. 
26 Whitehead (1990): 37-8.  In spite of these objections, some scholars prefer to see mutual exchange, 
informal or otherwise, between the two authors (see, for example, Anderson and Delatte in Whitehead 
1990: 36).  After all, if Aeneas the writer of Siegecraft is to be identified with Aeneas of Stymphalus, 
whom Xenophon mentions in the Hellenica as general of the Arcadians in 367/6, then it is reasonable to 
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Appendix 2: The Eikoste and Dekate in the Fourth Century 
 
In Chapter 3, Section 3C, I discussed several forms of imperial control and 
dominance the Athenians employed in the fourth century that were economic in nature.  
Here I provide the evidence in support of the claim that the Athenians imposed both the 
eikoste (five-percent tax) and ekate (ten-percent tax) periodically from ca. 391 to at le st 
357.  Let us review briefly the history of these two taxes before examining this evidence.   
In 413 the Athenians abolished tribute, levying in its stead a five percent tax 
(εἰκοστή) on all sea-borne commerce.27  According to Thucydides, the Athenians levied 
this tax on their subjects (ὑπηκόοι) because revenues had been decreasing over the 
course of the war and “they thought more money would come to them” (πλείω 
νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι).  Unfortunately, the inner workings 
of this new tax system are unclear, but a chance remark of Aristophanes provides some 
insights.  In the Frogs, produced in 405, the comedian mentions an εἰκοστολόγος, “a 
collector of the five percent tax,” operating in Aegina (363).  The scholium glosses 
                                                                                                                                      
assume that Xenophon would have been familiar with at least some of his military works (Xenophon, 
Hellenica 7.3.1; Delebecque 1957: 432-57 dates Hellenica 7 generally to the period 357-6).  Moreover, 
many of the similarities noted above, may ultimately originate from the two authors’ indebtedness to 
common written sources (e.g., Daimachus of Plataea) or, more probably, to a “common stock of practical 
military wisdom still disseminated and elaborated orally” (Whitehead 1990: 37).  While these explanations 
may account for the broad affinities Aeneas and Xenophon share in respect to military subjects, I am 
unconvinced that Xenophon’s originality in financial matters is attributable to either Aeneas or a comm n 
stock of financial wisdom.     
27 Thucydides 7.28.4 and Aristophanes, Frogs 363.  In general, see Boeckh 1976: 325, 401, Beloch 1884: 
44, Romstedt 1914: 36-46, Gomme et al. 1970: 408-9, Meiggs 1972: 349, and Kallet 2001: 136-40, 195-
226.  As Kallet remarks, the imposition of the eikoste “is nothing short of extraordinary in the history of the 
arche, representing a major overhaul of its financial and economic basis with far-reaching implications for 
the Athenians’ changing conception of their rule” (Kallet 2001: 196).  The ikoste, above all, indicates to 
this author that the Athenian empire around 413 “was becoming increasingly economic in nature and 
purpose” and was regarded by the Athenians “more and more as a revenue generating mechanism rather 
than strictly a means of military/political rule over other Greeks” (Kallet 2001: 199-200).   
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εἰκοστολόγος as “he who collects the five percent taxes in a crisis; that is, when the 
generals demanded the five percents from the harbors and the islands and paid for 
military expenditures with these monies” (τὰ εἰκοστὰ ἐν τῇ κρίσει συνάγων· ἐπεὶ οἱ 
στρατηγοὶ ἀπῄτουν τὰς εἰκοστὰς τῶν λιμένων καὶ τῶν νήσων καὶ οὕτως 
ἀνήλισκον εἰς τὰ πολεμικά).  In the collection of the ikoste, then, it appears that the 
Athenians followed their practice during the Peloponnesian War of sending generals out 
on “quick ships” “to collect money” (ἀργυρολογεῖν) when needed directly from the 
allies.28  Given the financial straits the Athenians found themselves in 413, it is not 
surprising that they wished the money from the eikoste to get into the hands of their 
generals and soldiers as quickly as possible.29  Furthermore, it is unknown how the tax 
was collected locally in the cities of the empire, but on analogy with tribute collection, 
local officials were probably involved.30  Assessment would have been simple because 
each city probably had its own customs officers (ἐλλιμενισταί) who kept record of 
                                                
28 IG I3 60 with Meritt 1953: 298-303; IG I3 71, 45-50 = ML 69; IG I3 283 col. III, 37; Aristophanes, 
Knights 1071; Thucydides 2.69.1-2; 3.19.1; 4.50.1; Ps.-Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 24.3 with Rhodes 
1981: 307-8; Plutarch, Alcibiades 35.6.  For an analysis of the evidence, see Kallet-Marx 1993: 136-7, 160-
4, 202, who argues convincingly that references to ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες need not necessarily refer to 
“tribute-collecting ships.” 
29 For the evidence of generals paying their crews and soldiers directly from the received tribute, see IG I3 
281 col. III, 42-53 and IG I3 285 col. I, 107-9; Xenophon, Hellenica 1.1.12 with Ferguson 1932: 41 and 
4.8.30 with Pritchett 1991: 392; cf. Gomme 1945: 277-8.  Each general and trierarch had a treasurer who 
kept account of monies received and paid out for misthos (Harpocration s.v. ταμίαι; Lysias 19.50-51; 29.3; 
Demosthenes 49.5-10; 50.10; see also Pritchett 1991: 394, 489, n. 743). 
30 IG I3 68, 8-9 = ML 68; Antiphon Fg. 52 (Thalheim) with Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 187 and Meiggs 1972: 
241.  Kallet 2001: 203, n. 76 suggests that Athenians would have also been included among those who had 
the right to bid to collect the tax. 
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harbor traffic for local taxation purposes.31  A city’s eikoste assessment could have been 
calculated simply by dividing the amount collected from the year’s customs dues by the 
local tax rate, which yields the total taxable income from sea-borne trade, and then 
multiplying this number by five percent.   
In addition to the eikoste, the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War levied a 
ten-percent (δεκατή) transit tax on goods traveling in and out of the Black Sea.32  In 410 
Xenophon reports that the Athenians built fortificat ons at Chrysopolis on the Asian side 
of the Propontis “and established a customs house in the city and began to collect a ten 
percent on ships sailing out of the Pontus” (καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν 
αὐτῇ, καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξέλεγον τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων) (Hellenica 1.1.22; 
cf. Diodorus 13.64.2).  Polybius too attests to this tax but adds: “It was this town [sc. 
Chrysopolis] which the Athenians once occupied on the advice of Alcibiades when they 
first attempted to levy toll on ships sailing into the Pontus” (ἣν Ἀθηναῖοι τότε 
κατασχόντες Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ παραγωγιάζειν ἐπεβάλοντο πρῶτον τοὺς 
εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας) (4.44.4).  Polybius’ statement seems to express the idea that the 
                                                
31 Demosthenes 34.34; in general, see Andreades 1933: 138-41.  Kallet 2001: 202, n. 72 is certainly 
correct to argue that the imposition of the eikoste did not lead locals to abandon the collection of their own 
harbor dues, which were customarily around two percent (see Andreades 1933: 139).  However, I must 
disagree with Kallet’s assessment that evasion of the eikoste would have been much easier than evasion of 
tribute (224-5).  Obfuscation would have been completely at odds with the self-interest of the polis.  
“Cooking the books,” so to speak, would have brought with it too many problems for a city in the 
collection of their own customs dues.  For example, falsification of the official records would have offered 
a ready-made defense to those caught smuggling, who could demand that the records be examined in court; 
if any falsification was detected at any point, a defendant could rightfully question the integrity of the entire 
system and the ability of the city to record accurately its trade transactions.  Besides, the official po is 
records could be easily checked with those of the tax farmers.  Even if city officials and tax farmers 
conspired to defraud the Athenians, previous records from the pre-eikoste era could be used as a check.      
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dekate was collected for the “first time” in 410, which suggests that it did not exist prior 
to this time.33  But there is good evidence to support the idea that the tax was collected 
since the beginning of the war.34  The discrepancy between Xenophon/Diodorus (ἐκ τοῦ 
Πόντου πλοίων) and Polybius (τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας) is simply resolved if we 
follow the natural word order of Polybius’ sentence and take πρῶτον as modifying the 
phrase τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας.   In other words, 410 marks the time when the 
Athenians first imposed a dekate on ships traveling into the Pontus, whereas previously 
they had been only taxing the ships sailing out of the Pontus.  Technically speaking, then, 
there were two dekatai levied in this region.  The increased bi-directional trade with the 
Black Sea evidenced for the last quarter of the fifth century made the imposition of the 
double-tax a financially savvy move.35  Given the date of its inception, the d kate was 
                                                                                                                                      
32 This transit tax was referred to as either διαγώγιον or παραγώγιον; see GHI2 12, 16; Ps.-Aristotle, 
Oeconomica 1346a5-7 with Boeckh 1976:  300 n.17; Polybius 4.46.5-6. 
33 Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 161.  Hopper 1979: 76 and  Rubel 2001: 40 offer the other interpretation that 
πρῶτον may only indicate that 410 was the first time the dekate was collected at Chrysopolis, which does 
not exclude the possibility of an earlier transit tax at Byzantium (see next note).  Walbank’s 1957: 497
explanation that Polybius wrote τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας (despite Xenophon and Diodorus’ ἐκ τοῦ 
Πόντου) because he was following another source is unconvincing.      
34 References to several dekatai before 410: IG I3 52, 7 = ML 58; Harpocration s.v. δεκατευταί; 
Aristophanes, Fg. 449 Edmonds.  The provisions regulating foreign trade at Byzantium outlined in the 
second Methone Decree in 426/5  (IG I3 61, 34-41 = ML 65) have led several scholars to speculate that the 
Athenians did collect a ten percent tax at Byzantium by 426 if not before the war (Beloch 1916: 343-4, 
Mattingly 1964: 45-6, Hopper 1979: 75-6, MacDonald 1981: 143 and n.24; Romstedt 1914: 22 dates the 
dekate after the capture of Sphacteria in 425).  The reference to the dekate in the Callias decree (IG I3 52, 7 
= ML 58) has long puzzled scholars because the funds from it are said to be in the hands of the 
hellenotamiai, who are imperial, not domestic financial officers.  According to the traditional date of the 
decrees (434/3), the dekate then is a pre-war measure, which some scholars conider “exceptionally high 
and barely explicable in peace-time” (Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 161; cf. Rubel, 2001: 49).  However, Kallet-
Marx 1989: 112 has argued forcefully that the orthodox dating of the Callias decree cannot be maintained 
on historical and epigraphic grounds, and that a date in the summer of 431 is “the most probable.”     
35 Polybius’ claim that “the lands which surround the Pontus…absorb the surplus produce of our own 
countries, namely olive oil and every kind of wine” (4.38.5), is substantiated by the presence of large 
numbers of fourth- and fifth-century amphorae from Aegean poleis [e.g., from Peparethos] in recent 
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another measure designed to alleviate Athens’ financial straights and therefore is similar 
in scope to the eikoste.  Interestingly, the Lexica Segueriana links both these taxes 
together: “Dekate and eikoste: the Athenians collected these taxes from the islanders” 
(Δεκάτη καὶ εἰκοστή: οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῶν νησιωτῶν ταῦτα ἐλάμβανον) (p. 185, 
21 Nauck).  I will return shortly to the significance of this gloss.  
We know nothing about the amounts collected from these taxes, but their 
financial profitability can be inferred from Thrasybulus’ re-imposition of both in the early 
fourth century.  At the beginning of his infamous voyage in 391, “Thrasybulus sailed to 
Byzantium and sold the ten percent on ships sailing out of the Pontus” (πλεύσας εἰς 
Βυζάντιον ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων).36  Byzantium 
held a position more favorable for the collection of such a transit tax than Chrysopolis.  
As Polybius famously puts it: “On the seaward side it [Byzantium] commands the entry 
to the Black sea so completely that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the 
                                                                                                                                      
nautical archaeological finds.  For the evidence, see Rutishauser 2001: 201-2 contra Tsetskhladze 1998, 
who downplays the amount of trade with the Black Sea region in the fifth century.    
36 Hellenica 4.8.27; cf. 4.8.31; cf. Demosthenes 20.60: “by putting Byzantium into Thrasybulus’ hands, 
they [sc. Archebius and Heraclides, two Byzantines] made you masters of the Hellespont so that you 
farmed out the ten percent and thus being well furnished with money compelled the Spartans to make a 
peace that was favorable to you” (οἳ Βυζάντιον παραδόντες Θρασυβούλῳ κυρίους ὑμᾶς ἐποίησαν 
τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, ὥστε τὴν δεκάτην ἀποδόσθαι καὶ χρημάτων εὐπορήσαντας 
Λακεδαιμονίους ἀναγκάσαι τοιαύτην, οἵαν ὑμῖν ἐδόκει, ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην).  Cawkwell 
1976 has argued convincingly that Thrasybulus’ voyage began in 391 and not 390, as argues Seager 1967: 
109, n. 127, Funke 1980:  95, n. 27, and Strauss 1986: 150, 167, n. 1.  All the sources agree that 
Thrasybulus “sold” the contract for the collection f the dekate to tax farmers.  Like the collection of the 
two percent in Athens, the buyers of the contract would have been responsible for either paying the state up 
front or providing sureties until the full amount was collected (Andocides 1.133-4).  That locals bought the 
contract and not Athenians is supported by Xenophon’s statement that “the ten percent on goods from the 
Pontus was sold in Byzantium by the Athenians” (ἡ δεκάτη τε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πεπραμένη εἴη ἐν 
Βυζαντίῳ ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων) (4.8.31).  Normally, the poletai sold taxes in Athens in the presence of the 
council (Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia 47.2).  This does not mean that Athenians were excluded from 
bidding on such contracts, but collaboration with the locals was always politically expedient, and it is likely 
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Byzantines.  Consequently, they have complete control over the supply of those 
numerous products that the rest of the world needs for everyday life and in which the 
Pontus is particularly rich” (4.38.1-3).  Another aspect of its beneficial position, as 
Polybius goes on to explain, is that the water currents “carry you to Byzantium whether 
you like it or not” (4.44.1-2; cf. Cassius Dio 75.10 and Strabo 7.320).  As Histiaeus’ 
behavior during the Ionian revolt demonstrates well, a mere eight ships could dominate 
the Bosporus.37  The Athenians therefore had no difficulty compelling ships sailing 
through the Bosporus to put into Byzantium, where the value of their cargo was assessed 
for payment of the tax.  Once the d kate was paid, the ship was then free to sail to its 
destined port of call.  Presumably, any belligerent state’s goods would have been 
confiscated in wartime.38  
Sometime on this same voyage, Thrasybulus also reinstated the eikoste, though it 
is unclear how many poleis were subject to the tax since there are only two surviving 
                                                                                                                                      
that Byzantines were given preference (on the “collaborative” nature of the Athenian empire, see Kallet-
Marx 1993: 8-9, 27). 
37 Herodotus 6.5.3.  In 410 the Athenians had 30 ships (50 = Diodorus [Ephorus] 13.64.3) operating at 
Chrysopolis (Hellenica 1.1.22), a number which Rubel 2001: 47 questions needlessly for the control of the 
straights.  The large size of this force was not left b hind to enforce the collection of the d kate alone, but, 
as Xenophon says, to “do any harm they could against the enemy.”  According to Diodorus, the ships were 
to help in the siege of Chalcedon and Byzantium.  Cf. Demosthenes 18.241: “That through the Byzantines 
he [Philip] gained the mastery of the Hellespont, ad the control of the grain-trade of all of Greece.”  
38 While no evidence bears directly on the workings of the collection of the dekatai (as sketched here), the 
procedure outlined in the Second Methone Decree (IG I3 61) (see below n.59) and the actions of the 
Byzantines when they left the Second Athenian Sea League in 362 are instructive comparanda.  According 
to Pseudo-Aristotle, the Byzantines levied a ten-percent tax on goods traveling out of the Black Sea: “On
one occasion when they [sc. the Byzantines] were in a grain shortage and lacked funds, they detained ships 
that were sailing out of the Pontus.  After some time had past, although the merchants were angry, the 
taxed them with a ten percent (ἐπιδεκάτους) on their profits…” (Oeconomica 1346b30; cf. Demosthenes 
5.25; 45.64; 50.6; cf. Cassius Dio 75.12).  As these sources make clear, the Byzantines did not regularly 
impose a transit tax on ships traveling in and out of he Pontus.  The grain shortage mentioned here is 
probably the one of 362/1 and 361/0 (Demosthenes 50.61).  Rostovtzeff 1941: 1287 is certainly correct to 
maintain a date in the fourth century for the financi l schemes in Oeconomica II.2.  The parallels in 
Demosthenes certainly speak against a date in the fif  century (Van Groningen 1979: 61 and Wartelle 
1968: 54) and in the late third (Walbank 1957: 500).    
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references in the historical sources.39  The first one comes from Thasos in a fragmentary 
honorary inscription where Thrasybulus’ name is explicitly mentioned in conjunction 
with the eikoste.40  A better preserved inscription concerning Clazomenae survives (387), 
which outlines in detail the procedure by which thecity became subject to the tax (IG II2 
28 = GHI2 18).  Athens honors the Clazomeneans for their loyalty, grants them the 
authority to decide about welcoming back hostages and exiles and receiving an Athenian 
governor and garrison, and allows them to import grain from nearby poleis, as long as 
they are willing to pay the eikoste (4-14).  The Clazomeneans reject an Athenian 
governor and garrison but agree to pay the eikoste while being “exempt from other taxes” 
(τέ]λη οὐχ ὑποτελοῦ[ντας ἄλλα) (23-26).  The “other taxes” quite possibly refers to 
the dekate/dekatai.41  The inscription dates to autumn 387, shortly before the King’s 
Peace, which officially stipulated that Clazomenae belong to the king thereafter.42  What 
happened to both these taxes after 387?  
The only explicit evidence for the ikoste after this date is limited to one source.  
Pollux (9.29) cites the middle comedian Anaxilias, who mentions εἰκοστολόγοι in his 
play Glaucon (Fg. 8 Kock).  Unfortunately, there is no way to date this play with any 
precision, but what little is known about the floruit of his literary activity points to the 
                                                
39 Based on Diodorus 14.94.2-3 it would seem best to put Thrasybulus’ visit to the islands before his 
voyage to the Hellespont and Byzantium.   
40 IG II2 24, 4-6: [Θ]ασίοις εἰκοστὴγ κ[— — — — — — — — — —] είων εἰκοστὴν ὑποτ[ελ--------
15-------- ἐμ]πορίων εἰκοστὴν τω[— — — — — — — — — — —] ν ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν —  
— — —  — —]. 
41 A similar phrase is found in the first Methone decree IG I3 61, 9 = ML 95, which also concerns the right 
to export grain (34-41).  As stated above (note 34), there is good reason to think the Athenians were levying 
the dekate at Byzantium in the early 420s (see also Merkelbach 1970: 33).    
42 Merkelbach 1970: 33. 
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middle of the fourth century. Diogenes Laertius’ comment (3.28) that he poked fun at 
Plato places Anaxilias’ squarely in the fourth century, and his lampooning of 
Demosthenes’ Halonnesus politics indicates that he was still producing plays down to the 
340s.43  The earliest historical reference in his plays dates to the mid 370s (Fg. 39 
Edmonds), and thus there is a strong possibility that Glaucon postdates the King’s Peace.  
Indirect evidence for a fourth-century eikoste is furnished by the Lexica Segueriana’s 
gloss of dekate and eikoste mentioned above.  It is significant that these are annotated as 
taxes collected “from the islanders” (ἐκ τῶν νησιωτῶν).44  Why just from the 
islanders?  Because the source material from this part of the Lexica is taken from an 
anonymous work on legal terms (the so-called Δικῶν ὀνόματα), which overwhelming 
concerns fourth-century Athenian practices and procedures, it is reasonable to assume 
that this gloss derives from authentic historical material.45  The definition is explicable 
only if the historical source upon which the author of the Lexicon bases his annotation 
derives from the period after the King’s Peace, when Persia claimed the right to 
Clazomenae, Cyprus, and all the cities in Asia.  Prior to 387, the Athenians levied the 
eikoste on both the islanders and coastal poleis.  After this ime, the latter would have 
                                                
43 Brill’s New Pauly s.v. Anaxilias (Nesselrath). 
44 Recall that the scholium to Frogs 363 glosses εἰκοστολόγος as “he who collects the five percent taxes 
in a crisis; when the generals demanded the five percents from the harbors and the islands…”; cf. 
Demosthenes 18.234, Aeschines 2.71, and Xenophon, Poroi 5.6, who refer specifically to the allies of the 
Second Athenian Sea League as “the islanders.” 
45 This work cites only fourth-century orators (e.g. Aeschines) and historical figures (Eurybatus apud 
Aeschines 3.137) and gives annotations of terms, which make sense only in fourth and post-fourth century 
legal contexts.  For example, ἐπιστάτης is glossed as “a guardian of public funds and a superintendent of 
jurors” (φύλαξ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων καὶ ἐπιτηρητὴς τῶν δικαστῶν): as far as we can tell, the 
epistates never had judicial functions in the fifth or fourth centuries (see Athenaion Politeia 40 with Rhodes 
1981: 531-34). 
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been off limits to the Athenians but island states in the Aegean, such as Thasos, Paros, 
and Ceos, theoretically could have been taxed.46  I suspect that, unlike the fifth-century 
eikoste, the Athenians in the fourth century exacted it on an ad hoc basis.         
As for the dekate, two explicit references in the historical sources indicate that the 
Athenians continued to collect this tax after 387, though it is widely believed among 
historians that the Peace stipulated its terminatio.47  Shortly before Chares forced the 
Thracian king Cersobleptes to conclude a treaty more favorable to Athens in 357, 
Demosthenes recalls the outrageous terms Chabrias was compelled to accept concerning 
the Chersonesus: “Consider that he [Cersobleptes] claimed the right to collect the taxes 
and the ten-percents, and that again he kept talking as if the whole country was his, 
deeming it right that the tithe-collectors should be his own and in control of the taxes” 
( ἐνθυμεῖσθ’ ὅτι καὶ τέλη καὶ δεκάτας ἠξίου λαμβάνειν, καὶ πάλιν ὡς αὑτοῦ 
τῆς χώρας οὔσης τοὺς λόγους ἐποιεῖτο, τοὺς δεκατηλόγους ἀξιῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ 
                                                
46 It is unclear whether the imposition of the eikoste would have represented a breach of local autonomy 
and thus of the King’s Peace (see next note).  
47 Boeckh 1976: 326 and Stroud 1998: 83.  This idea implies that that the dekate was not only a belligerent 
measure but also an infringement upon the autonomia of the Greeks.  While there is much evidence to 
support the notion that the collection of the d kate was considered unjust, nothing indicates that the 
collection of a transit tax infringed a polis’ autonomy (no controversy, for example, is mentioned in the 
sources about transit taxes collected elsewhere, as in Corinth and Crisa; see Thucydides 1.13 and Strabo 
8.6.20, 9.3.4 with Cornford 1907: 34-5).  Indeed, the right to levy and collect taxes in one's territoy was a 
mark of a polis' autonomia, but this claim did not extend beyond a polis’ harbors (Hansen 1995: 26).  
Grants of autonomy in peace treaties only mention landed territory; see, for example, I. Priene 1.2-5; IG I3 
66, 11-2; IG II2 43, 10-12; Thucydides 2.71.2; 5.18.2.).  For instance, in a letter written to the city of Iasus 
ca. 300, Aristobolus swears that he will “guard the fre dom and autonomy of the people of Iasus, and allow 
the people of Iasus to collect their revenues—all of them from the city and the harbors” (διαφυλάξω τὴν 
ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτονομία τῷ δημῳ τῶν Ἰασέων, τὰς δὲ προσόδους ἐάσω Ἰασεῖς 
λαμβάνειν τὰς τῆς πόλεως πάσας καὶ τοὺς λιμένας) (IK Iasos 3, 13-15; cf. Milet III. 150, 40).  
Some sources call the collection of these commercial revenues “right” or “just” (δίκαιος) (IC III. iii 3A, 
66-72; IScM II. 67, 31ff., 68, 32ff.).  Thus, anyone who deprives a polis of these revenues can be said to be 
“acting unjustly” (ἀδικεῖν) (IK Iasus 3, 16).  In the famous treaty between Chaleion and Oianthea (ca. 
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τῶν τελῶν κυρίους εἶναι) (23.177).48  Given that the Athenians had not yet 
established cleruchies in the region, it is unlikely that these ten-percents Cersobleptes 
usurped from the Athenians were taxes on land or agriculture.  If however these ten-
percents were transit taxes, the use of the plural dekatai is puzzling.  Does the plural 
denote two or more than two?  The most parsimonious explanation is that dekatai refers 
to two ten-percents collected on goods moving into and out of the Pontus, as argued 
above.49  The main difference is that around 358 the Athenians were imposing this tax in 
the Hellespont off the coast of the Chersonesus, not at Chrysopolis or Byzantium as they 
had done previously.  By 364 Athens’ relationship wth Byzantium had soured, leading to 
the ally’s defection and open revolt in 357, a fact that explains well the relocation of the 
tax to the Chersonesus in the 350s.  That the Athenians had collected these taxes earlier 
than the 350s is evidenced in the naval records of 370/69, which state that the trireme 
Eudoxia “was given to the collectors of the ten percents” (τοῖς δεκατευταῖς ἐδόθη) 
(IG II2, 1609, 97).  While these references to do not necessarily imply that the dekatai 
were collected continuously from 391 to the early 350s, they nonetheless indicate that the 
Athenians did impose them when given the opportunity.50 
                                                                                                                                      
450), depredations of foreigners' goods “on the sea” are permitted, whereas seizures “from the harbor” are 
outlaws and  considered “unjust” (ἀδίκω) (GHI 34, 4-5). 
48 The τέλη of which he speaks are probably the customs dues from emporia, which in conjunction with 
revenues derived from ports elsewhere in eastern Thace fetched more than 200 talents a year (23.110). 
49 Stroud 1998: 83 makes this suggestion in relation to the “twin dekatai” (τὼ δεκάτ[.]) mentioned in the 
Athenian grain tax law of 374/3 (GHI2 26, 58-60).  Cf. Harris 1999: 269-70.         
50 Indirect evidence for a mid fourth-century dekate can be adduced from Chabrias’ advice (ca. 362-59) to 
the Egyptian King, Tachos, to levy a dekate on merchant ships as a method of raising cash (Ps.-Aristotle, 
Oeconomica 1350b34-1351b12).  Chabrias’ activities in the Chersonesus (Demosthenes 23.177) 
undoubtedly made him familiar with the benefits of such a tax system.  Indeed, he may have been 
responsible for levying the dekate in the Chersonesus in the first place.  As Will (cted in Davies 2004: 492-
3) provocatively suggests, Chabrias’ recommendations t  Tachos were part of a coherent and appropriate 
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No direct evidence exists for the reception of these taxes among the allies.  
However, we can infer a general negative attitude to the dekate from the Byzantines’ 
imposition of the tax.51  As discussed in Section 3C, when the Byzantines revolted from 
Athens after Epaminondas’ naval tour in 364, the Byzantines began to seize grain ships 
sailing through the Bosporus, forcing the merchants to pay a ten-percent on their goods, 
which caused consternation among them (τῶν ἐμπόρων ἀγανακτούντων) (Ps.-
Aristotle, Oeconomica 1346b30-5).  Because some of these merchants were bringing 
grain to Athens, the Athenians became indignant, no enjoying how the tables were 
turned on them.52  In the late third century, the Byzantines’ re-imposition of the dekate 
actually led to war with Rhodes: “The exaction by the Byzantines of a duty on goods 
brought from the Black Sea caused great loss and inconvenience to everyone.  There was 
general resentment and all the traders complained to the Rhodians…[and] the Rhodians 
were roused to action by their own losses as well as by those incurred by their 
neighbors.”53  The primary reason for these outrages over the dekate is that it necessarily 
involved the forceful escorting of ships in open waters to the harbor at Byzantium.  The 
general Greek phrase for this procedure is κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα, which was closely 
                                                                                                                                      
plan to apply money-raising techniques, which were developed in Athens, to the largely coinless economy 
of Egypt.    
51 For some suggestions about the reception of the eikoste, see Kallet 2001: 204 n. 80 citing Thucydides’ 
cynical reference to the newly-taxed allies as “subjects” in 7.28.4 and Heniochus Fg. 5 Edmonds. 
52 See, for example, Demosthenes 5.25; 45.64; 50.6, 17  
53 Polybius 4.47.1-3: μεγάλης δὲ γενομένης τῆς ἀλυσιτελείας καὶ δυσχρηστίας πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ 
τέλος πράττειν τοὺς Βυζαντίους τῶν ἐξαγομένων ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, δεινὸν ἡγοῦντο, καὶ πάντες 
ἐνεκάλουν οἱ πλοϊζόμενοι τοῖς Ῥοδίοις…Οἱ γὰρ Ῥόδιοι, συνεξεγερθέντες ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν 
σφετέραν βλάβην, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν πέλαςσφετέραν βλάβην…).   
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identified with piratical practices and considered unjust.54  Moreover, the Greeks did 
have a notion of the “freedom of the seas,” which banned such seizures on the open seas 
in peacetime.55  There may have also been a certain stigma attached to the Bosporus, 
which according to the myth of Jason and the Argonauts, the gods had opened for safe 
passage into the Black Sea.56   Thus, there is very good reason for considering the dekate 
an “extortion-toll,” as Boeckh calls it, or even what Gernet deemed a “state organized 
system of robbery.”57  These characterizations correspond well to Hasebroek’s judgment 
of Athenian thalassocracy as a form of “terrorisation” in which ships were methodically 
seized and inspected.58  Ships heading to friends and allies secured safe p ssage upon 
                                                
54 Harpocration s.v. κατάγειν τὰ πλοῖα: λέγεται ἀντὶ τοῦ λῄζεται [τοῦ βιάζεσθαι] καὶ κακοῦν, 
καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν τοὺς πλέοντας ὅποι βούλονται πλεῖν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα χωρία τοῖς λῃστεύουσι 
κατάγειν.  Aeschines 2.71-2: “they [the toddies of Chares] exacted sixty talents in contributions a year 
from the miserable islanders, and seizing merchant ships and Greeks on the open seas.  And instead of 
honor and the hegemony of Hellas, our city was infected with the name of Myonnesia [notorious pirates’ 
den] and a reputation for being pirates” (τοὺς μὲν ταλαιπώρους νησιώτας καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν 
ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα εἰσέπραττον σύνταξιν, κατῆγον δὲ τὰ πλοῖα καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκ τῆς 
κοινῆς θαλάττης. Ἀντὶ δὲ ἀξιώματος καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν τῆς 
Μυοννήσου καὶ τῆς τῶν λῃστῶν δόξης ἀνεπίμπλατο).  Cf. Amit 1965: Appendix 6, Ste Croix 
1972: 47 and Appendix 8, and Garnsey 1988: 143.  On the injustice of such actions, see Ps.-Aristotle, 
Oeconomica 1347b29-30 and Demosthenes 8.9, 28. 
55 Thucydides 4.118; 5.18.2; Andocides 3.19; Demosthenes 17.19-20; Isocrates 4.115; 8.20; Plutarch, 
Pericles 17; in general, see Seager 1969. 
56 Apollonius, Argonautica 2.604-6.  Incidentally, in the fourth century Jason was known for his role in 
clearing the seas of pirates (Cleidemus, FGrH 323 F 5). 
57 Boeckh 1976: 325 and Gernet 1909: 356; cf. Romstedt 1914: 33-4, who cites Beloch’s erroneous 
suggestion that the dekate was a League creation.  For the accusations of piracy against Chares, see 
Salmond 1996: 49-50. 
58 Hasebroek 1965: 143.  That is, the Athenians used th ir sea power not only to benefit financially but 
also as means to control the flow of grain and other vital resources to loyal and restive allies and eemy 
states.  Control of narrow straights such as the Bosporus or Hellespont was an important Athenian strategy 
(Miltner 1935: 10-11).  As Sealey puts it succinctly: “The peninsula [Hellespont] was well placed for 
guarding or disrupting the sea route along which the Pontic grain traveled” (1993: 76).  This policy was a 
old as the fifth century: “Wealth they alone of the Greeks and non-Greeks are capable of possessing.  If 
some city is rich in ship-timber, where will it distribute it without consent of the rulers of the sea?...In 
addition they forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use the sea.  
Furthermore, every mainland has either some projecting headland or an offshore island or a strait, so that it 
is possible for the rulers of the sea to put in there and to injure those dwell on the land” (Ps.-Xenophon, 
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payment of the tax; the cargoes of ships bounding for enemy territory or those carrying 
contraband were confiscated.59       
 
                                                                                                                                      
Athenaion Politeia).  One of the strategies of the Peloponnesian war s, in fact, to cut off the 
Peloponnesus from Sicilian and Italian grain (Thucydides 3.86.4; 6.90.3; cf. 1.120.2).  When Perdiccas of 
Macedon betrays Athens in 417/16 by joining the alliance of Argos and Sparta, “the Athenians blockaded 
Macedonia” (5.83.4).  Even in times of peace, control of the grain trade was critical for securing allegiance 
from the allies.  The inscription concerning Clazomenae (GHI2 18) is revealing in this respect because 
Athens grants the Clazomeneans, per their request, the right to import grain from cities according to the 
treaty (which demonstrates that it was uncertain whether these rights were automatic!).  That these policies 
were operative throughout the fourth century is evid nced by Isocrates 8.36 and Demosthenes 9.24-5 
especially: “All the generals who have ever set sail from your land raise money from the Chians, 
Erythraeans, from whatever people they can, I mean the Greeks of Asia Minor…And those who pay do not 
pay for nothing…No, they purchase for the merchants sailing from their harbors immunity from injury or
robbery, or a safe conduct for their own ships, or s mething of that sort.  They say they are granting 
benevolences.”  On the effectiveness of Athenian naval power in the mid fourth century, see Cawkwell 
1984.   
59 The procedure outlined in the Second Methone Decree (IG I3 61) is informative.  At lines 40-41, we 
learn that a Methonaean ship exporting grain from Byzantium is to be “free from injury” (ἀζέμιος), that is, 
as long as the Methonaeans follow the guidelines set forth in the decree.  The procedure is as follows: (i) 
the Methonaeans must first write ahead to the hellespontophylakes requesting the amount of grain to export 
prescribed by the decree; (ii) during this process the hellespontophylakes hall not prevent them from 
exporting the grain or allow anyone else (a Byzantine, e.g.) to prevent them; (iii) and even the ship all be 
ἀζέμιος.  Rubel’s translation of ἀζέμιος as “steuerfrei” (tax-free), makes little sense of the grammatical 
and logical sequence of this sentence (2001: 44).  The gloss that Suda s.v. gives for ἀζέμιος is the most 




Accame, S.  1941.  La lega ateniese del sec. IV A.C.  Rome. 
Adam, J.  1902.  The Republic of Plato.  2 vols.  Cambridge.    
Adams, C.D.  1912.  “Are the Political ‘Speeches’ of Demosthenes to Be Regarded as 
Political Pamphlets?”  TAPhA 43: 5-22. 
———.1905.  Lysias.  Selected Speeches.  New York.   
Adkins, A.  1976.  “Polupragmosune and ‘Minding One’s Own Business’: A Study in  
 Greek Social and Political Values.” CPh 71: 301-27. 
———.1972.  Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greec .  New York. 
———.1960.  Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values.  Oxford. 
van Alfen, P.  2002.  “The ‘Owls’ From the 1989 Syria Hoard, With A Review of Pre- 
 Macedonian Coinage in Egypt.” AJN 14: 1-57. 
———.2000.  “The ‘Owls’ From the 1973 Iraq Hoard.” AJN 12: 9-58. 
Althusser, L.  1971.  Lenin and Philosophy.  New York. 
Amit, M.  1965.  Athens and the Sea: A Study in Athenian Sea-Power.  Brussels. 
Anderson, J.K.  1982.  “Xenophon.” In T.J. Luce ed., Ancient Writers.  New York.   
———.1986.  “Xenophon at Corinth.”  In M. del Chiaro, ed., Corinthiaca.  Studies in 
 Honor of Darell A. Amyx.  Columbia, MS.   
———.1974.  Xenophon.  London. 
Andreades, A.M. 1933 (Greek original 1918).  A History of Greek Public Finance.   
 Cambridge, MA. 
Andreau, J.  2002.  “Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy.”  In  
 W. Scheidel and S. von Reden, eds. 
Andrewes, A.  1978.  “The Opposition to Pericles.” JHS 98: 1-8. 
Aperghis, G.G.  1998.  “A Reassessment of the Laurion Mining Lease Records.”  BCIS 
 42: 1-20. 
Archibald, Z., Davies, J., and Gabrielsen, V. eds.  2005.  Making, Moving and Making.  
 Oxford. 
 429 
Ardaillon, E.  1897.  Les mines du Laurium dans l’antiquité.  Paris. 
Audring, G.  1992.  Xenophon.  Ökonomische Schriften.  Berlin. 
Austin, A. and Vidal-Naquet, P.  1977.  Economic and Social History of Greece. 
Berkeley. 
Azoulay, V.  2004.  Xénophon et les graces du pouvoir.  Paris. 
Badian, E.  2004.  “Xenophon the Athenian.”  In C. Tuplin, ed.   
———.1995.  “The Ghost of Empire: Reflections on Athenian Foreign Policy in the 
Fourth Century B.C.”  In W. Eder, ed. 
Bakhtin, M.M.  1986.  Speech Genres and Other Late Essays.  Austin. 
———.1981.  The Dialogic Imagination.  Austin. 
Bakker, E.  2002.  “The Making of History: Herodotus’ Histories Apodexis.”  In E.  
Bakker, I. de Jong, and H. van Wees, eds.,  Brill’s Companion to Herodotus.  Leiden. 
———.1999.  “Homeric ΟΥΤΟΣ and the Poetics of Deixis.”  CPh 94: 1-19. 
Balot, R.  2006.  Greek Political Thought.  Oxford.     
———.2001.  Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens.  Princeton. 
Barker, E.  1960.  Greek Political Theory.  London. 
Bastable, C.F.  1927 (original publication 1892).  Public Finance.  New York. 
Baynes, N.H.  1955.  Byzantium: An Introduction to East Roman Civilization.  Oxford.  
Beloch, K.  1967 (German original 1914-27).  Griechische Geschichte.  4 vols.  2nd ed. 
Berlin. 
———.1884.  “Zur finanzgeschichte Athens. IV.”  RhM 39: 249-59. 
Bicknell, P.J.  1984.  “The Date of Timoleon’s Crossing to Italy and the Comet of 361 
B.C.” CQ 34: 130-4. 
Blamire, A.  2001.  “Athenian Finance, 459-404 B.C.” Hesperia 70: 99-126 
Bloch, D.  2004.  “The Date of Xenophon’s Poroi.” C&M 55: 5-16. 
Bloch, M. and Parry, J. eds.  1989.  Money and the Morality of Exchange.  Cambridge. 
Bloedow E. F.  1975.  “Corn Supply and Athenian Imperialism.”  AC 44: 20-29. 
Boeckh, A.  1976 (German original 1828).  The Public Economy of Athens.  New York.  
Bolkestein, H.  1958.  Economic Life in Greece's Golden Age.  Leiden.  
———.1939.  Wohltatigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum.  Utrecht. 
 430 
Bonner, R.  1923.  “The Commercial Policy of Imperial Athens.” CPh 18: 193-201. 
Bosworth, A.B.  1980.  A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander.  
Oxford. 
Boulding, K. and Mukerjee, T. eds. 1972.  Economic Imperialism.  Ann Arbor. 
Bourdieu, P.  1977.  Outline of a Theory of Practice.  Cambridge. 
Bradeen, D.W.  1964.  “Athenian Casualty Lists.” Hesperia 33: 16-62. 
Braund, D.  1994.  “The Luxuries of the Athenian Democracy.”  G&R 41: 41-48. 
Breitenbach, H.R.  1967.  “Xenophon von Athen.” In Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopädie 
 der Altertumswissenschaft IX A2: 1567-1928. 
Bresson, A.  2005. “Coinage and money supply in the Hellenistic Age.” In Z. Archibald,  
et al., eds. 
———.2000. La cité marchande.  Paris. 
Bringmann, K.  1965.  Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates.  Göttingen. 
Brun, P.  1983.  Eisphora-Syntaxis, Stratiotika.  Paris. 
Brunt, P.A.  1966.  “Athenian Settlements Abroad in the Fifth Century.” In E. Badian ed., 
Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg.  Oxford. 
Brunt, P.A. and Moore, J.M. eds.  1967.  Res Gestae Divi Augustus.  Oxford. 
Buchanan, J.  1962.  Theorika: A Study of Monetary Distributions to the Athenian  
Citizenry During the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.  New York.   
Bugh, G.  1988.  The Horsemen of Athens.  Princeton. 
Burford, A.  1969.  The Greek Temple Builders at Epidauros.  Toronto. 
Burke, E.M.  1992.  “The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to  
the Primitivist Model.”  TAPhA 122: 199-226.   
———.1985.  “Lycurgan Finances.”  GRBS 26: 251-64.   
———.1984.  “Eubulus, Olynthus, and Euboea.” TAPhA 114: 111-20. 
Busolt, G. and Swoboda, H.  1926.  Griechische Staatskunde.  Munich.   
Buttrey, T.V.  1984.  “Seldom What They Seem: the Case of the Athenian   
Tetradrachms.”  In W. Heckel and R. Sullivan eds., Ancient Coins of the Graeco-
Roman World: The Nickle Numismatics Papers. Waterloo, Ontario.  
———.1979.  “The Athenian Currency Law of 375/4.”  In Greek Numismatics and  
 431 
Archaeology.  Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson.  Wetteren. 
Cahill, N.  2002.  Household and City Organization at Olynthus.  New Haven. 
Cairnes, F.  1972.  Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry.  Edinburgh. 
Camp, J.  1986.  The Athenian Agora.  London. 
Caporaso, J and Levine, D.  1992.  Theories of Political Economy.  Cambridge.  
Cargill, J.  1995.  Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C.  Leiden. 
———.1983.  “IG II2 1 and the Athenian Cleruchy on Samos.” GRBS 24: 321-31. 
———.1982.  “Hegemony, not Empire: The Second Athenian League.” AncW 5: 91-102. 
———.1981.  The Second Athenian League.  Berkeley. 
Cartledge, P.  2002a.  “The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece.”  In W Scheidel  
and S. von Reden, eds.     
———.2002b.  “The Political Economy of Greek Slavery,” in Cartledge et al., eds.   
———.2001.  Spartan Reflections.  Berkeley.   
———.1997.  Introduction and notes to R. Waterfield.  165-229. 
———.1987.  Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta.  London. 
Cartledge, P. and Harvey, F. eds.  1985.  Crux: Essays in Greek history Presented to  
G.E.M. de Ste. Croix.  London. 
Cartledge, P., Cohen, E., and Foxhall, L. eds.  2002.  Money, Labour and Land.  London. 
Carter, L.B.  1986.  The Quiet Athenian.  Oxford. 
Casson, L.  1995.  “A Trireme for Hire (IS. 11.48).”  CQ 45: 241-5. 
———.1976.  “The Athenian Upper Class and New Comedy.”  TAPhA 106: 29-59. 
———.1971.  Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World.  Princeton. 
Cataudella, M.R.  1984.  “Per la Datazione dei Poroi: Guerre ed Eisphorai.”  Sileno 10: 
147-55. 
Cawkwell, G.L., 1984.  “Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century.”  CQ 34: 334-45. 
———.1981.  “Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy.”  JHS 101: 
40-55. 
———.1976.  “The Imperialism of Thrasybulus.” CQ 26: 270-7. 
———.1979a.  Xenophon.  A History of My Times.  Harmondsworth.  
———.1979b.  Review of Gauthier 1976.  CR 29: 17-19.  
 432 
———.1973.  “The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy.” CQ 23: 47-60.   
———.1963.  “Eubulus.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 83: 47-67. 
———.1962.  “Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund.” Mnemosyne 15: 377-83. 
Chambry, E.  1958.  Xénophon.  Revenus.  Paris. 
Christ, M.R.  1990.  “Liturgy Avoidance and Antidosis in Classical Athens.” TAPhA 120: 
147-69. 
Christesen, P.  2003.  “Economic Rationalism in Fourth-Century BCE Athens.” G&R 50:  
31-56. 
Chroust, A.  1965.  “Aristotle’s first literary effort.  The Gryllos, a lost dialogue on the 
nature of rhetoric.”  REG 78: 576-91.  
Clerc, M.  1979 (French original 1893).  Métèques Athéniens.  Paris. 
Cloché, P.  1934.  La politique etrangere d'Athenes de 404 a 338 avant Jesus-Christ.   
Paris. 
Cobet, C.G.  1858.  Novae lectiones quibus continentur observations criticae in  
scriptores graecos.  Leiden. 
Cohen, E.  2000.  The Athenian Nation.  Princeton. 
———.1992.  Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective.  Princeton. 
———.1973.  Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts. Princeton. 
Cohen, R.  1986.   “History and Genre.”  New Literary History 17: 203-218. 
Cole, T.  1991.  The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece.  Baltimore.   
Connor, W.R.  1992.  The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens.  Indianapolis.   
Conophagos, C.  1980.  Le Laurium antique.  Athens. 
Conrad, A. and Meyer, J.  1964.  The Economics of Slavery.  Chicago. 
Conte, G.  1994.  Genres and Readers: Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny’s Encyclopedia.   
Baltimore. 
———.1986.  The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other  
Latin Poets.  Ithaca. 
Cooper, A.B.  1978.  “The Family Farm in Greece.” CJ 73: 162-75. 
Cooper, J.M.  1980.  “Aristotle on Friendship.”  InA.O. Rorty ed., Essays on Aristotle’s   
Ethics.  Berkeley. 
 433 
———.1977.  “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship.” Rev. of Metaphysics 30: 619-48. 
Cope, M.  1973.  (original publication 1877).  The Rhetoric of Aristotle.  Rev. and  
ed. J.E. Sandys.  New York.  
Cornford, F.  1991 (original publication 1912). From Religion to Philosophy.     
Princeton. 
———.1907.  Thucydides Mythistoricus.  Philadelphia. 
Crosby, M.  1957.  “More Fragments of Mining Leases from the Athenian Agora.”  
Hesperia 26: 1-23. 
———.1950.  The Leases of the Laureion Mines.”  Hesperia 19: 189-312. 
———.1941.  “Greek Inscriptions.”  Hesperia 10: 14-30. 
Croiset, A. and Croiset, M.  1928-1947.  Histoire de la Littérature Grecque.  3 vols.  
Paris. 
Csapo, E. and Slater, W.  1994.  The Context of Ancient Drama.  Michigan. 
Cunnigham, J.K.  1967.  “The Silver Laurion.” G&R 14: 145-56. 
Dalton, G., ed.  1968.  Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies:  Essays of Karl 
Polanyi.  Garden City.  
Danzig, G.  2003.  “Apologizing for Socrates: Plato nd Xenophon on Socrates’ Behavior  
in Court.”  TAPhA 133: 281-321. 
Davenant, C.  1771.  The Political and Commercial Works.  5 vols.  London. 
David, P.A. et al. 1976.  Reckoning with Slavery: A Critical Study in the Quantit tive  
History of American Negro Slavery.  Oxford. 
Davidson, J.  1990.  “Isocrates Against Imperialism: An Analysis of the De Pace.”  
Historia 39: 20-36. 
Davies, J.K.  2004.  “Athenian Fiscal Expertise andIts Influence.” MediterrAnt 7: 491- 
512. 
———.2001.  “Temples, Credit, and the Circulation of Money.”  In A Meadows and K.  
Shipton eds. 
———.1998.  “Ancient economies: models and muddles.”  In H. Parkins and C.Smith   
eds.  
———.1981.  Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens.  New York. 
 434 
———.1971.  Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.  Oxford. 
Delebecque, E.  1957.  Essai Sur La Vie De Xénophon.  Paris. 
Dickey, L. 1993.  “Economics and Ethics in Smith’s Theory of Capital Accumulation.” 
In A. Smith An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  
Indianapolis. 
Diggins, J.P.  1984.  “The Oyster and the Pearl: The Problem of Contextualism in  
Intellectual History.” History and Theory 23:151-69. 
Dillery, J.  1995.  Xenophon and the History of His Times.  London. 
———.1993.  “Xenophon’s Poroi and Athenian Imperialism.” Historia 42:1: 1-11. 
Dindorf, L.  1866.  Xenophontis opuscula politica, equestria et venatica.  Oxford. 
Doty, R.  2003.  Poroi: A New Translation.  New York. 
Dover, K.  1980.  Plato: Symposium.  Cambridge. 
———.1974.  Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle.  Berkeley 
Dusanic, S.  1999.  “Isocrates, the Chian Intellectuals, and the Political Context of the 
 Euthydemus.”  JHS 119: 1-16. 
Eder, W., ed. 1995.  Die athenische Demokratie im 4.Jahrhundert v. Chr.  Stuttgart. 
Edmunds, L.  2001.  Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry.  Baltimore.   
Ehrenberg, V.  1962.  The World of Aristophanes.  New York.      
———.1960.  The Greek State.  Oxford. 
———.1947.  “Polypragosyne: A Study in Greek Politics.”  JHS 67: 46-67 
Ekman, E.  1933.  “Zu Xenophons Hipparchikos.”  Diss. Uppsala. 
Ellis-Jones, J.  1982.  “The Laurion Silver Mines.” G&R 29: 169-83. 
Engen, D.T.  2005.  “‘Athenian Greenbacks’: Athenian Owls, The Law of Nikophon, and 
the Greek Economy.”  Historia 54: 359-81.   
———.1996.  “Athenian Trade Policy, 415-307 B.C.: Honors and Privileges for Trade- 
Related Services.”  Diss. UCLA. 
Engles, D.  1990.  Roman Corinth.  Chicago. 
Erdkamp, P.  2001.  “Beyond the Limits of the ‘Consumer City’.” Historia 50: 332-56. 
Evans, J.A.S.  1991.  Herodotus.  Explorer of the Past.  Princeton.      
Faraguna, M.  1991.  Atene nell’ età di Alessandro.  Rome.    
 435 
Felson, N.  1999.  “Vicarious Transport: Fictive Deixis in Pindar’s Pythian Four.”  HSPh  
99: 1-31 
Ferguson, W.S.  1932.  The Treasurers of Athena.  Cambridge, MA. 
———.1913.  Greek Imperialism.  1913. 
Figueira, T.  1998.  The Power of Money.  Philadelphia. 
———.1991. Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization.  Baltimore. 
Fisher, N.R.E.  1994.  “Sparta Re(de)valued: Some Ath nian Public Attitudes to Sparta  
Between Leuctra and the Lamian War.”  In A Powell and S. Hodkinson, eds. 
Finley, M.I.  1999.  The Ancient Economy.  2nd ed.  Berkeley. 
———.1987.  Ancient History.  London. 
———.1982.  Economy and Society in Ancient Greece.  New York. 
———.1979.  The Bücher-Meyer Controversy.  New York.  
———.1978.  “Empire in the Greco-Roman World.”  G&R 25: 1-15. 
———.1970.  “Aristotle and Economic Analysis.”  Past and Present 47: 4-25. 
———.1969.  Aspects of Antiquity.  New York.  
———.1954.  The World of Odysseus.  New York. 
———.1952.  Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens, 500-200 B.C.  New  
Brunswick, N.J.  
Finley, M.I. ed.  1973.  Problèms de la terre en Gréce anciene.  Paris and the Hague.  
Fogel, R. and Engerman, S.  1974.  Time on the Cross.  Boston. 
Forde, S.  1989.  The Ambition to Rule.  Ithaca. 
Fowler, H.N.  1923.  A History of Ancient Greek Literature.  London. 
Fornara, C.  1977.  Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War.  Baltimore. 
———.1971.  Herodotus: An Interpretative Essay.  Oxford. 
Fox, R.L. ed.  2004.  The Long March.  Xenophon and the Ten Thousand.  New Haven. 
Foxhall, L.  and Forbes, H.A.  1982.  “SITOMETREI/A: The role of grain as a staple  
food in classical antiquity.” Chiron 12: 41-90 
French, A.  1991.  “Economic Conditions in Fourth-Century Athens.” G&R 38: 24-40. 
Frisch, H.  1942.  The Constitution of the Athenians.  Copenhagen. 
Frolov, E.  1973.  “Staat und Ökonomie im Lichte Schriftlicher Quellen des 4. 
 436 
Jahrhunderts v.u.Z.  zum Traktat des Xenophon ‘Über die Einkünfte’.”  In Jahrbuch 
für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 4: 175-89. 
Fuks, A.  1972.  “Isokrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece.”  AncSoc 3: 
17-44. 
Funke, P.  1980.  Homonoia und Arché.  Wiesbaden. 
Gabrielsen, V.  1994.  Financing the Athenian Fleet.  Baltimore. 
———.1981.  Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth Century B.C. Athens.  Odense. 
Gagarin, M.  1997.  Antiphon.  The Speeches.  Cambridge.  
———.1990.  “The Nature of Proofs in Antiphon.”  CPh 85: 22-32. 
Gallant, T.  1991.  Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece.  Stanford. 
Gallo, L.  1984.  Alimentazione e demografia della Grecia antica.  Salerno. 
Galpin, T.  1984.  “The Democratic Roots of Athenian Imperialism in the Fifth Century  
B.C.”  CJ 79: 100-09. 
Garlan, Y.  1988.  Slavery in Ancient Greece. Ithaca.     
Garland, R.  1987.  The Piraeus.  Ithaca. 
Garnsey, P.  1987.  Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World.  Cambridge. 
Garnsey, P., Hopkins, K., and Whittaker, C.R. eds.  1983.  Trade in the Ancient  
Economy.  London.  
Garnsey, P. and Whittaker, C. eds.  1978.  Imperialism in the Ancient World.  Cambridge. 
Gauthier, L.  1912.  La Langue de Xénophon.  Geneva. 
Gauthier, P.  1984.  “Le Programme de Xénophon dansles Poroi.” RPh 58: 181-99. 
———.1976.  Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon.  Paris. 
———.1973.  “A propos des cléròuques athéniennes du ve siècle.”  In M.I. Finley ed. 
———.1972.  Symbola: les etrangers et la justice dans les cites gr cques.  Nancy.  
Geertz, C.  1983.  Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology.  New  
York. 
Gehrke, H.J.  1986.  Jenseits von Athen und Sparta.  Munich. 
Genovese, E.  1965.  Political Economy of Slavery.  New York. 
Gera, D.  1993.  Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique.  Oxford. 
Gernet, L.  1955. Droit et societe dans la Grece ancienne.  Paris. 
 437 
———.1954.  Démosthène.  Plaidoyers Civils I.  Paris. 
———.1909.  L’approvisionment d’Athèns en blé au Ve et IVe siècle.  Paris.  
Giglioni, G. Bodei.  1970.  Xenophontis De Vectigalibus.  Florence. 
Glotz, G.  1926.  Ancient Greece at Work.  New York.    
———.1920.  Le travail dans la Grece ancienne.  Paris. 
Gomme, A.W.  1945-81.  A Historical Commentary on Thucydides.  5 vols. (vols. 4-5 by  
A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K.J. Dover).  Oxford. 
———.1933.  The Population of Ancient Athens.  Oxford.  
Graham, A.J.  1983.  Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece.  2nd ed.  Chicago. 
Gray, V. 2000.  “Xenophon and Isocrates.”  In C. Rowe and M Schofield eds. 
———.1998.  The Framing of Socrates.  Hermes Einzelschriften 79.  Stuttgart. 
———.1985.  “Xenophon’s Cynegeticus.”  Hermes 113: 156-172. 
Green, P.  1996.  “The Metamorphosis of the Barbarian: Athenian Panhellenism in a 
Changing World.”  In E. Harris and R. Wallace eds., Transitions to Empire.  Norman.   
———.1994.  “Text and Context in the Matter of Xenophon’s Exile.”  In I. Worthington   
ed., Ventures in Greek History.  Oxford.   
Griffith, G.T.  1978.  “Athens in the Fourth Century.”  In P Garnsey and C. Whittaker 
eds.   
Griffith, M.  1983.  Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound.  Cambridge. 
Grimaldi, W.  1988.  Aristotle, Rhetoric II : A Commentary.  New York. 
———.1980.  Rhetoric I: A Commentary.  New York. 
van Groningen, B. 1933. Le second livre de l'Economique.  New York. 
Grote, G.  1869.  A History of Greece.  12 vols.  London. 
Grundy, G.B.  1948.  Thucydides and the History of His Age.  2 vols. Oxford. 
Haakonssen, K. ed.  1994.  Hume: Political Essays.  Cambridge.  
Hagen, H.  1866.  “Über die angebkiche xenophontische Schrift von dem Einkünften.” 
Eos 2: 149-67. 
Hamilton, C.  1980.  “Isocrates, IGii 2, 43, Greek Propaganda and Imperialism.” Traditio 
36: 83-108. 
Hammond, M.  1948.  “Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications.”  HSPh 58:  
 438 
105-61. 
Hammond, N.G.L.  1986.  A History of Greece to 322B.C.  3rd ed.  Oxford. 
———.1937.  “Diodorus’ Narrative of the Third Sacred War.”  JHS 57: 44-78. 
Hands, A.R.  1968.  Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome.  Ithaca. 
Hansen, M.H.  2000.  “The Hellenic Polis.”  In M.H. ansen ed., A Comparative Study of  
Thirty City-State Cultures.  Copenhagen. 
———.1995.  “The ‘Autonomous City-State.’  Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction.”  In  
M.H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub eds.,  Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis.  Stuttgart. 
———.1991.  The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes.  Oxford. 
———.1985.  Demography and Democracy.  Herning, Denmark.  
———.1979.  “Misthos for Magistrates in Classical Athens.”  SO 54: 5-22. 
———.1978.  “Demos, Ecclesia, Dicasterion i  Classical Athens.”  GRBS 19: 127-46.     
Hansen, M.V.  1984.  “Athenian Maritime Trade in the 4th Century B.C. Operation and  
Finance.” C&M 35: 71-92 
Hanson, V.D.  1995.  The Other Greeks.  New York. 
———.1992.  “Thucydides and the Desertion of Attic Slaves during the Decelean  
War.”  ClAnt: 11: 210-28 
Harding, P.  1995.  “Athenian Foreign Policy in theFourth Century.”  Klio 77: 105-25. 
Harris, E.  2002.  “Workshops, marketplace and household: the nature of technical  
specialization in classical Athens and its influenc on economy and society.”  In P. 
Cartledge et al., eds.   
———.2001.  Rev. of Bresson 2000.  BMCR 2001.9.40.  
———.2000.  “The Authenticity of Andokides’ De Pace.  A Subversive Essay.”  In P. 
Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein eds.  Polis and Politics.  Studies in 
Ancient Greek History.  Copenhagen. 
———.1999.  “Notes on the New Grain-Tax Law.”  ZPE 128: 269-72. 
———.1996.  “Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund.”  In E. Harris and R. Wallace eds. 
———.1995.  Aeschines and Athenian Politics.  New York. 
———.1994.  Rev. of Migeotte 1992.  CR 44: 105-7. 
———.1988.  “When is a sale not a sale? The riddle of Athenian terminology for real  
 439 
security revisited.” CQ 38: 351-381. 
Harris, E. and Wallace, R. eds. 1996.  Transitions to Empire.  Norman.   
Harris, W.  1989.   Ancient Literacy.  Cambridge, MA. 
———.1979.  War and Imperialism in Republican Rome.  Oxford. 
Harrison, A.R.W.  1968-71.  The Law of Athens.  2 vols.  Oxford. 
Hartog, F.  1988 (French original 1980).  The Mirror of Herodotus.  Berkeley. 
Hasebroek, J.  1965 (German original 1928).  Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece.  New  
York. 
Havelock, E.  1982.  The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences.  
Princeton. 
———.1957.  The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics.  New Haven. 
Heap, S.H.  1993.  “Post-Modernity and New Conceptions of Rationality in Economics.”  
In B. Gerrard ed., The Economics of Rationality.  London.   
Hemelrijk, J.  1925.   Penia en ploutos.  Amsterdam. 
Henderson, W.  2000.  John Ruskin’s Political Economy.  London. 
Henry, A.S.  1983.   Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees.  Hildesheim. 
Henry, W.P.  1967.  Greek Historical Writing.  Chicago. 
Herman, G.  1987.  Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City.  Cambridge. 
Herzog, R.  1914.  “Zu Xenophons Poroi.”  In Festgabe Hugo Blümner.  Zurich.  469-80.  
Hewitt, J.W.  1927. “The Terminology of ‘Gratitude in Greek.”  CPh 22: 142-61. 
Higgins, W.E.  1977.  Xenophon the Athenian.  Albany.   
Hinds, S.  1998.  Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry. 
Cambridge.   
Hirsch, S.  1985.  The Friendship of the Barbarians.  Hannover. 
Hirschman, A.O.  1977.  The Passions and the Interests.  Princeton. 
Hobson, J.  1938 (original publication 1902).  Imperialism.  London. 
Hodkinson, S.  2000.  Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta.  London. 
———.1983.  “Land Tenure and Inheritance in Classical Sparta.”  CQ 36: 378-406. 
Hölkeskamp, K.  2004.  Rev. of M.H. Hansen 2000.  BMCR 2004.04.03.   
Holladay, A.J.  1977.  “Spartan Austerity.” CQ 27: 111-26. 
 440 
Holzapfel, L.  1882.  “Über die Abfassungszeit der m Xenophon zugeschriebenen  
Poroi.”  Philologus 41: 242-69 
Hopper, R.J.  1979.  Trade and Industry in Classical Greece.  London. 
———.1968.  “The Laurion Mines: A Reconsideration.”  BSA 63: 293-326.  
———.1961.  “The Mines and Miners of Ancient Athens.” G&R 8: 138-51. 
———.1953.  “The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.” BSA 48: 200-54. 
Hopkins, K.  1980.  “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire.”  JRS 70: 101-25.   
———.1978.  “Economic Growth and Towns in Classical Antiquity.”  In P. Abrams and 
E. Wrigley eds., Towns in Societies.  Cambridge. 
Hornblower, S.  2004.  “‘This was Decided’ (edoxe tauta): The Army as polis in  
Xenophon’s Anabasis—and Elsewhere.”  In R.L. Fox ed.   
———.1995.  “The Fourth Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides.”  JHS 115:  
47-68. 
———.1991-1996.  A Commentary on Thucydides.  2 vols.  Oxford. 
———.1982a.  Mausolus.  Oxford. 
———.1982b.  Rev. of J. Cargill 1981.  CR 32: 235-9. 
How, W. and Wells, J.  1928.  A Commentary on Herodotus.  Oxford. 
Howgego, C.  1995.  Ancient History From Coins.  London. 
Hudson-Williams, H.  1951.  “Political Speeches in Athens.”  CQ 1: 68-73. 
Humble, N.  2002.  “The Limits of Biography: The Case of Xenophon.”  In K. Sidwell  
ed., Pleiades Setting.  Essays for Pat Cronin on His 65th Birthday.  Cork. 
———.1997.  “Xenophon’s View of Sparta: A Study of the “Anabasis,” “ Hellenica,” 
“Respublica Lacedaemonium.”  Diss. McMaster University. 
Humphreys, S.  1978.  Anthropology and the Greeks.  London. 
Hunt, P.  1998.  Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians.  Cambridge. 
Hunter, L.W.  1927.  Aineiou Poliorketica (Aeneas on Siegecraft).  Revised by S.A.  
Handford.  Oxford.   
Hunter, V. and Edmondson, J. eds.  2000.  Law and Social Status in Classical Athens.   
Oxford. 
Iggers, G.  1958.  The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition.  Boston. 
 441 
Isager, S. and Hansen, M.H.  1975.  Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century.  
Odense. 
Isager, S. and Skydsgaard, E.  1992.  Ancient Greek Agriculture.  London. 
Ito, S.  1986.  “Pheidippos An Athenian Minder.  A Note on the Poletai Inscriptions.”  In 
H. von Kalcyk et al., eds., A Studien zur alten Geschichte. Siegfried Lauffer zum 70. 
Geburtstag.  Rome. 
Jacob, O.  1928.  Les Esclaves Public À Athènes.  Liege. 
Jacoby, F.  1949.  Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens.  Oxford. 
Jaeger, W.  1943-4.  Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.  3 vols.  Oxford.  
———.1940.  “The Date of Isocrates’ Areopagiticus and the Athenian Opposition.” In 
HSPh Suppl. Vol. 1. Athenian Studies Presented to William Scott Ferguson.  
Cambridge. 
———.1938.  Demosthenes.  The Origin and Growth of His Policies.  Berkeley. 
———.1934.  Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development.  Oxford. 
Jameson, M.H.  1978. “Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens.”  CJ 73: 122-45.  
Jardé, A.  1925.   Les cereales dans l'antiquite grecque.  Paris. 
Jasny, N.  1944.  The Wheats of Classical Antiquity.  Baltimore. 
Jebb, R.C.  1890.  Greek Literature.  New York.   
———.1876.  The Attic orators from Antiphon to Isaeos.  2 vols.  London. 
Johnston, S.  1994.  “Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style.”   
CPh 89: 219-40. 
Jones, A.H.M.  1957.  Athenian Democracy.  Oxford. 
———.1940.  The Greek City.  Oxford. 
Jones, J.E.  1975.  “Town and Country Houses of Attica in Classical Times.”  In H.  
Mussche and P. Spitaels eds. 
Kalcyk, H.  1982.  Untersuchungen zum attischen Silberbergbau.  Frankfurt. 
Kallet, L.  2001.  Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides.  Berkeley. 
Kallet-Marx, L.  1994.  “Money Talks: Rhetor, Demos, and the Resources of the  
Athenian Empire.”  In R. Osborne and S. Hornblower eds., Ritual, Finance, Politics.  
Oxford. 
 442 
———.1993.  Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24.   
Berkeley. 
———.1989.  “The Kallias Decree, Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian  
War.”  CQ 39: 93-113. 
Kanitz, J.D.  1873.  “De tempore et auctore libelli qu  inscribitur Poroi.” Diss. Gottingen. 
Kennedy, G.  1963.  The Art of Persuasion in Greece.  Princeton. 
———.1959.  “Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative Oratory.” TAPhA 90: 131- 
8. 
Keynes, J.M.  1936.  General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.  New York.   
Kitto, H. D. F. 1951.  The Greeks.  Baltimore. 
Knox, B.  1985.  “Book and Readers in the Greek World.”  In P. Easterling and B. Knox 
eds., The Cambridge History of Classical Literature.  Vol. 1.  Cambridge.  
Koebner, R and Schmidt, H.  1965.   Imperialism.  Cambridge.  
Konstan, D. 1997.  “The Greek Polis and Its Negations: Versions of Utopia in  
Aristophanes Birds.”  In G. Dobrov ed., The City as Comedy.  Chapel Hill. 
Knorringa, H.  1926. Emporos: Data on Trade and Trader in Greek Literatue From  
Homer to Aristotle.  Chicago. 
Kraay, C.  1976.  Archaic and Classical Greek Coins.  Berkeley. 
———.1968. Coins of Ancient Athens.  Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
Kroll, J.H.  2001.  “A Small Bullion Find from Egypt.”  AJN 13: 1-20. 
———.1993.  The Greek Coins.  Athenian Agora XXVI.  Princeton. 
———.1977.  “An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry.”  Hesperia 46: 83-140. 
———.1976.  “Aristophanes’ πονηρὰ χαλκία: A Reply.”  GRBS 17: 329-41 
Kroll, J. and Waggoner, N.  1984.  “Dating the earliest coins of Athens, Corinth and  
Aegina.”  AJA 88: 325-340. 
Kurke, L. 1999.  Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold.  Princeton.   
———.1991.  The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy.  Ithaca.  
Laforse, B.  1997.  “Xenophon and the History of Panhellenism.”  Diss. UT Austin. 
de Laix, R.A.  1973.  Probouleusis at Athens: A Study of Political Decision Making.  
Berkeley. 
 443 
Lalonde, G.V.  1991.  The Athenian Agora: Inscriptions, Horoi. Vol. XIX.  Princeton. 
Langdon, M.K.  1991.  The Athenian Agora: Inscriptions, Poletai Records.  Vol. XIX. 
Princeton. 
———.1987.  “An Attic Decree Concerning Oropos.” Hesperia 56: 47-58. 
Lange, G.  1931.  “Xenophons Verhältnis zur Rhetorik.” In R. Helm ed., Natalicium  
Johannes Geffcken.  Heidelberg. 
Lauffer, S.  1975.  “Das Bergbauprogram in Xenophons Poroi.”  In H. Mussche et al.,  
eds. 
———.1955-6.  Die Bergwerkssklaven von Laureion.  Wiesbaden.   
Leiwo, M.  and Remes, P.  1999.  “Partnership of Citizens and Metics: The Will of  
Epicurus.”  CQ 49: 161-6. 
Lenin, V.  1939 (Russian original 1917).  Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.   
New York.  
Lévy, E.  1976.  Athènes devant la défaite de 404.  Paris. 
Lewis, D.  1990.  “Public Property in the City.”  In O. Murray and S. Price eds. 
———.1973.  “The Athenian Rationes Centesimarum.” In M.I. Finley ed. 
Lipka, M.  2002.  Xenophon's Spartan Constitution: Introduction, Text, Commentary.   
Berlin. 
Loomis, W.T.  1998.  Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens.  Ann  
Arbor. 
———.1995.  “Pay Differentials and Class Warfare in Lysias’ Against Theozotides: Two  
Obols or Two Drachmas?”  ZPE 107: 230-237. 
Loraux, N.  1986.  The Invention of Athens.  Cambridge, MA. 
Loftus, A.  2000.  “A New Fragment of the Theramenes Papyrus (P. Mich. 5796b).”  ZPE  
133: 11-20. 
Love, J.R.  1992.  Antiquity and Capitalism.  Max Weber and the Sociological  
Foundations of Roman Civilization.  London.  
Lovejoy, A.O. and Boas, G.  1935.  Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity.  
Baltimore. 
Lowry, T.  1987.  The Archaeology of Economic Ideas.  Durham. 
 444 
Luccioni, J.  1953.  Xénophon et le socratisme.  Paris. 
———.1947.  Les Idees politiques et socials de Xénophon.  Paris. 
MacDonald, B.  1981.  “The Phanosthenes Decree.  Taxes nd Timber in Late Fifth- 
Century Athens.”  Hesperia 50: 141-146. 
MacDowell, D.M.  1986.  “The Law of Periandros about Symmories.”  CQ 36: 438-49. 
McKechnie, P.  1989.  Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century B.C.  London. 
MacLachlan, B. 1993.  The Age of Grace:  Charis in Early Greek Poetry.  Princeton. 
Macve, R.  1985.  “Some Glosses on Ste. Croix’s ‘Greek and Roman Accounting.”  In P.  
Cartledge and F.D. Harvey eds. 
Madvig, J.N.  1871.  Adversaria Critica.  Vol. 1.  Copenhagen. 
Mafaffy, J.P.  1880.  A History of Classical Greek Literature.  2 vols.  New York. 
Marchant, E.C.  1961.  Xenophontis Opera Omnia.  5 Vols.  Oxford.    
———.1925.  Xenophon: Scripta Minora.  London. 
———.1914.  Thucydides: Book I.  London. 
Marincola, J.  1999 “Genre, Convention, and Innovation in Greco-Roman 
Historiography.”  In C. Kraus ed., The Limits of Historiography.  Leiden. 
Markle, M.M.  1985.  “Jury Pay & Assembly Pay At Athens.”  In P. Cartledge and F.D.  
Harvey eds. 
Marshall, F.M.  1905.  The Second Athenian Confederacy.  Cambridge. 
Martin, R.  1984.  “Hesiod, Odysseus, and the Instruction of Princes.”  TAPhA 114: 29- 
48. 
Marx, K.  1977.  Capital.  Vol. 1.  B. Fowkes trans.  New York. 
Mathieu, G.  1925.  Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate.  Paris. 
Mattingly, D.J. and Salmon, J.  eds.  2001.  Economies Beyond Agriculture in the  
Classical World.  London.    
Mattingly, H.B.  1996.  The Athenian Empire Restored.  Ann Arbor. 
———.1964.  “The Financial Decrees of Kallias.”  Proceedings of the African Classical 
Association 7: 35-55.   
Mayhew, R.  1995.  “Aristotle on the Self-Sufficiency of the City.”  History of Political  
Thought 16: 488-502. 
 445 
McKechnie, P.  1989.  Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC.  London. 
Meadows, A and Shipton, K. eds. 2001.  Money and its Uses in the Ancient Greek World.   
Oxford. 
Meiggs, R.  1982.  Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World.  Oxford. 
———.1972.  The Athenian Empire.  Oxford. 
Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D.  1969.  A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions.  Oxford.  
Meikle, Scott.  1995.  Aristotle’s Economic Thought.  Oxford. 
———.1979.  “Aristotle and the Political Economy of the Polis.”  JHS 99: 57-73. 
Meritt, B.  1936.  “Greek Inscriptions.”  Hesperia 5: 355-430 
Merkelbach, R.  1970.  “Das Attische Dekret Fur Klazomenai Aus Dem Jahr 387.”  ZPE  
5: 32-6. 
Meyer, E.  1884.  Geschichte des Alterthums.  5 vols. Stuttgart. 
Migeotte, L.  1992.  Les Souscriptions Publiques Dans Les Cités Grecques.  G neva. 
———.1983.  “Souscriptions Athéniennes de la période classique.”  Historia 32: 129-48. 
Mill, J.S.  1904.  Principles of Political Economy.  2 vols.  London. 
Miller. S.G.  1978.  The Prytaneion.  Berkeley. 
Millett, P.  2001.  “Productive to some purpose?  The problem of ancient economic  
growth.”  In D.J. Mattingly and J. Salmon eds. 
———.1991.  Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens.  Cambridge. 
———.1983.  “Maritime loans and the structure of credit in fourth-century Athens.”  In 
P. Garnsey et al., eds. 
Michell, H.  1940.  The Economics of Ancient Greece.  Cambridge. 
Miltner, F.  1935.  “Die Meerengenfrage in der grieschischen Geschichte.”  Klio 28: 1-15. 
Mirhady, D.  1991.  “Non-Technical Pisteis in Aristotle and Anaximenes.”  AJPh 112:  
5-28.  
Missiou, A.  1992.  The Subversive Oratory of Andokides.  Cambridge. 
Mitchell, F.  1984.  “The Assessment of the Allies n the Second Athenian League.” 
EMC 28: 23-37.  
Mitscherling, J.  1982.  “Plato and Xenophon.”  CQ 32: 468-9.  
Momigliano, A.  1944.  “Sea-Power in Greek Thought.”  CR 58: 1-7. 
 446 
———.1932.  “Sull’ Aministrazione delle miniere del Laurio.” Athenaeum 10: 247-8. 
Monoson,  S.  1994.  “Citizen as Erastes: Erotic Imagery and the Idea of Reciprocity in 
the Periclean Funeral Oration.”  Political Theory 22: 253-76.   
Montgomery, H.  1986.  “Merchants fond of corn. Citizens and foreigners in the Athenian 
grain trade.”  SO 61: 43-61. 
Moore, J.M.  1986.  Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy.  Berkeley. 
Morley, N.  1996.  Metropolis and Hinterland.  Cambridge. 
Moreno, A.  2003.  “Athenian Bread-Baskets: The Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C. Re- 
Interpreted.”  ZPE 145: 97-106. 
Morpeth, N.A.  1982.  “Aristotle, Plato, and Self-Sufficiency.”  AncSoc 12: 34-46. 
Morris, I.  2002.  “Hard surfaces.”  In P. Cartledg et al. eds.     
———.2001.  “Remaining Invisible: The Archaeology of the Excluded in Classical  
Athens.”  In S. Joshel and S. Murnagham eds., Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman 
Culture.  London.    
———.1994.  “The Community Against The Market In Classical Athens.”  In C. Duncan  
and D. Tandy eds.,  From Political Economy to Anthropology.  Montreal. 
Morrow, G.  1993.  Plato’s Cretan City.  Princeton. 
———.1976.  Plato’s Law of Slavery.  New York.   
Morstein-Marx, R.  1985.  “Athens, Thebes, and the Foundation of the Second Athenian  
League.”  ClAnt 4: 127-51. 
Mossé, C.  1983.  “The ‘World of the Emporium’ in the private speeches of  
Demosthenes.”  In   P. Garnsey et al., eds. 
———.1973.  Athens in Decline, 404-86 B.C. London. 
———.1962.  La Fin De La Démocratie Athénienne.  Paris. 
Mosey, R.A.  1976.  “The Date of the Strato of Sidon Decree (IG II2 141).”  AJAH 1: 
182-9. 
Moyle, W.  1697.  A Discourse Upon Improving the Revenue of The State of Athens. 
London. 
Müller, K.O.  1971 (German original 1858).  A History of the Literature of Ancient  
Greece.  2 vols.  Port Washington, NY. 
 447 
Münscher, K. 1920.  Xenophon in der Griechische-Römischen Literatur.  Leipzig. 
Murray, G.  1957.  The Literature of Ancient Greece.  Chicago. 
Murray, O. and Price, S. eds.  1990.  The Greek City From Homer to Alexander.  Oxford. 
Mussche, H., Spitaels, P., and Goemaere, F. eds.  1975.  Thorikos and the Laurion in  
Archaic and Classical Times.  Miscellenea Graeca, Facs. 1.  Ghent. 
Nadon, C.  2001.  Xenophon’s Prince.  Berkeley. 
Nesselhauf, H.  1933.  Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der delisch-attischen Symmachie.  
Leipzig. 
Newell, W.R.  1981.  “Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus and the Classical Critique of  
Liberalism.”  Diss. Yale. 
Nickel, R.  1979.  Xenophon.  Darmstadt. 
Norden, E.  1971 (original publication 1909).  Die Antike Kuntsprosa.  Stuttgart. 
Norlin, G.  1931.  Rev. of F. Kleine-Piening, Quo tempore Isocratis Orationes quae  
ΠEPI EIPHNHΣ et APEOΠAΓITIKOΣ.  CPh 26: 209-10. 
Ober, J.  1998.  Political Dissent in Democratic Athens.  Princeton.   
———.1991.  “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class. Status, and Order in the Politics.” 
In C. Lord and D. O’Connor eds., Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political 
Science.  Berkeley.   
———.1989.  Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens.  Princeton. 
———.1985.  Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404-322 B.C.  
Leiden  
Oliver, J.H. 1968.  “The civilizing power: a study of the Panathenaic Discourse of 
Aelius Aristides.”   TPhS 58.1. 
———.1960.  Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World.  Baltimore.  
———.1953.  “The ruling power: a study of the Roman empire in the second century  
after Christ through the Roman oration of Aelius Aristides.”  TPhS 43.4. 
Ollier, F.  1959.  “Le renommée posthume de Gryllos, fil  de Xénophon.” BAGB: 425-37. 
———.1933-43.  Le mirage spartiate.  2 Vols.  Paris. 
Olson, D.  1991.  “Firewood and Charcoal in Classical Athens.”  Hesperia 60: 411-420. 
Osborne, R.  2002a.  “Pride and Predjudice, Sense ad Subsistence: Exchange and  
 448 
Society in the Greek City.”  In  W. Scheidel and S. von Reden eds.      
———.2002b.  Rev. of Cohen 2000.  CPh 97: 93-98.   
———.1995.  “Economics and Politics of Slavery at Athens.”  In A Powell ed., The  
Greek World.  London.   
———.1987.  Classical Landscape with Figures.  London. 
———.1985.  Demos, the Discovery of Classical Attika.  Cambridge. 
Ostwald, M.  1982.  Autonomia, Its Genesis and Early History.  Chico, CA. 
Parkins, H and Smith, C. eds.  1998.  Trade, Traders and the Ancient City.  London. 
Patterson, C.  2000.  “Athenian Justice: The Metic in Court,” in V. Hunter and 
J. Edmondson eds.  
Payrau, S.  1971.  “Eirenika.” REA 73: 24-79. 
Pearson, L.  1976.  The Art of Demosthenes.  Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 68.  
Meisenheim am Main.   
Pearson, W. and Polanyi, K. eds.  1957.  Trade and Market in the Early Empires.  New  
York. 
Pecírka J.  1982.  “Athenian Imperialism and the Athenian Economy.”  Eirene 19: 117- 
25. 
———.1976.  “The crisis of the Athenian Polis in the Fourth Century B.C.”  Eirene 14: 
5-29. 
———.1973.  “Homestead Farms in Classical and Hellenistic Hellas.”  In M.I. Finley ed. 
———.1967.  “A Note On Aristotle’s Conception of Citizenship and the Role of  
Foreigners in Fourth Century Athens.” Eirene 6: 23-6 
———.1966.  The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions.  Prague. 
Perlman, S.  1976.  “Panhellenism , the Polis and Imperialism.”  Historia 25: 1-30.   
———.1968.  “Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the 
Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.”  CPh 63: 257-67. 
Petrochilos, G.  2002.  “Kalokagathia: The Ethical Basis of Hellenic Political Economy 
and Its Influence from Plato to Ruskin and Sen.”  History of Political Economy 34: 
599-631. 
 449 
Picard, O.  2001.  “La decouverte des gisements du Laurion et debuts de la chouette,” 
RBN 147: 1-10. 
von Pöhlmann, R.  1984 (original publication 1925).  Geschichte der sozialen Frage und 
des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt.  Darmstadt. 
Polanyi, K.  1977.  The Livelihood of Man.  New York. 
———.1968.  “Aristotle Discovers the Economy.”  In Dalton ed.. 
———.1968. “The Economy As Instituted Process.”   In Dalton ed.. 
———.1946.  The Great Transformation.  London. 
Pomeroy, S.  1994.  Xenophon: Oeconomicus.  Oxford. 
Popper, K.  1963.  The Open Society and Its Enemies.  Vol. 1.  New York. 
Post, C.  2003.  “Plantation Slavery and Economic Development in the Antebellum  
Southern United States.”  Journal of Agrarian Change 3: 289-332. 
Powell, A.  1994.  “Plato and Sparta: Modes of Rule and of Non-Rational Persuasion in  
the Laws.”  In A. Powell and S. Hodkinson eds. 
Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S. eds.  1994.  The Shadow of Sparta.  London. 
Préaux, C.  1966.  “De la Grèce Classique à l’Égypte Hellénistique: Les Troupeaux  
‘immortels’ et les esclaves de Nicias.”  Chronique D’Égypte 41: 161-4.  
Pritchett, W.K.  1991.  The Greek State at War.  Vol. 5.  Berkeley.    
———.1971.   The Greek State at War.  Vol. 1.  Berkeley.    
———.1956.  “Attic Stelai: Part II.”  Hesperia 25: 178-328.   
———.1953.  “Attic Stelai: Part I.”  Hesperia 22: 225-99.   
Raaflaub, K.  2004 (German original 1985).  The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient  
Greece.  Chicago. 
———.1994.  “Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens.”  In P.  
Euben, J. Wallach, and J. Ober eds., Athenian Political Thought and the 
Reconstruction of American Democracy.  Ithaca.  
Rahn, P.  1981.  “The Date of Xenophon’s Exile.”  In G.S. Shrimpton and D.J.  
McGargar, eds., Classical Contributions: Studies in Honor of M.F. McGregor.  New 
York.   
Randall, R.  1953.  “The Erectheum Workmen.” AJA 57: 199-210. 
 450 
Rangabé, A.  1842.  Antiquités Helléniques.  2 vols.  Athens. 
Rankin, D.  1988.  “The Mining Lobby at Athens.” AncSoc 19: 189-205. 
Rathbone, D.  2002.  “The Ancient Economy and Greco-Roman Egypt.”  In W. Scheidel  
and S. von Reden eds. 
———.1991.  Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in 3rd Century B.C. Egypt.   
Cambridge. 
Raubitschek, A.E.  1948.  “The Case Against Alcibiades (Andocides IV).”  TAPhA 79: 
191-210. 
Raymond, J.  2003.  Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain. 
Cambridge. 
Reade, W.  1871.  The Martyrdom of Man.  In the Ex-Classics Web Site  
http://www.exclassics.com/martyrdom/mrtintro.htm (October 10, 2006). 
Redard, G.  1953.  Recherches sur χρή, χρῆσθαι: Etude Semantique.  Paris.     
Rihll, T.E.  2001.  “Making money in classical Athens.”  In D.J. Mattingly and J. Salmon 
eds. 
Rhodes, P.J.  1997.  The Decrees of the Greek City States.  Oxford. 
———.1982.  “Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies.” AJAH 7: 1-19. 
———.1981.  A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia.  Oxford. 
———.1980.  “Athenian Democracy After 403 B.C.” CJ 75: 305-23 
———.1972.  The Athenian Boule.  Oxford. 
Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, R.  2003.  Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404-323 BC.  
Oxford. 
Richards, H.  1907.  Notes on Xenophon and Others.  London. 
Robinson, E.S.G. and Price, M.J.  1967.  “An Emergency Coinage of Timotheos.”  NC 7: 
1-6. 
Rogers, B.B.  1919.  The Comedies of Aristophanes.  Vol. 5: The Frogs and 
Ecclesiazusae.  London.  
de Romilly, J.  1963 (French original 1947).  Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism.  
Oxford.     
———.1954.  “Les modérés Athéniens vers le milieu IVe siécle: échos et concordances.” 
 451 
REG 57: 327-54. 
Romstedt, M.  1914.  “Das wirtschaftliche Organisation des athenischen Riches.”  Diss.  
Universität Leipzig. 
Rood, T.  2004.  “Panhellenism and Self-Presentation: Xenophon’s Speeches.”  In R.L.  
Fox ed. 
Rose, H.J.  1934.  A Handbook of Greek Literature.  London. 
Rosenbloom, D.  2004.  “Poneroi vs. Chrestoi: The Ostracism of Hyperbolos and the  
Struggle for Hegemony in Athens after the death of Perikles, Part I.”  TAPhA 134: 55-
105.  
Rosenberg, N.  1994.  Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics, andHistory.  
Cambridge.  
Rosivach, V.  2000.  “Some Economic Aspects of the Fourth-Century Athenian Market in 
Grain.”  Chiron 30: 31-64.   
———.1993.  “Manpower and the Athenian Navy in 362 B.C.”  In R. Love et al., eds.,  
New interpretations in Naval History.  Annapolis.  
———.1991.  “Some Athenian Presuppositions about ‘The Poor’.”  G&R 38: 189-98. 
Rostovtzeff, M.  1941.  The Social & Economic History of the Hellenistic World.   
Oxford.  
Rowe, C. and Schofield, M. eds.  2000.  The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman  
Thought.  Cambridge. 
Rubel, A.  2001.  “Hellespontophylakes—Zöllner am Bosporus?  Uberlegungen zur  
Fiskalpolitik des attischen Seebundes (IG I3 61).”  Klio 83: 39-51.     
Rühl, F.  1912.  Xenophon. Scripta minora.  Leipzig. 
Ruschenbusch, E.  1987.  “Symmorieprobleme.”  ZPE 69: 75-81. 
———.1985. “Die trierarchischen Syntelien und das Vermögen der Synteliemitglieder.” 
ZPE 59: 240-249. 
———.1984. Die Bevölkerungszahl Griechenlands im 5. und 4. Jh. v. Chr.”  ZPE 56:  
55-57. 
———.1978.  “Die Athenischen Symmorien Des 4.Jh.V.Chr.”  ZPE 31: 275-84. 
 452 
Runciman, W.G.  1990.  “Doomed to Extinction: The Polis as an Evolutionary Dead-
End.”  In O. Murray and S. Price eds. 
Ruskin, J.  1907.  The Works of John Ruskin.  E.T. Cook and A. Wedderburn eds. 
London. 
Rusten, J.S.  1989.  Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War.  Book II.  Cambridge. 
Rutishauser, B.  2001.  “Island Strategies: The Case of Tenedos.” REA 103: 197-204. 
Ruzicka, S.  1998.  “Epaminondas and the Genesis of the Social War.” CPh 93: 60-9. 
Ryder, T.  1965.  Koine Eirene.  Oxford. 
Sagan. E.  1991.  The Honey and the Hemlock.  New York. 
Said, E.  1993.  Culture and Imperialism.  New York. 
de Ste. Croix, G.E.M.  1981.  The Class Struggle in the Ancient World.  London. 
———.1972.  The Origins of the Peloponnesian War.  Ithaca. 
———.1956.  “Greek and Roman Accounting.”  In A. Littleon and B. Yamey eds.,  
Studies in the History of Accounting.  Homewood, Il. 
———.1953.  “Demosthenes’ TIMHMA and the Athenian Eisphora in the Fourth  
Century B.C.”  C&M 14: 30-70. 
Saller, R.  2002.  “Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy.”  In W. 
Scheidel and S. von Reden eds.   
Sallares, R. 1991.  The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World.  London. 
Salmon, J.B.  1984.  Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC.  Oxford. 
Salmond, P.  1996.  “Sympathy for the Devil: Chares and Athenian Politics.”  G&R 43: 
43-53. 
Samuel, A.E.  1983.  From Athens to Alexandria: Hellenism and Social Goals in 
Ptolemaic Egypt.  Louvian. 
Sandys, J.  1924.  The First Philippic and the Olynthiacs of Demosthenes.  London. 
Schacht, H.  1890.  “De Xenophontis studiis rhetoricis.”  Diss.  Berlin  
Schaefer, A.  1966 (German original 1858-87).  Demosthenes und seine Zeit.  4 vols.  
Hildesheim. 
Scheidel, W. and von Reden, S., eds.  2002.  The Ancient Economy.  New York. 
Scheidel, W.  2005.  “Real Slave Prices and the Relativ  Cost of Slave Labor.”  AncSoc  
 453 
35: 1-17. 
Sherwin-White, S.M.  1982.  Rev. of Cargill 1982.  JHS 102: 269-71. 
Schmitt-Pantel, P.  1990.  “Collective Activities and the Political.”  In O. Murray and S. 
Price eds. 
Schmitz, W.  1988.  Wirtschaftliche Prosperität, soziale Intergration ud die  
Seebundpolitik Athens.  Munich. 
Schoell, R.  1890.  Anfänge einer politische Literatur bei den Griechen.  Munich. 
Schofield, M.  2000.  “Aristotle: An Introduction.”  In C. Rowe and M. Schofield eds.  
Schönert-Geiss, E.  1974.  “Die Geldzirkulation Attikas.”  Klio 56: 377-414. 
———.1973.  “Die Geldzirkulation Attikasim 4.Jh. v.u. Z.”  In E. Welskopf ed.,  
Hellenische Poleis.  Berlin. 
Schumpeter, J.  1959.  History of Economic Analysis.  New York. 
Schütrumpf, E.  1995.  “Politische Reformmodelle im vierten Jahrhundert.”  In W. Eder   
ed. 
———.1994.  “Aristotle on Sparta,” in Powell, A. and Hodkinson, S. eds. 
———.1982.  Xenophon Vorschläge zur Beschaffung von Geldmitteln oder Über die  
Staatseinkünfte.  Darmstadt. 
Schwahn, W.  1931.  “Die xenophonitische Poroi und die athenische Industrie im vierten  
Jahrhundert.”  RhM 80: 252-78. 
Scott, J.  1976.  The Moral Economy of the Peasant.  New Haven. 
Seaford, R.  1994.  Reciprocity and Ritual.  Oxford. 
Seager, R.  1967.  “Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C.”  JHS  
87: 95-115. 
———.1969.  “The Congress Decree: Some Doubts and a Hypothesis.”  Historia 18:  
129-141. 
Sealey, R.  1993.  Demosthenes and His Times.  Berkeley.   
———.1976.  A History of the Greek City States 700-338 B.C.  Berkeley. 
———.1956.  “Callistratos of Aphidna and his contemporaries.”  Historia 5: 178-203. 
———.1955.  “Athens After the Social War.”  JHS 75: 74-81. 
Sellars, J.  2003.  “Simon the Shoemaker and the Problem of Socrates.”  CPh 98:  
 454 
207-216. 
Sen, A.  2000.  Development as Freedom.  New York.   
———.1987.  On Ethics and Economics.  Oxford. 
Sherwin-White, S.M.  1982.  Review of Cargill 1982.  JHS 102: 269-71. 
———.1978.  Ancient Cos.  Göttingen. 
Shipton, K.  2001.  “Money and the Elite in Classical Athens.”  In A. Meadows and K. 
Shipton eds. 
———.2000.  Leasing and Lending: the Cash Economy in Fourth-century BC Athens.  
London. 
———.1998.  “The Prices of the Athenian Silver Mines.”  ZPE 120: 57-63. 
Shorey, P.  1930.  Plato.  The Republic.  London. 
Sickinger, J.  1999.  Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens.  Chapel Hill. 
Siewert, P.  “The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens.”  JHS 97: 102-11. 
Sinclair, R.K.  1988.  Democracy and Participation in Athens.  Cambridge. 
Simone de Sismondi, J.C.L.  1951.  Nouveaux Principes D’Économie Politique.  Paris. 
Skinner, Q.  1998.  “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action.”  In 
J. Tully ed., Meaning and Context.  Quintin Skinner and His Critics.  Princeton. 
———.1978. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought.  Vol. 1.  Cambridge. 
Smith, A.  1981.  An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  2  
vols. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, es. Indianapolis. 
Smith, M.  1998.  Debating Slavery: Economy and Society in the Antebellum American  
South.  Cambridge. 
Sombart, W.  1915.  The Quintessence of Capitalism.  London.  
Sommerstein, A.  1998.  Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae.  Warminster.   
———.1981.  Aristophanes: Knights.  Warminster. 
de Souza, P.  1999.  Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World.  Cambridge. 
Spengler, J.  1980.  Origins of Economic Thought and Justice.  Carbondale, Il. 
Stevens, E.B.  1933.  “Topics of Counsel and Deliberation in Prephilosophical Greek  
Literature.” CPh 28: 104-20 
Starr, C.  1988.  “Athens and Its Empire.”  CJ 83: 114-123.   
 455 
Strauss, B.  1986. Athens After the Peloponnesian War.  London.      
———.1984.  “Thrasybulus and Conon: A Rivalry in Athens i  the 390s B.C.” AJPh  
105: 37-48. 
Strauss, L.  2000 (original publication 1961).  On Tyranny.  Chicago.   
———.1968.  Liberalism Ancient and Modern.  Ithaca.   
Stroud, R.  1998.  The Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C.  Hesperia, Supplement 29 
Princeton.      
———.1974.  “An Athenian Law on Silver Coinage.”  Hesperia 43: 157-88. 
———.1971.  “Greek inscriptions. Theozotides and the Athenian orphans.”  Hesperia  
40: 280-301  
Tandy, D.  1997.  Warriors Into Traders.  Berkeley. 
Tatum, J.  1989.  Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus.  Princeton. 
Thiel, J.H.  1926.  “Zu altgriechische Gebühren.”  Klio 20: 62-7.    
———.1922.  “ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΠΟΡΟΙ.”  Diss. Amsterdam.  
Thesleff, H.  1978.  “The Interrelationship and Dates of the Symposiums of Plato and   
Xenophon.”  BICS 8: 79-84.    
Thomas, R.  1992.  Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece.  Cambridge. 
———.1989.  Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens.  Cambridge. 
Thomsen, R.  1977.  “War Taxes in Classical Athens.”  In  Armées et Fiscalité dans le  
Monde Antique.  Paris.  
———.1964.  Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens.  Copenhagen. 
Thompson W. E.  1982.  “The Athenian Entrepreneur.”  L’Antiquité Classique 51: 53-85. 
———.1978.  “The Athenian Investor.”  Rivista di Studi Classici 26: 403-423. 
———.1966. “The Functions of the Emergency Coinages of the Peloponnesian War.” 
Mnemosyne 19: 337-343. 
Tod, M.  1946.  A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions.  2nd ed.  Oxford. 
Todd, S.C.  2000.  Lysias.  Austin. 
———.1993.  The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford. 
Todorov, T.  1990.  Genres in Discourse.  Cambridge.   
Treves, P.  1937.  “Note Su La Guerra Corinzia.” Rivista di Filologia 15: 113-40.  
 456 
Trevett, J.  1996.  “Did Demosthenes publish his deliberative speeches?” Hermes 124: 
425-41. 
———.1996.  “Aristotle’s Knowledge of Athenian Oratory.”  CQ 46: 371-9. 
Tsetskhladze, G.  1998.  “Trade on the Black Sea in the Archaic and Classical Periods: 
Some Observations.”  In H. Parkins and C. Smith eds.
Tully, J. ed.  1988.  Meaning and Context.  Quintin Skinner and His Critics.  Princeton. 
Tuplin, C.  1993.  The Failings of Empire.  Historia Einzelschriften 76.  Stuttgart. 
———.1987.  “Xenophon’s Exile Again.”  In M. Whitby, P. Hardie, and Whitby, Mary  
eds., Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble.  Bristol.  59-68. 
Tuplin, C. ed.  2004.  Xenophon and His World.  Historia Einzelschriften Heft 172.   
Stuttgart. 
Underhill, G.E.  1900.  A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon.  Oxford. 
Ussher, R.G.  1973.  Aristophanes.  Ecclesiazusae.  Oxford. 
Vanhove, D.  1996.  “Aristotle et les mines du Laurion.”  AC 65: 243-9. 
Vannier, F.  1988.  Finances publiques et richesses privées.  Paris. 
Vasic. R.  1979.  “Some Observations on Euphranor’s ‘Cavalry Battle’.”  AJA83: 345-8. 
Vela Tejada, J.  1998.  Post H.R. Breitenbach: Tres Décades de estudios sobre Jenofonte  
(1967-1997).  Zaragoza. 
Velissaropoulos, J.  1980.  Les Nauclères grecs.  Geneva. 
———.1977.  “Le monde de l’emporion.”  DHA 3: 61-85. 
Veyne, P.  1990.  Bread and Circuses.  London. 
Vidal-Naquet, P.  1995.  Politics Ancient and Modern.  Cambridge, MA.  
———.1978.  “Plato’s Myth of the Statesman, The Ambiguity of the Golden Age and of 
History.”  JHS 98: 132-41. 
Vince, J.H.  1930.  Demosthenes.  Vol. 1.  Loeb Classical Library.  London. 
Viner, J.  1972.  The Role of Providence in the Social Order.  Princeton. 
Vivenza, G.  2001.  Adam Smith and the Classics.  Oxford. 
von der Lieck, K.  1933.  “Die xenophontische Schrift von den Einkünften.”  Diss. 
Cologne.  
Wade-Gery, H.T.  1945.  “Kritias and Herodes.”  CQ 39: 19-33. 
 457 
Walbank, F.  1957.  A Historical Commentary on Polybius.  Vol  1.  Oxford. 
Walbank, M.B.  1991.  The Athenian Agora: Inscriptions, Leases of Public Lands.  Vol.  
XIX.  Princeton. 
Wallace, R.  1986.  “The Date of Isokrates’ Areopagitikos,” HSPh 90: 77-84. 
Wartelle, A.  1968.  Aristote Économique.  Paris.  
Waterfield, R.  1997.  Xenophon. Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises.  London.   
Weber, M.  1978.  Economy and Society.  Berkeley. 
———.1976.  The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations.  London.  
———.1958.  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  New York. 
———.1947.  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.  Glencoe, Ill. 
———.1927.  General Economic History.  Glencoe, Ill. 
Weintraub, R.  2002.  “Neoclassical Economics.” In Library of Economics and Liberty.  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (May 16, 2007). 
West, M.  1978.  Hesiod, Works and Days.  Oxford. 
Westerman, W.  1955.  The Slaves Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity.  Philadelphia. 
———.1940.  “Athenaeus and the Slaves of Athens.” In HSPh. Suppl. Vol. 1. Athenian  
Studies Presented to William Scott Ferguson.  Cambridge. 
Westlake, H.D.  1952.  Timoleon and His Relations With Tyrants.  Manchester. 
Wheeler, M.  1955.  “Self-Sufficiency and the Greek City.”  Journal of the History of  
Ideas 16: 416-20. 
Whitby, M. 1998.  “Athenian Grain Trade in the Fourth Century BC.”  In H. Parkins and  
C. Smith eds.  
White, S.  1995.  “Thrasymachus the Diplomat.”  CPh 90: 307-27. 
Whitehead, D.  1990.  How to Survive Under Siege.  Oxford. 
———.1986.  The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca.250 B.C.  Princeton. 
———.1977.  The Ideology of the Athenian Metic.  Cambridge. 
Wiedemann, T.  1981.  Greek and Roman Slavery.  Baltimore. 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U.  1893.  Aristotles und Athen.  Berlin. 
Wilhelm, A.  1934.  “Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Poroi.” Wiener Studien 61: 18-56. 
Will, E.  1975.  “Fonctions de la monnaie dans les cités grecques de l'époque classique.” 
 458 
EAC 4: 233-246. 
———.1972.  Le monde grec et l’Orient I: Le Ve siècle.  Paris. 
———.1954.  “Trois Quartes de Siècle de Recherches Sur L’Économie Grecque  
Antique.”  Annales ESC 9: 7-22.  
Wilson, C.H.  1970.  “Athenian Military Finances, 378/7 to the Peace of 375.” 
Athenaeum 48: 302-26. 
Wood, E.M.  1983.  “Agricultural Slavery in Classical Athens.”  AJAH 8: 1-47 
Wood, E.  and Wood, N.  1978.   Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory.  Oxford. 
Wycherley, R.E.  1978.  The Stones of Athens.  Princeton. 
———.1974.  “The Stones of Athens.”  G&R  21: 54-67.  
Wyse, W.  1904.  The Speeches of Isaeus.  Cambridge. 
Yushi, M.  1998.  “Liberalism, Equal Status, and Human Rights.”  Journal of Democracy  
9.4: 20-23. 
Zevin, R.  1972.  “An Interpretation of American Imperialism.”  The Journal of  
Economic History 32: 316-60. 
Zimmern, A.  1928.  Solon, Croesus, and Other Greek Essays.  Oxford.   




Joseph Nicholas Jansen, the son of Ralph and Carol J nsen, was born on 
November 25, 1972 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he att nded Marquette University 
High School.  Upon graduating in 1991, he entered the University of Wisconsin-
Madison.  He majored in history and classical humanities, wrote a senior honors thesis on 
Philo of Alexandria, and earned his B.A. with Distinction in 1995.  He reentered the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison in the fall of 1996 to pursue graduate work in ancient 
history.  After completing a master’s thesis on Xenophon’s Oeconomicus and Leon 
Battista Alberti’s Della Famiglia, he received his M.A. in 1998.  He entered the 
University of Texas at Austin in 1999 to earn a doctorate in Classics.  His main fields of 
study were Greek and Roman historiography, archaic and classical Greek history, and the 
ancient economy.  In the spring semester of 2005, he began his dissertation research with 
funding from the William J. Battle Graduate Fellowship.  During the 2005-2007 
academic years, he was an instructor at Rhodes College in Memphis.  In August 2007, he 
will join the Department of Greek and Roman Studies at Rhodes College as an Assistant 
Professor. 
 
Permanent address: 367 Green Acres Road, Memphis, TN 38117 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
